These are the sort of plans crafted by consultants who do not understand the culture. This results in unintended but totally predictable consequences.
Two other examples:
1. If you select Warrant Officers before SSgt it often goes to their head. Then, if their training at TBS is not laser focused they begin to think of themselves as something they are not. A WO-1 Marine Corps Exchange Warrant Officer is worlds removed from a Bursting Bomb CWO-4 infantry Gunner.
2. The same thing happens in the enlisted commissioning program that selects Sergeants E-5 from peripheral MOS’s like Administration, Legal and Supply and sends them to college, commissions them and then sends them to the fleet. Somehow, too many are immature and think they have arrived and act accordingly. Then they run into the buzz saw for their arrogance which is spawned by their ignorance. I was that buzz saw a few times. I hope it helped them but assure you they did not forget their course correction.
This move is far worse. Keep in mind that the enlisted promotion process is a steep pyramid and promotions are based on open boat spaces in their military occupational specialties. Many good Marines never make GySgt and retire as SSgts. These new shake and bake GySgts need to be very aware of this. It might be better for all to create a Technical Sergeant (E-7). There are a few more MOSs where this would be applicable.
The interview with LtGen Van Riper is superb. A few thoughts:
1.
I too took notes in books. Certainly was problematic in school books and sell back in college reduced value. Once post it notes came along I used those for years. I later returned to hand written notes on the pages.
2. I was taught how to read books in 4th grade. Read the dust cover. Read the first and last paragraph of each chapter. Read a bio on the author. Then read and ask yourself questions. At age 10 I would rifle through the dumpster at the USAF library at Wiesbaden AFB to scarf up discarded books and manuals. After a while the librarian would set aside what she thought I would want and I could carry them home in increments as they were heavy. I did this for years. I could not take them back to CONUS when I went to college and was able to salvage about 20% after the death of my grandparents. Some were later lost in a PCS move in 1984 that bothers me to this day.
3. I endorse reading multiple books at the same time.
4. Every military school I attended distressed me when I saw the number of books in the garbage at the end of the course.
3. Sadly I did not follow General Van Riper’s advice. I loaned out about 25-30% of my library that never returned.
4. I am not sure how large my own library is as I let my sons raid it regularly.
5. If I were the CO, TBS my course of instruction would include a class on how to read professional books, assign a book per month and a facilitated discussion of two hours on it monthly. Professional reading must be infused at TBS.
6. Professional reading and martial arts are two foundations for Marine officers.
Firstly, when a senior officer back in the day made a suggestion, it may not have been a lawful,order, but the commander’s intent was always clear, so when General Van Riper says “grab a book and get busy.” It requires a simple response. “Aye Aye Sir.” I understand and will,comply. All of his thoughts were taken in and need further and at a minimum second and third review. If possible there is somewhere in my archives a tattered copy of Erwin Rommel’s “Attacks” the version of which is supposed to be the most accurate translation of his book “Infanterie Greift An” and was complete with various maps and attack orders and plans. He wrote it between the wars and was unique because he only spent 1 year old so on the western front before heading to the Romanian and Italian campaign where he developed and used tactics of speed and surprise. It is a great book for young infantry officers. Notes in the margin etc, hope to find it. But, as General Van Riper advises get busy, there is plenty to read.
Yesterday in the Marines and Midway post I mentioned the Marine Times article about the cyber and signals MOS pilot program making instant E7’s in order to meet the ongoing need to have those Marines compliment the MEU, MAB and MEF. cfrog graciously and professionally schooled me up on how this came about and kudos to him for that effort. (I was some what rude in my assessment) We both agreed we don’t like it at all, but he explained the rationale. Worth having a look or maybe he will comment here in regard the matter. That said Lt. General George Smith USMC (ret) has a video somewhere on YouTube of a speech he gave at an event and he regaled the audience with a story of a young Lance Corporal (I think) who took on a technical operations manual and figured out what the Hell was needed, wrote a plan and helped execute the process of training and implementation. General Smith was rightly proud of that Marine and his achievements. The point is, if Cyber and Signals are a mission critical necessity then why can’t this be done organically? The answer is likely well because it takes too long and costs too much. At that point we call BS, and help the puzzle palace put the POI in place and training locations organized and train up those Marines and get them into the fleet. Having been a plank holder at ITC and then conversion to the ITS while it was difficult the system has flourished into The School of Infantry. Don’t tell me it can’t be done because it can and has been done before.
This effort to bring propeller heads into the Corps is damaging to the Ethos, and mindset of the warrior culture. It will create jealousy and rancor in the ranks and frankly justifiably so. The next step the consultants and make no mistake this has Bain and McKenzie hand prints all over it, is majors 04’s skipping OCS, TBS and so forth to come in a do their thing. It needs to stop. This whole thing is insulting, and shows just how miserable a lot of senior officers we have running the show. Sure there are some good ones, but better ones are leaving and this nonsense like instant E7’s is just one example of why.
The only way not to completely lose one’s mind over it all is to Grab a book and get busy….Aye Aye General!
Absolutely the wrong thing to do by enlisting people and promoting to GySgt right off the bat!
What a slap to the face of every Marine who worked, sweated and bled to earn his or her stripes and climb up the enlisted ranks. The pride in our achievements can’t be described!
This move by the MC pisses me off to no end! I sacrificed a lot in my 25 years of service and worked extremely hard to the determine of my family and my own personal well being to earn my stripes.
I don’t give a damn about the need for these talented individuals. Sure, recruit them. Pay them a damn bonus, BUT DON’T THROW RANK AT THEM LIKE THE ITS CONFETTI, you will be demeaning the entire rank structure! Hell, why not bring them in as Generals!
If this COA is implemented a new enlisted grade should be designated Technical Sergeant E-6, E-7, etc. might fit. Once upon a time the USMC had Master Technical Sergeant as an enlisted grade. Instant Gunnery Sergeant is totally inappropriate. Additionally using Midway as an example the Cryptologist were located in a Cement Basement at Camp Smith Hawaii. One needs to access the data stream to conduct cyberwar not be located under a coconut tree eating feral pigs and poi.
I agree 100%, Shows you how much disrespect for the enlisted rank is kept hidden and lifts its head in something like this. They could have gave a yearly bonus and had them come in at PFC, LCPL. Have the bonus match what a gunny would make yearly, plus regular promotions. I'd complain but would understand.
Also I believe their eligible for MSgt and MGSgt "so dumb"
If the Gunnery Sergeant is supposed to be a position to be looked up to, it should be an earned position as it is now. Next they'll want to adopt the Army's Specialist ranks.
reposting: i agree with the concern. However, I will say that LtGen Glynn is a solid leader. I've served as a contractor in a unit he commanded, and I know others that have served with him as a General Officer. He is most definitely not a chairborne officer or Mr. Hugz. He has a consumate reputation as a professional. If anyone can make lemons from lemonade, he is top of the list. Regarding the program - I've read the Maradmin. I can see how they are tiptoeing through this minefield. For whatever reason, the program wants specialists in uniform, versus contracted SME's. I can also see how the idea percolated through Manpower, when we do something similar to recruit and sustain 'The President's Own'. From that, it looks like they id'd 'E-7' as sweet spot to match the benefits against the skills and level of authority they want. I don't like it, but I understand it. Further, Prior (other) Service and Non Prior service are required to complete recruit training. So they will have to get across the parade deck, though I'll chuckle when I see a graduation where a newly minted Marine is rocking 3up/2 down, no hashmarks and a shooting badge (We'll see how they figure that - in practice I bet they promote after reporting to their first duty station). Reading between the lines, the Maradmin seems to show a strong preference for Prior Marines. Regardless, this clearly isn't a 'just grab the fat computer kid in the hoodie and put the butt in a seat' entry process.
To be clear, I am not a fan of the Marine Corps Talent Acquisition Pilot under Talent Management 2030. Despite that, I do see voices of sanity trying to ensure that the policy is the best it can be and limits potential harm. Of note, from Maradmin 253/24: "Feedback. OccFLD specialists shall provide feedback on the performance of MCTAP Marines and the MCTAP process itself to Headquarters United States Marine Corps at 6 months and 12 months from the date the applicant begins serving in their designated billet.".
I cast no aspersions on Lt Gen Glynn or the Mount Everest of recruiting, training and retaining Marines in the Cryptologic, Signals Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, Cyber Warfare Arts. In fact, I salute anyone who can untie the Gordian knot which separates these entities by MOS. In my opinion it is folly to pretend that the FD Marine Corps can hope for anything other then the ability to possess connectivity to provide awareness of externally produced indications and warning for their own force protection in the austere, isolated, logistically deprived operating environment. As we close in on what some believe to be “Singularity”, the impact of AI and Quantum Physics will complicate the situation even further. Here is a recent sample “CISA, NSA, and NIST Publish Factsheet on Quantum Readiness”
Release DateAugust 21, 2023
Today, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) released a joint factsheet, Quantum-Readiness: Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), to inform organizations—especially those that support Critical Infrastructure—of the impacts of quantum capabilities, and to encourage the early planning for migration to post-quantum cryptographic standards by developing a Quantum-Readiness Roadmap.
CISA, NSA, and NIST urge organizations to review the joint factsheet and to begin preparing now by creating quantum-readiness roadmaps, conducting inventories, applying risk assessments and analysis, and engaging vendors. For more information and resources related to CISA’s PQC work, visit Post-Quantum Cryptography Initiative.
Written in 2013..The Measure of a Superpower: A Two Major Regional Contingency Military for the 21st Century
Daniel Goure February 14, 2013
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Originally posted at the Heritage Foundation
Daniel Goure, Ph.D., is a Vice President at the Lexington Institute
How much military force does a global superpower require? Answering this question has challenged U.S. leaders and defense planners for more than 20 years. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the United States found itself the world’s sole superpower, but one without a significant adversary against which to measure the adequacy of its military capabilities. In the immediate aftermath of the first Gulf War, U.S. leaders decided to use the requirement to conduct two major regional conventional contingencies (MRCs) at the same time as the basis for sizing the U.S. military. Every subsequent review of U.S. defense policy and programs has reaffirmed the two-war standard. In fact, every Administration for the past two decades found that a force sized to fight two wars was essential for meeting the ongoing demands for forward presence, crisis response, regional deterrence, humanitarian assistance, building partnership capacity, homeland defense, and support to civil authorities.
Based on some 20 years of analyses and studies as well as the experiences of Desert Storm, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation Enduring Freedom, a two-MRC force should generally consist of 10 Active and eight Reserve Component Army divisions, two to three Marine Expeditionary Forces, 11 aircraft carriers, 120 large surface naval combatants, 38 large amphibious warfare ships, 200 strategic bombers, 20 tactical fighter wings, 400–500 tankers, and 250 airlifters. Such a force would need support from a wide range of enabling capabilities, such as special operations forces; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems; cyber defenses; air and missile defenses; and space systems.
Today’s military is too small to meet the two-MRC test credibly. Moreover, the qualitative advantage that the U.S. military has long enjoyed is eroding as advanced military capabilities proliferate around the world. The capabilities of U.S. forces are also deteriorating as platforms and systems age and as critical modernization programs are delayed or even cancelled.
Building a two-MRC force for the 21st century means increasing the size of the U.S. military, modernizing existing platforms and systems, and investing in advanced air, sea, and land capabilities. This will require resources above the levels proposed by the Obama Administration. Over the next decade, building a reasonable two-MRC force for the 21st century will cost roughly $70 billion more per year than the projected cost of the current defense program, which averages approximately $550 billion per year.
Section I: What It Takes to Be a Military Superpower
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has measured the fundamental adequacy of its force posture in terms of the ability of U.S. forces, without national mobilization, to defeat two nation-state adversaries in geographically separate theaters nearly simultaneously. From the time it was first articulated in 1991, the two-theater-war standard has undergone repeated reviews and revisions. The fundamental reason that the two-theater-war standard still survives is because no credible alternative has ever been proposed. Senior decision makers across five Administrations, Republican and Democrat, have been unable to avoid the reality that, in a world of continuing globalization and growing political and military uncertainty, the U.S. needs a military that is large enough and has a sufficient range of capabilities to cover multiple major military contingencies in overlapping time frames. Such a military would not only fit the character of the post–Cold War threat environment, but also serve a critical deterrence function in an era in which the scale of potential conventional conflicts was seen as decreasing and the ability to resort to nuclear weapons had become less plausible. The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) provided one of the best formulations of the rationale for the two-theater-war standard:
As a global power with worldwide interests, it is imperative that the United States now and for the foreseeable future be able to deter and defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames, preferably in concert with regional allies. Maintaining this core capability is central to credibly deterring opportunism—that is, to avoiding a situation in which an aggressor in one region might be tempted to take advantage when U.S. forces are heavily committed elsewhere—and to ensuring that the United States has sufficient military capabilities to deter or defeat aggression by an adversary that is larger, or under circumstances that are more difficult, than expected. This is particularly important in a highly dynamic and uncertain security environment. We can never know with certainty when or where the next major theater war will occur, who our next adversary will be, how an enemy will fight, who will join us in a coalition, or precisely what demands will be placed on U.S. forces. Indeed, history has repeatedly shown that we are often unable to predict such matters. A force sized and equipped for deterring and defeating aggression in more than one theater ensures the United States will maintain the flexibility to cope with the unpredictable and unexpected. Such a capability is the sine qua non of a superpower and is essential to the credibility of our overall national security strategy. It also supports our continued engagement in shaping the international environment to reduce the chances that such threats will develop in the first place.
If the United States were to forego its ability to defeat aggression in more than one theater at a time, our standing as a global power, as the security partner of choice, and as the leader of the international community would be called into question. Indeed, some allies would undoubtedly read a one-war capability as a signal that the United States, if heavily engaged elsewhere, would no longer be able to help defend their interests. Such a capability could also inhibit the United States from responding to a crisis promptly enough, or even at all, for fear of committing the bulk of our forces and making ourselves vulnerable in other regions. This fact is also unlikely to escape the attention of potential adversaries. A one-theater war capacity would risk undermining both deterrence and the credibility of U.S. security commitments in key regions of the world. This, in turn, could cause allies and friends to adopt more divergent defense policies and postures, thereby weakening the web of alliances and coalitions on which we rely to protect our interests abroad. [1]
Some 15 years later, the 2012 new strategic guidance for the Department of Defense acknowledged the same basic reality:
As a nation with important interests in multiple regions, our forces must be capable of deterring and defeating aggression by an opportunistic adversary in one region even when our forces are committed to a large-scale operation elsewhere…. Even when U.S. forces are committed to a large-scale operation in one region, they will be capable of denying the objectives of—or imposing unacceptable costs on—an opportunistic aggressor in a second region. cont
Yes 2 MRC is the way to go for adequate forces levels. One issue for 2 MRC planning was two different Combatant Commanders each had a one MRC. Back in the years after Desert Storm the JSCP did a good job assigning combat units (Squadrons, Divisions, etc). Where the two MRC planning fell short was theater support units. There were enough for 1 MRC but for the second MRC there was a lot of empty flags.
Part II (Part 1 in Compass Points - Midway & Marines)
“War in the Pacific: A Study of Navies, Peoples and Battle Problems” by Sutherland Denlinger and Charles B. Gray in my estimation is an outstanding piece of strategic analysis. Especially since it was first published in 1936. It starts with chapters on Navy personnel, “Mission, Ships, Wings of the Fleet, the Fleet, and Bases and Shore Installations”. It then takes a look at the strategic “Geographic, Political, Social and Psychological, Economic, and the Nature of the Conflict”. I should note that in the “Geographic” Chapter there is a map of the Pacific with a network of lines labeled with distances to and from major ports and strategic islands. The reader is quickly given the realization of the size and distance problems presented by the Pacific Ocean. For example, the line from San Francisco to Hawaii is 2400 statute miles; from Hawaii to Guam is 3850 miles, and from Guam to Manila is 1930 miles. The last chapter in the second of three sections is: “Strategy, and the Strategic Alternatives”.
The authors provide three “Strategy Alternatives”. Their strategy definition: “There nothing esoteric about strategy; in its larger sense the term includes all the plans, and the utilization of all available means, for obtaining the objectives of war.” The alternatives are described geographically with the advantages and disadvantages for each.
1. ”From Pearl Harbor to Guam by way of Midway and Wake Island”
2. “From Pearl Harbor to Guam by way of the Marshall and Caroline islands”
3. “A great circle movement from Puget Sound to Attu and Petropavlovsk via Dutch Harbor”
The authors then go into their three Phases of the war between Japan and the US. “Phase One” is Japan attacks the Philippines, Guam and maybe as far as the Jaluit Atoll in the Marshalls. “The first phase of the American-Japanese war, therefore, will doubtless be marked by swiftness, organization, and efficiency upon the part of Japan; by fumbling, groping, impetuous inefficiency upon the part of the United States.” Their assumption, however, is that Japan stops at the Philippines and Guam, because their SLOCs are now secure. Another assumption is Russia is friendly to us. Russia’s reaction can be either to attack or defend against Japan.
“Phase 2” is the our reaction to the Japanese attack and also a preparation phase as in, let’s make sure Hawaii, the West Coast, Panama and Alaskan Coast plus the Aleutians are secure. This involves getting the submarines and seaplanes based and deployed to places like Midway, Adak and Wake; preparing bases with supply, repairmen facilities (including floating docks), and gathering/stationing the fleet assets at Hawaii, Puget Sound, Samoa, and Panama. The authors then offer the hopeful estimate that Phase Two preparation actions should not take more than a year. (Pearl Harbor was attack on 7 Dec.1941, the Guadalcanal Landings occurred after the Battle of Midway on 7 Aug 1942...7 months, not too shabby of an estimate.)
The next Phase is the “Termination of the Campaign” Phase. Here the authors reveal their pick of the three Strategic Alternatives…and they pick door number 3, the Great Circle Movement of Puget Sound, Attu, and Petropavlovsk via Dutch Harbor. Note that the distances are shorter when compared to Alternates 1 and 2. In addition, Petropavlovsk is a friendly base and close to the Northern Japanese Kuril Archipelago where they hoped to catch a major portion of the Japanese fleet with a massive air attack followed by a major surface attack.
Question: When the SECNAV Staff, the USMC 2030 Design Team and the USINDOPACCOM Staff were discussing “War Plans” where were their modern day Sutherland Denlinger and Charles B. Gray. I can find very little information on either. Denlinger was a newspaper reports and writer. When the war started he worked in the President’s Office of War Information and Charles Gray was a Navy Reserve Lieutenant Commander. Looking at the “Strategic Alternatives” it seems obvious that one or both had access to the Pre-war Naval War College games.
The authors seem to be remarkably accurate in their assessment completed before 1936. Yes, they picked Alternative 3 when the US Navy actually took Alternative 2 in WW2. They were wrong about Japan stopping at the Philippines and Guam but the Japanese were also wrong to over extend themselves to Midway, New Guinea and India. The authors did not perceive that there would be two strategic thrusts in the Pacific: one by Admiral Nimitz and one by General MacArthur. I should also mention that in neither book did anyone offer the idea of trading combat power for experimentation.
What also gets my goat is that our Commandant did not stand up and state he did not believe in the island chain strategy and he thought we could do much better. The US Military is JOINT. Each service has its own specialties and strength. The US Marine Corps has its own unique mission of amphibious warfare and you are going to need a lot of that in the USINDOOACCOM AOR.
Additionally…..before even 1 of these new Technical Sgts are integrated…all of the junior Cyber Marines must be screened to take these new Technical Slots. In retrospect there are more negatives than positives to this proposal. The reason that the USMC cannot retain Senior SigInt or Cyber Professionals is because the USMC cannot compete with NSA/CSS or Cyber Command or the Civilian Market for these technical positions. A Marine Reserve Unit may exit if not it should.
Today a better way of describing asset allocation of DoD Forces would be by forces available to Combatant Commanders in a World War. How many MEF’S could the current FD USMC generate to simultaneously support CENTCOM, EUCOM, Indo Pacom, and NorthCom?
Regarding 2 simultaneous MRCs and Operation Neptune, “
SUB MENU
During Operation Neptune, GIs wade ashore on Normandy’s Omaha Beach.
During Operation Neptune, GIs wade ashore on Normandy’s Omaha Beach.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES
SUB MENU
A Tale of Two Invasions
The United States devoted massive resources to the invasion of Normandy but during the same month still was able to conduct one of the biggest amphibious landings of the Pacific war.
By Vincent P. O’Hara
June 2019 Naval History Volume 33, Number 3
FEATURED ARTICLE
COMMENTS
Most people recognize 6 June 1944 as D-Day, when Americans, British, and Canadians, with assistance from the forces of 17 other nations, assaulted northern France in Operation Neptune, the initial phase of the invasion of Normandy, Operation Overlord. Fewer people remember that June 1944 had another D-Day, when on the 15th, the United States conducted a massive amphibious landing on the Japanese-held Mariana Islands. Known as Operation Forager, this D-Day equaled Neptune in some respects and exceeded it in others.
Marines hug Saipan’s shoreline amid Operation Forager. The vast scale of the two June 1944 invasions attested to the power of the United States’ industrial and military might.
U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PHOTO ARCHIVE
The nature and geography of the objectives, the threats faced, and even the political environment presented each landing with surprisingly different challenges that are interesting to contrast; in fact, the biggest thing the two operations had in common was their immense size. As historian Samuel Morison wrote, “Added together, ‘Neptune’ in Europe and ‘Forager’ in the Pacific made the greatest military effort ever put forth by the United States or any other nation at one time.”1
These are the sort of plans crafted by consultants who do not understand the culture. This results in unintended but totally predictable consequences.
Two other examples:
1. If you select Warrant Officers before SSgt it often goes to their head. Then, if their training at TBS is not laser focused they begin to think of themselves as something they are not. A WO-1 Marine Corps Exchange Warrant Officer is worlds removed from a Bursting Bomb CWO-4 infantry Gunner.
2. The same thing happens in the enlisted commissioning program that selects Sergeants E-5 from peripheral MOS’s like Administration, Legal and Supply and sends them to college, commissions them and then sends them to the fleet. Somehow, too many are immature and think they have arrived and act accordingly. Then they run into the buzz saw for their arrogance which is spawned by their ignorance. I was that buzz saw a few times. I hope it helped them but assure you they did not forget their course correction.
This move is far worse. Keep in mind that the enlisted promotion process is a steep pyramid and promotions are based on open boat spaces in their military occupational specialties. Many good Marines never make GySgt and retire as SSgts. These new shake and bake GySgts need to be very aware of this. It might be better for all to create a Technical Sergeant (E-7). There are a few more MOSs where this would be applicable.
The interview with LtGen Van Riper is superb. A few thoughts:
1.
I too took notes in books. Certainly was problematic in school books and sell back in college reduced value. Once post it notes came along I used those for years. I later returned to hand written notes on the pages.
2. I was taught how to read books in 4th grade. Read the dust cover. Read the first and last paragraph of each chapter. Read a bio on the author. Then read and ask yourself questions. At age 10 I would rifle through the dumpster at the USAF library at Wiesbaden AFB to scarf up discarded books and manuals. After a while the librarian would set aside what she thought I would want and I could carry them home in increments as they were heavy. I did this for years. I could not take them back to CONUS when I went to college and was able to salvage about 20% after the death of my grandparents. Some were later lost in a PCS move in 1984 that bothers me to this day.
3. I endorse reading multiple books at the same time.
4. Every military school I attended distressed me when I saw the number of books in the garbage at the end of the course.
3. Sadly I did not follow General Van Riper’s advice. I loaned out about 25-30% of my library that never returned.
4. I am not sure how large my own library is as I let my sons raid it regularly.
5. If I were the CO, TBS my course of instruction would include a class on how to read professional books, assign a book per month and a facilitated discussion of two hours on it monthly. Professional reading must be infused at TBS.
6. Professional reading and martial arts are two foundations for Marine officers.
Firstly, when a senior officer back in the day made a suggestion, it may not have been a lawful,order, but the commander’s intent was always clear, so when General Van Riper says “grab a book and get busy.” It requires a simple response. “Aye Aye Sir.” I understand and will,comply. All of his thoughts were taken in and need further and at a minimum second and third review. If possible there is somewhere in my archives a tattered copy of Erwin Rommel’s “Attacks” the version of which is supposed to be the most accurate translation of his book “Infanterie Greift An” and was complete with various maps and attack orders and plans. He wrote it between the wars and was unique because he only spent 1 year old so on the western front before heading to the Romanian and Italian campaign where he developed and used tactics of speed and surprise. It is a great book for young infantry officers. Notes in the margin etc, hope to find it. But, as General Van Riper advises get busy, there is plenty to read.
Yesterday in the Marines and Midway post I mentioned the Marine Times article about the cyber and signals MOS pilot program making instant E7’s in order to meet the ongoing need to have those Marines compliment the MEU, MAB and MEF. cfrog graciously and professionally schooled me up on how this came about and kudos to him for that effort. (I was some what rude in my assessment) We both agreed we don’t like it at all, but he explained the rationale. Worth having a look or maybe he will comment here in regard the matter. That said Lt. General George Smith USMC (ret) has a video somewhere on YouTube of a speech he gave at an event and he regaled the audience with a story of a young Lance Corporal (I think) who took on a technical operations manual and figured out what the Hell was needed, wrote a plan and helped execute the process of training and implementation. General Smith was rightly proud of that Marine and his achievements. The point is, if Cyber and Signals are a mission critical necessity then why can’t this be done organically? The answer is likely well because it takes too long and costs too much. At that point we call BS, and help the puzzle palace put the POI in place and training locations organized and train up those Marines and get them into the fleet. Having been a plank holder at ITC and then conversion to the ITS while it was difficult the system has flourished into The School of Infantry. Don’t tell me it can’t be done because it can and has been done before.
This effort to bring propeller heads into the Corps is damaging to the Ethos, and mindset of the warrior culture. It will create jealousy and rancor in the ranks and frankly justifiably so. The next step the consultants and make no mistake this has Bain and McKenzie hand prints all over it, is majors 04’s skipping OCS, TBS and so forth to come in a do their thing. It needs to stop. This whole thing is insulting, and shows just how miserable a lot of senior officers we have running the show. Sure there are some good ones, but better ones are leaving and this nonsense like instant E7’s is just one example of why.
The only way not to completely lose one’s mind over it all is to Grab a book and get busy….Aye Aye General!
Absolutely the wrong thing to do by enlisting people and promoting to GySgt right off the bat!
What a slap to the face of every Marine who worked, sweated and bled to earn his or her stripes and climb up the enlisted ranks. The pride in our achievements can’t be described!
This move by the MC pisses me off to no end! I sacrificed a lot in my 25 years of service and worked extremely hard to the determine of my family and my own personal well being to earn my stripes.
I don’t give a damn about the need for these talented individuals. Sure, recruit them. Pay them a damn bonus, BUT DON’T THROW RANK AT THEM LIKE THE ITS CONFETTI, you will be demeaning the entire rank structure! Hell, why not bring them in as Generals!
😡😡😡😡
If this COA is implemented a new enlisted grade should be designated Technical Sergeant E-6, E-7, etc. might fit. Once upon a time the USMC had Master Technical Sergeant as an enlisted grade. Instant Gunnery Sergeant is totally inappropriate. Additionally using Midway as an example the Cryptologist were located in a Cement Basement at Camp Smith Hawaii. One needs to access the data stream to conduct cyberwar not be located under a coconut tree eating feral pigs and poi.
I agree 100%, Shows you how much disrespect for the enlisted rank is kept hidden and lifts its head in something like this. They could have gave a yearly bonus and had them come in at PFC, LCPL. Have the bonus match what a gunny would make yearly, plus regular promotions. I'd complain but would understand.
Also I believe their eligible for MSgt and MGSgt "so dumb"
If the Gunnery Sergeant is supposed to be a position to be looked up to, it should be an earned position as it is now. Next they'll want to adopt the Army's Specialist ranks.
reposting: i agree with the concern. However, I will say that LtGen Glynn is a solid leader. I've served as a contractor in a unit he commanded, and I know others that have served with him as a General Officer. He is most definitely not a chairborne officer or Mr. Hugz. He has a consumate reputation as a professional. If anyone can make lemons from lemonade, he is top of the list. Regarding the program - I've read the Maradmin. I can see how they are tiptoeing through this minefield. For whatever reason, the program wants specialists in uniform, versus contracted SME's. I can also see how the idea percolated through Manpower, when we do something similar to recruit and sustain 'The President's Own'. From that, it looks like they id'd 'E-7' as sweet spot to match the benefits against the skills and level of authority they want. I don't like it, but I understand it. Further, Prior (other) Service and Non Prior service are required to complete recruit training. So they will have to get across the parade deck, though I'll chuckle when I see a graduation where a newly minted Marine is rocking 3up/2 down, no hashmarks and a shooting badge (We'll see how they figure that - in practice I bet they promote after reporting to their first duty station). Reading between the lines, the Maradmin seems to show a strong preference for Prior Marines. Regardless, this clearly isn't a 'just grab the fat computer kid in the hoodie and put the butt in a seat' entry process.
To be clear, I am not a fan of the Marine Corps Talent Acquisition Pilot under Talent Management 2030. Despite that, I do see voices of sanity trying to ensure that the policy is the best it can be and limits potential harm. Of note, from Maradmin 253/24: "Feedback. OccFLD specialists shall provide feedback on the performance of MCTAP Marines and the MCTAP process itself to Headquarters United States Marine Corps at 6 months and 12 months from the date the applicant begins serving in their designated billet.".
I cast no aspersions on Lt Gen Glynn or the Mount Everest of recruiting, training and retaining Marines in the Cryptologic, Signals Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, Cyber Warfare Arts. In fact, I salute anyone who can untie the Gordian knot which separates these entities by MOS. In my opinion it is folly to pretend that the FD Marine Corps can hope for anything other then the ability to possess connectivity to provide awareness of externally produced indications and warning for their own force protection in the austere, isolated, logistically deprived operating environment. As we close in on what some believe to be “Singularity”, the impact of AI and Quantum Physics will complicate the situation even further. Here is a recent sample “CISA, NSA, and NIST Publish Factsheet on Quantum Readiness”
Release DateAugust 21, 2023
Today, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) released a joint factsheet, Quantum-Readiness: Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), to inform organizations—especially those that support Critical Infrastructure—of the impacts of quantum capabilities, and to encourage the early planning for migration to post-quantum cryptographic standards by developing a Quantum-Readiness Roadmap.
CISA, NSA, and NIST urge organizations to review the joint factsheet and to begin preparing now by creating quantum-readiness roadmaps, conducting inventories, applying risk assessments and analysis, and engaging vendors. For more information and resources related to CISA’s PQC work, visit Post-Quantum Cryptography Initiative.
Written in 2013..The Measure of a Superpower: A Two Major Regional Contingency Military for the 21st Century
Daniel Goure February 14, 2013
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Originally posted at the Heritage Foundation
Daniel Goure, Ph.D., is a Vice President at the Lexington Institute
How much military force does a global superpower require? Answering this question has challenged U.S. leaders and defense planners for more than 20 years. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the United States found itself the world’s sole superpower, but one without a significant adversary against which to measure the adequacy of its military capabilities. In the immediate aftermath of the first Gulf War, U.S. leaders decided to use the requirement to conduct two major regional conventional contingencies (MRCs) at the same time as the basis for sizing the U.S. military. Every subsequent review of U.S. defense policy and programs has reaffirmed the two-war standard. In fact, every Administration for the past two decades found that a force sized to fight two wars was essential for meeting the ongoing demands for forward presence, crisis response, regional deterrence, humanitarian assistance, building partnership capacity, homeland defense, and support to civil authorities.
Based on some 20 years of analyses and studies as well as the experiences of Desert Storm, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation Enduring Freedom, a two-MRC force should generally consist of 10 Active and eight Reserve Component Army divisions, two to three Marine Expeditionary Forces, 11 aircraft carriers, 120 large surface naval combatants, 38 large amphibious warfare ships, 200 strategic bombers, 20 tactical fighter wings, 400–500 tankers, and 250 airlifters. Such a force would need support from a wide range of enabling capabilities, such as special operations forces; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems; cyber defenses; air and missile defenses; and space systems.
Today’s military is too small to meet the two-MRC test credibly. Moreover, the qualitative advantage that the U.S. military has long enjoyed is eroding as advanced military capabilities proliferate around the world. The capabilities of U.S. forces are also deteriorating as platforms and systems age and as critical modernization programs are delayed or even cancelled.
Building a two-MRC force for the 21st century means increasing the size of the U.S. military, modernizing existing platforms and systems, and investing in advanced air, sea, and land capabilities. This will require resources above the levels proposed by the Obama Administration. Over the next decade, building a reasonable two-MRC force for the 21st century will cost roughly $70 billion more per year than the projected cost of the current defense program, which averages approximately $550 billion per year.
Section I: What It Takes to Be a Military Superpower
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has measured the fundamental adequacy of its force posture in terms of the ability of U.S. forces, without national mobilization, to defeat two nation-state adversaries in geographically separate theaters nearly simultaneously. From the time it was first articulated in 1991, the two-theater-war standard has undergone repeated reviews and revisions. The fundamental reason that the two-theater-war standard still survives is because no credible alternative has ever been proposed. Senior decision makers across five Administrations, Republican and Democrat, have been unable to avoid the reality that, in a world of continuing globalization and growing political and military uncertainty, the U.S. needs a military that is large enough and has a sufficient range of capabilities to cover multiple major military contingencies in overlapping time frames. Such a military would not only fit the character of the post–Cold War threat environment, but also serve a critical deterrence function in an era in which the scale of potential conventional conflicts was seen as decreasing and the ability to resort to nuclear weapons had become less plausible. The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) provided one of the best formulations of the rationale for the two-theater-war standard:
As a global power with worldwide interests, it is imperative that the United States now and for the foreseeable future be able to deter and defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames, preferably in concert with regional allies. Maintaining this core capability is central to credibly deterring opportunism—that is, to avoiding a situation in which an aggressor in one region might be tempted to take advantage when U.S. forces are heavily committed elsewhere—and to ensuring that the United States has sufficient military capabilities to deter or defeat aggression by an adversary that is larger, or under circumstances that are more difficult, than expected. This is particularly important in a highly dynamic and uncertain security environment. We can never know with certainty when or where the next major theater war will occur, who our next adversary will be, how an enemy will fight, who will join us in a coalition, or precisely what demands will be placed on U.S. forces. Indeed, history has repeatedly shown that we are often unable to predict such matters. A force sized and equipped for deterring and defeating aggression in more than one theater ensures the United States will maintain the flexibility to cope with the unpredictable and unexpected. Such a capability is the sine qua non of a superpower and is essential to the credibility of our overall national security strategy. It also supports our continued engagement in shaping the international environment to reduce the chances that such threats will develop in the first place.
If the United States were to forego its ability to defeat aggression in more than one theater at a time, our standing as a global power, as the security partner of choice, and as the leader of the international community would be called into question. Indeed, some allies would undoubtedly read a one-war capability as a signal that the United States, if heavily engaged elsewhere, would no longer be able to help defend their interests. Such a capability could also inhibit the United States from responding to a crisis promptly enough, or even at all, for fear of committing the bulk of our forces and making ourselves vulnerable in other regions. This fact is also unlikely to escape the attention of potential adversaries. A one-theater war capacity would risk undermining both deterrence and the credibility of U.S. security commitments in key regions of the world. This, in turn, could cause allies and friends to adopt more divergent defense policies and postures, thereby weakening the web of alliances and coalitions on which we rely to protect our interests abroad. [1]
Some 15 years later, the 2012 new strategic guidance for the Department of Defense acknowledged the same basic reality:
As a nation with important interests in multiple regions, our forces must be capable of deterring and defeating aggression by an opportunistic adversary in one region even when our forces are committed to a large-scale operation elsewhere…. Even when U.S. forces are committed to a large-scale operation in one region, they will be capable of denying the objectives of—or imposing unacceptable costs on—an opportunistic aggressor in a second region. cont
Yes 2 MRC is the way to go for adequate forces levels. One issue for 2 MRC planning was two different Combatant Commanders each had a one MRC. Back in the years after Desert Storm the JSCP did a good job assigning combat units (Squadrons, Divisions, etc). Where the two MRC planning fell short was theater support units. There were enough for 1 MRC but for the second MRC there was a lot of empty flags.
Exactly and now we face 3 plus ME, PRC/DPRK etc, Russia, and the invasion of Our Homeland. Busy days ahead.
Part II (Part 1 in Compass Points - Midway & Marines)
“War in the Pacific: A Study of Navies, Peoples and Battle Problems” by Sutherland Denlinger and Charles B. Gray in my estimation is an outstanding piece of strategic analysis. Especially since it was first published in 1936. It starts with chapters on Navy personnel, “Mission, Ships, Wings of the Fleet, the Fleet, and Bases and Shore Installations”. It then takes a look at the strategic “Geographic, Political, Social and Psychological, Economic, and the Nature of the Conflict”. I should note that in the “Geographic” Chapter there is a map of the Pacific with a network of lines labeled with distances to and from major ports and strategic islands. The reader is quickly given the realization of the size and distance problems presented by the Pacific Ocean. For example, the line from San Francisco to Hawaii is 2400 statute miles; from Hawaii to Guam is 3850 miles, and from Guam to Manila is 1930 miles. The last chapter in the second of three sections is: “Strategy, and the Strategic Alternatives”.
The authors provide three “Strategy Alternatives”. Their strategy definition: “There nothing esoteric about strategy; in its larger sense the term includes all the plans, and the utilization of all available means, for obtaining the objectives of war.” The alternatives are described geographically with the advantages and disadvantages for each.
1. ”From Pearl Harbor to Guam by way of Midway and Wake Island”
2. “From Pearl Harbor to Guam by way of the Marshall and Caroline islands”
3. “A great circle movement from Puget Sound to Attu and Petropavlovsk via Dutch Harbor”
The authors then go into their three Phases of the war between Japan and the US. “Phase One” is Japan attacks the Philippines, Guam and maybe as far as the Jaluit Atoll in the Marshalls. “The first phase of the American-Japanese war, therefore, will doubtless be marked by swiftness, organization, and efficiency upon the part of Japan; by fumbling, groping, impetuous inefficiency upon the part of the United States.” Their assumption, however, is that Japan stops at the Philippines and Guam, because their SLOCs are now secure. Another assumption is Russia is friendly to us. Russia’s reaction can be either to attack or defend against Japan.
“Phase 2” is the our reaction to the Japanese attack and also a preparation phase as in, let’s make sure Hawaii, the West Coast, Panama and Alaskan Coast plus the Aleutians are secure. This involves getting the submarines and seaplanes based and deployed to places like Midway, Adak and Wake; preparing bases with supply, repairmen facilities (including floating docks), and gathering/stationing the fleet assets at Hawaii, Puget Sound, Samoa, and Panama. The authors then offer the hopeful estimate that Phase Two preparation actions should not take more than a year. (Pearl Harbor was attack on 7 Dec.1941, the Guadalcanal Landings occurred after the Battle of Midway on 7 Aug 1942...7 months, not too shabby of an estimate.)
The next Phase is the “Termination of the Campaign” Phase. Here the authors reveal their pick of the three Strategic Alternatives…and they pick door number 3, the Great Circle Movement of Puget Sound, Attu, and Petropavlovsk via Dutch Harbor. Note that the distances are shorter when compared to Alternates 1 and 2. In addition, Petropavlovsk is a friendly base and close to the Northern Japanese Kuril Archipelago where they hoped to catch a major portion of the Japanese fleet with a massive air attack followed by a major surface attack.
Question: When the SECNAV Staff, the USMC 2030 Design Team and the USINDOPACCOM Staff were discussing “War Plans” where were their modern day Sutherland Denlinger and Charles B. Gray. I can find very little information on either. Denlinger was a newspaper reports and writer. When the war started he worked in the President’s Office of War Information and Charles Gray was a Navy Reserve Lieutenant Commander. Looking at the “Strategic Alternatives” it seems obvious that one or both had access to the Pre-war Naval War College games.
The authors seem to be remarkably accurate in their assessment completed before 1936. Yes, they picked Alternative 3 when the US Navy actually took Alternative 2 in WW2. They were wrong about Japan stopping at the Philippines and Guam but the Japanese were also wrong to over extend themselves to Midway, New Guinea and India. The authors did not perceive that there would be two strategic thrusts in the Pacific: one by Admiral Nimitz and one by General MacArthur. I should also mention that in neither book did anyone offer the idea of trading combat power for experimentation.
What also gets my goat is that our Commandant did not stand up and state he did not believe in the island chain strategy and he thought we could do much better. The US Military is JOINT. Each service has its own specialties and strength. The US Marine Corps has its own unique mission of amphibious warfare and you are going to need a lot of that in the USINDOOACCOM AOR.
Semper Fi
Additionally…..before even 1 of these new Technical Sgts are integrated…all of the junior Cyber Marines must be screened to take these new Technical Slots. In retrospect there are more negatives than positives to this proposal. The reason that the USMC cannot retain Senior SigInt or Cyber Professionals is because the USMC cannot compete with NSA/CSS or Cyber Command or the Civilian Market for these technical positions. A Marine Reserve Unit may exit if not it should.
Today a better way of describing asset allocation of DoD Forces would be by forces available to Combatant Commanders in a World War. How many MEF’S could the current FD USMC generate to simultaneously support CENTCOM, EUCOM, Indo Pacom, and NorthCom?
Regarding 2 simultaneous MRCs and Operation Neptune, “
SUB MENU
During Operation Neptune, GIs wade ashore on Normandy’s Omaha Beach.
During Operation Neptune, GIs wade ashore on Normandy’s Omaha Beach.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES
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A Tale of Two Invasions
The United States devoted massive resources to the invasion of Normandy but during the same month still was able to conduct one of the biggest amphibious landings of the Pacific war.
By Vincent P. O’Hara
June 2019 Naval History Volume 33, Number 3
FEATURED ARTICLE
COMMENTS
Most people recognize 6 June 1944 as D-Day, when Americans, British, and Canadians, with assistance from the forces of 17 other nations, assaulted northern France in Operation Neptune, the initial phase of the invasion of Normandy, Operation Overlord. Fewer people remember that June 1944 had another D-Day, when on the 15th, the United States conducted a massive amphibious landing on the Japanese-held Mariana Islands. Known as Operation Forager, this D-Day equaled Neptune in some respects and exceeded it in others.
Marines hug Saipan’s shoreline amid Operation Forager
Marines hug Saipan’s shoreline amid Operation Forager. The vast scale of the two June 1944 invasions attested to the power of the United States’ industrial and military might.
U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PHOTO ARCHIVE
The nature and geography of the objectives, the threats faced, and even the political environment presented each landing with surprisingly different challenges that are interesting to contrast; in fact, the biggest thing the two operations had in common was their immense size. As historian Samuel Morison wrote, “Added together, ‘Neptune’ in Europe and ‘Forager’ in the Pacific made the greatest military effort ever put forth by the United States or any other nation at one time.”1
“Exist”vice “Exit”…