I admit up front I am not as well-read as those who contribute to Compass Points. And my seven years of active duty in the Marine Corps does not stack up to those who have given their careers to the Corps and continue to do so after service. The slight advantage or insight I have is two years with the amphibs in the mid-1970's on two ships. I know how difficult it is to load, embark, debark, and conduct an amphibious exercise. The Navy and Marines both have to be excellent and professional. The Marines can become even better warfighters but without ships, they cannot perform the mission. The Navy has demonstrated poor quality leadership, poor maintenance, poor ship design, long construction time, and other problems many of you have read. We need to push for an improved, professional Navy at the same time we work to refocus, rebuild, and restructure the Marine Corps.
One of the problems is that the 38th and 39th CMC became distracted and then dilusional in their views of what and where the Marine Corps ought to go. Any CMC can get very bright Mairnes and or outside consultants to craft a cogent argument for FD2030 and “divest to invest.” Obviously they did just that, ergo they got distracted from a warfighting culture of maneuver warfare to one of chasing a “peer foe” in a combantant region (which is HUGE) and playing hide and seek in a totally defensive posture with no regard to logistics. It has been a puzzling time, General’s Berger and Smith are not dumb people, but here comes the dilusional part, they deluded themselves and the DC cocktail circuit or vice versa that skipping Title X was fine, that the MEU, MEB and MEF had seen their best days and moved on. Nearly everything they prognosticated was wrong or off kilter. The USA assuming that the new administration even bothers to keep the Marine Corps around, is going to find itself in a new war on terrorism, the bad guys such as Al-Qaeda and Isis are clearly reconstituted, on the move and likely many terror cells here and abroad waiting for orders. One might opine that “October 7th” was a dress rehearsal. To combat these threats we will need a highly agile fully complementary MAGTF that can attack from the platoon level and up, with full combined arms capability. No military outfit on the earth currently can mix and match men and equipment to the situation as fast and functionally as the USMC. Further, no fighting force has the Marine Corps secret sauce, namely “US” meaning we Marines and our ethos. We can find, fix and kill the enemy. We need strident senior officers to go up on the hill and tell the various committees that we are ready to degrade, wound and kill bad guys in that simple language that most Marines speak in. The language of FD2030 and “Divest to invest” is college theory talk. Time for hard talk, and a revitalized MAGTF that will meet the many small to medium engagements that are coming down the line. If it comes to a peer foe fight it’s gonna be a lot more than a couple of MLR’s being engaged or even an entire US Marine Corps, so sticking to our knitting and getting back to basics seems the order of the day.
Speaking of getting back to basics, I have not read anything recently about Marines training with Army tankers to get some tank-infantry training. This would be a good start.
Bring the armor MOS back, send them to For Knox and then if they have to run around in Humvees masquerading as Abram’s at least the infantry and armor are working together again. I suspect if needed, if we have the people we can find the gear. Never wish for something out loud with your rifle platoon, as in “I wish we had…” damn if it doesn’t turn up…then it is “Now what?!!!”
We do well in this debate to assume nothing. The opposition has a viewpoint and an argument. Contrary to popular opinion, they are intelligent. This is a very good example. While I disagree with his take, it is coherent and definitely briefs well. It captures the same source material we point to and plays it for purpose to the advantage of FD(2030). Imagine a member of Congress or the incoming administration getting this as part of the brief:
**"The purpose of the Marine Littoral Regiments is similar. They’re not intended to stop PLAN sorties, but rather put them in a dilemma. Either expend a massive amount of time and munitions finding and striking small Marine squads or just go around. If they choose the first, that opens them up to counter-offensive by the Navy and Air Force as they lock themselves down in one operating area. If they choose the latter, then they are channeled into one or just a few predictable axes, making them vulnerable to Navy/Air Force assets. If PLAN ships start taking naval strike missiles between the eyes in the process, that’s even better.
So the MLRs are a bit like the Maginot Line: a way to facilitate counter-offensives. They’re not analogous to the World War II era defense battalions that had no offensive purpose. It requires a little faith that the Navy and Air Force can react faster than the French Army, but it is a direct application of combined arms at the joint level and the creation of dilemmas from MCDP-1 Warfighting. Deny key maneuver space to the enemy and force them to do what you want. It’s nothing the Marine Corps hasn’t done forever, now it’s just doing so at sea too."**. - B.A. Friedman (https://bafriedman.substack.com/p/amphibiosity-ix) (please do not go mob Friedman's account and post 50 times in the comments for this article how wrong he is. He wrote it last year, he knows we don't agree, and you aren't going to enlighten him on this point.)
Well, maybe not. The general focus of the debate here on CP has been capabilities and I agree with your warning; “We do well in this debate to assume nothing”. The question in my mind is; should we be debating capabilities vs the strategy (and resultant war plans)? I have commented on previous CP posts about the “Tradeoff Triangle”. When you discuss capability needs, they should be accessed through the strategy “trade off” filter’s relational legs of lethality, survivability, and affordability. The bad assumption was to cut capabilities in order to experiment, nor should we be ignoring our amphibious genealogy. It makes no sense to me to cut capabilities when they are not part of the tradeoff analysis. This is a good example of I am talking about (https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/june/improving-sea-missile-rearming). The Navy is not cutting capabilities here they are enhancing them based on their strategic needs.
If you look at the history of the pre-WW2 “Plan Orange” (war against Japan in the Pacific), its planning and war gaming started after WWI and continued until Pearl Harbor. The first strategic assumption our military leadership made was the “Plan” had to be offensive in nature. Yet, they assumed in Phase 1 that the US would rapidly lose lightly defended outposts South and West of the Japanese owned “Mandate Islands” (the Marianas, the Carolina, and the Marshall Islands) and the Philippines. Despite MacArthur’s boost he could defined the Philippines with bombers, PT boats and the Philippine Army. Due to the unremitting attention and review, War Plan Orange was expanded to include (1939 – 1941) the South China Sea (Singapore, Java, and Rabaul). Phase 2 and 3 of the "Plan" would be Naval spearheads of superior naval and air forces fighting “intense but small-scale battles” to choke off all Japan’s imports and ravage its industries and cities by air bombardment until it sued for peace, even though its proud army stood intact in the home islands and in China”. (p.4) The Plan also assumed that the progressively tightening blockade would; “At a time and place of Japan’s choosing, the two battle fleets would meet in a cataclysmic gunnery engagement.” Think the Battle of Leyte Gulf here. (*Ref: War Plan Orange, The US Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897 -1945 by Edward S. Miller; Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1991)
The current assumption seems to be the INDOPACOM Combatant Commander and service chiefs are the primary planners for a war with the CCP. I feel that a better assumption will be any war with the CCP will be a global war. In addition, because of the CCP’s asymmetric warfare genealogy and “Total War” doctrine, every effort will be made to distract all of our Combatant Commander's attention away from Taiwan and the South China Sea. Think about the current US Red Sea situation here. The US Military needs a “Global War Plan” involving all the Combatant Commanders addressing the assessed CCP’s global threats. Question: Who will manage that global war plan? Joint Staff maybe? Will that call for a rehab of the Joint Deliberate Planning System?
The difference between the MLR concept and the Maginot Line is (in naval warfare) small islands are easily neutralized, bypassed and hard to reinforce. Remember the Wake Island relief force was recalled after receiving reports of Japanese carriers and battleships in the area and the air attacks on Wake. S/F
SecDef will look at this internecine conflict and give a definitive course on which we will set sail. As an aside, I used 3-1 to develop my thesis for an MBA although I had many business planning books on my shelf. Principle reader thought it was thoroughly prepared. Don’t toss it it, still give a framework for the task at hand
I admit up front I am not as well-read as those who contribute to Compass Points. And my seven years of active duty in the Marine Corps does not stack up to those who have given their careers to the Corps and continue to do so after service. The slight advantage or insight I have is two years with the amphibs in the mid-1970's on two ships. I know how difficult it is to load, embark, debark, and conduct an amphibious exercise. The Navy and Marines both have to be excellent and professional. The Marines can become even better warfighters but without ships, they cannot perform the mission. The Navy has demonstrated poor quality leadership, poor maintenance, poor ship design, long construction time, and other problems many of you have read. We need to push for an improved, professional Navy at the same time we work to refocus, rebuild, and restructure the Marine Corps.
Semper Fi
The USN is still suffering from the Fat Leonard Scandal, a Toxic Admiralty, a DEI CNO, and the inability to STAND A FIRE WATCH!
One of the problems is that the 38th and 39th CMC became distracted and then dilusional in their views of what and where the Marine Corps ought to go. Any CMC can get very bright Mairnes and or outside consultants to craft a cogent argument for FD2030 and “divest to invest.” Obviously they did just that, ergo they got distracted from a warfighting culture of maneuver warfare to one of chasing a “peer foe” in a combantant region (which is HUGE) and playing hide and seek in a totally defensive posture with no regard to logistics. It has been a puzzling time, General’s Berger and Smith are not dumb people, but here comes the dilusional part, they deluded themselves and the DC cocktail circuit or vice versa that skipping Title X was fine, that the MEU, MEB and MEF had seen their best days and moved on. Nearly everything they prognosticated was wrong or off kilter. The USA assuming that the new administration even bothers to keep the Marine Corps around, is going to find itself in a new war on terrorism, the bad guys such as Al-Qaeda and Isis are clearly reconstituted, on the move and likely many terror cells here and abroad waiting for orders. One might opine that “October 7th” was a dress rehearsal. To combat these threats we will need a highly agile fully complementary MAGTF that can attack from the platoon level and up, with full combined arms capability. No military outfit on the earth currently can mix and match men and equipment to the situation as fast and functionally as the USMC. Further, no fighting force has the Marine Corps secret sauce, namely “US” meaning we Marines and our ethos. We can find, fix and kill the enemy. We need strident senior officers to go up on the hill and tell the various committees that we are ready to degrade, wound and kill bad guys in that simple language that most Marines speak in. The language of FD2030 and “Divest to invest” is college theory talk. Time for hard talk, and a revitalized MAGTF that will meet the many small to medium engagements that are coming down the line. If it comes to a peer foe fight it’s gonna be a lot more than a couple of MLR’s being engaged or even an entire US Marine Corps, so sticking to our knitting and getting back to basics seems the order of the day.
Speaking of getting back to basics, I have not read anything recently about Marines training with Army tankers to get some tank-infantry training. This would be a good start.
Bring the armor MOS back, send them to For Knox and then if they have to run around in Humvees masquerading as Abram’s at least the infantry and armor are working together again. I suspect if needed, if we have the people we can find the gear. Never wish for something out loud with your rifle platoon, as in “I wish we had…” damn if it doesn’t turn up…then it is “Now what?!!!”
We do well in this debate to assume nothing. The opposition has a viewpoint and an argument. Contrary to popular opinion, they are intelligent. This is a very good example. While I disagree with his take, it is coherent and definitely briefs well. It captures the same source material we point to and plays it for purpose to the advantage of FD(2030). Imagine a member of Congress or the incoming administration getting this as part of the brief:
**"The purpose of the Marine Littoral Regiments is similar. They’re not intended to stop PLAN sorties, but rather put them in a dilemma. Either expend a massive amount of time and munitions finding and striking small Marine squads or just go around. If they choose the first, that opens them up to counter-offensive by the Navy and Air Force as they lock themselves down in one operating area. If they choose the latter, then they are channeled into one or just a few predictable axes, making them vulnerable to Navy/Air Force assets. If PLAN ships start taking naval strike missiles between the eyes in the process, that’s even better.
So the MLRs are a bit like the Maginot Line: a way to facilitate counter-offensives. They’re not analogous to the World War II era defense battalions that had no offensive purpose. It requires a little faith that the Navy and Air Force can react faster than the French Army, but it is a direct application of combined arms at the joint level and the creation of dilemmas from MCDP-1 Warfighting. Deny key maneuver space to the enemy and force them to do what you want. It’s nothing the Marine Corps hasn’t done forever, now it’s just doing so at sea too."**. - B.A. Friedman (https://bafriedman.substack.com/p/amphibiosity-ix) (please do not go mob Friedman's account and post 50 times in the comments for this article how wrong he is. He wrote it last year, he knows we don't agree, and you aren't going to enlighten him on this point.)
On target! 20 January, 2025 Make the Marine Corps, A Warfighter AGAIN!
Yes. Drop the Maginot Line/defensive missile force, and get offensive.
Reply to cfrog’s comments on MLR’s defense:
Well, maybe not. The general focus of the debate here on CP has been capabilities and I agree with your warning; “We do well in this debate to assume nothing”. The question in my mind is; should we be debating capabilities vs the strategy (and resultant war plans)? I have commented on previous CP posts about the “Tradeoff Triangle”. When you discuss capability needs, they should be accessed through the strategy “trade off” filter’s relational legs of lethality, survivability, and affordability. The bad assumption was to cut capabilities in order to experiment, nor should we be ignoring our amphibious genealogy. It makes no sense to me to cut capabilities when they are not part of the tradeoff analysis. This is a good example of I am talking about (https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/june/improving-sea-missile-rearming). The Navy is not cutting capabilities here they are enhancing them based on their strategic needs.
If you look at the history of the pre-WW2 “Plan Orange” (war against Japan in the Pacific), its planning and war gaming started after WWI and continued until Pearl Harbor. The first strategic assumption our military leadership made was the “Plan” had to be offensive in nature. Yet, they assumed in Phase 1 that the US would rapidly lose lightly defended outposts South and West of the Japanese owned “Mandate Islands” (the Marianas, the Carolina, and the Marshall Islands) and the Philippines. Despite MacArthur’s boost he could defined the Philippines with bombers, PT boats and the Philippine Army. Due to the unremitting attention and review, War Plan Orange was expanded to include (1939 – 1941) the South China Sea (Singapore, Java, and Rabaul). Phase 2 and 3 of the "Plan" would be Naval spearheads of superior naval and air forces fighting “intense but small-scale battles” to choke off all Japan’s imports and ravage its industries and cities by air bombardment until it sued for peace, even though its proud army stood intact in the home islands and in China”. (p.4) The Plan also assumed that the progressively tightening blockade would; “At a time and place of Japan’s choosing, the two battle fleets would meet in a cataclysmic gunnery engagement.” Think the Battle of Leyte Gulf here. (*Ref: War Plan Orange, The US Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897 -1945 by Edward S. Miller; Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1991)
The current assumption seems to be the INDOPACOM Combatant Commander and service chiefs are the primary planners for a war with the CCP. I feel that a better assumption will be any war with the CCP will be a global war. In addition, because of the CCP’s asymmetric warfare genealogy and “Total War” doctrine, every effort will be made to distract all of our Combatant Commander's attention away from Taiwan and the South China Sea. Think about the current US Red Sea situation here. The US Military needs a “Global War Plan” involving all the Combatant Commanders addressing the assessed CCP’s global threats. Question: Who will manage that global war plan? Joint Staff maybe? Will that call for a rehab of the Joint Deliberate Planning System?
The difference between the MLR concept and the Maginot Line is (in naval warfare) small islands are easily neutralized, bypassed and hard to reinforce. Remember the Wake Island relief force was recalled after receiving reports of Japanese carriers and battleships in the area and the air attacks on Wake. S/F
SecDef will look at this internecine conflict and give a definitive course on which we will set sail. As an aside, I used 3-1 to develop my thesis for an MBA although I had many business planning books on my shelf. Principle reader thought it was thoroughly prepared. Don’t toss it it, still give a framework for the task at hand