Compass Points - FRAGO - Ships
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April 10, 2024
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In his recent frag order, the Commandant reaffirms that the Marine Corps must continue to provide Marine expeditionary forces onboard Navy amphibious ships.
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The changing character of war does not eliminate the need for forward deployed forces; we will continue to provide our Nation with world-class naval expeditionary forces deployed forward to campaign closely alongside our Navy shipmates.
-- FRAGO 01-2024
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If the Navy and Marine Corps are going to have ARG/MEUs on patrol around the globe, the serious issues with Navy ship building and ship maintenance need to be solved. The Marine Commandant and the Navy CNO have co-signed a letter to start a "deep dive into ship readiness." The Navy CNO says it is time to "nip this in the bud."
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NATIONAL HARBOR, Md. — The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps will study amphibious warship readiness and how the services can get ahead of ship maintenance challenges, the top Navy officer told reporters today.
Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Lisa Franchetti said she and Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. Eric Smith signed a letter to their three-star officers who oversee plans and operations, calling for a deep dive on ship readiness and requirements for the training and certification of ship groups and the Marines who embark on them.
Franchetti, who spoke to a group of reporters following remarks at the Navy League’s annual Sea-Air-Space conference here, acknowledged the amphibious assault ship Boxer deployed last week several months later than planned. To make up for its delay — caused by a maintenance challenge, as reported by Military.com — fellow Boxer Amphibious Ready Group ship Somerset deployed in January, taking on missions solo until its two fellow vessels and their embarked Marines could join it in the Pacific Ocean. She said the Navy is also eyeing potential delays for the amphibious assault ship Wasp, which recently began basic at-sea operations following a lengthy maintenance availability.
“We’re trying to look ahead to make sure that we can, I want to say, nip this in the bud,” she explained.
-- Megan Eckstein, Navy Times
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It is good news that the challenges with ship building and ship maintenance are getting the attention of senior leaders. Unfortunately, solutions will require more than just attention. The Navy needs to build many more new ships and subs than it has the capacity to build. And the Navy needs to overhaul many more existing ships and subs than it has the capacity to overhaul. What to do? There are several answers including using the facilities of our Pacific allies for more ship maintenance and overhaul. Another answer is to use ships that are available now. Author Carl Forsling advocates more use of ESDs and ESBs.
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There is a good chance the Marine Corps will get neither the amphibious transport docks (LPDs) nor LSMs in the numbers it needs, leaving it unable to conduct traditional expeditionary operations or deploy distributed forces. The Navy needs to stop buying LPDs and LSMs. Instead, it needs more of the already fielded expeditionary transfer dock (ESD) and expeditionary sea base (ESB) ships.
. . . The versatility of ESDs and ESBs offers incredible value for both the Marine Corps and the Navy. These ships have immense capacity to embark personnel and equipment to support EABO. They have an organic capability to support surface and air insertion at vast distances. They both can support multiple modes of reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance. With the right packages on board, they could even be formidable strike platforms.
-- Carl Forsling, Proceedings
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The Marine Corps needs more Navy amphibious ships available both now and in the future. The LSM is not a realistic alternative as it is not in procurement now and may never be. Marines need ships in the water with a consistent readiness rate close to 80%. While the Proceedings article advocates the Marine Corps give up the small deck amphibs, the better approach is most likely to keep building and overhauling both large deck and small deck amphibs, while making use of Military Sealift Command temporary alternatives like the ESB, ESD, and particularly the Expeditionary Fast Transports (EST) which are available now in quantity. Marines could be deployed in three groups of three ESTs permanently home ported in Naples (3 ESTs), Bahrain (3 ESTs), and Sasebo (3 ESTs). That way, the Marine Corps would have a Special Purpose MAGTF always available to respond immediately to EUCOM, AFRICOM, CENTCOM, and INDO-PACOM.
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Compass Points salutes Carl Forsling for his fine Proceedings article and also salutes the Commandant and the CNO for their initiative to "nip in the bud" the many challenges with amphibious ship building and ship maintenance. The clock is ticking. The Nation cannot wait a decade to make progress on amphibious ships. More amphibious ships and support ships are needed today and that includes a great need for more Maritime Prepositioning Ships as well.
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The Marine Corps has previously made some small use of the Military Sealift Command vessels; now is the time to do more. The Navy and Marine Corps must take a very serious look at temporary, amphibious alternatives, some of which are available now including the ESB and ESD. Beyond those two, the Expeditionary Fast Transports are available now in significant numbers.
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USNI Proceedings - April 2024 - Vol. 150/4/1,454
Solve Amphibious Shipping Shortfall with ESDs and ESBs
The landing ship medium program is still years away from delivering intertheater lift capacity to support EABO, and San Antonio-class LPDs are too expensive to buy in quantities needed. A solution is already at hand.
By Major Carl Forsling, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
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Navy Times - 04/08/2024
Navy, Marines launching study to improve readiness of amphibious fleet
By Megan Eckstein
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US Marine Corps
FRAGO 01-2024
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Compass Points - DAX MAGTF - Part 2
Keep the promise to be there.
August 12, 2023
https://marinecorpscompasspoints.substack.com/p/compass-points-dax-magtf-part-2
A timely and interesting article in this month's Proceeding ... topic ESDs and EBSs https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/april/solve-amphibious-shipping-shortfall-esds-and-esbs
Combine this article with this CP - FRAGO- Ships .... I think we are making progress
Another Proceedings Article
Some interesting articles in this month’s Proceedings. This month’s theme is “Expedition Warfare”. I am still going through this April 2024 Volume, but the second article to get my attention is “Force Design Still Too Heavy”.
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/april/force-design-still-too-heavy
The author makes the case that the “Marine Corps should incorporate a light infantry force or develop light infantry-capable elements within the infantry battalion force structure. In this regard, the Russia-Ukraine war offers lessons the Marine Corps should consider.” After a good discussion on light infantry the author cites the WW2 “Chindits” as an example of light infantry used in guerrilla warfare and as a deep penetration force.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chindits
The Chindit’s units were formed as a long ranger deep penetration guerrilla force after the British were chased out of Burma into India by the Japanese Army. One reason the Chindits were deemed an unconventional guerrilla force because their “total reliance on airdrops for their supplies and complete dependence on wireless for communications”.
General Orde Wingate formed the first brigade of approximately 3000 Chindits. Operation “Longcloth” was their first expedition. The Brigade was divided into small groups and they entered the Burma jungles in February 1943.
They did manage to keep the Japanese attention for three months, however, their success is questionable. Air supply, coordination, and communications remained major issues. “After a three-month mission, the majority of the surviving Chindits had crossed the Chindwin River, having marched between 750–1,000 miles. Of the 3,000 men that had begun the operation, a third (818 men) had been killed, taken prisoner or died of disease, and of the 2,182 men who returned, about 600 were too debilitated from their wounds or disease to return to active service. Of the remaining men, Wingate practically handpicked those few he would retain, while the rest were put back under the normal army command structure as part of their original battalions.”
After the Chindit “guerilla” operation “Longcloth”, General Wingate organized and planned a “deep penetration” operation. The Chindits, as Special Operators, made a glider assault on a landing zone and clear an airfield for follow on brigades. They accomplished this despite inadequate planning and intelligence. Of the 46 gliders nearly half did not make the landing zone. They did manage to hold and clear the landing zone to establish an airfield for the fly in brigades. Once the fly-in brigades began offensive operations, however, the Chindits were used to seize well defended Japanese objectives.
“…the Chindits were misused under Stillwell's command and suffered heavy casualties undertaking roles that they were not trained or equipped … the Chindits had suffered heavy casualties: 1,396 killed and 2,434 wounded. Over half had to be confined to hospital and prescribed a special nutritional diet whilst hospitalized.”
The other question is: Were Chindits really light infantry? ”Each man carried more than 72 pounds (33 kg) of equipment, which was proportionally more than the mules carrying the support weapons and other stores. This included a personal weapon, such as the SMLE rifle or Sten Gun, ammunition, grenades, a machete or Gurkha kukri knife...rations, groundsheet… and other assorted items. Much of this load was carried in an Everest carrier, which was essentially a metal rucksack frame without a pack.”
I have always thought of US Marine infantry battalions as light infantry. However, because of the MAGTF doctrine that allows the tailoring of the force to the mission, I recognized that Marine infantry came with the needed sustainment, fire support and air support based on the mission.
The US Marine Corps issue today is force structure and the lack of US Navy Amphibious ships. The issue is not “light infantry”. SOCCOM has the “guerrilla” mission. The US deep penetration force is the 101st Airborne Division. One of the capability lessons demonstrated in Desert Storm was the 101st Division’s 175 mile penetration into Iraqi territory to cut the Iraq MSR. Let’s not confuse the issues. Lets keep the Marines focus on their amphibious warfare roots and the MAGTF doctrine.