Some interesting articles in this month’s Proceedings. This month’s theme is “Expedition Warfare”. I am still going through this April 2024 Volume, but the second article to get my attention is “Force Design Still Too Heavy”.
The author makes the case that the “Marine Corps should incorporate a light infantry force or develop light infantry-capable elements within the infantry battalion force structure. In this regard, the Russia-Ukraine war offers lessons the Marine Corps should consider.” After a good discussion on light infantry the author cites the WW2 “Chindits” as an example of light infantry used in guerrilla warfare and as a deep penetration force.
The Chindit’s units were formed as a long ranger deep penetration guerrilla force after the British were chased out of Burma into India by the Japanese Army. One reason the Chindits were deemed an unconventional guerrilla force because their “total reliance on airdrops for their supplies and complete dependence on wireless for communications”.
General Orde Wingate formed the first brigade of approximately 3000 Chindits. Operation “Longcloth” was their first expedition. The Brigade was divided into small groups and they entered the Burma jungles in February 1943.
They did manage to keep the Japanese attention for three months, however, their success is questionable. Air supply, coordination, and communications remained major issues. “After a three-month mission, the majority of the surviving Chindits had crossed the Chindwin River, having marched between 750–1,000 miles. Of the 3,000 men that had begun the operation, a third (818 men) had been killed, taken prisoner or died of disease, and of the 2,182 men who returned, about 600 were too debilitated from their wounds or disease to return to active service. Of the remaining men, Wingate practically handpicked those few he would retain, while the rest were put back under the normal army command structure as part of their original battalions.”
After the Chindit “guerilla” operation “Longcloth”, General Wingate organized and planned a “deep penetration” operation. The Chindits, as Special Operators, made a glider assault on a landing zone and clear an airfield for follow on brigades. They accomplished this despite inadequate planning and intelligence. Of the 46 gliders nearly half did not make the landing zone. They did manage to hold and clear the landing zone to establish an airfield for the fly in brigades. Once the fly-in brigades began offensive operations, however, the Chindits were used to seize well defended Japanese objectives.
“…the Chindits were misused under Stillwell's command and suffered heavy casualties undertaking roles that they were not trained or equipped … the Chindits had suffered heavy casualties: 1,396 killed and 2,434 wounded. Over half had to be confined to hospital and prescribed a special nutritional diet whilst hospitalized.”
The other question is: Were Chindits really light infantry? ”Each man carried more than 72 pounds (33 kg) of equipment, which was proportionally more than the mules carrying the support weapons and other stores. This included a personal weapon, such as the SMLE rifle or Sten Gun, ammunition, grenades, a machete or Gurkha kukri knife...rations, groundsheet… and other assorted items. Much of this load was carried in an Everest carrier, which was essentially a metal rucksack frame without a pack.”
I have always thought of US Marine infantry battalions as light infantry. However, because of the MAGTF doctrine that allows the tailoring of the force to the mission, I recognized that Marine infantry came with the needed sustainment, fire support and air support based on the mission.
The US Marine Corps issue today is force structure and the lack of US Navy Amphibious ships. The issue is not “light infantry”. SOCCOM has the “guerrilla” mission. The US deep penetration force is the 101st Airborne Division. One of the capability lessons demonstrated in Desert Storm was the 101st Division’s 175 mile penetration into Iraqi territory to cut the Iraq MSR. Let’s not confuse the issues. Lets keep the Marines focus on their amphibious warfare roots and the MAGTF doctrine.
All good comments, though at this point I think the lift plan for the Evacuation of Dunkirk and the Composition of TF 317 (UK - Falklands) may be worth more study than much else. Ad hoc Amphibious sourcing appears to be more the order of the day, with inertia on the side of it getting worse before it gets better. I suspect it would be better to plan an ARG with 1 grey ship and some leased public vessels. If the USN has to concentrate on keeping the Carriers, Surface Warfare, and Submarine Force at speed, then the ARGs should lean on that protection to mitigate the risk in using private sourcing and leasing to compensate for amphibious shortfalls. Conversely, maybe we need to look at matching priorities for ship building with where we put Marines, even if it isn't a perfect solution.
A timely and interesting article in this month's Proceeding ... topic ESDs and EBSs https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/april/solve-amphibious-shipping-shortfall-esds-and-esbs
Combine this article with this CP - FRAGO- Ships .... I think we are making progress
Another Proceedings Article
Some interesting articles in this month’s Proceedings. This month’s theme is “Expedition Warfare”. I am still going through this April 2024 Volume, but the second article to get my attention is “Force Design Still Too Heavy”.
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/april/force-design-still-too-heavy
The author makes the case that the “Marine Corps should incorporate a light infantry force or develop light infantry-capable elements within the infantry battalion force structure. In this regard, the Russia-Ukraine war offers lessons the Marine Corps should consider.” After a good discussion on light infantry the author cites the WW2 “Chindits” as an example of light infantry used in guerrilla warfare and as a deep penetration force.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chindits
The Chindit’s units were formed as a long ranger deep penetration guerrilla force after the British were chased out of Burma into India by the Japanese Army. One reason the Chindits were deemed an unconventional guerrilla force because their “total reliance on airdrops for their supplies and complete dependence on wireless for communications”.
General Orde Wingate formed the first brigade of approximately 3000 Chindits. Operation “Longcloth” was their first expedition. The Brigade was divided into small groups and they entered the Burma jungles in February 1943.
They did manage to keep the Japanese attention for three months, however, their success is questionable. Air supply, coordination, and communications remained major issues. “After a three-month mission, the majority of the surviving Chindits had crossed the Chindwin River, having marched between 750–1,000 miles. Of the 3,000 men that had begun the operation, a third (818 men) had been killed, taken prisoner or died of disease, and of the 2,182 men who returned, about 600 were too debilitated from their wounds or disease to return to active service. Of the remaining men, Wingate practically handpicked those few he would retain, while the rest were put back under the normal army command structure as part of their original battalions.”
After the Chindit “guerilla” operation “Longcloth”, General Wingate organized and planned a “deep penetration” operation. The Chindits, as Special Operators, made a glider assault on a landing zone and clear an airfield for follow on brigades. They accomplished this despite inadequate planning and intelligence. Of the 46 gliders nearly half did not make the landing zone. They did manage to hold and clear the landing zone to establish an airfield for the fly in brigades. Once the fly-in brigades began offensive operations, however, the Chindits were used to seize well defended Japanese objectives.
“…the Chindits were misused under Stillwell's command and suffered heavy casualties undertaking roles that they were not trained or equipped … the Chindits had suffered heavy casualties: 1,396 killed and 2,434 wounded. Over half had to be confined to hospital and prescribed a special nutritional diet whilst hospitalized.”
The other question is: Were Chindits really light infantry? ”Each man carried more than 72 pounds (33 kg) of equipment, which was proportionally more than the mules carrying the support weapons and other stores. This included a personal weapon, such as the SMLE rifle or Sten Gun, ammunition, grenades, a machete or Gurkha kukri knife...rations, groundsheet… and other assorted items. Much of this load was carried in an Everest carrier, which was essentially a metal rucksack frame without a pack.”
I have always thought of US Marine infantry battalions as light infantry. However, because of the MAGTF doctrine that allows the tailoring of the force to the mission, I recognized that Marine infantry came with the needed sustainment, fire support and air support based on the mission.
The US Marine Corps issue today is force structure and the lack of US Navy Amphibious ships. The issue is not “light infantry”. SOCCOM has the “guerrilla” mission. The US deep penetration force is the 101st Airborne Division. One of the capability lessons demonstrated in Desert Storm was the 101st Division’s 175 mile penetration into Iraqi territory to cut the Iraq MSR. Let’s not confuse the issues. Lets keep the Marines focus on their amphibious warfare roots and the MAGTF doctrine.
All good comments, though at this point I think the lift plan for the Evacuation of Dunkirk and the Composition of TF 317 (UK - Falklands) may be worth more study than much else. Ad hoc Amphibious sourcing appears to be more the order of the day, with inertia on the side of it getting worse before it gets better. I suspect it would be better to plan an ARG with 1 grey ship and some leased public vessels. If the USN has to concentrate on keeping the Carriers, Surface Warfare, and Submarine Force at speed, then the ARGs should lean on that protection to mitigate the risk in using private sourcing and leasing to compensate for amphibious shortfalls. Conversely, maybe we need to look at matching priorities for ship building with where we put Marines, even if it isn't a perfect solution.
Finally, some positive news!