Compass Points – First Battle, Next War
Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan
Compass Points – First Battle, Next War
Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan
Marine Colonel Mark Cancian (ret) has led the production of a masterful wargame report about China invading Taiwan. The executive summary begins:
CSIS developed a wargame for a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan and ran it 24 times. In most scenarios, the United States/Taiwan/Japan defeated a conventional amphibious invasion by China and maintained an autonomous Taiwan. However, this defense came at high cost. The United States and its allies lost dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, and tens of thousands of servicemembers. Taiwan saw its economy devastated. Further, the high losses damaged the U.S. global position for many years. China also lost heavily, and failure to occupy Taiwan might destabilize Chinese Communist Party rule. Victory is therefore not enough. The United States needs to strengthen deterrence immediately.
The 165 page report is worth reading in its entirety, including his comments below about the usefulness of Marine Littoral Regiments.
Congratulations to Colonel Cancian and to the whole CSIS team who have created such a thorough and professional wargame and report.
Center for Strategic & International Studies
(csis.org) 1/9/23
The First Battle of the Next War:
Wargaming a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan
By Mark E. Cancian, Matthew Cancian, & Eric Heginbotham
. . . Although these units [MLRs and MDTFs] could contribute to the fight, neither played heavily in most scenarios. The problems of operating inside the Chinese defensive zone were insurmountable. In several games, the U.S. player tried to move an MLR onto Taiwan by air or sea, but in all cases the unit and transportation assets were destroyed while trying to transit the extensive Chinese defensive zones.301 In most scenarios, political assumptions prevented any U.S. forces from being pre-positioned on Taiwanese or Philippine territory before the conflict begins. (See Chapter 4 for a description of the base case assumptions and above for a recommendation on verifying war plan assumptions.) However, one scenario assumed that that the United States was willing to risk provocation by putting U.S. forces onto Taiwan, whether because Chinese mobilization generated sufficient concern, or the U.S.-China relationship had changed. In this scenario, before hostilities began, an MLR deployed from Okinawa with its load of missiles and one reload, augmenting the shore-based fires of Taiwanese Harpoons. The NSM’s 100-nautical-mile range could easily enable attacks on Chinese amphibious ships from Taiwan. Assuming that the MLR deployed with a load of 72 NSMs on 18 launchers, modeling showed that the MLRs would sink an average of five major Chinese amphibious ships. Because of the MLR’s ability to conduct distributed operations, it was assumed to be survivable in the face of Chinese counteraction. However, resupply proved impossible. A resupply mission of C-17s escorted by fighters attempted to break through the Chinese CAP but was shot down. After that, no further attempts were made at resupply. The MLR became a ground infantry battalion, augmenting the 114 combat battalions of the Taiwanese ground forces.
. . . Ground units will not provide a significant volume of fire. A squadron of bombers armed with long-range cruise missiles has a greater volume of fire than an entire MLR but without the challenges of transportation and logistics. Ground-based anti-ship units must either deploy with a large number of missiles before the conflict begins or act as forward sensors for long-range air and naval power. Similar stories emerged from MLR deployments to the western Ryukyus and Philippines. In one scenario, the MLR was prepositioned in the western Ryukyus. In that location, it could attack Chinese naval forces that moved north of Taiwan, but resupply was deemed too risky. In another scenario, an MLR moved onto the Philippine islands north of Luzon. There, it could attack Chinese forces that moved south of Taiwan, but again resupply was impossible, limiting its value.302 All game iterations had an MLR and Army MDTF on Hawaii available for deployment by airlift, but no U.S. player called them forward. Instead, the U.S. player gave priority to Patriot battalions, which could add to the air defense of threatened airfields. These were needed because of repeated Chinese air and missile attacks. Therefore, the project team recommends continuing to develop land-based forces to counter Chinese air and naval capabilities but also the need to recognize their employment challenges. While these new formations were more useful than traditional ground forces, multiplying these specialized units has limited value because only the first few can be deployed successfully. Others will sit unused. The maximum number is probably two or three. The acquisition of long-range ground-launched missiles might overcome this limitation. If ground launched Tomahawks have a similar range to their Vertical Launch System (VLS) counterparts, they could be employed from peacetime bases on Okinawa without moving in the Chinese defensive zone.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/first-battle-next-war-wargaming-chinese-invasion-taiwan
Looks like I need to do a lot of homework. Seems important to dig into the 165 page report. Lots of hard work has gone into it. One wonders just what the benefits of stranding US Marine units on/in Littoral Zones has to the Corps. It seems a defensive posture, far afield from the mission of the Corps. The last time I checked, our mission had not changed too much from "Seize, occupy and defend advanced navy bases" or whatever the modern iteration of that mission is today. I have read Senator Cotton's report on The Fighting Culture of the United States Navy Surface Fleet. It was quite stark that we are not prepared for a peer navy engagement. How would this surface Navy logistically support the Marines? Sounds like Wake Island redux.
The scenarios all revolve around a fight over Taiwan where missiles with a range of 100 miles can actually contribute something, however minor, to the fight. Where else across the vast expanses of the S China Sea do any Chinese ships need to come into range of a 100 mile missile if they wish to avoid it before other Chinese assets have destroyed it, its launchers and crew? If these 100 mile missiles on modified trucks were so potent I am certainly wondering why the Taiwanese would not just buy a few hundred? Should the scenario perhaps have placed these units even closer to the Chinese mainland earlier. I suspect the scenario would reveal their destruction in the earliest stages. After all how do they defend themselves?
The very concept that the MAGTF should sink ships with anything but aircraft is fantasy. Tanks tend to lose direct fire duals with ships with guns. Dunkirk, Sicily etc. Of course, they were not designed to duel with ships.
Nor has the M777 laid claim be being a ship killer. I would further ask for some data on the M-777’s in Ukraine being inferior to the Russian artillery despite ammunition shortages.
Before anyone gets excited about the 100 mile range of the missile we might want to review the ranges of ground launched missiles starting with the V-1, V-2 and subsequent developments.