Compass Points - Focus on Aviation, Part 1
Where have all the Rotor and Tiltrotor Aircraft Gone?
Compass Points - Focus on Aviation, Part 1
Where have all the Rotor & Tiltrotor Aircraft Gone?
During the coming weeks, Compass Points will be focusing on subjects that underpin a ready, relevant, and capable Marine Corps today and in the future. Examples include expeditionary logistics, academic freedom, moral leadership, and applicable lessons from the war in Ukraine. All these essentials are worthy of discussion and debate. No topic, however, is more deserving of discussion and clarity than divestments in Marine aviation. The losses in aircraft are significant. The reductions are not the result of insufficient funding or mandated cuts in personnel. The wounds have been self-inflicted.
For years, Marine Corps aviation has been the envy of every air force in the world. The United States Army and other armies have admired the almost seamless integration of the Marine air-ground team. Compass Points believes the recent divestments of 44 advanced MV-22 tiltrotor aircraft, 30 AH-1Z attack helicopters, and 24 UH-1Y utility helicopters in the active force and the forthcoming divestments of 48 CH-53K helicopters and 54 F-35B fighter/attack aircraft in the active force, all reportedly to fund future experimental capabilities, are unwise and wasteful.
The jettisoning of state-of-the-art aircraft significantly weakens the Aviation Combat Element, today and tomorrow. Marine air can no longer boast the operational prowess that made it the model for expeditionary aviation around the world. The sad fact is that Marine aviation is being so decimated by self-inflicted losses that it may soon lack the depth of capabilities and resiliency to properly support Marines “in every clime and place,” across the spectrum of conflict. As one recently retired, very senior Marine aviator put it, “the big ‘A’ in MAGTF is rapidly becoming a little ‘a,’ significantly degrading air support to the other elements of the force.”
The discarding of AH-1Z attack helicopters and F-35B fighter/attack aircraft compounds the loss of most cannon artillery in the active force (67%). Since the opening salvos of World War II, Marine infantry has relied on close air support to supplement the fires of limited direct support artillery, especially during the early phases of amphibious operations before artillery can be brought ashore. The loss of 30 AH-1Z attack helicopters in the active force (29%) is a devastating blow to Marine infantry. The approaching loss of 54 F-35B fighter/attack aircraft in the active force (28%) will make an already difficult situation significantly worse. The synergistic effect of the air and artillery losses on combined arms operations is incalculable.
In the next two posts, today and tomorrow, Compass Points will provide facts and ask pertinent questions intended to provide better transparency about aircraft divestments. Please let us know if you have different numbers and their source. We always strive for accuracy. Today’s post will focus on helicopters. Tomorrow’s post will focus on the F-35 Lighting II.
Compass Points wants its readers to judge for themselves if the divestitures make the Marine Corps stronger or weaker to respond to global crises and contingencies. As always, we invite reader comments from those who agree or disagree.
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Where Have All the Rotor and Tiltrotor Aircraft Gone?
During a recent, so-called “myth-busting” presentation at Quantico, Va., a senior officer from Headquarters Marine Corps stated the Marine Aviation Combat Element (ACE) had never been better off “programmatically.” His choice of the word “programmatically” was brilliant in its obfuscation, allowing him to avoid saying if the ACE was more “operationally” capable today than previously.
According to the speaker, the Marine Corps has bought the full Program of Record (POR) for the advanced MV-22 Osprey medium lift tiltrotor (360 aircraft), the new AH-1Z attack helicopter (189 aircraft), and the new UH-1Y utility helicopter (160 aircraft) and has not changed the POR for the currently in production CH-53K heavy lift helicopter (200 aircraft) by “a single tail.”
Note: The POR for the AH-1Z and the UH-1Y included helicopters for 8 active-duty squadrons; one more than the 7 active-duty squadrons that were reduced to 5 under Force Design 2030. The POR for the MV-22 included aircraft for 18 active-duty squadrons of 12 aircraft each; one more than the 17 active-duty squadrons of 12 aircraft each that were reduced to 16 squadrons of 10 aircraft each under Force Design 2030.
So, what has happened/will happen to the excess aircraft?
Years ago, the pop group Peter, Paul, and Mary had a hit song, “Where Have All the Flowers Gone?” Compass Points proposes a different song, “Where Have All the Assault Support Aircraft Gone?” While the Marine Corps may have bought/will buy the POR for the entire helicopter and tiltrotor fleet, how can buying new aircraft and then discarding them or parking them on the fence line, make any sense?
1. Where have the 30 new AH-1Z attack helicopters (or 29% of the active inventory) gone? Where have the additional 15 helicopters bought as an envisioned 8th squadron under the POR gone?
2. Where have the 24 new UH-1Y helicopters (or 29% of the active inventory) gone? Where have the additional 12 helicopters bought as an envisioned 8th squadron under the POR gone?
3. Where have the 44 advanced MV-22 tiltrotor aircraft (or 22% of the active inventory) gone? Where have the additional 12 aircraft bought as an envisioned 18th squadron under the POR gone?
4. Where will the 48 new CH-53K (or 38% of the active inventory) go if they are procured in the outyears? If not procured, what is the real and total cost of a Nunn-McCurdy breach?
5. How do these losses, specifically the MV-22s and CH-53Ks, hinder or help future mobility requirements envisioned and needed by Marine ground forces and logistic demands?
The sobering final verse of the Peter, Paul, and Mary song asks, “Where have all the soldiers gone?” And then answers, “Gone to graveyards everyone.” Will Marine assault support aircraft suffer the same fate? Will they eventually go to the Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, “Aircraft Boneyard” outside Tucson, Arizona? If not there, will they go overseas as excess defense articles or somewhere else?
Compass Points can only speculate where they have gone or will go, but one thing is certain - - 44 MV-22s, 30 AH-1Zs, and the 24 UH-1Ys are no longer available in the active force to support Marines. The 48 CH-53K are still in the POR (for now) but for what purpose since they will not be in the active or even reserve force? The Marine Corps has divested all of these aircraft as ostensible bill payers for experimental capabilities that are years away from being fielded in sufficient quantities to make a difference in operational capabilities. A Marine capability that is supposedly fine “programmatically” has been “operationally” devastated. The ACE is clearly less capable today, even with the new aircraft, than it was three years ago.
Compass Points invites readers to weigh in on all these aviation questions. A stronger Marine Corps requires stronger aviation.
For decades both DoD and my beloved Marine Corps chose to ignore the principle of mass. Training to fight out numbered and win became a self fulfilling prophesy of ignorance and high risk. Each time we made units more capable we reduced the manning or numbers of units to give ourselves a trade off that resulted in zero greater capability. The tank becomes better so we reduce the tank platoon from five to four. We get better weapons in the rifle battalions and we cut one infantry company and make the other three companies smaller. Aircraft become more lethal and we reduce the number of aircraft per squadron. The weapons become more accurate and we assume less ammunition expenditure and cut the ammo men. Who believes this is even remotely logical? Napoleon said that God favors the bigger Battalions. It would take a delusional half wit to believe these cuts in Aviation would increase our chances of winning.
There is a strange paradigm at work in the circles of the deep thinkers. The allure of smaller forces defeating larger ones is a romantic perversion in our schools and contrary to 85% of historical battlefield outcomes. For every example of smaller force beating the larger I can find the opposite results ten fold. There is tremendous value in training to win as the smaller force. There is no value in structuring yourself to actually being smaller.
The problem is actually compounded. No tanks, 70% reduction in tube artillery, smaller rifle Bn’s and less of them and smaller squadrons and less of them. The one eyed, one armed fighter decides he doesn’t need two legs either?
If I am a Chinese General I am salivating at the chance to go down in history as the man who finished off the Marine Corps.