Some times the simple approach is the best approach. In early 1975 I became an infantry platoon leader and had 62 Marines on the books. Yet, I could not fall out more than 25. In reality, I did not have a full two squads.
The number of Amphibs that could load Marines and sail into harms way is about 18-20. The amount of Marines and their gear to conduct an Amphibious Assault is day to day and hard to determine. Are the Ospreys and F-35’s grounded for a safety stand down? Will the sea state be sufficiently calm to launch Assault Amphibious vehicles? Does the MAGFT of probably Brigade size have air defense capabilities? How about fully manned, trained and equipped infantry Bn’s? Of course, no tanks, no snipers, no bridging equipment, no MP’s, probably no Brigade HQ that has conducted a live fire exercise in years or tube artillery either.
For a full five years the Corps has cut MAGTF assets without having created a single, fully functioning EABO team. The bulldozers tore down the barracks and the Marines are standing in the rain waiting for the new, promised building to be built.
I might note that in the five years that the Corps castrated itself of war fighting prowess I have not seen a cut in the supporting establishment or higher HQ’s. I have not seen an improvement in facilities like barracks or family housing.
I am puzzled. What exactly is HQMC doing? It might be time for a unit formation and see what will form up on the parade deck. It might mirror my first formation as a Plt Ldr. The Corps fixed itself then and that challenge was child’s play compared to what must be set right today.
Douglas, if it is any consolation, when I got assigned to Mike Co. 3/2 in January of 1979, the situation was very similar to yours in 1975. We may have had a T/O of 30, but at any given day/week/month we effectively had 25 in 3rd platoon. The EAS virus was eating up man power at the rapid rate. Mike Co. I was the only officer Platoon Commander, the rest were SNCO’s, thought they were very sharp! Mike was folded into the Battalion and I went down to Lima, assigned to 1st platoon, and situation the same. Maybe 25 effectives. But at least we had the tanks to train with and several training evolutions of tanks and infantry working together. In fairness to the Marines, once we got out to the field and away from garrison life, they responded, especially if the training was made interesting. In addition to looking at the budgets, whether anyone likes Musk and his Whiz Kids or not, they are gonna look in, the whole Goldwater Nichols construct needs a hard look. From the outside looking in how many “J’s” do we really need? How many 4 stars, 44 seems high for a combined force of roughly 1.8M. Lots to contemplate and a lot to repair.
Current technology drones are relatively simple, crude tools. Appropriate for a Marine? A forward focus, instead of a backward focus on artillery/tanks/aircraft, would provide a direction which is suitable to the Marine. Rebuilding is necessary; and if I were a young Marine a personal drone squad as a primary breaching tool would be very attractive. Do not tie these into a large centrally commanded fustercluck.
We have seen that in the conflict in the Ukraine that drones are there in many many iterations, local squad and platoon sized units deploying various drones and ever more large and lethal as well on the larger tactical level. That said, artillery has been the king of battle in that conflict. The Russian Federation forces are firing 12,000 rounds a day to the Ukrainians 6,000 rounds. They are using armor and mechanized infantry. They are using engineers to build and breach the well constructed defensive bands. They are using fire and maneuver both straight leg and mechanized infantry. Once again the drones have shown that lethality doesn’t change, broad swords and long bows, tanks in WWI etc, etc, the drones are now part of the table of equipment but their implementation on the battlefield is clearly a work in progress. This all said, a key element is the ability to get to the battle and have the logistics to support the MEU/MEB/MEF or similar Army configurations the drones are not much help. Reconstituting the MAGTF and having 3 divisions and 3 air wings to meet Title X mandates is not old or backward thinking. If the world is going to drones then change Title X and change the make of the USMC. “If you can be seen you will be hit, if you are hit, you will be killed.” TRADOC circa 1974/75. Not much has changed.
The ebb and flow of Marines to the operational units revealed that Manpower at HQMC simply could not manage the requirement. In my 26 years I served in two billets where we were supposed to be manned at 100% of T/O. We never were. There were many reasons. None were good enough in my opinion. I hope that today, with sophisticated computer manning models, we no longer have this problem.
One has to ask if the Marines that were discharged will come back. Maybe yes and maybe no. One could equally ask why would they? When anyone who can put fog on a mirror sees the level of leadership across all branches of our military it is hard to be even notionally confident that senior leadership has any clue other than to be sure the pinky finger is pointed up and outward when having tea with senator foghorn leghorn. If something stronger than just two drinks and it is “by your leave.” How can we regain the trust and confidence of the American people? We will need more than the new SecDef saying what will be done. They need to get busy and fast. Sands are slipping down through the hourglass Dorthy. The flying monkeys are still airborne. And we are worried about drones when the puzzle palace has us covered with their own brand of flying monkeys.
Compass Points has provided both detailed analysis and opinions on how the USMC force structure arrived where she now is in regards to Force Design. Do not think the how adequately addressed. In whatever details were provided by our combat development approach to our senior leaders, what Marine Corps Commander was responsible for identifying the operational impacts of the Force Design initiatives to the EOS?
FD2030 is a proven colossal FAILURE and criminal in its intent and implementation by Berger and continued by current CMC Gen Smith... VISION2035 is a MUST to SAVE our Corps and reverse the curse of this scam and restore our Corps' MAGTF lethality and capabilities!!! Semper Fi!
If you are a frequent reader of Marine Corps CP comments, you cannot help but notice the recommendations for military leaders and civilians to read the Marine Corps Doctrinal Pub., MCDP 1 WARFIGHTING. From the MCDP 1 Forward: “Since Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Warfighting, was first published in 1989, it has had a significant impact both inside and outside the Marine Corps. The manual has changed the way Marines think about warfare.”
In the late 70s, this thinking was initiated by USAF Col John Boyd and his briefing “Patterns of Conflict”. This brief was born out of a study on asymmetric warfare that is – “a type of war between belligerents whose relative military power, strategy or tactics differ significantly.” Col. Boyd’s briefing and his “OODA Loop Theory” started a debate not only within the US Marine Corps but also within all DOD Services. Initially Col Boyd’s briefing answered the question of how does a smaller force defeat an enemy force that is significantly larger. This idea of “smaller can defeat larger” is perfect for the US Marine Corps, however, in many ways the debate shifted and took on “luggage” because of the label it acquired of “Maneuver Warfare”. At first, the label was a good idea because it countered the idea of attrition warfare. New ideas, however, are seldom accepted easily and can be countered with “dogma”. Doctrine is a teaching and dogma is an opinion.
The dogma against Maneuver Warfare died, at least within the Marine Corps, on 6 March 1989 when A.M. Gray, General US Marine Corps, Commandant of the Marine Corps, signed FMFM 1 WARFIGHTING. General Gray didn’t title this document “Maneuver Warfare” because FMFM1 doctrine is a good and better way of thinking about WARFIGHTING. This document was republished by the Commandant, General Krulak (Chowder 2) on 20 June 1997 as MCDP1 with the Forward statement: “Very simply, this publication describes the philosophy which distinguishes the US Marine Corps.” When it comes to warfighting, I know of no document or book better when it comes to the philosophy of strategy, operational or tactical warfighting. (I state this because this will upset the “Clausewitz” folks who do sortie out of their Alamo occasionally.)
I have heard two Commandants refer to the CCP “pacing threat”. A pacing threat is defined as “a nation or entity that poses a significant and sustained challenge to a country's military capabilities and strategic interests. This term is often used in the context of U.S. defense strategy to describe a competitor that has the potential to match or exceed the military, economic, and technological advancements of the United States. I feel it is time to move past the equalizations like “pacing threat”. If the new SECDEF wants a priority on “Warfighting”, then let’s make sure he understands that the US Marine Corps should be the first in line for that priority.
Some times the simple approach is the best approach. In early 1975 I became an infantry platoon leader and had 62 Marines on the books. Yet, I could not fall out more than 25. In reality, I did not have a full two squads.
The number of Amphibs that could load Marines and sail into harms way is about 18-20. The amount of Marines and their gear to conduct an Amphibious Assault is day to day and hard to determine. Are the Ospreys and F-35’s grounded for a safety stand down? Will the sea state be sufficiently calm to launch Assault Amphibious vehicles? Does the MAGFT of probably Brigade size have air defense capabilities? How about fully manned, trained and equipped infantry Bn’s? Of course, no tanks, no snipers, no bridging equipment, no MP’s, probably no Brigade HQ that has conducted a live fire exercise in years or tube artillery either.
For a full five years the Corps has cut MAGTF assets without having created a single, fully functioning EABO team. The bulldozers tore down the barracks and the Marines are standing in the rain waiting for the new, promised building to be built.
I might note that in the five years that the Corps castrated itself of war fighting prowess I have not seen a cut in the supporting establishment or higher HQ’s. I have not seen an improvement in facilities like barracks or family housing.
I am puzzled. What exactly is HQMC doing? It might be time for a unit formation and see what will form up on the parade deck. It might mirror my first formation as a Plt Ldr. The Corps fixed itself then and that challenge was child’s play compared to what must be set right today.
Douglas, if it is any consolation, when I got assigned to Mike Co. 3/2 in January of 1979, the situation was very similar to yours in 1975. We may have had a T/O of 30, but at any given day/week/month we effectively had 25 in 3rd platoon. The EAS virus was eating up man power at the rapid rate. Mike Co. I was the only officer Platoon Commander, the rest were SNCO’s, thought they were very sharp! Mike was folded into the Battalion and I went down to Lima, assigned to 1st platoon, and situation the same. Maybe 25 effectives. But at least we had the tanks to train with and several training evolutions of tanks and infantry working together. In fairness to the Marines, once we got out to the field and away from garrison life, they responded, especially if the training was made interesting. In addition to looking at the budgets, whether anyone likes Musk and his Whiz Kids or not, they are gonna look in, the whole Goldwater Nichols construct needs a hard look. From the outside looking in how many “J’s” do we really need? How many 4 stars, 44 seems high for a combined force of roughly 1.8M. Lots to contemplate and a lot to repair.
Current technology drones are relatively simple, crude tools. Appropriate for a Marine? A forward focus, instead of a backward focus on artillery/tanks/aircraft, would provide a direction which is suitable to the Marine. Rebuilding is necessary; and if I were a young Marine a personal drone squad as a primary breaching tool would be very attractive. Do not tie these into a large centrally commanded fustercluck.
We have seen that in the conflict in the Ukraine that drones are there in many many iterations, local squad and platoon sized units deploying various drones and ever more large and lethal as well on the larger tactical level. That said, artillery has been the king of battle in that conflict. The Russian Federation forces are firing 12,000 rounds a day to the Ukrainians 6,000 rounds. They are using armor and mechanized infantry. They are using engineers to build and breach the well constructed defensive bands. They are using fire and maneuver both straight leg and mechanized infantry. Once again the drones have shown that lethality doesn’t change, broad swords and long bows, tanks in WWI etc, etc, the drones are now part of the table of equipment but their implementation on the battlefield is clearly a work in progress. This all said, a key element is the ability to get to the battle and have the logistics to support the MEU/MEB/MEF or similar Army configurations the drones are not much help. Reconstituting the MAGTF and having 3 divisions and 3 air wings to meet Title X mandates is not old or backward thinking. If the world is going to drones then change Title X and change the make of the USMC. “If you can be seen you will be hit, if you are hit, you will be killed.” TRADOC circa 1974/75. Not much has changed.
The ebb and flow of Marines to the operational units revealed that Manpower at HQMC simply could not manage the requirement. In my 26 years I served in two billets where we were supposed to be manned at 100% of T/O. We never were. There were many reasons. None were good enough in my opinion. I hope that today, with sophisticated computer manning models, we no longer have this problem.
One has to ask if the Marines that were discharged will come back. Maybe yes and maybe no. One could equally ask why would they? When anyone who can put fog on a mirror sees the level of leadership across all branches of our military it is hard to be even notionally confident that senior leadership has any clue other than to be sure the pinky finger is pointed up and outward when having tea with senator foghorn leghorn. If something stronger than just two drinks and it is “by your leave.” How can we regain the trust and confidence of the American people? We will need more than the new SecDef saying what will be done. They need to get busy and fast. Sands are slipping down through the hourglass Dorthy. The flying monkeys are still airborne. And we are worried about drones when the puzzle palace has us covered with their own brand of flying monkeys.
Compass Points has provided both detailed analysis and opinions on how the USMC force structure arrived where she now is in regards to Force Design. Do not think the how adequately addressed. In whatever details were provided by our combat development approach to our senior leaders, what Marine Corps Commander was responsible for identifying the operational impacts of the Force Design initiatives to the EOS?
FD2030 is a proven colossal FAILURE and criminal in its intent and implementation by Berger and continued by current CMC Gen Smith... VISION2035 is a MUST to SAVE our Corps and reverse the curse of this scam and restore our Corps' MAGTF lethality and capabilities!!! Semper Fi!
Lets hope that FD goes the way the way of the Army's Pentomic Division of the late 50s and early 60s.
If you are a frequent reader of Marine Corps CP comments, you cannot help but notice the recommendations for military leaders and civilians to read the Marine Corps Doctrinal Pub., MCDP 1 WARFIGHTING. From the MCDP 1 Forward: “Since Fleet Marine Force Manual 1, Warfighting, was first published in 1989, it has had a significant impact both inside and outside the Marine Corps. The manual has changed the way Marines think about warfare.”
In the late 70s, this thinking was initiated by USAF Col John Boyd and his briefing “Patterns of Conflict”. This brief was born out of a study on asymmetric warfare that is – “a type of war between belligerents whose relative military power, strategy or tactics differ significantly.” Col. Boyd’s briefing and his “OODA Loop Theory” started a debate not only within the US Marine Corps but also within all DOD Services. Initially Col Boyd’s briefing answered the question of how does a smaller force defeat an enemy force that is significantly larger. This idea of “smaller can defeat larger” is perfect for the US Marine Corps, however, in many ways the debate shifted and took on “luggage” because of the label it acquired of “Maneuver Warfare”. At first, the label was a good idea because it countered the idea of attrition warfare. New ideas, however, are seldom accepted easily and can be countered with “dogma”. Doctrine is a teaching and dogma is an opinion.
The dogma against Maneuver Warfare died, at least within the Marine Corps, on 6 March 1989 when A.M. Gray, General US Marine Corps, Commandant of the Marine Corps, signed FMFM 1 WARFIGHTING. General Gray didn’t title this document “Maneuver Warfare” because FMFM1 doctrine is a good and better way of thinking about WARFIGHTING. This document was republished by the Commandant, General Krulak (Chowder 2) on 20 June 1997 as MCDP1 with the Forward statement: “Very simply, this publication describes the philosophy which distinguishes the US Marine Corps.” When it comes to warfighting, I know of no document or book better when it comes to the philosophy of strategy, operational or tactical warfighting. (I state this because this will upset the “Clausewitz” folks who do sortie out of their Alamo occasionally.)
I have heard two Commandants refer to the CCP “pacing threat”. A pacing threat is defined as “a nation or entity that poses a significant and sustained challenge to a country's military capabilities and strategic interests. This term is often used in the context of U.S. defense strategy to describe a competitor that has the potential to match or exceed the military, economic, and technological advancements of the United States. I feel it is time to move past the equalizations like “pacing threat”. If the new SECDEF wants a priority on “Warfighting”, then let’s make sure he understands that the US Marine Corps should be the first in line for that priority.
BTW: This is where SECDEF (and SECNAV, the Joint Staff, Combatant Commanders and Congressional Staffers) can get a copy of MCDP1 WARFIGHTING: https://www.amazon.com/Warfighting-Department-Navy/dp/1490367217/ref=sr_1_2?crid=2P4EK1PTZOL7V&dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.LU9CKaYiFbtWWC_n-zsMo1a6437NcFzO_w9Hdcld4MqR4hyaGax_wI51TFUlZyhZc5EtO8BypgluzQX5SsWxUiuXhvNeVvTf3RVtLg1grfWu8Gfc3PgU7ZNgfi3FKqSnGKSMb0LloiccHX8EZTiL4kYHWCpJKXlwRUomeLzQnHHAgMDiE2d4xwTJaV5fdxy5sXh-XvTUVQbfbdxaj44TGw_Jfnn-rkR7Bitih_cBF3o.9RjzhWyBR2qhX_scEBCq5HE652dwp-qb5VivE4YNoF4&dib_tag=se&keywords=Warfighting&qid=1739206225&s=books&sprefix=warfighting%2Cstripbooks%2C104&sr=1-2
A Super set of Points! More latter. Semper Fidelis!