The events of the past few years in the Western Pacific, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East have made it crystal clear that it is in our nation's best interests to have three forward deployed ARG/MEUs ready at all times to respond to a wide range of missions, from presence and theater-specific security operations to non-combatant evacuations to full-on combat operations.
To sustain these forward deployed ARG/MEUs 365/24/7, the Navy requires a force of 12 LHA/LHDs and 24 LPD/LSDs. A force of 36 amphibious ships, properly manned, trained and equipped, can support the AEG/MEU forward deployed requirements as well as enable the non-deployed force to conduct thorough pre-deployment training and maintenance and provide a 60 - 90 day surge capacity should one be required.
LHAs and LPDs are currently under construction and a multi-ship buy has recently been awarded for 3 LPD 17 Flight IIs and 1 LHA Flight II. It is vital to maintain this shipbuilding momentum and accelerate getting our amphibious fleet to where it needs to be with the right number of well-maintained ships, the right number of well-trained Sailors to man those ships and an expeditionary mindset shared with the Marine Corps that will provide a force built from the keel up to move fast, hit hard and stay in the fight as long as necessary.
Thank you Admiral Harvey for the precise information provided and your "Gung Ho" approach to help the Corps. Now all we need is a Marine Corps that can rally up and get back to MAGTF quality MEU's that fall in line with ARG/MEU forward deployed concept and schedules as you have outlined. We know the Chowder. Society II is out pounding the pavement, they no doubt appreciate your support. Your comment reinforces that the Navy and Marine Corps breath in and out together.
Admiral, I am a defense hawk. I’m very worried about America’s woeful lack of shipbuilding, maintenance and repair capabilities. That said, with a limited shipbuilding budget I’d like to see more Virginias and Columbias in the blue water, AIP diesel-electric boats to patrol our coasts, fewer Ford class and more Constellation class plus 150 medium unmanned missile carriers. Given that even the Houthis have capable anti-ship missiles, why should we continue to invest in the Gator Navy? I fear the loss of thousands of Marines, sailors and ships in a forced landing attempt which would shock the American people, not unlike the loss of one Nimitz or Ford class at the hands of Chinese DF-26s and DF 27s. I look forward to your reply.
Sharon, defense owls are much wiser birds than defense hawks. I hope the following information will aide you into becoming one because they are an endangered species, especially in the Pentagon.
Lesson 1: If the United States wants to project a full range of military power and maintain that military power in a hostile environment it must do it by sea, there is no other option. As one example, to support Desert Storm 90 percent of cargo went by sea as did 38 percent of the troops. We simply could not build and maintain the number of aircraft needed to move the cargo and troops required for a major overseas operation. Moreover, there are few regions in the world that could handle the influx of aircraft in a reasonable time. In short, we need ships including amphibious ships and lots more of them.
Lesson 2: The United States used ships to deploy troops overseas in World War I, World War II, and Korea. It used amphibious ships in the latter two wars and in the Vietnam War and Operation Desert Storm. In the first three wars there were enemy threats equal to and perhaps greater than that posed by modern missiles. In World War I it was German submarines. In World War II it was German and Japanese submarines, mines, surface combatants, and aircraft. In the case of the Japanese there was the additional threat of Kamikaze aircraft, a threat not unlike today’s guided missiles. In the Korean War it was mines. The U.S. military took actions to protect those ships in all cases. Such protection included the use of convoys, mine sweepers, surface combatants detailed to provide air defenses over these ships, especially amphibious ships, and often air-cover. I have no doubt US forces would provide the same types of protection today.
Lesson 3: US Navy ships are built to “survivability standards,” which means they are designed and constructed to survive modern weapons. There are three levels, with amphibious warships built to level 2 (moderate). Modern Navy ships are surprisingly difficult to sink. Of note, no US aircraft carrier has ever been sunk by enemy action since the Navy begin to build (not convert) carriers from the keel up. The first class was the Essex. In exercises (SINCEXs) intended to test antiship weapons against Navy ships it has taken multiple weapons and considerable time to sink them. In 2005 it took four weeks to sink the USS America (CV-66)! Finally, it had to be scuttled with explosives placed in its interior. Granted, there were constraints on the weapons used so that the ship would remain afloat long enough to test a variety of torpedoes, bombs, and missiles but at the same time there were no sailors aboard to undertake damage control.
Lesson 4: The US Navy’s surface combatants have proven quite capable of withstanding multiple missile and drone attacks by the Houthi rebels. Obviously, these attacks are less sophisticated than what we would expect from the Chinese military, but they give us a good indication that the Navy can operate inside of a weapons engagement zone (despite the 38th Commandant’s assertion otherwise).
Please don’t think I have unfairly singled you out in my response for your view is a very common one including with very high Pentagon officials.
Now that I have offered an “owl’s” view , I welcome a response because there is much more I need to learn.
Ms Lewis, Lt Gen Van Riper has certainly covered many of the critical issues dealing with the defense of our ships at sea from capable anti-ship missiles in his response to you. And I share your concern regarding our ability to provide that defense in order to maintain the operational viability of our Navy/Marine team today and into the future.
I have a couple of additional thoughts for your consideration.
First, I give the Chinese credit for many of the decisions they have made regarding the force structure/Fleet architecture they require to achieve their goals with respect to dominating the Western Pacific from the Straits of Malacca to the La Perouse Strait and potentially invading and subduing Taiwan.
One of the biggest and most consequential decisions the Chinese have made is to develop, build and deploy a significant naval force composed primarily of large surface combatants, amphibious assault ships and aircraft carriers. The Chinese are certainly aware of the capabilities of our air and surface launched anti-ship cruise missiles and our attack submarines (and those of our allies), yet despite these capabilities, they continue to make an enormous investment in large surface combatants - why?
I believe the Chinese have employed a rationale similar to ours - while these ships are indeed at risk, they can be successfully defended by means of a well-integrated system of hard and soft kill defenses that have been proven to be effective under actual combat conditions. Our ships, large and small, can be defended by well-trained teams operating a variety of currently fielded, effective weapons systems under the command of operationally competent leaders.
A second important point to consider - the current mission set for today's ARG/MEU goes far beyond the classic amphibious assault you mention. Here's the current mission set for the 31st MEU:
Prior to deployment each MEU is thoroughly trained in 10 Mission Essential Tasks (METS), ranging from humanitarian assistance to traditional amphibious assaults:
* Security, Stability, Transition and Reconstruction Operations
* Support Theater Security Cooperation Activities
* Humanitarian Assistance (HA)
* Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)
* Tactical Recovery of Aircraft, Equipment, Personnel (TRAP)
* Airfield Operations from Expeditionary Sea or Shore Based Sites
* Airfield and/or Port Seizure Operations
* Joint and Combined Operations
As capable as our submarine force is today, they are clearly not the force of choice for the missions listed above and neither would be a collection of various small or unmanned ships.
These missions are not the stuff of imagination, but real world missions that the Navy and Marine Corps have been called upon, repeatedly, to accomplish in the past.
In today's world, the pace of change is incredibly rapid both in terms of events on the ground (witness the fall of the Assad regime) and the impact of technology on military operations (witness the explosion of drone-related operations in the Russo-Ukraine war).
A "one-trick pony" Navy and Marine Corps team strikes me as woefully inadequate to deal with the challenges this extraordinary pace of change we are now experiencing, and will surely continue to experience, will place before us. We must be more than a large force of unmanned missile shooters, focused on a single mission. There is certainly a place in our Navy for small corvettes (ex, the exceptionally capable Sa'ar class) and autonomous platforms capable of performing the "dirty and dangerous" missions in a very high-threat environment, but the Navy's and Marine Corps' needs do not end there.
Accordingly, I am still a firm believer in a "balanced" and inherently expeditionary Fleet possessing a wide range of capabilities and capable of delivering rapid, effective and powerful responses to a broad array of threats and operational challenges, both the ones we can anticipate and, perhaps more importantly, the ones we can't.
Today’s CP post exposes the ill-advised decision to arbitrarily reduce the amphibious ship requirement from 38 to 31. Just my opinion but the reduction was part of the 38th Commandant’s wrongheaded “divest to invest” strategy. The Marine Corps was willing to give up 7 large amphibious ships to get Navy buy-in for the 38 LAW (now LSM) needed to support the SIF concept. The LSM is not survivable in a contested environment and will probably never be built, certainly not in the numbers requested. The bottom line is the Marines gave up needed capability and damaged the national security for nothing! How we could do this to ourselves and our Nation is astonishing.
The procurement of another type of ship platform will only complicate the Navy's already stressed maintenance problems. We should just stick to three or even better, two types of amphibious hulls: one big deck, and one cargo type.
It is good to see some factual data added to what any professional with a modicum of common sense could have presented with about 30 minutes of prep time. The number of Amphibious ships was too low even before Gen Berger’s arbitrary divestment offer to the Navy. They quickly agreed with no guarantee to a quid pro quo for a fleet of third rate ferry boats. That the GAO proposed a schedule synchronization between ships and units is a sophomoric answer of stunning ignorance.
If one just steps back and views the last six years, the common denominator across the Navy and Marine Corps is a dysfunctional and often dishonest leadership that has failed at every turn. There simply are no solutions without addressing the fundamental problems of leadership, integrity, military professional acumen and understanding of history. “Lost confidence in the ability to lead” is a common phrase and nowhere is it more appropriate than across the senior leadership of the past 5-6 years. The problems will not be solved by the very individuals who created the problem. No commander I ever knew would have tolerated this clown show for six weeks, let alone for six years.
It is all fairly simple: This effort failed in a spectacular fashion. Fire and punish those at the heart of the disaster and bring in a new team as fast as possible to fix this mess. Can anyone imagine this being tolerated in any other institution or endeavor.
How much time do we have? No one knows but every passing hour is an hour too long. Break out the check book and buy ships, buy combat gear, recruit and train accordingly.
THE BURNING OF THE USS BONHOMME RICHARD (LHD -6) July 12, 2020, by the criminal negligence of a US Navy whose Toxic Admiralty gave America the Fat Leonard Scandal and a Navy incapable of standing Fire Watch, combined with CMCs Berger and Smith’s Broke Dick Donkey i.e. Fatal Design have produced an impotent Marine Corps that is unrecognizable from the Magnificent MEF and it agile, lethal MAGTFs they were entrusted to protect.
As i have said before. MEUs used to pass one another during the translant or transpac portion. One leaving and one returning. That hasn't happened in years.
The other thing I have found so shocking is there hasn't been a CAX at 29 Palms in 5 years?? Are you kidding me?? WTF?? What have these people done to my CORPS!!!!!
Deck LDO here, with 3 amphib tours under my belt (one on staff). Over 20 years have gone by since my retirement. In my day, we had an awful lot of ships that were old, but their crews worked hard and they got the mission done. And although I have always said that I don't miss it, I still have a couple of haze gray dreams a week. Sad to say, current gators probably have nightmares.
Hi, great article. Semper fi. I had a few thoughts about it.
1: Buy and build more amphibs and improve the readiness of ships across the board.
And crew them with what sailors?
The navy would absolutely love to have more ships, the issue is they can't adequately crew the ones they have now. Ships get bigger (a WW2 destroyer displacement was 2k tonnes with a crew of 100-300 whereas a modern destroyer can get up to 15k tonnes and have a crew of 300-500, for example) requiring more crew but we have less people eligible for service and few are interested. This trend is accelerating generationally.
2: More shipyards and More ship construction.
Again, this ignores the crewing issue.
The shipyards are difficult. We have 3 major government shipyard in America. We used to have 7. It will be all but impossible to repurpose those 4 closed shipyards back into shipyards - Charleston shipyards closed, for instance, and now ocean front condos for the rich are where it was. Eminent domain is possible but politically not going to happen. You cant just wave a wand and create shipyards. They require natural harbors.
I'm not opposed to your end goals - a stronger nation and a stronger military with a restored to purpose USMC.
But the days of our country having trillion dollar budgets is just about over, we can't afford it. And more the American people no longer trust us (the military) to spend it wisely, public trust of the military is bad and the younger they are the worst it is viewed for the most part.
We will be forced to operate our military within its means vs what we want it to be capable of. We don't have the money, the industrial base, or the manpower to continue to be the colossal giant that soft power ruled much of the planet like we were from the 50s-2000s. Those days are gone and we must accept that.
Not being to afford as much means we are also going to have to start redefining national interest and what's truly vital. In a way it's a bit like our police departments - tighter resources mean slower response times and in some cases no response.
I'm not arguing for cuts. I'm just saying we should recognize they are possible/probable. And again, manpower will continue to decline as the capable pool shrinks and interest declines.
Before asking for lots more money the military services need serious reform. Our procurement is terrible. R&D a charlie foxtrot. We spend money like drunken sailors - the litoral ship is a great example of billions wasted. We win every battle and yet haven't won a war since ... When?
Instead of binge spending we really need to refocus our spending and focus on winning conflicts.
The events of the past few years in the Western Pacific, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East have made it crystal clear that it is in our nation's best interests to have three forward deployed ARG/MEUs ready at all times to respond to a wide range of missions, from presence and theater-specific security operations to non-combatant evacuations to full-on combat operations.
To sustain these forward deployed ARG/MEUs 365/24/7, the Navy requires a force of 12 LHA/LHDs and 24 LPD/LSDs. A force of 36 amphibious ships, properly manned, trained and equipped, can support the AEG/MEU forward deployed requirements as well as enable the non-deployed force to conduct thorough pre-deployment training and maintenance and provide a 60 - 90 day surge capacity should one be required.
LHAs and LPDs are currently under construction and a multi-ship buy has recently been awarded for 3 LPD 17 Flight IIs and 1 LHA Flight II. It is vital to maintain this shipbuilding momentum and accelerate getting our amphibious fleet to where it needs to be with the right number of well-maintained ships, the right number of well-trained Sailors to man those ships and an expeditionary mindset shared with the Marine Corps that will provide a force built from the keel up to move fast, hit hard and stay in the fight as long as necessary.
Admiral, Good to have you in the fight. Your explanation is one we are working hard to ensure the new Congress understands and supports. PKVR
Thank you Admiral Harvey for the precise information provided and your "Gung Ho" approach to help the Corps. Now all we need is a Marine Corps that can rally up and get back to MAGTF quality MEU's that fall in line with ARG/MEU forward deployed concept and schedules as you have outlined. We know the Chowder. Society II is out pounding the pavement, they no doubt appreciate your support. Your comment reinforces that the Navy and Marine Corps breath in and out together.
Admiral, I am a defense hawk. I’m very worried about America’s woeful lack of shipbuilding, maintenance and repair capabilities. That said, with a limited shipbuilding budget I’d like to see more Virginias and Columbias in the blue water, AIP diesel-electric boats to patrol our coasts, fewer Ford class and more Constellation class plus 150 medium unmanned missile carriers. Given that even the Houthis have capable anti-ship missiles, why should we continue to invest in the Gator Navy? I fear the loss of thousands of Marines, sailors and ships in a forced landing attempt which would shock the American people, not unlike the loss of one Nimitz or Ford class at the hands of Chinese DF-26s and DF 27s. I look forward to your reply.
Sharon, defense owls are much wiser birds than defense hawks. I hope the following information will aide you into becoming one because they are an endangered species, especially in the Pentagon.
Lesson 1: If the United States wants to project a full range of military power and maintain that military power in a hostile environment it must do it by sea, there is no other option. As one example, to support Desert Storm 90 percent of cargo went by sea as did 38 percent of the troops. We simply could not build and maintain the number of aircraft needed to move the cargo and troops required for a major overseas operation. Moreover, there are few regions in the world that could handle the influx of aircraft in a reasonable time. In short, we need ships including amphibious ships and lots more of them.
Lesson 2: The United States used ships to deploy troops overseas in World War I, World War II, and Korea. It used amphibious ships in the latter two wars and in the Vietnam War and Operation Desert Storm. In the first three wars there were enemy threats equal to and perhaps greater than that posed by modern missiles. In World War I it was German submarines. In World War II it was German and Japanese submarines, mines, surface combatants, and aircraft. In the case of the Japanese there was the additional threat of Kamikaze aircraft, a threat not unlike today’s guided missiles. In the Korean War it was mines. The U.S. military took actions to protect those ships in all cases. Such protection included the use of convoys, mine sweepers, surface combatants detailed to provide air defenses over these ships, especially amphibious ships, and often air-cover. I have no doubt US forces would provide the same types of protection today.
Lesson 3: US Navy ships are built to “survivability standards,” which means they are designed and constructed to survive modern weapons. There are three levels, with amphibious warships built to level 2 (moderate). Modern Navy ships are surprisingly difficult to sink. Of note, no US aircraft carrier has ever been sunk by enemy action since the Navy begin to build (not convert) carriers from the keel up. The first class was the Essex. In exercises (SINCEXs) intended to test antiship weapons against Navy ships it has taken multiple weapons and considerable time to sink them. In 2005 it took four weeks to sink the USS America (CV-66)! Finally, it had to be scuttled with explosives placed in its interior. Granted, there were constraints on the weapons used so that the ship would remain afloat long enough to test a variety of torpedoes, bombs, and missiles but at the same time there were no sailors aboard to undertake damage control.
Lesson 4: The US Navy’s surface combatants have proven quite capable of withstanding multiple missile and drone attacks by the Houthi rebels. Obviously, these attacks are less sophisticated than what we would expect from the Chinese military, but they give us a good indication that the Navy can operate inside of a weapons engagement zone (despite the 38th Commandant’s assertion otherwise).
Please don’t think I have unfairly singled you out in my response for your view is a very common one including with very high Pentagon officials.
Now that I have offered an “owl’s” view , I welcome a response because there is much more I need to learn.
“Rip” Van Riper
Ms Lewis, Lt Gen Van Riper has certainly covered many of the critical issues dealing with the defense of our ships at sea from capable anti-ship missiles in his response to you. And I share your concern regarding our ability to provide that defense in order to maintain the operational viability of our Navy/Marine team today and into the future.
I have a couple of additional thoughts for your consideration.
First, I give the Chinese credit for many of the decisions they have made regarding the force structure/Fleet architecture they require to achieve their goals with respect to dominating the Western Pacific from the Straits of Malacca to the La Perouse Strait and potentially invading and subduing Taiwan.
One of the biggest and most consequential decisions the Chinese have made is to develop, build and deploy a significant naval force composed primarily of large surface combatants, amphibious assault ships and aircraft carriers. The Chinese are certainly aware of the capabilities of our air and surface launched anti-ship cruise missiles and our attack submarines (and those of our allies), yet despite these capabilities, they continue to make an enormous investment in large surface combatants - why?
I believe the Chinese have employed a rationale similar to ours - while these ships are indeed at risk, they can be successfully defended by means of a well-integrated system of hard and soft kill defenses that have been proven to be effective under actual combat conditions. Our ships, large and small, can be defended by well-trained teams operating a variety of currently fielded, effective weapons systems under the command of operationally competent leaders.
A second important point to consider - the current mission set for today's ARG/MEU goes far beyond the classic amphibious assault you mention. Here's the current mission set for the 31st MEU:
Prior to deployment each MEU is thoroughly trained in 10 Mission Essential Tasks (METS), ranging from humanitarian assistance to traditional amphibious assaults:
* Amphibious Raids (Small Boat, Combat Rubber Raiding Craft)
* Mechanized Amphibious Assaults (Assault Amphibious Vehicles)
* Security, Stability, Transition and Reconstruction Operations
* Support Theater Security Cooperation Activities
* Humanitarian Assistance (HA)
* Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)
* Tactical Recovery of Aircraft, Equipment, Personnel (TRAP)
* Airfield Operations from Expeditionary Sea or Shore Based Sites
* Airfield and/or Port Seizure Operations
* Joint and Combined Operations
As capable as our submarine force is today, they are clearly not the force of choice for the missions listed above and neither would be a collection of various small or unmanned ships.
These missions are not the stuff of imagination, but real world missions that the Navy and Marine Corps have been called upon, repeatedly, to accomplish in the past.
In today's world, the pace of change is incredibly rapid both in terms of events on the ground (witness the fall of the Assad regime) and the impact of technology on military operations (witness the explosion of drone-related operations in the Russo-Ukraine war).
A "one-trick pony" Navy and Marine Corps team strikes me as woefully inadequate to deal with the challenges this extraordinary pace of change we are now experiencing, and will surely continue to experience, will place before us. We must be more than a large force of unmanned missile shooters, focused on a single mission. There is certainly a place in our Navy for small corvettes (ex, the exceptionally capable Sa'ar class) and autonomous platforms capable of performing the "dirty and dangerous" missions in a very high-threat environment, but the Navy's and Marine Corps' needs do not end there.
Accordingly, I am still a firm believer in a "balanced" and inherently expeditionary Fleet possessing a wide range of capabilities and capable of delivering rapid, effective and powerful responses to a broad array of threats and operational challenges, both the ones we can anticipate and, perhaps more importantly, the ones we can't.
Today’s CP post exposes the ill-advised decision to arbitrarily reduce the amphibious ship requirement from 38 to 31. Just my opinion but the reduction was part of the 38th Commandant’s wrongheaded “divest to invest” strategy. The Marine Corps was willing to give up 7 large amphibious ships to get Navy buy-in for the 38 LAW (now LSM) needed to support the SIF concept. The LSM is not survivable in a contested environment and will probably never be built, certainly not in the numbers requested. The bottom line is the Marines gave up needed capability and damaged the national security for nothing! How we could do this to ourselves and our Nation is astonishing.
One correction - - the Marines have a stated requirement for 35 LAWs/LSMs vice 38.
The procurement of another type of ship platform will only complicate the Navy's already stressed maintenance problems. We should just stick to three or even better, two types of amphibious hulls: one big deck, and one cargo type.
Adm. Harvey hit the nail on the head!! A consummate sailor and leader, he needs to be listened to by the DON, DOD, and most importantly, the Hill.
It is good to see some factual data added to what any professional with a modicum of common sense could have presented with about 30 minutes of prep time. The number of Amphibious ships was too low even before Gen Berger’s arbitrary divestment offer to the Navy. They quickly agreed with no guarantee to a quid pro quo for a fleet of third rate ferry boats. That the GAO proposed a schedule synchronization between ships and units is a sophomoric answer of stunning ignorance.
If one just steps back and views the last six years, the common denominator across the Navy and Marine Corps is a dysfunctional and often dishonest leadership that has failed at every turn. There simply are no solutions without addressing the fundamental problems of leadership, integrity, military professional acumen and understanding of history. “Lost confidence in the ability to lead” is a common phrase and nowhere is it more appropriate than across the senior leadership of the past 5-6 years. The problems will not be solved by the very individuals who created the problem. No commander I ever knew would have tolerated this clown show for six weeks, let alone for six years.
It is all fairly simple: This effort failed in a spectacular fashion. Fire and punish those at the heart of the disaster and bring in a new team as fast as possible to fix this mess. Can anyone imagine this being tolerated in any other institution or endeavor.
How much time do we have? No one knows but every passing hour is an hour too long. Break out the check book and buy ships, buy combat gear, recruit and train accordingly.
THE BURNING OF THE USS BONHOMME RICHARD (LHD -6) July 12, 2020, by the criminal negligence of a US Navy whose Toxic Admiralty gave America the Fat Leonard Scandal and a Navy incapable of standing Fire Watch, combined with CMCs Berger and Smith’s Broke Dick Donkey i.e. Fatal Design have produced an impotent Marine Corps that is unrecognizable from the Magnificent MEF and it agile, lethal MAGTFs they were entrusted to protect.
The less amphibious ships we have, will mean that the ones we do have, will be overworked. Thank you, CMC Berger!
As i have said before. MEUs used to pass one another during the translant or transpac portion. One leaving and one returning. That hasn't happened in years.
The other thing I have found so shocking is there hasn't been a CAX at 29 Palms in 5 years?? Are you kidding me?? WTF?? What have these people done to my CORPS!!!!!
Deck LDO here, with 3 amphib tours under my belt (one on staff). Over 20 years have gone by since my retirement. In my day, we had an awful lot of ships that were old, but their crews worked hard and they got the mission done. And although I have always said that I don't miss it, I still have a couple of haze gray dreams a week. Sad to say, current gators probably have nightmares.
Hi, great article. Semper fi. I had a few thoughts about it.
1: Buy and build more amphibs and improve the readiness of ships across the board.
And crew them with what sailors?
The navy would absolutely love to have more ships, the issue is they can't adequately crew the ones they have now. Ships get bigger (a WW2 destroyer displacement was 2k tonnes with a crew of 100-300 whereas a modern destroyer can get up to 15k tonnes and have a crew of 300-500, for example) requiring more crew but we have less people eligible for service and few are interested. This trend is accelerating generationally.
2: More shipyards and More ship construction.
Again, this ignores the crewing issue.
The shipyards are difficult. We have 3 major government shipyard in America. We used to have 7. It will be all but impossible to repurpose those 4 closed shipyards back into shipyards - Charleston shipyards closed, for instance, and now ocean front condos for the rich are where it was. Eminent domain is possible but politically not going to happen. You cant just wave a wand and create shipyards. They require natural harbors.
I'm not opposed to your end goals - a stronger nation and a stronger military with a restored to purpose USMC.
But the days of our country having trillion dollar budgets is just about over, we can't afford it. And more the American people no longer trust us (the military) to spend it wisely, public trust of the military is bad and the younger they are the worst it is viewed for the most part.
We will be forced to operate our military within its means vs what we want it to be capable of. We don't have the money, the industrial base, or the manpower to continue to be the colossal giant that soft power ruled much of the planet like we were from the 50s-2000s. Those days are gone and we must accept that.
Not being to afford as much means we are also going to have to start redefining national interest and what's truly vital. In a way it's a bit like our police departments - tighter resources mean slower response times and in some cases no response.
I'm not arguing for cuts. I'm just saying we should recognize they are possible/probable. And again, manpower will continue to decline as the capable pool shrinks and interest declines.
Before asking for lots more money the military services need serious reform. Our procurement is terrible. R&D a charlie foxtrot. We spend money like drunken sailors - the litoral ship is a great example of billions wasted. We win every battle and yet haven't won a war since ... When?
Instead of binge spending we really need to refocus our spending and focus on winning conflicts.