The objective use of IRAS is additive to current combined arms methods through a capability centric approach. Specifically for aerial robotics, the procedural use and developing TTPs can be found within MCRP 3-10.3. Marines throughout the NCO/SNCO Corps are doing what they do best and are innovating in ways that make their squads and platoons more capable -at this point it is on the institution to keep up with them as none of this is conceptual and hasnt been for many years.
The USMC work with sUAS is a very bright spot that seems to currently be in a phase analogous to the post WWI phase of CAS development. For those that don't know, IRAS is Intelligent Robotics and Autonomous Systems and MCRP 3-10.3 is the Small Unmanned Aircraft System Operations (SUAS) reference manual.
I blew past it in my morning readings but I believe the Air Force discontinued experimental airborne directed energy programs against drones. Mean while we need 0811’s!!
The UAS of all sizes, shapes, speed and so forth have added to the lethality of the battle space and the Ukrainian conflict has demonstrated that both Russian and Ukrainian militaries can adapt very quickly to the devasting changes these weapons provide. A very small high speed drone with a small shaped charge of some sort can break through and hit the back side of T-82 and render it useless if not destroy it in total. But that drone equally has limitations. This all said, Artillery is still the king of battle, the images coming from the eastern edges of the battlefield in Ukraine are starkly reminiscent of the images from the Battle of Somme. Perhaps FW Close Air Support will become a relic, but given the choice of fast movers with a Marine flying it, one might will opt for the CAS, just in case…We keep hearing the new thinkers tell us that the old thinking is dead, but we keep seeing the old thinking and order of battle being used full force on a conventional battlefield using new and unconventional weapons to augment the conventional maneuver units. The ground is drying out, the Russians are pressing from the east to west, they are pressing abet slowly from the north to the south. Tank weather is coming. Drones from both sides will be involved. The evolution will continue but at a lot slower pace than many would like to think. In the meantime we need the artillery tubes back, and or imagine engineers helping the infantry to field craft a drone that can blast, blind and burn a hardened position. Fire is an under utilized weapon. The M202 was great when it worked. Imagine having a drone with that sort of capability close in. It would be good to have the engineers up with the infantry now wouldn’t it…was just looking for the Marine with the det cord and C4 oh that’s right, we don’t have any engineers today now do we…old thinking…guilty as charged…
Charles, If you have several hours this 130 page document can be pulled up online. “The more things change the more they stay the same.” So the current changes in the tools of war are simply another page or chapter that began with the jaw bone of an ass. A guy named Samson mentioned in Judges 15:16 reportedly killed a thousand men w one. Now that is old think.
I thoroughly love this post and this topic. Maybe I am biased towards this area, and if the audience will allow me, I’ll take this narrow introductory focus and expand it as to why I think sUASs, drones, swarms, and automation in general will continue to be more important.
First, a controversial take from the 50,000’ view: I think manned fighter/attack aircraft should be a thing of the past. Much like the internal combustion replaced the cavalry horse (in spite of the romanticized view of the knight on horseback) and much like the aircraft carrier replaced the battleship (in spite of the emphasis placed on more armor, heavier displacement, and bigger deck guns in the early 20th century), I think the fighter pilots can and should be replaced, regardless of their enduring romanticized cultural image. Even in a close air support role, most modern high-performance FW aircraft are designed to drop guided munitions from 3-20+ miles away. They are not optimized for engaging with direct-fire weapons, in the way that RW aircraft can. When it comes to air defense, a robust Ground Based Air Defense (GBAD) has always been more successful against enemy air forces than small elements of fighter aircraft. (Battles of Britain, Midway, and Marianas/Philippine Sea being the few exceptions - each with their own caveats and GBAD support.)
So even if FW CAS becomes a thing of the past, as cannon artillery is, the infantry still needs ordnance dropped from above in order to create the desired combined arms effects. I think drones of varying size and at scale are the right answer. From the Ukrainian sUAS that drops a hand grenade from <100’, to loitering munitions like the Switchblade that can pack-carried and launched from a 81mm mortar tube, to clusters and swarms of autonomous drones with anywhere from 5-50 lbs of high-explosive/incendiary, to guided rocket artillery to help shape the deep fight, to cruise missiles that can take the place of naval bombardment ISO amphibious operations, these are the wave of the future.
The Russians view tubed artillery as more a vulnerability than an enabler. The Ukrainians have increased their ask for rocket artillery while decreasing their ask for 155. The Marine Corps has reduced from 16 cannon batteries to 5. And the army is divesting of towed artillery. So I think cannon artillery in general is becoming a thing o the past, whether people want it to or not.
My friend, it is obvious you have never been involved in a close-battle fight with a large and determined enemy as I and others on this site have. I know this because you dismiss as passé the only weapons system except mortars that can bring high volumes of fire on that enemy in any weather condition and at distances as short as “danger close.” Similarly, it does not appear that you have ever needed to call for smoke rounds to screen your unit’s movement because rockets do not have that capability. Neither are they able to fire illumination. And before you dismiss illumination with all the night vision devices on the modern battlefield know that the Ukrainians use it regularly. I was about to relate numerous personal experiences calling these sorts of fires and the feeling of laying in the dirt with enemy small-arms rounds cracking overhead and friendly artillery HE rounds dropping 100 meters to the front, but I imagine you get the picture without any vivid descriptions.
And, as a final note, please check your sources more carefully. Having participated in a recent US Army artillery conference I can attest to the fact that the Army has no intention of lessening its cannon artillery, just the opposite.
The United States Marine Corps is the only military service divesting itself of cannon artillery. Force Design 2030 called for the divestment of 14 of the 21 batteries in the active force; arguably the greatest mistake in the history of the Marine Corps. Marine infantry cannot fight, win, and survive the close and rear battles without adequate cannon artillery support. The U.S. Army continues to invest in cannon artillery, now and into the future. See: https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2024/05/armys-future-artillery-may-include-wheeled-howitzers-automated-cannons-and-long-range-mortars/396641/.
Only cannon artillery provides Marine infantry the close, continuous, accurate, all-weather fire support needed to locate, close with, and destroy the enemy. Rockets are great for reinforcing fires. Rockets and missiles are great for shaping and supporting the deep battle. Rockets and missiles are also expensive and hard to replenish, which will significantly limit their availability in an extended fight.
Folks often confuse towed artillery with cannon artillery. Towed artillery definitely has its limitations and is being replaced by wheeled and self-propelled artillery by various militaries. Whether towed, motorized, or self-propelled, cannon artillery remains the “King of Battle.” It is irreplaceable on the modern battlefield.
Jeff, I don't think your references bore out your assertion. None more so than the RUSI article you linked. One highlight from the article: "However, Russian attacks are often preceded by extensive indirect fire; Russia's ammunition consumption and accounts from Ukraine both support this argument. Recent reports indicate that 70% of Ukraine's casualties are a result of artillery fires. It is clear that despite challenges, Russian artillery is having a significant impact on the Ukrainian armed forces and delivering effects through a combination of innovative tactics and technology, as well as reliance upon its traditional doctrine.".
The article goes on to state the following in it's conclusion: "The evidence from Ukraine suggests that Russian forces have combined both approaches: the use of UAVs, radar and precision munitions indicates that accuracy is essential for certain tasks, but attaining the weight of fires remains critical." It was the way in which the Russians employ tubed artillery fires that was the change.
Also, all reports indicate that both the Russians and Ukrainians maintain infinite appetite for more artillery ammunition. With respect to the Ukrainian ask, I think the cause may be that they are getting more surgical in their asking, rather than asking for everything. I suspect their losses of modern western rocket systems to maintenance or damage, as a percentage of their relatively low inventory, cause them to ask for more of these systems to replace and increase that inventory. We know they already have a lot of tube artillery.
Jeff, If the demand for artillery is waning why is the US increasing its production of 155 mm rounds from 15,000 rounds a month last year and expected to produce 100,000 rounds a month next year?
That's an interesting way to put it; "their demand is waning". Taken as a percentage of an entire force, then you may be on to something, especially with emerging systems vying for their share of the budget. Taken as waning demand in it's entirety, I don't think so. As a cost efficient, effective way of providing mass fires effects over time, it's hard to replace. Artillery is basically a mature ballistic launch, high velocity, min-post launch guidance, EW/DE resistant, high payload sUAS using a durable and reusable launcher if we look at it using a hyper-modern perspective. (*cFrog is good, no sir needed. Semper Fi)
UAV's have there role I believe, but no more than any other platform that causes the enemy to plan around or against. I do not want my side of the chess board full of Knights and pawns or only a multitool in my toolbox.
A pawn still has to be planned for just as vice-grips have their place.
Jeff, tube artillery is one of the topics covered here at CP. Tube artillery is 24/7 rain or shine and contributes more in suppressive fires on a continual basis. True, MLRS/Katushya fire is suppressive but just for that salvo. In Ukraine they are firing at WWII rates. I do agree that for the most part towed arty is on the way out. It's good for airmobile hip-shoots/raids. Myself I like the Humvee Hawkeye mobile 105mm.
IDF “Mows the Grass w Combined Arms” vice FOBs. “Israel Is Succeeding in Gaza
Western analysts think otherwise, because they are seeing Israel’s war through the lens of America’s own failed counterinsurgency doctrines
BY
ANDREW FOX
MAY 22, 2024
Smoke plumes from an explosion billow in the Gaza Strip, as seen from Israel's southern border with the Palestinian territory on May 21, 2024, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas
JACK GUEZ/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES
As the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducts another assault in the north of Gaza, they face significant criticism from Western officials and analysts who are asking why the IDF is repeatedly going into areas they have already cleared and conducting further operations. Critics claim this behavior reflects a flaw in operational design, or is even proof that Israel’s campaign against Hamas has failed. The flaw, however, lies in their own assumptions.
These critics are looking at IDF tactics through the lens of Western counterinsurgency (COIN), the doctrine that U.S. and European militaries applied in the failed campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the “global war on terror,” Western tactics were to seize a chunk of territory and clear it of enemies through military force. The plan was then to hold the territory through forward operating bases (or FOBs) and try to conduct alternative governance in those areas while providing security. The system of FOBs meant that our enemies, embedded in the local civilian population, always knew where we were and what routes we were likely to use. They could mortar, rocket, and IED us at will. It was a recipe for endless violence and huge numbers of casualties.
In the case of the 2023-24 Gaza war, Western critics have almost comically misunderstood what the Israeli military is trying to do. The flaw in Western analysis is always the same: “We wouldn’t do it that way.” Yet the IDF has absolutely no intention of using the clear-hold-build COIN tactics the West tried in Afghanistan and Iraq. Why would it? Those tactics were an unmitigated disaster in both campaigns, which ended in humiliating defeats at the hands of technologically inferior armies.
COIN tactics are time consuming and costly. They also require huge troop levels …”
The objective use of IRAS is additive to current combined arms methods through a capability centric approach. Specifically for aerial robotics, the procedural use and developing TTPs can be found within MCRP 3-10.3. Marines throughout the NCO/SNCO Corps are doing what they do best and are innovating in ways that make their squads and platoons more capable -at this point it is on the institution to keep up with them as none of this is conceptual and hasnt been for many years.
The USMC work with sUAS is a very bright spot that seems to currently be in a phase analogous to the post WWI phase of CAS development. For those that don't know, IRAS is Intelligent Robotics and Autonomous Systems and MCRP 3-10.3 is the Small Unmanned Aircraft System Operations (SUAS) reference manual.
I blew past it in my morning readings but I believe the Air Force discontinued experimental airborne directed energy programs against drones. Mean while we need 0811’s!!
The UAS of all sizes, shapes, speed and so forth have added to the lethality of the battle space and the Ukrainian conflict has demonstrated that both Russian and Ukrainian militaries can adapt very quickly to the devasting changes these weapons provide. A very small high speed drone with a small shaped charge of some sort can break through and hit the back side of T-82 and render it useless if not destroy it in total. But that drone equally has limitations. This all said, Artillery is still the king of battle, the images coming from the eastern edges of the battlefield in Ukraine are starkly reminiscent of the images from the Battle of Somme. Perhaps FW Close Air Support will become a relic, but given the choice of fast movers with a Marine flying it, one might will opt for the CAS, just in case…We keep hearing the new thinkers tell us that the old thinking is dead, but we keep seeing the old thinking and order of battle being used full force on a conventional battlefield using new and unconventional weapons to augment the conventional maneuver units. The ground is drying out, the Russians are pressing from the east to west, they are pressing abet slowly from the north to the south. Tank weather is coming. Drones from both sides will be involved. The evolution will continue but at a lot slower pace than many would like to think. In the meantime we need the artillery tubes back, and or imagine engineers helping the infantry to field craft a drone that can blast, blind and burn a hardened position. Fire is an under utilized weapon. The M202 was great when it worked. Imagine having a drone with that sort of capability close in. It would be good to have the engineers up with the infantry now wouldn’t it…was just looking for the Marine with the det cord and C4 oh that’s right, we don’t have any engineers today now do we…old thinking…guilty as charged…
Charles, If you have several hours this 130 page document can be pulled up online. “The more things change the more they stay the same.” So the current changes in the tools of war are simply another page or chapter that began with the jaw bone of an ass. A guy named Samson mentioned in Judges 15:16 reportedly killed a thousand men w one. Now that is old think.
A SHORT HISTORY OF WAR © The Evolution of Warfare and Weapons
AD-A255 111 —
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SEP 1 1992
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Professional Readings in Military Strategy, No. Five
Richard A. Gabriel and
Karen S. Metz
Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College
Thanks for your comments I recommend themerge.com as a source for the evolution of the evolutionary trends in the “means” element of strategy.
I’m a fan of themerge
Super …..now the rest of MCCP can ck it out.
I thoroughly love this post and this topic. Maybe I am biased towards this area, and if the audience will allow me, I’ll take this narrow introductory focus and expand it as to why I think sUASs, drones, swarms, and automation in general will continue to be more important.
First, a controversial take from the 50,000’ view: I think manned fighter/attack aircraft should be a thing of the past. Much like the internal combustion replaced the cavalry horse (in spite of the romanticized view of the knight on horseback) and much like the aircraft carrier replaced the battleship (in spite of the emphasis placed on more armor, heavier displacement, and bigger deck guns in the early 20th century), I think the fighter pilots can and should be replaced, regardless of their enduring romanticized cultural image. Even in a close air support role, most modern high-performance FW aircraft are designed to drop guided munitions from 3-20+ miles away. They are not optimized for engaging with direct-fire weapons, in the way that RW aircraft can. When it comes to air defense, a robust Ground Based Air Defense (GBAD) has always been more successful against enemy air forces than small elements of fighter aircraft. (Battles of Britain, Midway, and Marianas/Philippine Sea being the few exceptions - each with their own caveats and GBAD support.)
So even if FW CAS becomes a thing of the past, as cannon artillery is, the infantry still needs ordnance dropped from above in order to create the desired combined arms effects. I think drones of varying size and at scale are the right answer. From the Ukrainian sUAS that drops a hand grenade from <100’, to loitering munitions like the Switchblade that can pack-carried and launched from a 81mm mortar tube, to clusters and swarms of autonomous drones with anywhere from 5-50 lbs of high-explosive/incendiary, to guided rocket artillery to help shape the deep fight, to cruise missiles that can take the place of naval bombardment ISO amphibious operations, these are the wave of the future.
I was not aware that tube artillery is a weapon of the past.
The Russians view tubed artillery as more a vulnerability than an enabler. The Ukrainians have increased their ask for rocket artillery while decreasing their ask for 155. The Marine Corps has reduced from 16 cannon batteries to 5. And the army is divesting of towed artillery. So I think cannon artillery in general is becoming a thing o the past, whether people want it to or not.
https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-artillery-war-ukraine-challenges-and-innovations
https://www.forbes.com/sites/vikrammittal/2023/01/09/from-strength-to-vulnerability-the-decline-of-russian-artillery-in-the-ukraine-war/?sh=1d0dc8d0651c
https://news.usni.org/2020/03/23/new-marine-corps-cuts-will-slash-all-tanks-many-heavy-weapons-as-focus-shifts-to-lighter-littoral-forces
https://www.thedefensepost.com/2024/04/01/us-army-towed-artillery/
Jeff,
My friend, it is obvious you have never been involved in a close-battle fight with a large and determined enemy as I and others on this site have. I know this because you dismiss as passé the only weapons system except mortars that can bring high volumes of fire on that enemy in any weather condition and at distances as short as “danger close.” Similarly, it does not appear that you have ever needed to call for smoke rounds to screen your unit’s movement because rockets do not have that capability. Neither are they able to fire illumination. And before you dismiss illumination with all the night vision devices on the modern battlefield know that the Ukrainians use it regularly. I was about to relate numerous personal experiences calling these sorts of fires and the feeling of laying in the dirt with enemy small-arms rounds cracking overhead and friendly artillery HE rounds dropping 100 meters to the front, but I imagine you get the picture without any vivid descriptions.
And, as a final note, please check your sources more carefully. Having participated in a recent US Army artillery conference I can attest to the fact that the Army has no intention of lessening its cannon artillery, just the opposite.
The United States Marine Corps is the only military service divesting itself of cannon artillery. Force Design 2030 called for the divestment of 14 of the 21 batteries in the active force; arguably the greatest mistake in the history of the Marine Corps. Marine infantry cannot fight, win, and survive the close and rear battles without adequate cannon artillery support. The U.S. Army continues to invest in cannon artillery, now and into the future. See: https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2024/05/armys-future-artillery-may-include-wheeled-howitzers-automated-cannons-and-long-range-mortars/396641/.
Only cannon artillery provides Marine infantry the close, continuous, accurate, all-weather fire support needed to locate, close with, and destroy the enemy. Rockets are great for reinforcing fires. Rockets and missiles are great for shaping and supporting the deep battle. Rockets and missiles are also expensive and hard to replenish, which will significantly limit their availability in an extended fight.
Folks often confuse towed artillery with cannon artillery. Towed artillery definitely has its limitations and is being replaced by wheeled and self-propelled artillery by various militaries. Whether towed, motorized, or self-propelled, cannon artillery remains the “King of Battle.” It is irreplaceable on the modern battlefield.
Jeff, I don't think your references bore out your assertion. None more so than the RUSI article you linked. One highlight from the article: "However, Russian attacks are often preceded by extensive indirect fire; Russia's ammunition consumption and accounts from Ukraine both support this argument. Recent reports indicate that 70% of Ukraine's casualties are a result of artillery fires. It is clear that despite challenges, Russian artillery is having a significant impact on the Ukrainian armed forces and delivering effects through a combination of innovative tactics and technology, as well as reliance upon its traditional doctrine.".
The article goes on to state the following in it's conclusion: "The evidence from Ukraine suggests that Russian forces have combined both approaches: the use of UAVs, radar and precision munitions indicates that accuracy is essential for certain tasks, but attaining the weight of fires remains critical." It was the way in which the Russians employ tubed artillery fires that was the change.
Also, all reports indicate that both the Russians and Ukrainians maintain infinite appetite for more artillery ammunition. With respect to the Ukrainian ask, I think the cause may be that they are getting more surgical in their asking, rather than asking for everything. I suspect their losses of modern western rocket systems to maintenance or damage, as a percentage of their relatively low inventory, cause them to ask for more of these systems to replace and increase that inventory. We know they already have a lot of tube artillery.
Sir, I’m not sayin that cannons can’t be effective. But I do think their demand is waning, both domestically and internationally.
Jeff, If the demand for artillery is waning why is the US increasing its production of 155 mm rounds from 15,000 rounds a month last year and expected to produce 100,000 rounds a month next year?
That's an interesting way to put it; "their demand is waning". Taken as a percentage of an entire force, then you may be on to something, especially with emerging systems vying for their share of the budget. Taken as waning demand in it's entirety, I don't think so. As a cost efficient, effective way of providing mass fires effects over time, it's hard to replace. Artillery is basically a mature ballistic launch, high velocity, min-post launch guidance, EW/DE resistant, high payload sUAS using a durable and reusable launcher if we look at it using a hyper-modern perspective. (*cFrog is good, no sir needed. Semper Fi)
UAV's have there role I believe, but no more than any other platform that causes the enemy to plan around or against. I do not want my side of the chess board full of Knights and pawns or only a multitool in my toolbox.
A pawn still has to be planned for just as vice-grips have their place.
Jeff, tube artillery is one of the topics covered here at CP. Tube artillery is 24/7 rain or shine and contributes more in suppressive fires on a continual basis. True, MLRS/Katushya fire is suppressive but just for that salvo. In Ukraine they are firing at WWII rates. I do agree that for the most part towed arty is on the way out. It's good for airmobile hip-shoots/raids. Myself I like the Humvee Hawkeye mobile 105mm.
IDF “Mows the Grass w Combined Arms” vice FOBs. “Israel Is Succeeding in Gaza
Western analysts think otherwise, because they are seeing Israel’s war through the lens of America’s own failed counterinsurgency doctrines
BY
ANDREW FOX
MAY 22, 2024
Smoke plumes from an explosion billow in the Gaza Strip, as seen from Israel's southern border with the Palestinian territory on May 21, 2024, amid the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas
JACK GUEZ/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES
As the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducts another assault in the north of Gaza, they face significant criticism from Western officials and analysts who are asking why the IDF is repeatedly going into areas they have already cleared and conducting further operations. Critics claim this behavior reflects a flaw in operational design, or is even proof that Israel’s campaign against Hamas has failed. The flaw, however, lies in their own assumptions.
These critics are looking at IDF tactics through the lens of Western counterinsurgency (COIN), the doctrine that U.S. and European militaries applied in the failed campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the “global war on terror,” Western tactics were to seize a chunk of territory and clear it of enemies through military force. The plan was then to hold the territory through forward operating bases (or FOBs) and try to conduct alternative governance in those areas while providing security. The system of FOBs meant that our enemies, embedded in the local civilian population, always knew where we were and what routes we were likely to use. They could mortar, rocket, and IED us at will. It was a recipe for endless violence and huge numbers of casualties.
In the case of the 2023-24 Gaza war, Western critics have almost comically misunderstood what the Israeli military is trying to do. The flaw in Western analysis is always the same: “We wouldn’t do it that way.” Yet the IDF has absolutely no intention of using the clear-hold-build COIN tactics the West tried in Afghanistan and Iraq. Why would it? Those tactics were an unmitigated disaster in both campaigns, which ended in humiliating defeats at the hands of technologically inferior armies.
COIN tactics are time consuming and costly. They also require huge troop levels …”
Cast your nets widely. The LVT got its inspiration from a swamp rescue vehicle in the late 30's.
Cfrog…
Thanks frog