Looks like I need to do a lot of homework. Seems important to dig into the 165 page report. Lots of hard work has gone into it. One wonders just what the benefits of stranding US Marine units on/in Littoral Zones has to the Corps. It seems a defensive posture, far afield from the mission of the Corps. The last time I checked, our mission had not changed too much from "Seize, occupy and defend advanced navy bases" or whatever the modern iteration of that mission is today. I have read Senator Cotton's report on The Fighting Culture of the United States Navy Surface Fleet. It was quite stark that we are not prepared for a peer navy engagement. How would this surface Navy logistically support the Marines? Sounds like Wake Island redux.
The scenarios all revolve around a fight over Taiwan where missiles with a range of 100 miles can actually contribute something, however minor, to the fight. Where else across the vast expanses of the S China Sea do any Chinese ships need to come into range of a 100 mile missile if they wish to avoid it before other Chinese assets have destroyed it, its launchers and crew? If these 100 mile missiles on modified trucks were so potent I am certainly wondering why the Taiwanese would not just buy a few hundred? Should the scenario perhaps have placed these units even closer to the Chinese mainland earlier. I suspect the scenario would reveal their destruction in the earliest stages. After all how do they defend themselves?
The very concept that the MAGTF should sink ships with anything but aircraft is fantasy. Tanks tend to lose direct fire duals with ships with guns. Dunkirk, Sicily etc. Of course, they were not designed to duel with ships.
Nor has the M777 laid claim be being a ship killer. I would further ask for some data on the M-777’s in Ukraine being inferior to the Russian artillery despite ammunition shortages.
Before anyone gets excited about the 100 mile range of the missile we might want to review the ranges of ground launched missiles starting with the V-1, V-2 and subsequent developments.
The excerpt does a good job of highlighting the limitations of MLRs, but does not mention any kind of forcible entry operations on our part. I wonder if CSIS chose not to employ our amphibious forces because they weren't relevant to the scenario or suspected that they would sustain prohibitive losses or ... Regardless, from a Force Design perspective are Taiwan and the South China Sea the only scenario's the Corps is considering in 2030? My guess is that the Building and the Navy love 2030 due to the savings they'll realize when that amphib structure is gutted. I wonder how the COCOM's have assessed 2030? I also wonder what the Corps' reaction to this report is going to be? Perhaps a trip down that river in Egypt ...
A significant limitation of the MLR concept is stated by ^in most scenarios political assumptions prevented any U. S. forces from being prepositioned....before hostilities...^ Doesnt this diplomatic fact point out that indiginous forces are better suited for MLR island ring defense. The countries that own the islands are not constrained by this diplomatic limitation. It is also important to note that this diplomatic limitation is not limited solely to the Indo Pacific region. It is a global diplomatic limitation for MLR employment.
Good point. But 100 miles is certainly better than the 25 of current artillery. That said, the Corps has experimented with Tomahawk ASCMs and as you note they have a 1000 mile range. The good news is that the MLR rocket/missile batteries can upgrade to better missiles when funding is available. So, like all big bureaucracies, I think we are seeing incremental change. At least if we are smart enough to continue down the path of change and not revert.
The 14 missile batteries that the Corps intends to field come at the expense of cannon artillery for there will only be 7 eight-gun 155 mm batteries. If the Corps is going to only engage in the deep battle its operational units are in great shape. But if it faces a close or rear battle it is likely to be in deep trouble. The current leadership appears to have abandoned the concept of the single battle. Also, what is seldom discussed is that neither missiles nor rockets have smoke, WP, or illumination warheads. And few understand that the Naval Strike Missile costs $1.7 million each, so there is zero chance of firing final protective fires even if it was possible to bring the missiles in that close, time-on-target fires, or prep fires. More important than all of this, however, is the fact FD 2030 turns the Corps into a defensively-oriented force focused on one region at the expense of being capable of responding globally and being offensively-oriented, able and willing to close with an enemy.
I'll answer your questions but you missed the key point. Our traditional regiments added minimal value even if ashore in Taiwan. If they are in SW Islands or PI, they add zero value.
And one has to question if 72 missiles fired in volley at the right time would only sink five ships. How many others. were damaged and out of action
All towed artillery is subject to counterfire. Even a good crew, well drilled takes several minutes to displace a towed artillery piece. In contrast, SP arty (tracked or wheeled) can displace in much shorter times. The M777 is less favored because to make it light enough for helo lift, we made it less durable. Ukrainians say about 2,000 rounds is max before tube is shot. Plus like most American systems, it is very comples. A non-attributed research interview with RUSI personnel who had been on the ground with Ukrainian forces noted they were grateful for any artillery but thought the M777 was a poor artillery piece.
An of course, the Russians have not sent significant numbers of loitering munitions against M777s. The M777s shorter range means they will be vulnerable to a wider variety of loitering munitions. Lack of range has been a primary element of obsolescence since cross bowman beat knights and more recently carrier air replaced battleships. Tubes that cannot range the target have zero efficiency. Poland'w warmate is under $10K apiece and they are producing an autonomous drone armed with what is essentially an RPG warhead - HEAT, AT, or thermo baric. Even today it outranges half the basic load of an M777.
As for logistics, prepositioning allowed a limited number of rockets and did not seem to allow resupply by small cargo ships or explore the use of semi-submersibles. But they game also indicated a more serious investment in ASCMs would have hurt the PLAN even more.
My good friend, what you and all the supporters of FD 2030 appear to have forgotten is that for every new weapon enemies soon develop counters. Thus, you offer loitering weapons, UAVs, and so forth as game changers that will endure. In Ukraine we are already seeing effective counters to both and missiles have had little effect on the frontline battles. Their use to demoralize the civilian population is causing the same increased resistance among the people as it has in every war with the Battle of Britain being one of the most notable examples.
I got your point about the MLR. I was conceding the 5 ships. I just don't see what an MLR really did in that scenario other than provide eyes and HIMARS...something a conventional Task Org'd MAGTF could do. As far as anti-ships...how many missiles did it take for a hit? I've heard 2 to 1 for planning purposes (2 fired for one hit) as the rule of thumb.
-My point is the 777 looks bad in Ukraine because they aren't used to it and they try to run it like soviet equipment they are used to. That's the source of the 'not good' comments. Plus, they can't fix it the same. Like my old mechanic complaining about the new cars. I am very familiar with the RUSI interviews. The Ukrainians seem to not having a problem taking heavy mortars and 105s so I don't think range is always the issue. It's production, capability, and delivery. (Warmate great - I'll take 1,000,000 tomorrow.). Of course, 155 ballistic is not as susceptible to EW and Kinetic defeat as Warmate and other UAS. Hence why uncovered Crossbowmen got killed, and unsupported bowmen got ridden down in dynamic situations. The same RUSI report noted that one of the conclusions was not what should be replaced, but that we should look for ways to combine legacy and emerging technology and concepts in novel ways to make them more effective.
-Yes - ASCMs would have done more - I know the Navy supported the USMC delivery as part of their order. It makes sense tactically and also spreads the cost of the missiles.
So the current MLR (which I think has too few missile batteries and too much infantry) was able to sink 5 major Chinese amphibs. So it made a significant contribution. Losing 5 large amphibs is a signficant loss in any amphib plan but even more so since the PLAN plan calls for multiple trips to ferry Chinese troops.
What exactly would a current Marine regiment add to this fight? Its artilley is towed, tube and short range. (The M777 are suffering from even the fairly incompetent Russia counterbattery fire in Ukraine with no threat from Russian aviation.) So the regiment adds 3 infantry battalions instad of one to the 114 already there. In short, an insignificant contribution.
Having been a player in one of the iterations of this game, it did not allow for much creativity in logistics play. There are clearly better options than trying to brutte force aerial resupply.
Seems pretty clear to me that the Corps is trying to build at the expense of its primary role as global rapid response force units that the US Army already has and have been deployed in the Pacific since 2017, the Multi-Domain Task Force. A second is soon to stand up in the Pacific Theater. The MDTF has the weapons, sensors, command and control equipment and long experience with all of these. Moreover, it has the 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command"ready to accomplish [the[ mission of air defense agains missile attack--'anywhere, anytime in support of the war-fighting combatant commander." Also, on the material development side the US Army has its Aviation and Missile Command whose mission is to ensure material readiness of filed forces. It makes no sense for the Marine Corps to compete with and duplicate these capabilities.
When has anyone suggested that cannon artillery has an anti-ship role? The US did away with coastal artillery in the 40s. The discussion of the M777 is a red herring.
The wargame suggested that air delivered anti-ship missiles had more utility than ground based systems because they didn't have the access and sustainability problems associated with ground based systems. The MLR only made a contribution in scenarios where it had access prior to the start of hostilities. In every other scenario it sat on the sidelines or was destroyed in transit.
I am not aware of the US Navy ever engaging a maneuvering enemy ship protected by countermeasures with an air or sea launched missile, so any results from a simulation or wargame are subject to modeling error or bias. I am sure many Japanese ships were sunk in pre-WWII wargames at Newport by the MK-14 torpedo. Unfortunately, the real world realities were much different and costly in terms of US lives lost.
I am honestly puzzled with the fascination with a missile that has a range of 100 miles. In the early 1940’s the V-1 had a range of 150 miles and the V-2 200 miles. The modern tomahawk, ALCM, GLCM and others have ranges in excess of 1000 miles. So, the USMC contribution should be small numbers with short ranges, positioned where every enemy weapon can be brought to bear? Is this not unlike defending the FLOT with pistols?
-"So the current MLR...was able to sink 5 major Chinese amphibs. So it made a significant contribution. Losing 5 large amphibs is a signficant loss in any amphib plan but even more so since the PLAN plan calls for multiple trips to ferry Chinese troops" : Fair enough, 5 ships is a solid loss regardless of context.
-"The M777 are suffering from even the fairly incompetent Russia counter-battery fire in Ukraine with no threat from Russian aviation" : do you have a source that states M777 is any more susceptible to counter battery if it remains stationary than any other artillery (towed or untowed) in Ukraine? There is no lack of demand for Nato spec ammo or Soviet spec ammo...the big issue with the NATO guns is they have been introduced to a Ukrainian force that has an intimate history with the soviet spec systems and what it takes to operate and maintain them...not to mention the historical structure oriented towards Soviet gear. With respect to the NATO systems...the Ukrainians lack the normal NATO training, maintenance, supply chains, as well as the intimate familiarity and expertise at the operational level.
-I don't think anyone has argued against adding Himars, and other related capability sets. The argument has been when it is at the expense of other capability sets. Sometimes tubes are just more efficient.
-"Having been a player in one of the iterations of this game, it did not allow for much creativity in logistics play. There are clearly better options than trying to brutte force aerial resupply" : in the realm of open source, it would be of interest to hear what you asked (or would have asked) for that you could not do?
Looks like I need to do a lot of homework. Seems important to dig into the 165 page report. Lots of hard work has gone into it. One wonders just what the benefits of stranding US Marine units on/in Littoral Zones has to the Corps. It seems a defensive posture, far afield from the mission of the Corps. The last time I checked, our mission had not changed too much from "Seize, occupy and defend advanced navy bases" or whatever the modern iteration of that mission is today. I have read Senator Cotton's report on The Fighting Culture of the United States Navy Surface Fleet. It was quite stark that we are not prepared for a peer navy engagement. How would this surface Navy logistically support the Marines? Sounds like Wake Island redux.
The scenarios all revolve around a fight over Taiwan where missiles with a range of 100 miles can actually contribute something, however minor, to the fight. Where else across the vast expanses of the S China Sea do any Chinese ships need to come into range of a 100 mile missile if they wish to avoid it before other Chinese assets have destroyed it, its launchers and crew? If these 100 mile missiles on modified trucks were so potent I am certainly wondering why the Taiwanese would not just buy a few hundred? Should the scenario perhaps have placed these units even closer to the Chinese mainland earlier. I suspect the scenario would reveal their destruction in the earliest stages. After all how do they defend themselves?
The very concept that the MAGTF should sink ships with anything but aircraft is fantasy. Tanks tend to lose direct fire duals with ships with guns. Dunkirk, Sicily etc. Of course, they were not designed to duel with ships.
Nor has the M777 laid claim be being a ship killer. I would further ask for some data on the M-777’s in Ukraine being inferior to the Russian artillery despite ammunition shortages.
Before anyone gets excited about the 100 mile range of the missile we might want to review the ranges of ground launched missiles starting with the V-1, V-2 and subsequent developments.
The excerpt does a good job of highlighting the limitations of MLRs, but does not mention any kind of forcible entry operations on our part. I wonder if CSIS chose not to employ our amphibious forces because they weren't relevant to the scenario or suspected that they would sustain prohibitive losses or ... Regardless, from a Force Design perspective are Taiwan and the South China Sea the only scenario's the Corps is considering in 2030? My guess is that the Building and the Navy love 2030 due to the savings they'll realize when that amphib structure is gutted. I wonder how the COCOM's have assessed 2030? I also wonder what the Corps' reaction to this report is going to be? Perhaps a trip down that river in Egypt ...
A significant limitation of the MLR concept is stated by ^in most scenarios political assumptions prevented any U. S. forces from being prepositioned....before hostilities...^ Doesnt this diplomatic fact point out that indiginous forces are better suited for MLR island ring defense. The countries that own the islands are not constrained by this diplomatic limitation. It is also important to note that this diplomatic limitation is not limited solely to the Indo Pacific region. It is a global diplomatic limitation for MLR employment.
Douglas,
Good point. But 100 miles is certainly better than the 25 of current artillery. That said, the Corps has experimented with Tomahawk ASCMs and as you note they have a 1000 mile range. The good news is that the MLR rocket/missile batteries can upgrade to better missiles when funding is available. So, like all big bureaucracies, I think we are seeing incremental change. At least if we are smart enough to continue down the path of change and not revert.
The 14 missile batteries that the Corps intends to field come at the expense of cannon artillery for there will only be 7 eight-gun 155 mm batteries. If the Corps is going to only engage in the deep battle its operational units are in great shape. But if it faces a close or rear battle it is likely to be in deep trouble. The current leadership appears to have abandoned the concept of the single battle. Also, what is seldom discussed is that neither missiles nor rockets have smoke, WP, or illumination warheads. And few understand that the Naval Strike Missile costs $1.7 million each, so there is zero chance of firing final protective fires even if it was possible to bring the missiles in that close, time-on-target fires, or prep fires. More important than all of this, however, is the fact FD 2030 turns the Corps into a defensively-oriented force focused on one region at the expense of being capable of responding globally and being offensively-oriented, able and willing to close with an enemy.
I'll answer your questions but you missed the key point. Our traditional regiments added minimal value even if ashore in Taiwan. If they are in SW Islands or PI, they add zero value.
And one has to question if 72 missiles fired in volley at the right time would only sink five ships. How many others. were damaged and out of action
All towed artillery is subject to counterfire. Even a good crew, well drilled takes several minutes to displace a towed artillery piece. In contrast, SP arty (tracked or wheeled) can displace in much shorter times. The M777 is less favored because to make it light enough for helo lift, we made it less durable. Ukrainians say about 2,000 rounds is max before tube is shot. Plus like most American systems, it is very comples. A non-attributed research interview with RUSI personnel who had been on the ground with Ukrainian forces noted they were grateful for any artillery but thought the M777 was a poor artillery piece.
An of course, the Russians have not sent significant numbers of loitering munitions against M777s. The M777s shorter range means they will be vulnerable to a wider variety of loitering munitions. Lack of range has been a primary element of obsolescence since cross bowman beat knights and more recently carrier air replaced battleships. Tubes that cannot range the target have zero efficiency. Poland'w warmate is under $10K apiece and they are producing an autonomous drone armed with what is essentially an RPG warhead - HEAT, AT, or thermo baric. Even today it outranges half the basic load of an M777.
As for logistics, prepositioning allowed a limited number of rockets and did not seem to allow resupply by small cargo ships or explore the use of semi-submersibles. But they game also indicated a more serious investment in ASCMs would have hurt the PLAN even more.
My good friend, what you and all the supporters of FD 2030 appear to have forgotten is that for every new weapon enemies soon develop counters. Thus, you offer loitering weapons, UAVs, and so forth as game changers that will endure. In Ukraine we are already seeing effective counters to both and missiles have had little effect on the frontline battles. Their use to demoralize the civilian population is causing the same increased resistance among the people as it has in every war with the Battle of Britain being one of the most notable examples.
Thanks...
I got your point about the MLR. I was conceding the 5 ships. I just don't see what an MLR really did in that scenario other than provide eyes and HIMARS...something a conventional Task Org'd MAGTF could do. As far as anti-ships...how many missiles did it take for a hit? I've heard 2 to 1 for planning purposes (2 fired for one hit) as the rule of thumb.
-My point is the 777 looks bad in Ukraine because they aren't used to it and they try to run it like soviet equipment they are used to. That's the source of the 'not good' comments. Plus, they can't fix it the same. Like my old mechanic complaining about the new cars. I am very familiar with the RUSI interviews. The Ukrainians seem to not having a problem taking heavy mortars and 105s so I don't think range is always the issue. It's production, capability, and delivery. (Warmate great - I'll take 1,000,000 tomorrow.). Of course, 155 ballistic is not as susceptible to EW and Kinetic defeat as Warmate and other UAS. Hence why uncovered Crossbowmen got killed, and unsupported bowmen got ridden down in dynamic situations. The same RUSI report noted that one of the conclusions was not what should be replaced, but that we should look for ways to combine legacy and emerging technology and concepts in novel ways to make them more effective.
-Yes - ASCMs would have done more - I know the Navy supported the USMC delivery as part of their order. It makes sense tactically and also spreads the cost of the missiles.
So the current MLR (which I think has too few missile batteries and too much infantry) was able to sink 5 major Chinese amphibs. So it made a significant contribution. Losing 5 large amphibs is a signficant loss in any amphib plan but even more so since the PLAN plan calls for multiple trips to ferry Chinese troops.
What exactly would a current Marine regiment add to this fight? Its artilley is towed, tube and short range. (The M777 are suffering from even the fairly incompetent Russia counterbattery fire in Ukraine with no threat from Russian aviation.) So the regiment adds 3 infantry battalions instad of one to the 114 already there. In short, an insignificant contribution.
Having been a player in one of the iterations of this game, it did not allow for much creativity in logistics play. There are clearly better options than trying to brutte force aerial resupply.
Seems pretty clear to me that the Corps is trying to build at the expense of its primary role as global rapid response force units that the US Army already has and have been deployed in the Pacific since 2017, the Multi-Domain Task Force. A second is soon to stand up in the Pacific Theater. The MDTF has the weapons, sensors, command and control equipment and long experience with all of these. Moreover, it has the 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command"ready to accomplish [the[ mission of air defense agains missile attack--'anywhere, anytime in support of the war-fighting combatant commander." Also, on the material development side the US Army has its Aviation and Missile Command whose mission is to ensure material readiness of filed forces. It makes no sense for the Marine Corps to compete with and duplicate these capabilities.
When has anyone suggested that cannon artillery has an anti-ship role? The US did away with coastal artillery in the 40s. The discussion of the M777 is a red herring.
The wargame suggested that air delivered anti-ship missiles had more utility than ground based systems because they didn't have the access and sustainability problems associated with ground based systems. The MLR only made a contribution in scenarios where it had access prior to the start of hostilities. In every other scenario it sat on the sidelines or was destroyed in transit.
I am not aware of the US Navy ever engaging a maneuvering enemy ship protected by countermeasures with an air or sea launched missile, so any results from a simulation or wargame are subject to modeling error or bias. I am sure many Japanese ships were sunk in pre-WWII wargames at Newport by the MK-14 torpedo. Unfortunately, the real world realities were much different and costly in terms of US lives lost.
T.X.
I am honestly puzzled with the fascination with a missile that has a range of 100 miles. In the early 1940’s the V-1 had a range of 150 miles and the V-2 200 miles. The modern tomahawk, ALCM, GLCM and others have ranges in excess of 1000 miles. So, the USMC contribution should be small numbers with short ranges, positioned where every enemy weapon can be brought to bear? Is this not unlike defending the FLOT with pistols?
-"So the current MLR...was able to sink 5 major Chinese amphibs. So it made a significant contribution. Losing 5 large amphibs is a signficant loss in any amphib plan but even more so since the PLAN plan calls for multiple trips to ferry Chinese troops" : Fair enough, 5 ships is a solid loss regardless of context.
-"The M777 are suffering from even the fairly incompetent Russia counter-battery fire in Ukraine with no threat from Russian aviation" : do you have a source that states M777 is any more susceptible to counter battery if it remains stationary than any other artillery (towed or untowed) in Ukraine? There is no lack of demand for Nato spec ammo or Soviet spec ammo...the big issue with the NATO guns is they have been introduced to a Ukrainian force that has an intimate history with the soviet spec systems and what it takes to operate and maintain them...not to mention the historical structure oriented towards Soviet gear. With respect to the NATO systems...the Ukrainians lack the normal NATO training, maintenance, supply chains, as well as the intimate familiarity and expertise at the operational level.
-I don't think anyone has argued against adding Himars, and other related capability sets. The argument has been when it is at the expense of other capability sets. Sometimes tubes are just more efficient.
-"Having been a player in one of the iterations of this game, it did not allow for much creativity in logistics play. There are clearly better options than trying to brutte force aerial resupply" : in the realm of open source, it would be of interest to hear what you asked (or would have asked) for that you could not do?