This is an important post and a topic to easily undervalued is the approach is misunderstood. The integration of intelligent robotics and autonomous systems (IRAS) within each element of the MAGTF is not aimed to replace Marines. Rather, through a capabilities centric approach the ability to accomplish METs in each functional area are greatly enhanced given the proper integration of a family of uncrewed systems. In many ways the development is parallel to the foundations of the MAGTF's creation. Important in out history is CMC Shepherd in 1954 put forth the first bulletin outlining the creation of the MAGTF concept to enhance amphibious operations predicated on the inclusion of organic aviation capabilities within a task organized formation with a single commander over the constituent subordinate elements. Also important was Shepherd was envisioning a warfighting concept with nascent technologies, namely the helicopter, being employed from ships that did not yet exist. A very forward leaning and arguably controversial concept at the time both internal to the USMC and for the Navy. That concept took 8 years and a lot of refinement, to include the conversion of Navy shipping (CVE-90 to CHHA-1 in 1956), to finally be accepted in doctrine through CMC Shoup's signing of MCO 3120.3. Since that point, the MAGTF has evolved over the years providing a responsive "all arms" expeditionary formation -though "all arms" just with Shepherd's original bulletin has never been prescriptive.
The integration of IRAS in inline with the spirit of enhancing the combined arms capabilities of the MAGTF. Particularly with aerial robotics. Where the "A" in MAGTF is the binding element and typical reason why commanders fight to keep the MAGTF together, organic aerial systems become the lower-case "a" for ground formations. These systems augment the ACE and give ground commanders flexibility to provide internal ISR and striking capabilities that give options to maneuver like Marines have never had before -the systems also contribute to "saving the sortie" for crewed platforms where they are needed most. The rub rests in the DOTMLPFP requirements to integrate the at scale throughout the total force.
Quick Example: The training areas on our bases were designed predominantly between 1941-1943 for a force equipped with the weapons and tactics of the time. Yet the systems being employed today extend the operational reach of squads and platoons many times beyond the length of Camp Lejeune. Further, Group-1 systems are treated procedurally the same as crewed aircraft -greatly restricting how they can be used tactically due to not yet updated methods of airspace integration. This is not to mention spectrum fratricide as well as storage and maintenance shortfalls. *With all these current barriers it would be easy to understand why the Company Gunny says "leave that crap back in the rear." We have to get beyond this point smartly to realize what 21st Century Combined Arms truly means.
Last point and most important point -manpower. Current conflict is showing the increased specialization in training to employ any number of systems is required to achieved outsized effects of formations employing IRAS. We have created the 7316 PMOS (sUAS Operator) that trains Marines to employ aerial systems within infantry formations. They are trained within AITB, SOI-East along side and very much integrated with the other advanced infantry courses across the battalion. They spend the majority of their time in the field learning what it takes to put a sensor or munition in time and space to achieve a ground scheme of maneuver. As I am sure many have seen the videos coming out of Ukr showing these systems destroying tanks or locating and correcting surface indirect fires -what we dont see is the level of training to both operate and maintain the attritable mesh networks and data linkages to accomplish those tasks. Our Marines are doing that type of training today. It is quite impressive to see what a infantry platoon grounded in combined arms can achieve when given the tools to make their craft even more deadly to an enemy.
So again, it's not about replacing people and there are many challenges to overcome. But that is no different than what our Corps did to make itself better under the guidance of previous Commandants that first envisioned the utility of the MAGTF from the very birth of the concept.
This is an important post and a topic to easily undervalued is the approach is misunderstood. The integration of intelligent robotics and autonomous systems (IRAS) within each element of the MAGTF is not aimed to replace Marines. Rather, through a capabilities centric approach the ability to accomplish METs in each functional area are greatly enhanced given the proper integration of a family of uncrewed systems. In many ways the development is parallel to the foundations of the MAGTF's creation. Important in out history is CMC Shepherd in 1954 put forth the first bulletin outlining the creation of the MAGTF concept to enhance amphibious operations predicated on the inclusion of organic aviation capabilities within a task organized formation with a single commander over the constituent subordinate elements. Also important was Shepherd was envisioning a warfighting concept with nascent technologies, namely the helicopter, being employed from ships that did not yet exist. A very forward leaning and arguably controversial concept at the time both internal to the USMC and for the Navy. That concept took 8 years and a lot of refinement, to include the conversion of Navy shipping (CVE-90 to CHHA-1 in 1956), to finally be accepted in doctrine through CMC Shoup's signing of MCO 3120.3. Since that point, the MAGTF has evolved over the years providing a responsive "all arms" expeditionary formation -though "all arms" just with Shepherd's original bulletin has never been prescriptive.
The integration of IRAS in inline with the spirit of enhancing the combined arms capabilities of the MAGTF. Particularly with aerial robotics. Where the "A" in MAGTF is the binding element and typical reason why commanders fight to keep the MAGTF together, organic aerial systems become the lower-case "a" for ground formations. These systems augment the ACE and give ground commanders flexibility to provide internal ISR and striking capabilities that give options to maneuver like Marines have never had before -the systems also contribute to "saving the sortie" for crewed platforms where they are needed most. The rub rests in the DOTMLPFP requirements to integrate the at scale throughout the total force.
Quick Example: The training areas on our bases were designed predominantly between 1941-1943 for a force equipped with the weapons and tactics of the time. Yet the systems being employed today extend the operational reach of squads and platoons many times beyond the length of Camp Lejeune. Further, Group-1 systems are treated procedurally the same as crewed aircraft -greatly restricting how they can be used tactically due to not yet updated methods of airspace integration. This is not to mention spectrum fratricide as well as storage and maintenance shortfalls. *With all these current barriers it would be easy to understand why the Company Gunny says "leave that crap back in the rear." We have to get beyond this point smartly to realize what 21st Century Combined Arms truly means.
Last point and most important point -manpower. Current conflict is showing the increased specialization in training to employ any number of systems is required to achieved outsized effects of formations employing IRAS. We have created the 7316 PMOS (sUAS Operator) that trains Marines to employ aerial systems within infantry formations. They are trained within AITB, SOI-East along side and very much integrated with the other advanced infantry courses across the battalion. They spend the majority of their time in the field learning what it takes to put a sensor or munition in time and space to achieve a ground scheme of maneuver. As I am sure many have seen the videos coming out of Ukr showing these systems destroying tanks or locating and correcting surface indirect fires -what we dont see is the level of training to both operate and maintain the attritable mesh networks and data linkages to accomplish those tasks. Our Marines are doing that type of training today. It is quite impressive to see what a infantry platoon grounded in combined arms can achieve when given the tools to make their craft even more deadly to an enemy.
So again, it's not about replacing people and there are many challenges to overcome. But that is no different than what our Corps did to make itself better under the guidance of previous Commandants that first envisioned the utility of the MAGTF from the very birth of the concept.
LtCol T.L. Hord