For decades both DoD and my beloved Marine Corps chose to ignore the principle of mass. Training to fight out numbered and win became a self fulfilling prophesy of ignorance and high risk. Each time we made units more capable we reduced the manning or numbers of units to give ourselves a trade off that resulted in zero greater capability. The tank becomes better so we reduce the tank platoon from five to four. We get better weapons in the rifle battalions and we cut one infantry company and make the other three companies smaller. Aircraft become more lethal and we reduce the number of aircraft per squadron. The weapons become more accurate and we assume less ammunition expenditure and cut the ammo men. Who believes this is even remotely logical? Napoleon said that God favors the bigger Battalions. It would take a delusional half wit to believe these cuts in Aviation would increase our chances of winning.
There is a strange paradigm at work in the circles of the deep thinkers. The allure of smaller forces defeating larger ones is a romantic perversion in our schools and contrary to 85% of historical battlefield outcomes. For every example of smaller force beating the larger I can find the opposite results ten fold. There is tremendous value in training to win as the smaller force. There is no value in structuring yourself to actually being smaller.
The problem is actually compounded. No tanks, 70% reduction in tube artillery, smaller rifle Bn’s and less of them and smaller squadrons and less of them. The one eyed, one armed fighter decides he doesn’t need two legs either?
If I am a Chinese General I am salivating at the chance to go down in history as the man who finished off the Marine Corps.
-This is about capability set now. We had the CH-46 the whole time we waited for the MV-22. We've had the F-18 and AV-8B while waiting for the F-35. And, as much as it pains me to say it, there is something worse than the bloat of the F-35 program; no LOS aircraft at all (being threat informed, not threat agnostic...buzzword alert). The -53 issues...at least we've had flying -53s. I'm surprised you didn't mention any issues with the last 20 years of AH-1 / UH-1 upgrades, but at least we ensured available capability while airframes upgraded. Yes, maintenance readiness is key to capability...but you have to have something to maintain before you can keep it that way.
-The point here is the reduction of the force measured against the Program of Record, which was a main line in the article. This is key for readiness and because combat consumes systems. UAS / SUAS have an emerging prominent role on the battlefield, but the death of manned aviation, especially during the fielding / capability gap, is far from predetermined. As such "You made it that way." doesn't stick.
-I remember the worst days of the peace dividend when we were pulling parts off static displays for ground and air assets because supply was short.
Look, I get why you threw that bunch of darts...and some aspects of mismanagement rightfully stick, in context of reviewing those instances themselves. "What's wrong with Marine Aviation and how do we fix it" articles have been a staple in the Gazette since A.A. Cunningham.
-In response to "Where was Chowder II when the CH-53E continued to be extended well past its service life to the point that sub-par contractors used sub-par components to make the aircraft limp along? Where was Chowder II when old Kapton wiring short-circuited in 2011 and crushed a Marine under a 53’s landing gear? Where was Chowder II when old and improperly serviced parts caused fatal CH-53E crashes in Camp Lejeune and near El Centro?": I'd like to see the findings of fact in these cases; I'm not convinced these are necessarily Chowder II specific issues (unless you are asserting that a specific action or comprehensive culture of readiness risk and complacency is at someone's feat by name). Maybe the Brutecast should interview some senior active aviation leadership and shed some light on the historical problem of Marine Aviation as you presented it here; that would be interesting.
-Last note: I will echo your sentiment that the aviation Marines that have put sweat and blood into maintaining and operating the aircraft are, and will continue to be the glue that has kept it all together.
For decades both DoD and my beloved Marine Corps chose to ignore the principle of mass. Training to fight out numbered and win became a self fulfilling prophesy of ignorance and high risk. Each time we made units more capable we reduced the manning or numbers of units to give ourselves a trade off that resulted in zero greater capability. The tank becomes better so we reduce the tank platoon from five to four. We get better weapons in the rifle battalions and we cut one infantry company and make the other three companies smaller. Aircraft become more lethal and we reduce the number of aircraft per squadron. The weapons become more accurate and we assume less ammunition expenditure and cut the ammo men. Who believes this is even remotely logical? Napoleon said that God favors the bigger Battalions. It would take a delusional half wit to believe these cuts in Aviation would increase our chances of winning.
There is a strange paradigm at work in the circles of the deep thinkers. The allure of smaller forces defeating larger ones is a romantic perversion in our schools and contrary to 85% of historical battlefield outcomes. For every example of smaller force beating the larger I can find the opposite results ten fold. There is tremendous value in training to win as the smaller force. There is no value in structuring yourself to actually being smaller.
The problem is actually compounded. No tanks, 70% reduction in tube artillery, smaller rifle Bn’s and less of them and smaller squadrons and less of them. The one eyed, one armed fighter decides he doesn’t need two legs either?
If I am a Chinese General I am salivating at the chance to go down in history as the man who finished off the Marine Corps.
-This is about capability set now. We had the CH-46 the whole time we waited for the MV-22. We've had the F-18 and AV-8B while waiting for the F-35. And, as much as it pains me to say it, there is something worse than the bloat of the F-35 program; no LOS aircraft at all (being threat informed, not threat agnostic...buzzword alert). The -53 issues...at least we've had flying -53s. I'm surprised you didn't mention any issues with the last 20 years of AH-1 / UH-1 upgrades, but at least we ensured available capability while airframes upgraded. Yes, maintenance readiness is key to capability...but you have to have something to maintain before you can keep it that way.
-The point here is the reduction of the force measured against the Program of Record, which was a main line in the article. This is key for readiness and because combat consumes systems. UAS / SUAS have an emerging prominent role on the battlefield, but the death of manned aviation, especially during the fielding / capability gap, is far from predetermined. As such "You made it that way." doesn't stick.
-I remember the worst days of the peace dividend when we were pulling parts off static displays for ground and air assets because supply was short.
Look, I get why you threw that bunch of darts...and some aspects of mismanagement rightfully stick, in context of reviewing those instances themselves. "What's wrong with Marine Aviation and how do we fix it" articles have been a staple in the Gazette since A.A. Cunningham.
-In response to "Where was Chowder II when the CH-53E continued to be extended well past its service life to the point that sub-par contractors used sub-par components to make the aircraft limp along? Where was Chowder II when old Kapton wiring short-circuited in 2011 and crushed a Marine under a 53’s landing gear? Where was Chowder II when old and improperly serviced parts caused fatal CH-53E crashes in Camp Lejeune and near El Centro?": I'd like to see the findings of fact in these cases; I'm not convinced these are necessarily Chowder II specific issues (unless you are asserting that a specific action or comprehensive culture of readiness risk and complacency is at someone's feat by name). Maybe the Brutecast should interview some senior active aviation leadership and shed some light on the historical problem of Marine Aviation as you presented it here; that would be interesting.
-Last note: I will echo your sentiment that the aviation Marines that have put sweat and blood into maintaining and operating the aircraft are, and will continue to be the glue that has kept it all together.