The obliviousness of recent Marine Corps leadership to the threats world-wide is mind boggling. Half a word away from China are Russia and Iran. And we can’t forget the nation that has the fourth largest armed forces in the world, North Korea. Yet our Corps is on a path to build a force it claims will be optimized to fight the Chinese navy and any other military.
What good will 17 missile batteries do when Russian soldiers are in their final attack position in front of Marine lines? Zero because missiles can’t be fired “danger close.” Nor can rockets. This is where only cannon artillery will do the job, and the Corps will only have 7 batteries. How could it find itself so “unbalanced”?
Pure nonsense is the claim that modern combined arms consists of infantry, cyber, and information operations. How many fortified positions have the latter two taken? Can the Corps cyber its way through a minefield or across a river?
Its pastime for our Corps current leaders to get serious and put the Marine Corps on the path to again be a real combined arms air-ground task force.
This CP article jogged my old memory. During the EVAC of Viet Nam, I recall a certain Marine Colonel coming on board an amphib stationed off the coast of Viet Nam. The Colonel had a habit of briefing the MEU officers (including the 2nd LT Platoon Leaders) on the daily Saigon Embassy meetings and the general situation on the ground. We were already aware that the ARVN was collapsing with desertions of troops and officers turning a retreat into a rout. The Colonel mentioned that the South Viet Nam Marine Battalions were the exception. At this point, I remembered the South Viet Nam Marines officers that were at TBS going through the same training as my TBS company.
On this day the South VN Marines were holding open the key intersection at Vung Tao. The highway from Saigon and the main highway that lead north to Da Nang intersected just north the port city of Vung Tao. The Vung Tao port also sits on a peninsula that juts into the mouth of the Saigon River. The SVN Marines were under heavy attack by the North Vietnamese but were holding and fighting aggressively despite heavy causalities in the officer ranks including battalion and company commanders. What was implied (IMHO) from that briefing was, “heads up” there might be a contingency for a Marine MEU to reinforce our hard pressed South Viet Nam Marines brothers. Consequently, I was not surprised when my MEU was sent back to the Philippines before the EVAC, where our FO’s provided live-fire close air support training to not only each company, but also each and every platoon leader in the battalion.
I have to state this story is all from the memory of as 2nd LT on his first deployment. I could not find any reference to the South Viet Nam Marines battles at Vung Tao. I did manage to find this:
“During March, 1975, the Vietnamese Marines were deployed south from Quang Tri to provide for the defense of Danang. By April the GVN began to collapse in the face of the NVA final offensive. ARVN units in Danang disintegrated and only the Marine brigades maintained tactical integrity. For two days the Marines engaged in an attempt to defend the city, fighting the North Vietnamese near VNMC headquarters at Bo Tu Linh west of Danang. When this proved futile, they deployed aboard evacuation ships. Now split into two forces, during the GVN's final hours Vietnamese Marines were reported fighting NVA forces near the presidential palace in Saigon.
Less than 250 Vietnamese Marines ultimately escaped to the US after the fall of Saigon. This group included their two commandants, twenty officers, and 180 enlisted men who ended up in refugee camps in the U.S. For one last time, American Marines who had served as advisors to the Vietnamese Marines were on hand to assist them.
The special relationship between the Vietnamese and American Marines was summed up best by the last VNMC Commandant. According to General Khang, U.S. Marines never tried to command their Vietnamese comrades; rather, they served with them as friends and advisors. U.S. Marine advisors frequently worked outside their military fields to provide assistance to VNMC wives and children. American Marines were the only ones to share the food of the Vietnamese Marines - they did not carry their own rations into the field. Instead, they ate food procured in local markets and from individual farmers according to the methods of the Vietnamese Marines. The American Marines made no distinction between the U.S. Marines and the Vietnamese Marines.”
I really do not think SIF is a good idea for US Marines. SIF will not work unless the US can keep control of the SLOC. I am thinking about the 4th Marines Regiment and the surrender of Corregidor at the beginning of WW2. Yes, we need to train with the armed forces of the “Island Chain” at every opportunity. We need to have foreign officers in attendance at our schools and we need to send our officers to their schools. The standard of that training must reach, at a minimum, the same level as the South Viet Nam Marines.
As I've asserted before, the Philippine effort on the grounded BRP Sierra Madre at Second Thomas Shoal is the prime example of the practical application of SIF in the Pacific. That force is not meant to go toe to toe in combat; they can't. What they are doing is exploiting the grey zone vagary of cold conflict in favor of the Philippine Nation. They depend on the rest of the Philippine Marine Corps and sister Services to remain manned, trained, and equipped for the outbreak of hot conflict and other crisis contingencies. Beyond this example, SIF simply means units inside a long range threat ring, which quickly becomes generic at a certain point. As a point in contrast, it would be interesting to see the actual Chinese plan for the operation and defense of the installation at Mischief Reef and other locations, to get a feel for their version of SIF.
*To throw the USMC a bone, I am glad that the implemented SIF concept is forcing them to wrestle with the problem of long range logistics in a conflict zone.
It makes sense that military forces of the Philippines, Japan, Korea, and other nations have Stand In Forces: they are all in the WEZ of China. Instead of having a Marine SIF located on some island, they should be part of a traditional ARG/MEU. Thus they can be landed at a opportune location. Another option would be to have a Marine anti-ship unit flown in by seaplane. In my opinion, seaplanes would be a better option than buying another class of amphibious ship.
There is only 1 USMC, as prescribed by US Code. No other Country in the world would destroy a magnificent offensive fighting machine and turn it into a defensive reconnaissance and sensor element. No one could do this because no nation has a Marine Corps the size and composition of ours.
WW II SIF. “STARVED AND BEATEN: WAKE ISLAND PRISONERS OF WORLD WAR II
The heroic survivors of Wake Island's defense force faced nearly four years as Japanese prisoners
By HISTORYNET STAFF6/12/2006
A TBD from Enterprise joins in the attack on Japanese-held Wake Island on February 1, 1942. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
SHARE THIS ARTICLE
Early on the morning of December 8, 1941, Wake Island hummed with activity. For months, the wishbone-shaped Pacific atoll of three small islands—Wake, Wilkes and Peale—less than 10 miles long and barely above sea level, had been the site of construction work. Working feverishly to complete an airstrip and defensive fortifications were 449 U.S. Marines of the 1st Defense Battalion, commanded by Major James P.S. Devereux; Marine fighter squadron VMF-211, equipped with 12 Grumman F4F-3 Wildcats, led by Major Paul A. Putnam; 71 Naval personnel; a five-man Army radio detachment, commanded by Captain Henry S. Wilson; and 1,146 American civilian construction workers of the Contractors Pacific Naval Air Bases Company, managed by Dan Teters–all under the overall command of Commander Winfield S. Cunningham.
War with Japan was imminent, and an airstrip on Wake, about 2,000 miles west of Hawaii, would allow American heavy bombers to strike the Japanese-controlled Marshall Islands. And, if Guam were lost to the Japanese, Wake would be one of the closest American outposts to the Japanese mainland. Each day work began early and finished late. There were no other diversions on the tiny, barren atoll, and the defenders all realized that war could begin at any time.
Around 7 o’clock that morning an Army radio technician on Wake picked up a radio alert from Hawaii: ‘Hickam Field has been attacked by Jap dive bombers. This is the real thing.’ Devereux shouted for his bugler, Alvin J. Waronker, and soon the clear notes of ‘General Quarters’ sounded across the atoll.
At 8:50 the Marines raised the American flag on its staff, something Marines did every morning all over the world, and Waronker began to sound ‘To the Colors.’ In the past he had had trouble with the bugle call, never getting it quite right, but this time he did not miss a note, and for several minutes all activity stopped as each man stood at attention and saluted the flag. Devereux recalled: ‘The flag went up, and every note was proud and clear. It made a man’s throat tighten just to hear it.’ Not long after the flag raising, 36 Japanese Mitsubishi G3M2 Nell bombers crossed Wake in three V-formations”
The obliviousness of recent Marine Corps leadership to the threats world-wide is mind boggling. Half a word away from China are Russia and Iran. And we can’t forget the nation that has the fourth largest armed forces in the world, North Korea. Yet our Corps is on a path to build a force it claims will be optimized to fight the Chinese navy and any other military.
What good will 17 missile batteries do when Russian soldiers are in their final attack position in front of Marine lines? Zero because missiles can’t be fired “danger close.” Nor can rockets. This is where only cannon artillery will do the job, and the Corps will only have 7 batteries. How could it find itself so “unbalanced”?
Pure nonsense is the claim that modern combined arms consists of infantry, cyber, and information operations. How many fortified positions have the latter two taken? Can the Corps cyber its way through a minefield or across a river?
Its pastime for our Corps current leaders to get serious and put the Marine Corps on the path to again be a real combined arms air-ground task force.
Viet Nam Marines
This CP article jogged my old memory. During the EVAC of Viet Nam, I recall a certain Marine Colonel coming on board an amphib stationed off the coast of Viet Nam. The Colonel had a habit of briefing the MEU officers (including the 2nd LT Platoon Leaders) on the daily Saigon Embassy meetings and the general situation on the ground. We were already aware that the ARVN was collapsing with desertions of troops and officers turning a retreat into a rout. The Colonel mentioned that the South Viet Nam Marine Battalions were the exception. At this point, I remembered the South Viet Nam Marines officers that were at TBS going through the same training as my TBS company.
On this day the South VN Marines were holding open the key intersection at Vung Tao. The highway from Saigon and the main highway that lead north to Da Nang intersected just north the port city of Vung Tao. The Vung Tao port also sits on a peninsula that juts into the mouth of the Saigon River. The SVN Marines were under heavy attack by the North Vietnamese but were holding and fighting aggressively despite heavy causalities in the officer ranks including battalion and company commanders. What was implied (IMHO) from that briefing was, “heads up” there might be a contingency for a Marine MEU to reinforce our hard pressed South Viet Nam Marines brothers. Consequently, I was not surprised when my MEU was sent back to the Philippines before the EVAC, where our FO’s provided live-fire close air support training to not only each company, but also each and every platoon leader in the battalion.
I have to state this story is all from the memory of as 2nd LT on his first deployment. I could not find any reference to the South Viet Nam Marines battles at Vung Tao. I did manage to find this:
https://msuweb.montclair.edu/~furrg/Vietnam/pbvnmarines.html
“During March, 1975, the Vietnamese Marines were deployed south from Quang Tri to provide for the defense of Danang. By April the GVN began to collapse in the face of the NVA final offensive. ARVN units in Danang disintegrated and only the Marine brigades maintained tactical integrity. For two days the Marines engaged in an attempt to defend the city, fighting the North Vietnamese near VNMC headquarters at Bo Tu Linh west of Danang. When this proved futile, they deployed aboard evacuation ships. Now split into two forces, during the GVN's final hours Vietnamese Marines were reported fighting NVA forces near the presidential palace in Saigon.
Less than 250 Vietnamese Marines ultimately escaped to the US after the fall of Saigon. This group included their two commandants, twenty officers, and 180 enlisted men who ended up in refugee camps in the U.S. For one last time, American Marines who had served as advisors to the Vietnamese Marines were on hand to assist them.
The special relationship between the Vietnamese and American Marines was summed up best by the last VNMC Commandant. According to General Khang, U.S. Marines never tried to command their Vietnamese comrades; rather, they served with them as friends and advisors. U.S. Marine advisors frequently worked outside their military fields to provide assistance to VNMC wives and children. American Marines were the only ones to share the food of the Vietnamese Marines - they did not carry their own rations into the field. Instead, they ate food procured in local markets and from individual farmers according to the methods of the Vietnamese Marines. The American Marines made no distinction between the U.S. Marines and the Vietnamese Marines.”
I really do not think SIF is a good idea for US Marines. SIF will not work unless the US can keep control of the SLOC. I am thinking about the 4th Marines Regiment and the surrender of Corregidor at the beginning of WW2. Yes, we need to train with the armed forces of the “Island Chain” at every opportunity. We need to have foreign officers in attendance at our schools and we need to send our officers to their schools. The standard of that training must reach, at a minimum, the same level as the South Viet Nam Marines.
As I've asserted before, the Philippine effort on the grounded BRP Sierra Madre at Second Thomas Shoal is the prime example of the practical application of SIF in the Pacific. That force is not meant to go toe to toe in combat; they can't. What they are doing is exploiting the grey zone vagary of cold conflict in favor of the Philippine Nation. They depend on the rest of the Philippine Marine Corps and sister Services to remain manned, trained, and equipped for the outbreak of hot conflict and other crisis contingencies. Beyond this example, SIF simply means units inside a long range threat ring, which quickly becomes generic at a certain point. As a point in contrast, it would be interesting to see the actual Chinese plan for the operation and defense of the installation at Mischief Reef and other locations, to get a feel for their version of SIF.
*To throw the USMC a bone, I am glad that the implemented SIF concept is forcing them to wrestle with the problem of long range logistics in a conflict zone.
It makes sense that military forces of the Philippines, Japan, Korea, and other nations have Stand In Forces: they are all in the WEZ of China. Instead of having a Marine SIF located on some island, they should be part of a traditional ARG/MEU. Thus they can be landed at a opportune location. Another option would be to have a Marine anti-ship unit flown in by seaplane. In my opinion, seaplanes would be a better option than buying another class of amphibious ship.
There is only 1 USMC, as prescribed by US Code. No other Country in the world would destroy a magnificent offensive fighting machine and turn it into a defensive reconnaissance and sensor element. No one could do this because no nation has a Marine Corps the size and composition of ours.
WW II SIF. “STARVED AND BEATEN: WAKE ISLAND PRISONERS OF WORLD WAR II
The heroic survivors of Wake Island's defense force faced nearly four years as Japanese prisoners
By HISTORYNET STAFF6/12/2006
A TBD from Enterprise joins in the attack on Japanese-held Wake Island on February 1, 1942. (Naval History and Heritage Command)
SHARE THIS ARTICLE
Early on the morning of December 8, 1941, Wake Island hummed with activity. For months, the wishbone-shaped Pacific atoll of three small islands—Wake, Wilkes and Peale—less than 10 miles long and barely above sea level, had been the site of construction work. Working feverishly to complete an airstrip and defensive fortifications were 449 U.S. Marines of the 1st Defense Battalion, commanded by Major James P.S. Devereux; Marine fighter squadron VMF-211, equipped with 12 Grumman F4F-3 Wildcats, led by Major Paul A. Putnam; 71 Naval personnel; a five-man Army radio detachment, commanded by Captain Henry S. Wilson; and 1,146 American civilian construction workers of the Contractors Pacific Naval Air Bases Company, managed by Dan Teters–all under the overall command of Commander Winfield S. Cunningham.
War with Japan was imminent, and an airstrip on Wake, about 2,000 miles west of Hawaii, would allow American heavy bombers to strike the Japanese-controlled Marshall Islands. And, if Guam were lost to the Japanese, Wake would be one of the closest American outposts to the Japanese mainland. Each day work began early and finished late. There were no other diversions on the tiny, barren atoll, and the defenders all realized that war could begin at any time.
Around 7 o’clock that morning an Army radio technician on Wake picked up a radio alert from Hawaii: ‘Hickam Field has been attacked by Jap dive bombers. This is the real thing.’ Devereux shouted for his bugler, Alvin J. Waronker, and soon the clear notes of ‘General Quarters’ sounded across the atoll.
At 8:50 the Marines raised the American flag on its staff, something Marines did every morning all over the world, and Waronker began to sound ‘To the Colors.’ In the past he had had trouble with the bugle call, never getting it quite right, but this time he did not miss a note, and for several minutes all activity stopped as each man stood at attention and saluted the flag. Devereux recalled: ‘The flag went up, and every note was proud and clear. It made a man’s throat tighten just to hear it.’ Not long after the flag raising, 36 Japanese Mitsubishi G3M2 Nell bombers crossed Wake in three V-formations”
Thank you. We pay our Flag and General Officers to Never Forget History! Our Republic cannot allow Our Marine Corps to fail it.
Re copying the FD destruction of USMC Division by repurposing their Regiments, Wings, FSSG…..dear CMC or A/CMC for FD please provide one example .