Thank you Compass Points - today’s edition lays out views I think are spot on in accuracy. Mass and numbers still count - as they always have. Some real sobering thoughts in this one. I must leave the decision to rearm ourselves to those more senior, but, to this Marine, the message is very clear: get ready to fight as a robust, educated & well trained MAGTF, or be prepared for defeat, or dissolution by our own government. Time to move out smartly!
Below are my recommendations on books about close combat, which is the essence of warfare regardless of what the ill-informed and pundits claim. The books are grouped by categories.
A Modest List of Books on Close Combat
Overview
John Keegan, The Face of Battle (New York: The Viking Press, 1976)
Theory
S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War (Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1978) (A reprint of the original copyrighted in 1947)
B.A. Friedman, On Tactics: A Theory of Victory in Battle (Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, Maryland, 2017)
History
John A. English, On Infantry (New York: Praeger, 1981)
John A. English and Bruce I. Gudmunsson, On Infantry: Revised Edition (New York: Praeger, 1994) (Abridges much of the material in the original edition)
Paddy Griffith, Forward Into Battle: Fighting Tactics from Waterloo to the Near Future (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1991)
Illustrations
Michael D. Doubler, Closing With the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945 (University Press of Kansas: Lawrence, Kansas, 1994)
Charles B. MacDonald, Company Commander: The Classic Account of Infantry Combat in World War II (Bantam Books, Inc.: New York, 1947)
The Infantry Journal, Infantry in Battle (The Infantry Journal Incorporated: Washington, D.C., 1939) (Reprinted by Marine Corps Association in October 1986)
Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 (Greenwood Press: Westport, Connecticut, 1982)
Psychology/Biology — Courage, Fear, and Killing
John Baynes, Morale: A Study of Men and Courage (Avery Publishing Group, Inc.: Garden City Park, New York, 1988)
Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (Little Brown and Company: Boston, 1995)
Richard Holmes, Acts of War: The Behavior of Men in Battle (The Free Press: New York, 1985)
Peter S. Kindsvatter, American Soldiers: Ground Combat in the World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam (University Press of Kansas: Lawrence, Kansas, 2003)
Lord Moran, The Anatomy of Courage (Avery Publishing Group Inc.: Garden City Park, New York, 1987)
Geoffrey Regan, Fight or Flight (Avon Books: New York, 1996)
Stephan P. Rosen, War and Human Nature (Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, 2005)
Johnathan Shay, Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character (Simon & Schuster: New York, 1994)
Ben Shephard, A War of Nerves: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Twentieth Century (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2001)
I am puzzled. Could Bob Whitener be proposing infantry assaults without supporting arms? Heaven help us. A detailed, historically accurate analysis of Belleau Wood from 105 years ago might be called for. Desperate situations call for desperate measures and amazing courage. They are not models for organization, tactics and operations. We do not need to develop a Picket’s Charge mind set for future combat. Let us leave the “we will pit our will against their steel” mindset to others. FD 20XX is preparing the Corps for another scenario from history - Gallipoli.
The Belleau Wood battle fought without combined arms is used as an example to highlight the importance of the battle ethos of the individual Marine in combat. This is the ethos embedded in all Marines at the respective boot camps. It is this battle ethos that was the deciding factor in the WW2 Pacific campaign battles, the Korean War battles and the battles of every war since. The attempted point being made with Belleau Wood is, as the Marine Corps grapples with combined arms fallout issues over FD 2030, it must still maintain the battle ethos of all Marines. The Marine Corps can continue without tanks. It cant continue without the battle ethos. I conclude with the fact this battle ethos must be prevalent in all Marines if
Marine infantry is to receive the combined arms support it deserves. SF. RW
It is possible that a few battlefield experiences will further clarify my opinion about the importance of the Belleau Wood ethos and Marines. As a Marine officer, who is also an aviator, personal experiences loom heavy from events in Operation Texas in February 1966. It was reported that an infantry company attacked what was considered to be an NVA headquarters. The battle location was the plain west of HWY 1 between Chu Lai and Quang Ngai. Unfortunately, the presumed headquarters was in fact the entire NVA regiment. This realization led to an emergency, regimental heliborne assault employing both MAG-36 and MAG-16 UH-34D helicopters. There were two sequential assault lifts into the battle area. MAG-12 A-4 attack fixed wing were being used to suppress NVA anti air positions. Released napalm cannisters were visible as they wobbled thru the air toward 20mm NVA anti air positions.
The uninformed of both aviation and ground communities do not realize that it requires greater aviation skill to correctly fly aUH-34D than it does to fly an A-4E. As I took control of the helicopter from the copilot and dramatically nosed it over to increase my rate of descent, there was a very loud boom in my cargo compartment area. It was an explosive type boom.
My cargo window M-60 machine gun was being manned by our HMM-363 avionics officer. He was not paid flight skins. He was not a designated crew member. He was a CWO. he was there because we did not have enough L/LCpls to man all the machine guns. He was there because there were fellow Marine infantry in trouble. He was there because as a Marine he had to do his part. This is an example of the Belleau Wood ethos.
I called down on the ICS and asked, "Is everyone alright?" CWO Chip Chipola responded, "Everyone is OK, but this priest is going like hell on his beads." After disembarking the infantry in the LZ we went on to Quang Ngai. There, we learned the UH-34D flown by Lt Noah Kraft and Lt Tom Bird had been shot down in the flight right behind us. The aircrew and embarked infantry perished in the crash.
My crew chief, a sergeant, then told me the loud bang was caused by a shell that had barely missed the tail rotor servo. Had I lost that servo while in the 4000 foot per minute auto rotation descent I was in, I would have lost directional control. I don't think we would have survived. The crew chief was a very young Marine who was very good, or he would not have been a crew chief. I remarked to him after his debrief that he would not be shot at any more that day. The sergeant didn't bat an eye and responded, "Lieutenant, we are not winning this war with my helicopter sitting here down." That is an example of the Belleau Wood ethos and I've never forgotten it. There are many, many more ethos tales. Whatever it is that causes them has to continue. SF
As a final tribute to his D-Day, State visit to France, President Biden spoke at Belleau Wood. Today's, and former Marine Corps leaders, should dwell on the significance of the outcome of the WW l battle that stymied the German onslaught toward Paris. They should dwell on who fought this battle. Their commanding general was U. S. Army. They were suddenly thrown into battle because they were all that was available at the time. This was not a combined arms, maneuver warfare, amphibious assault battle. There was no artillery preparation or a line of departure. Originally, their pickets were badly bloodied. There was no close air support, no tanks, or even bridging equipment. There was no direct involvement in the battle at the flag rank level such was the emergency. There was minimal field grade rank involvement. There was some company grade rank. Belleau Wood was a battle fought by the enlisted United States Marine who prevailed over an elite, entrenched German infantry command. The Marines of the 4th Brigade of Marines won this battle because of who they were as fighting men. Their valor has enshrined them forever as the Treufelhunden by the defeated Germans. For as long as France exists, there will be the appreciation of their sacrifice by the French people.
The first place today's leaders need to be focusing attention is on the individual Marines, not on missing tanks. All of the battles that have been fought since all end up dependent on the performance of the individual Marine. I'm speaking of the hard infantry fighting it takes to seize and hold terrain. All of these battles have been influenced by the fighting ethos of the 4th Brigade of Marines established at Belleau Wood. In that the world's Competition Continuum is presently in a heightened tinderbox situation for armed conflict, who is going to fight the infantry role of the close with and destroy fight?
The infantry, battle role, in the foreseeable future, will fall on the Marines of the Marine Littoral Regiment. While it is true the regiment emphasis has been on Force Design training, the fact remains they are probably among the finest trained infantry Marines on earth today. There is no reason to believe otherwise. In the foreseeable future it is questionable that they will be transported to a battlefield embarked aboard amphibious ships. What alternatives to amphibious ships could be made available to them right now? Today's leaders, past and present, should have an answer right now. One example to the question is that two LHD's joined as an ARG could support a MEU in an emergency. Are there other nonstandard ARG/MEU options for an amphibious deployment? Should there be more geo-prepositioned sites strategically located to support potential; crisis areas that can be supported by fly-in-echelons in lieu of the availability of amphibious ships.
Not only will there be no tanks for combined arms support of the infantry, there are no tank Marines available. Can available aviation assets assume a broader combined arms role, especially with the reactivation of HMLA-269 for attack, air defense, assault and command and control support? Can a cavalry style mobility be better utilized with aviation and ground infantry in battle planning? can there be better day to day coordination between ground and air units in garrison?
During the 1980's, the former 4th Marine Amphibious Brigade deployed on a regular basis as the MAGTF HQ for units assigned from each of the major commands. This is why the later designated 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade was able to form up on an extremely short notice, deploy and then participate very effectively in the Kuwait emergency. The question becomes, are there MEBs formed as policy today to be prepared to deploy to Europe, the Mideast and the Indo Pacific? The MEB level MAGTF provides an ideal command structure for better tactical coordination of the command elements provided by the major commands.
The Marines of the 4th Brigade of Marines, who fought in Belleau Wood passed their battle ethos, the battle ethos of every individual Marine, on to every Marine, present or past, who claims today's Marine title. Are today's Marines, present and past, up to the task to move the Marine Corps forward to the next battle? Political and military events that exist right now demands that they better be ready. SF
In addition to the individual fire team and squad leader there is a long list of Marines finding themselves in the worst of situations and making decisions that were greater than the moment but had even moremomentous outcomes. Gunnery Sargent John Canley at the Battle of Hue. Then Lt. Harvey “Barney” Barnum, then Captain John Ripley, Sgt., then Corporal Dakota Meyer, each seized the moment, clearly leaving self behind to the greater good. This is not to leave out all the MOH Marines or those awarded the Navy Cross too many to mention. Or today driving by a cemetery where the grounds are kept well and American flags carefully planted and many, too many with a USMC ensign waving in the same beeeze. If the current crop of “managers” want to attract the Gen Z men and women to the Corps they could run 60 second ad on all the internet venues, and have it call them to hear the call, to learn the ethos and earn the Eagle, Globe and Anchor. “We few, we Proud, We humble (only at certain times) and just show the images of the many “LEADERS” of Marines, that all can conjure up!and leave the punch line as simple as possible. But, words to the effect of first to fight, faint of heart need not apply.
One cannot imagine what General(s) Louis Wilson or Robert Barrow would think of this current bunch of managers. One suspects they would be handing out paint brushes, cans of white paint and telling them “to get busy” painting those rocks around the Regimental HQ Flagpole.
This comments pertains to the Business Insider -article in yesterday's Compass Point 05/02/2024
"The US spent so much time fighting insurgents that it forgot 'what it means to actually fight a war,' a US vet in Ukraine says" By Sinéad Baker
I recently had the opportunity to talk with a Marine that served with 1st Marines in Fallujah who subsequently volunteered and fought for Ukraine. Without prompting, he said Ukraine made Fallujah look like a cake walk. I asked him to elaborate and he said it was the Russian artillery. It was unfortunate that we did not have more time to talk but his comment reinforces the points made in the article and also the warning by German Maj. Gen. Christian Freuding "To fight against peer adversaries, mass still matters."
The strategy among recruiters versus the officer selection officer (OSO) was quite different. This not a judgement right or wrong of any recruiter or OSO. They formulate their dialogue based on the prospects they can convince of an interview. Herein lies the difference as it played out in the Midwest. The OSO’s found that many prospects primarily sought to build a career in some form or fashion. So, the motivation to join was to build a resume within or without the Corps.
By contrast, recruiters continually faced the challenge of parental consent. Again, any recruiter, calibrates his behavior, appearance and dialogue in accordance with the perceived needs of the prospect. In the rural Midwest, it was routine at such appointments to arrive fit and trim in full Blues knowing full well that ranchers and farmers have a discerning eye as to “talk and walk”. While the recruiter presented and discussed the finer points of a copy of the Marine Corps Manual 1100 and the Hymn, his “flip chart” was open to a picture of a boot camp graduate in blues. The major point was the organization’s allegiance to values in 11001 and 1100.4.b and c. So, the objective was to not only to enable the parents to approve the enlistment, but to bring them to the point of encouraging and supporting the son in his decision. This was critical in the arena of non-cohort attrition.
The parents and son made a commitment in the expectation that a promise would be fulfilled. To the delight of the recruiter, no other Service could present the promise found in MCM 1100.2.d. and MCM 1100.4.b and 1100.4.c. Yet in large part, the OSO’ candidates focused on career development and growth.
The danger in this contrast of commitment and promise, was the risk of forming a culture apart from the Marine Corps Manual 1100 and the Hymn. This could have been reconciled by education and leadership. Yet, to my knowledge and experience, the MCM 1100 was not used by OSO’s, the origin, history and importance of the “promise” was not in the curriculum of OCS, TBS, AWS or C&S. No Chaplains were in the curriculum to show the relationship between MCM 1100 and Paul’s Letters to the Romans, the Ephesians and Philemon (as occurred to a few folks in South Dakota.)
Therein you see the seeds of organizational chaos rather than development. There grew two distinctly different “cohorts” as to the basis for their commitment to the Corps and their life goals.
One that created among some officer ranks, a cohort of unctuous sycophants, obsequious to the point of forming an oleaginous ethos. Another cohort the product of highly resourceful and talented recruiters in the early 1980’s.
This became highly evident in the leadership in 1988. The emphasis on spiritual and physical conditioning was gone. By example and contrast, it was a long way from General Walt’s command guidance in Operation County Fair. Now we see tattooed and obese worshipers of DEI and LQ etc. shepherded by politicians in uniform. Therein lies the chaos -- a deep values disconnect.
I am watching , “Unauthorized History of the Pacific War Podcast Peleliu Part 1 of 3 Stalemate II. First Marine Division has Massive Combined Arms Air, Naval Gunfire, Artillery, Tanks, etc etc…no civilians to sort out, Hamas must have paid attention, the vast majority of the enemy is underground. I will resist commenting on civil war tactics against machine guns and combined arms. I visited Verdun and Douaumont Ossuary. I wrote to Captain Toti USN Ret to discover if he was aware of the debacle known as Force Design and sent him General Zinni and General Van Riper’s exchanges on You Tube along with another short piece I found there on FD.
On X today U.S. Marines @ USMC replayed Retired Marine Berger’s Fantasy Design propaganda pitch followed by his acolyte and now CMC doubling down on stupid beating his chest about the incredible FD and it 1 trick pony. After spending almost 5 hours watching the Unauthorized History of the Pacific War Podcast 3 part series on The Battle of Saipan I was nauseated by the pathetic FD Destruction of Our Corps.
I agree - we don’t 10 years. But, if our meaningful opponents ever suspect either we are not ready, or that we can not get ready to fight, they will move against us and our friends on their time line. Avoid that “Treadmill To Pearl Harbor”.
Thank you Compass Points - today’s edition lays out views I think are spot on in accuracy. Mass and numbers still count - as they always have. Some real sobering thoughts in this one. I must leave the decision to rearm ourselves to those more senior, but, to this Marine, the message is very clear: get ready to fight as a robust, educated & well trained MAGTF, or be prepared for defeat, or dissolution by our own government. Time to move out smartly!
Below are my recommendations on books about close combat, which is the essence of warfare regardless of what the ill-informed and pundits claim. The books are grouped by categories.
A Modest List of Books on Close Combat
Overview
John Keegan, The Face of Battle (New York: The Viking Press, 1976)
Theory
S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War (Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1978) (A reprint of the original copyrighted in 1947)
B.A. Friedman, On Tactics: A Theory of Victory in Battle (Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, Maryland, 2017)
History
John A. English, On Infantry (New York: Praeger, 1981)
John A. English and Bruce I. Gudmunsson, On Infantry: Revised Edition (New York: Praeger, 1994) (Abridges much of the material in the original edition)
Paddy Griffith, Forward Into Battle: Fighting Tactics from Waterloo to the Near Future (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1991)
Illustrations
Michael D. Doubler, Closing With the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945 (University Press of Kansas: Lawrence, Kansas, 1994)
Charles B. MacDonald, Company Commander: The Classic Account of Infantry Combat in World War II (Bantam Books, Inc.: New York, 1947)
Erwin Rommel, Attacks (Athena Press, Inc.: Vienna, Virginia, 1979)
The Infantry Journal, Infantry in Battle (The Infantry Journal Incorporated: Washington, D.C., 1939) (Reprinted by Marine Corps Association in October 1986)
Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 (Greenwood Press: Westport, Connecticut, 1982)
Psychology/Biology — Courage, Fear, and Killing
John Baynes, Morale: A Study of Men and Courage (Avery Publishing Group, Inc.: Garden City Park, New York, 1988)
Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (Little Brown and Company: Boston, 1995)
Richard Holmes, Acts of War: The Behavior of Men in Battle (The Free Press: New York, 1985)
Peter S. Kindsvatter, American Soldiers: Ground Combat in the World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam (University Press of Kansas: Lawrence, Kansas, 2003)
Lord Moran, The Anatomy of Courage (Avery Publishing Group Inc.: Garden City Park, New York, 1987)
Geoffrey Regan, Fight or Flight (Avon Books: New York, 1996)
Stephan P. Rosen, War and Human Nature (Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, 2005)
Johnathan Shay, Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character (Simon & Schuster: New York, 1994)
Ben Shephard, A War of Nerves: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Twentieth Century (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2001)
Grab an armful and get busy just begins to cover it!
I am puzzled. Could Bob Whitener be proposing infantry assaults without supporting arms? Heaven help us. A detailed, historically accurate analysis of Belleau Wood from 105 years ago might be called for. Desperate situations call for desperate measures and amazing courage. They are not models for organization, tactics and operations. We do not need to develop a Picket’s Charge mind set for future combat. Let us leave the “we will pit our will against their steel” mindset to others. FD 20XX is preparing the Corps for another scenario from history - Gallipoli.
The Belleau Wood battle fought without combined arms is used as an example to highlight the importance of the battle ethos of the individual Marine in combat. This is the ethos embedded in all Marines at the respective boot camps. It is this battle ethos that was the deciding factor in the WW2 Pacific campaign battles, the Korean War battles and the battles of every war since. The attempted point being made with Belleau Wood is, as the Marine Corps grapples with combined arms fallout issues over FD 2030, it must still maintain the battle ethos of all Marines. The Marine Corps can continue without tanks. It cant continue without the battle ethos. I conclude with the fact this battle ethos must be prevalent in all Marines if
Marine infantry is to receive the combined arms support it deserves. SF. RW
It is possible that a few battlefield experiences will further clarify my opinion about the importance of the Belleau Wood ethos and Marines. As a Marine officer, who is also an aviator, personal experiences loom heavy from events in Operation Texas in February 1966. It was reported that an infantry company attacked what was considered to be an NVA headquarters. The battle location was the plain west of HWY 1 between Chu Lai and Quang Ngai. Unfortunately, the presumed headquarters was in fact the entire NVA regiment. This realization led to an emergency, regimental heliborne assault employing both MAG-36 and MAG-16 UH-34D helicopters. There were two sequential assault lifts into the battle area. MAG-12 A-4 attack fixed wing were being used to suppress NVA anti air positions. Released napalm cannisters were visible as they wobbled thru the air toward 20mm NVA anti air positions.
The uninformed of both aviation and ground communities do not realize that it requires greater aviation skill to correctly fly aUH-34D than it does to fly an A-4E. As I took control of the helicopter from the copilot and dramatically nosed it over to increase my rate of descent, there was a very loud boom in my cargo compartment area. It was an explosive type boom.
My cargo window M-60 machine gun was being manned by our HMM-363 avionics officer. He was not paid flight skins. He was not a designated crew member. He was a CWO. he was there because we did not have enough L/LCpls to man all the machine guns. He was there because there were fellow Marine infantry in trouble. He was there because as a Marine he had to do his part. This is an example of the Belleau Wood ethos.
I called down on the ICS and asked, "Is everyone alright?" CWO Chip Chipola responded, "Everyone is OK, but this priest is going like hell on his beads." After disembarking the infantry in the LZ we went on to Quang Ngai. There, we learned the UH-34D flown by Lt Noah Kraft and Lt Tom Bird had been shot down in the flight right behind us. The aircrew and embarked infantry perished in the crash.
My crew chief, a sergeant, then told me the loud bang was caused by a shell that had barely missed the tail rotor servo. Had I lost that servo while in the 4000 foot per minute auto rotation descent I was in, I would have lost directional control. I don't think we would have survived. The crew chief was a very young Marine who was very good, or he would not have been a crew chief. I remarked to him after his debrief that he would not be shot at any more that day. The sergeant didn't bat an eye and responded, "Lieutenant, we are not winning this war with my helicopter sitting here down." That is an example of the Belleau Wood ethos and I've never forgotten it. There are many, many more ethos tales. Whatever it is that causes them has to continue. SF
As a final tribute to his D-Day, State visit to France, President Biden spoke at Belleau Wood. Today's, and former Marine Corps leaders, should dwell on the significance of the outcome of the WW l battle that stymied the German onslaught toward Paris. They should dwell on who fought this battle. Their commanding general was U. S. Army. They were suddenly thrown into battle because they were all that was available at the time. This was not a combined arms, maneuver warfare, amphibious assault battle. There was no artillery preparation or a line of departure. Originally, their pickets were badly bloodied. There was no close air support, no tanks, or even bridging equipment. There was no direct involvement in the battle at the flag rank level such was the emergency. There was minimal field grade rank involvement. There was some company grade rank. Belleau Wood was a battle fought by the enlisted United States Marine who prevailed over an elite, entrenched German infantry command. The Marines of the 4th Brigade of Marines won this battle because of who they were as fighting men. Their valor has enshrined them forever as the Treufelhunden by the defeated Germans. For as long as France exists, there will be the appreciation of their sacrifice by the French people.
The first place today's leaders need to be focusing attention is on the individual Marines, not on missing tanks. All of the battles that have been fought since all end up dependent on the performance of the individual Marine. I'm speaking of the hard infantry fighting it takes to seize and hold terrain. All of these battles have been influenced by the fighting ethos of the 4th Brigade of Marines established at Belleau Wood. In that the world's Competition Continuum is presently in a heightened tinderbox situation for armed conflict, who is going to fight the infantry role of the close with and destroy fight?
The infantry, battle role, in the foreseeable future, will fall on the Marines of the Marine Littoral Regiment. While it is true the regiment emphasis has been on Force Design training, the fact remains they are probably among the finest trained infantry Marines on earth today. There is no reason to believe otherwise. In the foreseeable future it is questionable that they will be transported to a battlefield embarked aboard amphibious ships. What alternatives to amphibious ships could be made available to them right now? Today's leaders, past and present, should have an answer right now. One example to the question is that two LHD's joined as an ARG could support a MEU in an emergency. Are there other nonstandard ARG/MEU options for an amphibious deployment? Should there be more geo-prepositioned sites strategically located to support potential; crisis areas that can be supported by fly-in-echelons in lieu of the availability of amphibious ships.
Not only will there be no tanks for combined arms support of the infantry, there are no tank Marines available. Can available aviation assets assume a broader combined arms role, especially with the reactivation of HMLA-269 for attack, air defense, assault and command and control support? Can a cavalry style mobility be better utilized with aviation and ground infantry in battle planning? can there be better day to day coordination between ground and air units in garrison?
During the 1980's, the former 4th Marine Amphibious Brigade deployed on a regular basis as the MAGTF HQ for units assigned from each of the major commands. This is why the later designated 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade was able to form up on an extremely short notice, deploy and then participate very effectively in the Kuwait emergency. The question becomes, are there MEBs formed as policy today to be prepared to deploy to Europe, the Mideast and the Indo Pacific? The MEB level MAGTF provides an ideal command structure for better tactical coordination of the command elements provided by the major commands.
The Marines of the 4th Brigade of Marines, who fought in Belleau Wood passed their battle ethos, the battle ethos of every individual Marine, on to every Marine, present or past, who claims today's Marine title. Are today's Marines, present and past, up to the task to move the Marine Corps forward to the next battle? Political and military events that exist right now demands that they better be ready. SF
In addition to the individual fire team and squad leader there is a long list of Marines finding themselves in the worst of situations and making decisions that were greater than the moment but had even moremomentous outcomes. Gunnery Sargent John Canley at the Battle of Hue. Then Lt. Harvey “Barney” Barnum, then Captain John Ripley, Sgt., then Corporal Dakota Meyer, each seized the moment, clearly leaving self behind to the greater good. This is not to leave out all the MOH Marines or those awarded the Navy Cross too many to mention. Or today driving by a cemetery where the grounds are kept well and American flags carefully planted and many, too many with a USMC ensign waving in the same beeeze. If the current crop of “managers” want to attract the Gen Z men and women to the Corps they could run 60 second ad on all the internet venues, and have it call them to hear the call, to learn the ethos and earn the Eagle, Globe and Anchor. “We few, we Proud, We humble (only at certain times) and just show the images of the many “LEADERS” of Marines, that all can conjure up!and leave the punch line as simple as possible. But, words to the effect of first to fight, faint of heart need not apply.
One cannot imagine what General(s) Louis Wilson or Robert Barrow would think of this current bunch of managers. One suspects they would be handing out paint brushes, cans of white paint and telling them “to get busy” painting those rocks around the Regimental HQ Flagpole.
Regarding the instant E7 Technicians…must be an incredibly small number.
This comments pertains to the Business Insider -article in yesterday's Compass Point 05/02/2024
"The US spent so much time fighting insurgents that it forgot 'what it means to actually fight a war,' a US vet in Ukraine says" By Sinéad Baker
I recently had the opportunity to talk with a Marine that served with 1st Marines in Fallujah who subsequently volunteered and fought for Ukraine. Without prompting, he said Ukraine made Fallujah look like a cake walk. I asked him to elaborate and he said it was the Russian artillery. It was unfortunate that we did not have more time to talk but his comment reinforces the points made in the article and also the warning by German Maj. Gen. Christian Freuding "To fight against peer adversaries, mass still matters."
The strategy among recruiters versus the officer selection officer (OSO) was quite different. This not a judgement right or wrong of any recruiter or OSO. They formulate their dialogue based on the prospects they can convince of an interview. Herein lies the difference as it played out in the Midwest. The OSO’s found that many prospects primarily sought to build a career in some form or fashion. So, the motivation to join was to build a resume within or without the Corps.
By contrast, recruiters continually faced the challenge of parental consent. Again, any recruiter, calibrates his behavior, appearance and dialogue in accordance with the perceived needs of the prospect. In the rural Midwest, it was routine at such appointments to arrive fit and trim in full Blues knowing full well that ranchers and farmers have a discerning eye as to “talk and walk”. While the recruiter presented and discussed the finer points of a copy of the Marine Corps Manual 1100 and the Hymn, his “flip chart” was open to a picture of a boot camp graduate in blues. The major point was the organization’s allegiance to values in 11001 and 1100.4.b and c. So, the objective was to not only to enable the parents to approve the enlistment, but to bring them to the point of encouraging and supporting the son in his decision. This was critical in the arena of non-cohort attrition.
The parents and son made a commitment in the expectation that a promise would be fulfilled. To the delight of the recruiter, no other Service could present the promise found in MCM 1100.2.d. and MCM 1100.4.b and 1100.4.c. Yet in large part, the OSO’ candidates focused on career development and growth.
The danger in this contrast of commitment and promise, was the risk of forming a culture apart from the Marine Corps Manual 1100 and the Hymn. This could have been reconciled by education and leadership. Yet, to my knowledge and experience, the MCM 1100 was not used by OSO’s, the origin, history and importance of the “promise” was not in the curriculum of OCS, TBS, AWS or C&S. No Chaplains were in the curriculum to show the relationship between MCM 1100 and Paul’s Letters to the Romans, the Ephesians and Philemon (as occurred to a few folks in South Dakota.)
Therein you see the seeds of organizational chaos rather than development. There grew two distinctly different “cohorts” as to the basis for their commitment to the Corps and their life goals.
One that created among some officer ranks, a cohort of unctuous sycophants, obsequious to the point of forming an oleaginous ethos. Another cohort the product of highly resourceful and talented recruiters in the early 1980’s.
This became highly evident in the leadership in 1988. The emphasis on spiritual and physical conditioning was gone. By example and contrast, it was a long way from General Walt’s command guidance in Operation County Fair. Now we see tattooed and obese worshipers of DEI and LQ etc. shepherded by politicians in uniform. Therein lies the chaos -- a deep values disconnect.
I am watching , “Unauthorized History of the Pacific War Podcast Peleliu Part 1 of 3 Stalemate II. First Marine Division has Massive Combined Arms Air, Naval Gunfire, Artillery, Tanks, etc etc…no civilians to sort out, Hamas must have paid attention, the vast majority of the enemy is underground. I will resist commenting on civil war tactics against machine guns and combined arms. I visited Verdun and Douaumont Ossuary. I wrote to Captain Toti USN Ret to discover if he was aware of the debacle known as Force Design and sent him General Zinni and General Van Riper’s exchanges on You Tube along with another short piece I found there on FD.
On X today U.S. Marines @ USMC replayed Retired Marine Berger’s Fantasy Design propaganda pitch followed by his acolyte and now CMC doubling down on stupid beating his chest about the incredible FD and it 1 trick pony. After spending almost 5 hours watching the Unauthorized History of the Pacific War Podcast 3 part series on The Battle of Saipan I was nauseated by the pathetic FD Destruction of Our Corps.
HISTORY TELLS US WE DO NOT HAVE 10 and 1/2 years!
I agree - we don’t 10 years. But, if our meaningful opponents ever suspect either we are not ready, or that we can not get ready to fight, they will move against us and our friends on their time line. Avoid that “Treadmill To Pearl Harbor”.