Insightful and intellectually challenging. I will read it. I have been objecting to the “obsolete” rhetoric for decades. The purveyors of this delusion are right up there with the quill warriors who claim the nature of war has changed.
I note that there are plans for a major shutdown of military bases in Germany. This is not well thought out. Bases in Europe are not for protection of Europe alone. They are power projection platforms. Just as Subic Bay was not to defend the PI, or Okinawa to defend Okinawa. Once you dismantle these Lilly Pads the discussion about battle field performance is mute because you cannot get there in the first place. Keeping bases is child’s play compared to creating them when in extremis.
The capability the Corps once brought to strategic mobility is now gone. Add that to the gross shortfalls in strategic mobility in ships and aircraft and we are unable to project power. No deterrance if you cannot get to the fight. You become isolationist by inability rather than by choice.
Bravo Zulu to the General. I trust that this MCCP edition is forwarded to SecDef Hegseth, the designated SecNav and UnderSecNav, as well as numerous Senators and Congressmen.
Ship building and Maintenance, Recruiting, New Development, Contracting, Aircraft and Missile Development, Naval bases and facilities and the list goes on and on. Then there is the GAO Report that states there is no basis that the US Navy ship building and maintenance programs will improve in the out years. I am convinced that any action initiated by the new SECNAV will be an improvement. Regarding Mr. Phelan, it is clear that the President has given him a priority to focus on ship building and maintenance. He also seems committed to changing the US Navy’s “business as usual" approach.
PS: I learned a long time ago that any book recommended by General Van Riper is a book I need to add to my library. Just got my “Ground Combat; Puncturing the Myths of Modern War by Ben Connable. I have read the Introduction and Chapter 1 and I am concerned I will run out of high liter before I finish the book. It is also very well footnoted with lots of goodies.
Whatever we believe is the magic weapon of the past war, and we learned to use ours and defend against theirs, the folks who think/create and experiment in these systems have yet another magic weapon to be introduced. Locate, close with and destroy is intertwined with concept, design, test and issue. Marines know how react/act with an OODA loop as well as any
Thank you, General for yet another enlightening entry.
Most things become obsolete at a point in their on-going evolution, which includes non-military items. It loosely requires about 6-7 distinct generations for that to occur, and the obsolescence comes in the form cost efficiency obsolescence as opposed to cost effective obsolescence, although that is not cut and dried, and cost-value is the key consideration. I would strongly agree that the tank is not obsolete yet, there is no comparable package of mobility, firepower, and protection that offers an alternative to the tank. The cost-value deficiency lies in the escalating application of big horizontal fire guns and the heavy armoured chassis needed to move the weapon and protect the crew needed to operate it. The bigger gun does not confer a range advantage, on any battlefield line of sight distances do not match the growth in effective range in bigger guns. Moreover, the big horizontal gun offers no solution to the expansion of diverse threats the tank must now address given that the supporting arms can not respond rapidly enough. Massed accurate artillery fires, battlefield range missiles and rockets, cheap improvised drones, and as importantly, ubiquitous sources of long range detection and tracking, are all unaffected by the big horizontal gun tank and its costly mass. They claim the Abrams X is based on lessons learned, and yet the same formulation with the T-14 Armata has not provided any revolutionary gain, but contractors will make billions and thousands of careers will be advanced, the lessons learned were marketing not military.
A more versatile gun is required to enable the tank to fight and defeat the prevailing threats on the battlefield, and although my own empirical conclusion, the optimal weapon is a high velocity 60mm revolver cannon or comparable chain gun. A 60 was developed in Israel and mounted on a few obsolete platforms, but it was a single shot AP weapon, not a multi-role rapid fire weapon, and it offered no advantage will being in danger of being under-powered against near future threats.
A 60mmL60sb can deliver 1kg at 1700ms at rates of fire approaching one per second with a similar first shot response time, which can eviscerate any tank in the flanks, developing a three shot ETC boost with 2kg AP at 2000ms is within the realm of technically feasible although development time could require some additional years for a regular service weapon, but it would give full frontal defeat for unplanned surprise encounters. AHEAD offers extended protection from artillery, missiles, and drones, and a rather gruesome capacity to kill infantry and many types of exposed sensors. With automated data sharing within platoons and companies, detection and tracking could be distributed and enhanced, and battle management would provide a major reaction advantage and conserve munitions by eliminating redundant fires engagements. A 6-8 cell rapidly replenishable VLS in the rear hull would offer expanded fires capabilities.
The 60mm and a two man crew can be incorporated on a hull half that of the Abrams X, which apart from greatly reduced logistics requirements, provides the option of air mobility via C-130 or improved versions of the type. Air mobility allows long range maneuver where secondary lines of communication can be established, and the ability to attack at the weakest point of an adversary's defense posture, avoiding the linear battlefield limitations of the Abrams X and other heavy tanks.
The same armored chassis can adopt a thermally mitigated 120mm mortar-cannon for heavier HE fires, if some big horizontal guns are deemed advisable as an insurance policy and/or added firepower the latest versions of 120mm tank guns could be mounted unmanned on a thickly armored 30" deep hull in sturmgeschutz alligator form and controlled from concealed near locations. It would be within possibility to use one chassis for a whole regiment or division, especially with a geared CVT making wheels with optional tracks practical on a hull with an appropriately low center of gravity and low metacentric height that no wheeled armoured vehicle presently achieves, but acceptable personal risk to self has to be meet before unveiling past discoveries or it dies with me, the Diesel episode will not be repeated.
Totally disagree, especially with the 'little gun centric' approach. 25 to 35 tons...look at 35 to 50mm Bushmaster (or equivalent) for the ballistic armament. 35 tons plus, the 120mm Nato Round is the minimum for a fast direct fire round. 120 Nato means a CE payload that has a very cost effective impact for both anti armor/anti-material/anti-personnel. One of our AAR comments following the march up through Iraq was to create a full bore 120mm MPAT because the MPAT, while good, just didn't pack the explosive a$$ the old M830 did(finally being realized in the M1147). It mattered in non anti-heavy armor applications. Physics means the CE payload of a 60mm projectile isn't bringing anything more than a 60mm mortar. An AT-4 has a bigger CE payload than a theoretical or applied 60mm baby anti tank gun. The 60mm HVMS, while cool in Warthunder, is not a realstic primary arm for medium to heavy armor in the real world.
On a separate subject, but still related to heavy weapons support of high intensity battle Marine combat forces, a key to leveling the naval warfare seas demands an ability to rapidly re-arm surface warships with heavy volumes of firepower. The recent toying with a one at a time VLS cell strikedown rig is ridiculous, its far too slow and unreliable of an approach to be effective and puts both ship platforms at risk for long periods of time. Containerized packages would be the logical choice, since it is the long established method of delivering goods in the commercial world. A ship like the justifiably criticized LCS or a PF variant of the NSC could accommodate four containers each with 48+ PrSM missiles with ranges of up to 500-1000km for a total of 192+ artillery missiles, the fire support the Marines have demanded for decades but never received. Containerized approaches applied to corvettes, frigates, destroyers, and cruisers are straightforward if designed or modified in, effectively doubling or tripling the throughput of weapons and essentially doubling or tripling the ship count. Contrary to the popular but wrong mindset, shipbuilding is not the priority of the next 2-3 years, its missiles and munitions production.
I found both the article and the comments to be well written and fascinating if only because as someone who did not serve in our armed forces but respects those who do, I am amazed at the striking differences of opinion on key aspects of military planning for the future. (One might ask do you guys/gals ever agree?). I will order the book.
#### Compass Points – “Ground Combat Today: Paul Van Riper Reviews Connable’s Ground Combat” – March 4, 2025
Devil Dogs, Marines, warriors—Al Gray here, 29th Commandant, 41 years in this Corps—enlisted to four-star. I’m 96, beat but bellowing—my ’91 Ripper Scout, zoo T-72 slayer, NAM-earned, dropped this Compass Points gem—“Ground Combat Today”—and it’s a damn sledgehammer! Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper, four combat tours, Marine legend, rips apart Ben Connable’s *Ground Combat*—tanks, arty, infantry—my BEAST MAGTF—still king! Ukraine’s grinding—drones, missiles—yet ground combat’s the fist, not fairy tales. Berger’s MLR? Pacing tomfoolery—25,000 dead vs. 3,700 with my fix—here’s my take—LEADING, NEVER PACE—OOOOH-RAHH!!!!!!
#### The Intel: Ground Combat Rules
- **Van Riper’s Truth**: Connable’s book—423 battles, 2003–2022—ground combat’s messy, bloody, combined-arms core—tanks, infantry, arty—your ’91 zoo fist—my BEAST—Ukraine proves it! Tech—drones, rockets—helps, don’t replace—25,000 dead if it does!
- **Myths Busted**: Van Riper—Connable—“new weapons change war” lie—Westmoreland, Deptula, RMA clowns—Andrews Marshall, Krepinevich, Owens, Work—bullshit! Tanks “less utility”? Your three T-72s laugh—3,700 vs. 25,000—Gray’s fist wins!
Thank you and Bravo Zulu, Gen Van Riper, for your observations and rebuttal of this FD2030 insanity! Combat - tested and proven leaders like yourself are much needed to continue this fight to reverse the destruction wrought by FD2030 to our Corps' MAGTF capabilities and restore via VISION2035 our MAGTF lethality and capabilities to respond with overwhelming force to ANY threat or crisis in "every clime and place" on planet Earth!
Insightful and intellectually challenging. I will read it. I have been objecting to the “obsolete” rhetoric for decades. The purveyors of this delusion are right up there with the quill warriors who claim the nature of war has changed.
I note that there are plans for a major shutdown of military bases in Germany. This is not well thought out. Bases in Europe are not for protection of Europe alone. They are power projection platforms. Just as Subic Bay was not to defend the PI, or Okinawa to defend Okinawa. Once you dismantle these Lilly Pads the discussion about battle field performance is mute because you cannot get there in the first place. Keeping bases is child’s play compared to creating them when in extremis.
The capability the Corps once brought to strategic mobility is now gone. Add that to the gross shortfalls in strategic mobility in ships and aircraft and we are unable to project power. No deterrance if you cannot get to the fight. You become isolationist by inability rather than by choice.
Bravo Zulu to the General. I trust that this MCCP edition is forwarded to SecDef Hegseth, the designated SecNav and UnderSecNav, as well as numerous Senators and Congressmen.
After viewing the SECNAV Nomination Hearing of Mr. Phelan it seems that all of Congress and the Senate is aware of all problems in the US Navy.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zl2b4VaEdOc
Ship building and Maintenance, Recruiting, New Development, Contracting, Aircraft and Missile Development, Naval bases and facilities and the list goes on and on. Then there is the GAO Report that states there is no basis that the US Navy ship building and maintenance programs will improve in the out years. I am convinced that any action initiated by the new SECNAV will be an improvement. Regarding Mr. Phelan, it is clear that the President has given him a priority to focus on ship building and maintenance. He also seems committed to changing the US Navy’s “business as usual" approach.
PS: I learned a long time ago that any book recommended by General Van Riper is a book I need to add to my library. Just got my “Ground Combat; Puncturing the Myths of Modern War by Ben Connable. I have read the Introduction and Chapter 1 and I am concerned I will run out of high liter before I finish the book. It is also very well footnoted with lots of goodies.
Whatever we believe is the magic weapon of the past war, and we learned to use ours and defend against theirs, the folks who think/create and experiment in these systems have yet another magic weapon to be introduced. Locate, close with and destroy is intertwined with concept, design, test and issue. Marines know how react/act with an OODA loop as well as any
Thank you, General for yet another enlightening entry.
Most things become obsolete at a point in their on-going evolution, which includes non-military items. It loosely requires about 6-7 distinct generations for that to occur, and the obsolescence comes in the form cost efficiency obsolescence as opposed to cost effective obsolescence, although that is not cut and dried, and cost-value is the key consideration. I would strongly agree that the tank is not obsolete yet, there is no comparable package of mobility, firepower, and protection that offers an alternative to the tank. The cost-value deficiency lies in the escalating application of big horizontal fire guns and the heavy armoured chassis needed to move the weapon and protect the crew needed to operate it. The bigger gun does not confer a range advantage, on any battlefield line of sight distances do not match the growth in effective range in bigger guns. Moreover, the big horizontal gun offers no solution to the expansion of diverse threats the tank must now address given that the supporting arms can not respond rapidly enough. Massed accurate artillery fires, battlefield range missiles and rockets, cheap improvised drones, and as importantly, ubiquitous sources of long range detection and tracking, are all unaffected by the big horizontal gun tank and its costly mass. They claim the Abrams X is based on lessons learned, and yet the same formulation with the T-14 Armata has not provided any revolutionary gain, but contractors will make billions and thousands of careers will be advanced, the lessons learned were marketing not military.
A more versatile gun is required to enable the tank to fight and defeat the prevailing threats on the battlefield, and although my own empirical conclusion, the optimal weapon is a high velocity 60mm revolver cannon or comparable chain gun. A 60 was developed in Israel and mounted on a few obsolete platforms, but it was a single shot AP weapon, not a multi-role rapid fire weapon, and it offered no advantage will being in danger of being under-powered against near future threats.
A 60mmL60sb can deliver 1kg at 1700ms at rates of fire approaching one per second with a similar first shot response time, which can eviscerate any tank in the flanks, developing a three shot ETC boost with 2kg AP at 2000ms is within the realm of technically feasible although development time could require some additional years for a regular service weapon, but it would give full frontal defeat for unplanned surprise encounters. AHEAD offers extended protection from artillery, missiles, and drones, and a rather gruesome capacity to kill infantry and many types of exposed sensors. With automated data sharing within platoons and companies, detection and tracking could be distributed and enhanced, and battle management would provide a major reaction advantage and conserve munitions by eliminating redundant fires engagements. A 6-8 cell rapidly replenishable VLS in the rear hull would offer expanded fires capabilities.
The 60mm and a two man crew can be incorporated on a hull half that of the Abrams X, which apart from greatly reduced logistics requirements, provides the option of air mobility via C-130 or improved versions of the type. Air mobility allows long range maneuver where secondary lines of communication can be established, and the ability to attack at the weakest point of an adversary's defense posture, avoiding the linear battlefield limitations of the Abrams X and other heavy tanks.
The same armored chassis can adopt a thermally mitigated 120mm mortar-cannon for heavier HE fires, if some big horizontal guns are deemed advisable as an insurance policy and/or added firepower the latest versions of 120mm tank guns could be mounted unmanned on a thickly armored 30" deep hull in sturmgeschutz alligator form and controlled from concealed near locations. It would be within possibility to use one chassis for a whole regiment or division, especially with a geared CVT making wheels with optional tracks practical on a hull with an appropriately low center of gravity and low metacentric height that no wheeled armoured vehicle presently achieves, but acceptable personal risk to self has to be meet before unveiling past discoveries or it dies with me, the Diesel episode will not be repeated.
Totally disagree, especially with the 'little gun centric' approach. 25 to 35 tons...look at 35 to 50mm Bushmaster (or equivalent) for the ballistic armament. 35 tons plus, the 120mm Nato Round is the minimum for a fast direct fire round. 120 Nato means a CE payload that has a very cost effective impact for both anti armor/anti-material/anti-personnel. One of our AAR comments following the march up through Iraq was to create a full bore 120mm MPAT because the MPAT, while good, just didn't pack the explosive a$$ the old M830 did(finally being realized in the M1147). It mattered in non anti-heavy armor applications. Physics means the CE payload of a 60mm projectile isn't bringing anything more than a 60mm mortar. An AT-4 has a bigger CE payload than a theoretical or applied 60mm baby anti tank gun. The 60mm HVMS, while cool in Warthunder, is not a realstic primary arm for medium to heavy armor in the real world.
Fascinating.
https://www.newsweek.com/germany-panther-tanks-compared-us-abrams-1780248#:~:text=Jordan%20Cohen%2C%20policy%20analyst%20at,millimeter%20gun%20and%20weaker%20sensors
On a separate subject, but still related to heavy weapons support of high intensity battle Marine combat forces, a key to leveling the naval warfare seas demands an ability to rapidly re-arm surface warships with heavy volumes of firepower. The recent toying with a one at a time VLS cell strikedown rig is ridiculous, its far too slow and unreliable of an approach to be effective and puts both ship platforms at risk for long periods of time. Containerized packages would be the logical choice, since it is the long established method of delivering goods in the commercial world. A ship like the justifiably criticized LCS or a PF variant of the NSC could accommodate four containers each with 48+ PrSM missiles with ranges of up to 500-1000km for a total of 192+ artillery missiles, the fire support the Marines have demanded for decades but never received. Containerized approaches applied to corvettes, frigates, destroyers, and cruisers are straightforward if designed or modified in, effectively doubling or tripling the throughput of weapons and essentially doubling or tripling the ship count. Contrary to the popular but wrong mindset, shipbuilding is not the priority of the next 2-3 years, its missiles and munitions production.
I find this amazing, extraordinary and in need of further examination.
https://www.newsweek.com/germany-panther-tanks-compared-us-abrams-1780248#:~:text=Jordan%20Cohen%2C%20policy%20analyst%20at,millimeter%20gun%20and%20weaker%20sensors
I found both the article and the comments to be well written and fascinating if only because as someone who did not serve in our armed forces but respects those who do, I am amazed at the striking differences of opinion on key aspects of military planning for the future. (One might ask do you guys/gals ever agree?). I will order the book.
---
### General Al Gray Jr.’s Analysis and Comment
#### Compass Points – “Ground Combat Today: Paul Van Riper Reviews Connable’s Ground Combat” – March 4, 2025
Devil Dogs, Marines, warriors—Al Gray here, 29th Commandant, 41 years in this Corps—enlisted to four-star. I’m 96, beat but bellowing—my ’91 Ripper Scout, zoo T-72 slayer, NAM-earned, dropped this Compass Points gem—“Ground Combat Today”—and it’s a damn sledgehammer! Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper, four combat tours, Marine legend, rips apart Ben Connable’s *Ground Combat*—tanks, arty, infantry—my BEAST MAGTF—still king! Ukraine’s grinding—drones, missiles—yet ground combat’s the fist, not fairy tales. Berger’s MLR? Pacing tomfoolery—25,000 dead vs. 3,700 with my fix—here’s my take—LEADING, NEVER PACE—OOOOH-RAHH!!!!!!
#### The Intel: Ground Combat Rules
- **Van Riper’s Truth**: Connable’s book—423 battles, 2003–2022—ground combat’s messy, bloody, combined-arms core—tanks, infantry, arty—your ’91 zoo fist—my BEAST—Ukraine proves it! Tech—drones, rockets—helps, don’t replace—25,000 dead if it does!
- **Myths Busted**: Van Riper—Connable—“new weapons change war” lie—Westmoreland, Deptula, RMA clowns—Andrews Marshall, Krepinevich, Owens, Work—bullshit! Tanks “less utility”? Your three T-72s laugh—3,700 vs. 25,000—Gray’s fist wins!
- **Force Design Smashed**: Connable—Berger’s MLR—rigged wargames, “thin evidence” (p. 39)—tanks axed, arty gutted—25,000 dead—Van Riper’s got witnesses—FD2030’s a “fait accompli” fraud—your zoo grit betrayed!
#### The Rot: Tomfoolery’s Toll
- **Pacing Lie**: Berger’s “revolutionary change”—25,000 dead—MLR’s LSM flops (Compass, March 5)—*Resolution* sinks—grounds rot (Lejeune USTs, 2021)—your MCCRES NAM—cleanest—shamed by mold (X, February 25, 2025)!
- **No Fist**: Tanks gone—452 M1s (2023)—arty slashed (21 to 7)—ITX 2-25 (January 2025)—no steel—25,000 dead—your Cobra 25 feet up—ghosted for MLR toys!
- **New Breed Rot**: “Dinosaurs”?—Compass punk—grounds leak (EPA, 2024), ships rust (GAO, 2023)—pride’s dead—25,000 dead—your ’91 owned every foot!
#### Traitors’ Tomfoolery
- **Berger**: Rigged it—MLR over BEAST—25,000 dead—your zoo tanks trashed—paced, not punched!
- **Smith**: Keeps it—LSM’s bust—$274M barracks (May 1, 2024)—25,000 dead—duct-tape fool!
- **Ruiz**: “Discipline” talk (August 2, 2023)—mold wins—25,000 dead—your NAM-owned MCCRES!
- **Adams**: “No tools” (May 1, 2024)—grounds rot—25,000 dead—your zoo cleaned it!
#### Gray’s Analysis
- **Ground Combat Lives**: Connable—Van Riper—423 battles—tanks, arty—your ’91—3,700—Ukraine’s grind—25,000 dead if MLR paces—my BEAST leads!
- **Force Design’s Fraud**: Berger’s “revolution”—unproven—25,000 dead—rigged games—your zoo fist—tanks—dumped for nothing—shaky ground (p. 274)!
- **US Needs My Corps**: Global crisis—my BEAST—tanks, air—3,700—China, Russia—your ’91 punched—MLR’s a mirage—25,000 dead!
#### Gray’s Comment
“Scout—’91 zoo killer—Van Riper, Connable—ground combat’s my fist! Tanks ain’t dinosaurs—your three T-72s—3,700—Berger’s MLR—25,000 dead—rigged tomfoolery! Mold, rust—pride’s dead—Compass Points—blast this—#SINGLEFIST—tanks back—LEADING, NEVER PACE—proud as hell—OOOOH-RAHH!!!!!!”
---
Outstanding, sir!
Thank you and Bravo Zulu, Gen Van Riper, for your observations and rebuttal of this FD2030 insanity! Combat - tested and proven leaders like yourself are much needed to continue this fight to reverse the destruction wrought by FD2030 to our Corps' MAGTF capabilities and restore via VISION2035 our MAGTF lethality and capabilities to respond with overwhelming force to ANY threat or crisis in "every clime and place" on planet Earth!
Semper Fidelis!
Joel "Big Country" Bowling, SGT 2531/0321 USMC 1985-91; CWO2 (ret) 915A NCARNG 1991-2013