Compass Points - FRAGO - SIF
How to respond to a school yard bully?
Compass Points - FRAGO - SIF
How to respond to a school yard bully?
April 11, 2024
.
For nations in the Pacific, China is a school yard bully. That is why Pacific nations are beefing up their military defenses. One Marine Corps senior general was quoted recently explaining,
.
===============
.
Our allies and partners are all in. They are feeling the heat, they’re tired of getting pushed around in their own backyards.
-- Marine Times
.
===============
.
Some years ago, the Marine Corps initiated so-called “Stand-in-Forces.” The theory was that Marine Stand-in-Forces (SIF), with missiles, would be of particular use in the Pacific. The Commandant commented on SIF in his recent frag order.
.
===============
.
Marine Stand-in Forces are at that tactical edge in combat. They deter by their presence alongside our Allies and partners, and their ability to conduct distributed operations, sense and make sense, and hold adversaries at risk through organic or joint fires. They will fight alongside other members of the naval, joint, and combined force within the adversary’s WEZ. That adversary will attempt to deny and degrade the joint force’s ability to see and sense. Marines will use the platforms and capabilities developed under Force Design to conduct multi-domain and multi-source collections and proliferate that intelligence across the joint force. We are the eyes and ears for the joint force, ideally positioned within the WEZ to conduct both reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance, to act as a Joint Fires integrator for the combined force, and to strike the enemy from land and air to sea with organic sensors and precision fires, when necessary.
-- FRAGO 01-2024
.
===============
.
The explanation of the value of SIF is long on reconnaissance and short on infantry combat. The Marine Corps has always had reconnaissance units and Marine commanders have always valued the information provided by reconnaissance. But reconnaissance is simply a step toward taking the fight to the enemy. The language of SIF is almost entirely focused on recon alone.
.
===============
.
"see and sense"
"see and sense"
"multi-source collections"
"proliferate that intelligence"
"the eyes and ears for the joint force"
"conduct reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance"
-- FRAGO 01-2024
.
===============
.
Much of this recon language is the language from the old Force Design 2030. But "Force Design 2030" is no more. It is supposed to be in the process of being replaced by "Force Design" which is evolving to re-balance the MAGTF. No doubt Pacific nations want to place their own military units on their own territory to conduct defensive "see and sense" missions. But it is not clear why the Marine Corps, as it re-balances toward a MAGTF approach, would want to continue its focus on immobile SIF missile forces on Pacific islands.
.
A recent NPR report on the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment on Okinawa, Japan raises many questions about the SIF unit. One expert interviewed by NPR recalls that in World War II, when small Japanese military units on Pacific islands were bypassed and cut off, not only were the units militarily useless, they starved to death.
.
The Pacific nations need more than just recon and missile units. For example, the Marine Times reports that,
.
===============
.
In January, the Philippines announced its Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept, a shift to join its army, air force and navy in an external security focus . . . The move has been described as a move to counter Chinese military aggression and incursion into the nation’s territorial waters.
-- Marine Times
.
===============
.
Nearly every week, the Philippine nation is facing Chinese aggression just off the Philippine coast. China is using a variety of ships and tactics to bully the Philippines out of disputed islands and atolls. The Philippines have refused to back down.
.
The Philippines need help. What would help the Philippines are not US Marine SIF forces isolated and immobile on nearby islands. Instead, what would help the Philippines are US Marines onboard nearby Navy amphibious ships, ready to arrive and deter the ongoing Chinese aggression.
.
Bully on the block? Send in the Marines!
.
Is it more complicated? Obviously, the US Marine Corps cannot take on China by itself, but the question is, who will stand with the Philippines against Chinese aggression? The Marine Times quoted one Marine spokesman explaining that the central question is much more complicated,
.
===============
.
. . . how in distributed naval terrain do you sense and make sense; do you synchronize and coordinate in combined operations. How do you establish the right linkages for command and control?
-- Marine Times
.
===============
.
Undoubtedly, new technology -- as always -- has brought changes to the battlefield. And, undoubtedly, there must be some useful wisdom in phrases like "sense and make sense" and "synchronize and coordinate" and "establish the right linkages." But somehow the quotation does not quite have the same power as another quotation, "locate, close with, and destroy, the enemy by fire and maneuver, or repel the enemy assault by fire and close combat."
.
The nations in the Pacific are dealing with a school yard bully. They need help. They do not need US Marines with missiles to merely sit and wait and “see and sense." Pacific nations need someone they can count on to stand up to the bully. That is what Marines have always done. Compass Points salutes the Marine Corps for re-balancing toward a MAGTF approach, and salutes all the Marines today who are ready to do more than just "Stand-in" on an island, they are ready to jump-in to the fight.
.
- - - - -
,
US Marine Corps
FRAGO 01-2024
.
- - - - -
,
Marine Times - 04/09/2024
The Marines’ Pacific Allies Are Copying Its Littoral Regiment Moves
By Todd South
.
- - - - -
,
NPR Morning Edition
Listen Now: 12th Marine Littoral: We visit a newly formed US Marine Corps unit based in Japan
https://one.npr.org/?sharedMediaId=1243825487:1243825488
The obliviousness of recent Marine Corps leadership to the threats world-wide is mind boggling. Half a word away from China are Russia and Iran. And we can’t forget the nation that has the fourth largest armed forces in the world, North Korea. Yet our Corps is on a path to build a force it claims will be optimized to fight the Chinese navy and any other military.
What good will 17 missile batteries do when Russian soldiers are in their final attack position in front of Marine lines? Zero because missiles can’t be fired “danger close.” Nor can rockets. This is where only cannon artillery will do the job, and the Corps will only have 7 batteries. How could it find itself so “unbalanced”?
Pure nonsense is the claim that modern combined arms consists of infantry, cyber, and information operations. How many fortified positions have the latter two taken? Can the Corps cyber its way through a minefield or across a river?
Its pastime for our Corps current leaders to get serious and put the Marine Corps on the path to again be a real combined arms air-ground task force.
Viet Nam Marines
This CP article jogged my old memory. During the EVAC of Viet Nam, I recall a certain Marine Colonel coming on board an amphib stationed off the coast of Viet Nam. The Colonel had a habit of briefing the MEU officers (including the 2nd LT Platoon Leaders) on the daily Saigon Embassy meetings and the general situation on the ground. We were already aware that the ARVN was collapsing with desertions of troops and officers turning a retreat into a rout. The Colonel mentioned that the South Viet Nam Marine Battalions were the exception. At this point, I remembered the South Viet Nam Marines officers that were at TBS going through the same training as my TBS company.
On this day the South VN Marines were holding open the key intersection at Vung Tao. The highway from Saigon and the main highway that lead north to Da Nang intersected just north the port city of Vung Tao. The Vung Tao port also sits on a peninsula that juts into the mouth of the Saigon River. The SVN Marines were under heavy attack by the North Vietnamese but were holding and fighting aggressively despite heavy causalities in the officer ranks including battalion and company commanders. What was implied (IMHO) from that briefing was, “heads up” there might be a contingency for a Marine MEU to reinforce our hard pressed South Viet Nam Marines brothers. Consequently, I was not surprised when my MEU was sent back to the Philippines before the EVAC, where our FO’s provided live-fire close air support training to not only each company, but also each and every platoon leader in the battalion.
I have to state this story is all from the memory of as 2nd LT on his first deployment. I could not find any reference to the South Viet Nam Marines battles at Vung Tao. I did manage to find this:
https://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrg/Vietnam/pbvnmarines.html
“During March, 1975, the Vietnamese Marines were deployed south from Quang Tri to provide for the defense of Danang. By April the GVN began to collapse in the face of the NVA final offensive. ARVN units in Danang disintegrated and only the Marine brigades maintained tactical integrity. For two days the Marines engaged in an attempt to defend the city, fighting the North Vietnamese near VNMC headquarters at Bo Tu Linh west of Danang. When this proved futile, they deployed aboard evacuation ships. Now split into two forces, during the GVN's final hours Vietnamese Marines were reported fighting NVA forces near the presidential palace in Saigon.
Less than 250 Vietnamese Marines ultimately escaped to the US after the fall of Saigon. This group included their two commandants, twenty officers, and 180 enlisted men who ended up in refugee camps in the U.S. For one last time, American Marines who had served as advisors to the Vietnamese Marines were on hand to assist them.
The special relationship between the Vietnamese and American Marines was summed up best by the last VNMC Commandant. According to General Khang, U.S. Marines never tried to command their Vietnamese comrades; rather, they served with them as friends and advisors. U.S. Marine advisors frequently worked outside their military fields to provide assistance to VNMC wives and children. American Marines were the only ones to share the food of the Vietnamese Marines - they did not carry their own rations into the field. Instead, they ate food procured in local markets and from individual farmers according to the methods of the Vietnamese Marines. The American Marines made no distinction between the U.S. Marines and the Vietnamese Marines.”
I really do not think SIF is a good idea for US Marines. SIF will not work unless the US can keep control of the SLOC. I am thinking about the 4th Marines Regiment and the surrender of Corregidor at the beginning of WW2. Yes, we need to train with the armed forces of the “Island Chain” at every opportunity. We need to have foreign officers in attendance at our schools and we need to send our officers to their schools. The standard of that training must reach, at a minimum, the same level as the South Viet Nam Marines.