Compass Points - GAO Hit & Miss
Rebuilding the Navy & Marine Corps team
Compass Points - GAO Hit & Miss
Rebuilding the Navy & Marine Corps team
December 5, 2024
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Long before Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy's DOGE initiative, some members of Congress were already growing concerned over the decline in capabilities in America’s 9-1-1 force, the US Marines. For decades, retiring US policy makers would always caution their replacement, very soon in some far away corner of the globe, the next crisis will erupt; before that happens, make sure the US has Marines on Navy ships patrolling nearby.
Just in recent years, some national defense authorities began to suspect that neither the Navy amphibious fleet nor the combined arms 9-1-1 force of Marines were as capable as they should be. That is why, in the most recent National Defense Authorization Act, savvy members of Congress inserted two particular requirements. First, was a requirement that the GAO (Government Accountability Office) conduct a study of the the Navy amphibious fleet. The ships of the Navy amphibious fleet provide the transportation and support that keep the Marines always on duty across the world's oceans. Without the right numbers and types of amphibious ships, the Marines are left standing at the dock and the US is left without a global, 9-1-1, crisis response force.
The second requirement in the National Defense Authorization Act was for a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) to conduct a study of how Marine Corps crisis response capabilities have been reduced by the Marine's controversial Force Design program.
Both the GAO report on the condition of the Navy amphibious fleet and the FFRDC report on the condition of Marine Corps global, crisis response, capabilities, should give the incoming administration a leap forward on the need to rebuild both the amphibious fleet and Marine crisis response capabilities.
The GAO has now released its report on the Navy amphibious fleet.
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What GAO Found
Amphibious warfare ships are critical for Marine Corps missions, but the Navy has struggled to ensure they are available for operations and training. In some cases, ships in the amphibious fleet have not been available for years at a time. The Navy and Marine Corps are working to agree on a ship availability goal but have yet to complete a metrics-based analysis to support such a goal. Until the Navy completes this analysis, it risks jeopardizing its ability to align amphibious ship schedules with the Marine Corps units that deploy on them.
As of March 2024, half of the amphibious fleet is in poor condition and these ships are not on track to meet their expected service lives.
. . . Marine Corps documentation indicates that amphibious warfare ships have generally not met the Navy’s planned maintenance schedules dating back to 2010. Specifically, Marine Corps documentation states that, from 2010-2021, the Navy extended 71 percent of amphibious warfare ship depot maintenance beyond its original planned end date. This cumulatively resulted in 28.5 years of lost training and deployment time for those ships and their associated Marines.
-- GAO-25-106728
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The GAO report scores a direct hit when it puts a spotlight on the shortage of amphibious ships. When the report says lack of timely maintenance has "resulted in 28.5 years of lost training and deployment time for those ships and their associated Marines" the report reveals a dangerous gap in US global security.
On the other hand, when the GAO seems to say that the solution is to "align amphibious ship schedules" the GAO misses the target.
The solution is far more than simply aligning ship schedules. One senior Marine familiar with Marine global operations explains.
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Hold on GAO! Simply coordinating ship schedules with Marine unit schedules is not the answer! The enemy will have a "say" as to when and where they might "make a move." A perfect recent example of the unexpected crisis is South Korea and the enactment, for a short period of time, of martial law. Suppose North Korea took that time to move. How does a scheduling conference between PP&O and the N-6 possibly account for this? How does the COCOM and DOD address it? The enemy will always do the unexpected and will not cooperate with our ship schedules.
My point is simple but very hard to do. Buy and build more amphibs and improve the readiness of ships across the board. At a minimum, the Nation needs continuous, heel-to-toe, forward deployed ARGs out on the oceans, with enough ships and Marines back in the barn, ready to go! Fly-in forces of Marines to reinforce are a must, but they need to fall onto something other than what they bring in their packs. They need the heavy equipment and supplies that only forward deployed Maritime Prepositioning Ships can provide.
My fear is that anyone reading the GAO report might arrive at a faulty solution: "just get the ship schedules to dovetail with FMF unit readiness and all will be good." NOT the case!
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Very soon a new administration will take the reins of US foreign policy and US defense. Not long after taking office, in some far away corner of the globe, the next crisis will erupt. The US must make sure now that there will be Marines on Navy ships patrolling nearby. Every solution to restoring, enhancing, and upgrading the crisis response capabilities of the Navy & Marine Corps team must begin with the word 'more.'
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-- More help from allies in ship maintenance, ship building, ship leasing, and ship crewing.
-- More shipyards.
-- More ship construction.
-- More amphibious ships.
-- More maritime prepositioning ships.
-- More use of existing MSC ships, like the ESB and EPF.
-- More ARGs on more oceans on continuous patrol.
-- More Marine Corps combined arms capabilities.
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Compass Points congratulates the GAO on their Navy amphibious ship report and salutes the savvy members of Congress who provided leadership to require both the GAO report on Navy amphibious ships, as well as the upcoming FFRDC report on Marine Corps crisis response capabilities.
Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy and their whole team at DOGE - Department of Government Efficiency, will no doubt accomplish great things in bringing business concepts and approaches to government departments and agencies. One of the well-known business concepts is "just in time" logistics. The idea is to supply what is needed at just the right place and right time.
While the military is not a business enterprise and must always remain focused on effectiveness first before efficiency. Still, the “just in time” concept may be useful for those concerned about national defense. US challenges around the world mean that the "just in time" moment for Navy amphibious ships and Marine Corps 9-1-1 capabilities is here. There is not a moment to waste.
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GAO
AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE FLEET:
Navy Needs to Complete Key Efforts to Better Ensure Ships Are Available for Marines
GAO-25-106728. Published: Dec 03, 2024. Publicly Released: Dec 03, 2024.
https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-25-106728/index.html
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USNI News - 12/03/2024
‘Poor Material Condition’ of Navy Amphib Fleet Prevents Marine Deployments, Training, Says GAO
By Sam LaGrone
The events of the past few years in the Western Pacific, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East have made it crystal clear that it is in our nation's best interests to have three forward deployed ARG/MEUs ready at all times to respond to a wide range of missions, from presence and theater-specific security operations to non-combatant evacuations to full-on combat operations.
To sustain these forward deployed ARG/MEUs 365/24/7, the Navy requires a force of 12 LHA/LHDs and 24 LPD/LSDs. A force of 36 amphibious ships, properly manned, trained and equipped, can support the AEG/MEU forward deployed requirements as well as enable the non-deployed force to conduct thorough pre-deployment training and maintenance and provide a 60 - 90 day surge capacity should one be required.
LHAs and LPDs are currently under construction and a multi-ship buy has recently been awarded for 3 LPD 17 Flight IIs and 1 LHA Flight II. It is vital to maintain this shipbuilding momentum and accelerate getting our amphibious fleet to where it needs to be with the right number of well-maintained ships, the right number of well-trained Sailors to man those ships and an expeditionary mindset shared with the Marine Corps that will provide a force built from the keel up to move fast, hit hard and stay in the fight as long as necessary.
Today’s CP post exposes the ill-advised decision to arbitrarily reduce the amphibious ship requirement from 38 to 31. Just my opinion but the reduction was part of the 38th Commandant’s wrongheaded “divest to invest” strategy. The Marine Corps was willing to give up 7 large amphibious ships to get Navy buy-in for the 38 LAW (now LSM) needed to support the SIF concept. The LSM is not survivable in a contested environment and will probably never be built, certainly not in the numbers requested. The bottom line is the Marines gave up needed capability and damaged the national security for nothing! How we could do this to ourselves and our Nation is astonishing.