There was a time when the first two questions asked by the NSC during a crisis was where are the carriers and where are the Marines. We know where the carriers are right now. Where are the Marines?
And the answer isn’t the same. Where’s the afloat MEU in the IO, the Red Sea, or the Arabian Sea? And even if they were, under this Commandant their combat power is drastically limited. No tanks, no engineer assault capability, no snipers, and my guess is they have only a platoon of artillery not the 8 gun battery as in the past. Oh but we do have a few drones sir.
Thanks for the guidance, MAGTF King. In order of your points:
1. Embassy Evacuation
We’ll launch MV-22s at dawn for the embassy evac, potentially reinforced with CH-53s depending on numbers. Citizens already at the port can be handled via LCUs or LCACs. As for MPs—we don’t carry a company of them. To my knowledge, MEUs never have. But we have our rifle companies trained in NEO procedures, including crowd control with non-lethals. We’ll secure the LZ just fine.
2. Sniper Employment
Respectfully, sending sniper teams alone into an urban environment to “clean out” other snipers is not how we do business. Recon Snipers still exist (and are still very good), but they’re best used surgically—supporting infantry maneuver or providing overwatch. I’ll recommend an integrated plan, if you like.
3. Counter-Battery Fires
Our artillery battery is ashore and fully mission capable. Yes, MEUs still bring 155mm howitzers—and some deploy with HIMARS depending on tasking. Either way, we can begin counter-battery fire as soon as we receive targeting data. Coordination with ACE sensors and UAS is underway.
4. Fire & Maneuver Plan
MEUs do not have bridging companies—never did. But our ACVs can swim the river. LAVs might be able to cross too depending on current, slope, and depth. Alternatively, we will secure the far side with heliborne infantry and link up across the water. We don’t need to build a bridge to flank effectively—we’re Marines.
5. Engineer Capabilities
We do have engineers attached, but again, not a bridging unit (and again, not sure a MEU ever has). They can blow obstacles, clear routes, or shore up the local bridge if necessary. But if it’s about mass crossing, we’ll swim it or fly it. Adapt and overcome.
6. Follow-on Forces
We can request 22 MEU if this evolves into a larger operation, but right now we’re within the capability of a single MEU. No requirement yet for a second. If that changes, we’ll move quickly and 22 can cut their work up short.
7. Maritime Prepositioning
We do still have Maritime Prepositioning assets, sir. They’re staged globally, but activating them requires significant lead time and strategic lift coordination. Purpose will drive the request—are we planning to receive a full fly-in echelon or posture for regional deterrence? We’ll need clarity to initiate that process. I’m sure the designated USMC Service Response Force is ready.
8. Regional Threat
If the neighboring country commits conventional forces, we’re not handling that alone. That’s when the joint force gets called in. Air Force long-range strike, Navy cruise missiles, etc. will make their presence known. In the meantime, our organic F-35s, H-1s, and precision fires give us a powerful deterrent and plenty of fight.
Recently a young Corporal opined that the USMC was ready to participate in “any clime and place” as part of the Joint Force. HI Sutton has posted Iran’s threat to close the Straits of Hormuz. Grok has summarized the Iranian means available to accomplish this mission. The Iranian Parliament has just voted to close this vital waterway. How will the USMC minus Marine Raiders who belong to SOCOM contribute to this Joint Fight? Grok “Based on the image and additional details from H I Sutton's post, Iran could potentially close the Straits of Hormuz using its submarine fleet to deploy mines, launch torpedoes, or conduct covert operations, as depicted. Other means listed by Sutton include the use of anti-ship missiles, fast attack boats for swarm tactics, drones, and the deployment of naval mines by various vessels, including commercial ships with cranes. Additionally, Iran might employ shore-based missile batteries, limpet mines planted on hulls, and direct attacks or harassment of foreign warships and commercial vessels to disrupt navigation in the strategic waterway.”.
So what you are saying is a ship’s a fool to fight a fort, right? Brilliant!
“A ship’s a fool to fight a fort.”
That line—credited to Lord Horatio Nelson—came from a man who proved in the Battles of Copenhagen (1801 and 1807) that it was a caution, not a hard rule. It’s a timeless observation, and it applies directly to the U.S. Navy’s current challenges with the Houthis (or in this case Iran):
The Houthis—and the Ukrainians, (and now the Iranians) for that matter—haven’t rewritten naval warfare. What they’ve done is harness available technology to accelerate an enduring cycle: action, reaction, counteraction.
They’ve also forced naval forces to re-engage with the fundamentals of force design: What is the mission? Who is the adversary? What tools are being applied? Where is the fight occurring? And with what resources? These aren’t new questions—they’re ones we in the Naval Service have been asking with urgency for years
Today’s reality: operating ships in narrow, contested waters far from logistical support (like key SLOCs) —up against a “fort” dispersed across vast distances—is exactly the dilemma Nelson warned of. Not that such operations are impossible, but that they pose a serious tactical challenge. Modern technology only deepens the problem by expanding both the range of “restricted waters” and the scale of what a “fort” can be.
So what does this mean for Marine forces?
Historically, we’ve been both the creators of land-based “fort effects” and the ones who’ve dismantled them—through raids, amphibious assaults, and combined arms operations. That hasn’t changed. What has evolved is how we apply those capabilities.
Today, as part of the Joint Force, the Marine Corps is delivering precisely the kind of distributed, persistent, and cost-effective “fort effects” that complicate enemy naval operations. In fact, the very concerns people raise about what Iran might achieve against U.S. naval forces in the Gulf are exactly the kinds of dilemmas Marine Stand-in Forces are imposing on the PLA inside the First Island Chain. It’s the same playbook—just applied more precisely, at greater scale, and within a joint and networked framework.
The Marine Corps is not chasing expensive platforms—the are fielding affordable, agile options that create dilemmas for adversaries and buy time and maneuver space for the Joint Force. Littoral mobility, sensing, strike, and sea denial—all on a budget the taxpayer can live with. That’s the modern Marine Corps contribution to solving the “ship versus fort” challenge. We know the problem well—because we’ve seen both sides of it.
Bottom line: yes, the Iranians are making it hard on the US Navy and USMC. Yes, we are making it hard on the PLA. Especially because our “forts” are mobile, low signature, etc.
Samuel’s observation is spot on. We have not put US warships in the Persian Gulf for good reason, to wit: Iran is not without means to bring about heavy damage on US Naval forces in those restricted waters. Iran has every reason to inflict such injury since the US made this a conflict of CHOICE rather than one of NECESSITY. Moreover, while no agency denies Iran’s refinement of fissile materials, apparently, both the US Intelligence community & the IAEA (just this morning) have said they have detected no Iranian decision to actually build a nuclear weapon …. My hunch is that scenario will now change, and they will build it. So, in all this “stuff” where do we see a Marine Corps/Navy force able to engage/respond? Recent history tells me we’ve now done two NEO’s with pick up teams of Special Operators precisely because we lacked that traditionally deployed Navy-Marine
Team to do the job. We should avoid bluster as fact. I doubt we yet know how badly Iran has been hurt. But, what WE DO KNOW is our Navy/MAGTF robustness is vastly reduced in combat power, and putting our Marines ashore against Persian forces may be asking the impossible of our best troops.
Marines & Friends of Marines … I just saw the SecDef paying honors to the following for participations in yesterday’s strike on Iran: Air Force pilots of bomber, fighter, and refuelers; Sailors on Submarines and surface combatants; and Soldiers throughout the region manning various posts. Bravo & well deserved! Not one word of Marines. Don’t they have a role to play in the joint fight? This man has been in office for over six months … does he even know we have a Marine Corps by the peoples choice, and an Amphibious requirement as a national imperative? If so, very good - what is he doing about the issue at hand?
FIVE years of claims that Force Design “emasculated” the Corps, yet every recent posture hearing delivered praise for Marine performance and direction.
Then Chowder II gets their big meeting with a “very senior member of the administration”… and POTUS selects the ACMC—fully tied to FD—as Vice Chairman.
Loss after loss—and not one of you stops to ask why.
If your anti FD narrative is so compelling, why no gains? Why no legislative changes?
A serious question that deserves a serious answer.
Fair question. I do not know the precise answer to that one. I was not in that meeting to which you refer. I do, however, have a relevant opinion about the issue before us. Our current war of choice into which we have invited ourselves offers several point of relevant consideration. First, the missile exchanges between two of the three antagonists is pretty hi-tech stuff. Likewise, the strikes by a joint force of US aircraft & Submarine launched missiles is another example of hi-tech gadgetary at work. But, the fact that we have zero naval shipping in the Persian Gulf tells me some old traditional ways of doing battle at sea still work very nicely. Further, even at this late date in the conflict, observe on your evening news Israeli Combined Arms Teams in action in Gaza, & in other sectors of the Levant. Now, shift your sights to Ukraine to witness combined arms operations daily. My conclusion? Just because we have not engaged in combined arms - read MAGTF LEVEL STUFF - in a while does NOT invalidate its usefulness. Lastly, recall the late General Robert Barrow’s testimony before the SASC IN 1981, to wit: “You can destroy the Marine Corps if you wish …. But, when you need it, you’ll have to rebuild it.” I would hope high level officials to whom you refer would value that insight, but have no confidence they will. After all, as Army General Gordon Sullivan wrote “Hope Is Not A Strategy”. Semper Fidelis!
There was a time when the first two questions asked by the NSC during a crisis was where are the carriers and where are the Marines. We know where the carriers are right now. Where are the Marines?
Still is. . .
And the answer isn’t the same. Where’s the afloat MEU in the IO, the Red Sea, or the Arabian Sea? And even if they were, under this Commandant their combat power is drastically limited. No tanks, no engineer assault capability, no snipers, and my guess is they have only a platoon of artillery not the 8 gun battery as in the past. Oh but we do have a few drones sir.
Ok, I’ll play. . .
///
Thanks for the guidance, MAGTF King. In order of your points:
1. Embassy Evacuation
We’ll launch MV-22s at dawn for the embassy evac, potentially reinforced with CH-53s depending on numbers. Citizens already at the port can be handled via LCUs or LCACs. As for MPs—we don’t carry a company of them. To my knowledge, MEUs never have. But we have our rifle companies trained in NEO procedures, including crowd control with non-lethals. We’ll secure the LZ just fine.
2. Sniper Employment
Respectfully, sending sniper teams alone into an urban environment to “clean out” other snipers is not how we do business. Recon Snipers still exist (and are still very good), but they’re best used surgically—supporting infantry maneuver or providing overwatch. I’ll recommend an integrated plan, if you like.
3. Counter-Battery Fires
Our artillery battery is ashore and fully mission capable. Yes, MEUs still bring 155mm howitzers—and some deploy with HIMARS depending on tasking. Either way, we can begin counter-battery fire as soon as we receive targeting data. Coordination with ACE sensors and UAS is underway.
4. Fire & Maneuver Plan
MEUs do not have bridging companies—never did. But our ACVs can swim the river. LAVs might be able to cross too depending on current, slope, and depth. Alternatively, we will secure the far side with heliborne infantry and link up across the water. We don’t need to build a bridge to flank effectively—we’re Marines.
5. Engineer Capabilities
We do have engineers attached, but again, not a bridging unit (and again, not sure a MEU ever has). They can blow obstacles, clear routes, or shore up the local bridge if necessary. But if it’s about mass crossing, we’ll swim it or fly it. Adapt and overcome.
6. Follow-on Forces
We can request 22 MEU if this evolves into a larger operation, but right now we’re within the capability of a single MEU. No requirement yet for a second. If that changes, we’ll move quickly and 22 can cut their work up short.
7. Maritime Prepositioning
We do still have Maritime Prepositioning assets, sir. They’re staged globally, but activating them requires significant lead time and strategic lift coordination. Purpose will drive the request—are we planning to receive a full fly-in echelon or posture for regional deterrence? We’ll need clarity to initiate that process. I’m sure the designated USMC Service Response Force is ready.
8. Regional Threat
If the neighboring country commits conventional forces, we’re not handling that alone. That’s when the joint force gets called in. Air Force long-range strike, Navy cruise missiles, etc. will make their presence known. In the meantime, our organic F-35s, H-1s, and precision fires give us a powerful deterrent and plenty of fight.
Ready to execute when you are.
Recently a young Corporal opined that the USMC was ready to participate in “any clime and place” as part of the Joint Force. HI Sutton has posted Iran’s threat to close the Straits of Hormuz. Grok has summarized the Iranian means available to accomplish this mission. The Iranian Parliament has just voted to close this vital waterway. How will the USMC minus Marine Raiders who belong to SOCOM contribute to this Joint Fight? Grok “Based on the image and additional details from H I Sutton's post, Iran could potentially close the Straits of Hormuz using its submarine fleet to deploy mines, launch torpedoes, or conduct covert operations, as depicted. Other means listed by Sutton include the use of anti-ship missiles, fast attack boats for swarm tactics, drones, and the deployment of naval mines by various vessels, including commercial ships with cranes. Additionally, Iran might employ shore-based missile batteries, limpet mines planted on hulls, and direct attacks or harassment of foreign warships and commercial vessels to disrupt navigation in the strategic waterway.”.
Ahh. . Now we are on to something, Samuel.
So what you are saying is a ship’s a fool to fight a fort, right? Brilliant!
“A ship’s a fool to fight a fort.”
That line—credited to Lord Horatio Nelson—came from a man who proved in the Battles of Copenhagen (1801 and 1807) that it was a caution, not a hard rule. It’s a timeless observation, and it applies directly to the U.S. Navy’s current challenges with the Houthis (or in this case Iran):
The Houthis—and the Ukrainians, (and now the Iranians) for that matter—haven’t rewritten naval warfare. What they’ve done is harness available technology to accelerate an enduring cycle: action, reaction, counteraction.
They’ve also forced naval forces to re-engage with the fundamentals of force design: What is the mission? Who is the adversary? What tools are being applied? Where is the fight occurring? And with what resources? These aren’t new questions—they’re ones we in the Naval Service have been asking with urgency for years
Today’s reality: operating ships in narrow, contested waters far from logistical support (like key SLOCs) —up against a “fort” dispersed across vast distances—is exactly the dilemma Nelson warned of. Not that such operations are impossible, but that they pose a serious tactical challenge. Modern technology only deepens the problem by expanding both the range of “restricted waters” and the scale of what a “fort” can be.
So what does this mean for Marine forces?
Historically, we’ve been both the creators of land-based “fort effects” and the ones who’ve dismantled them—through raids, amphibious assaults, and combined arms operations. That hasn’t changed. What has evolved is how we apply those capabilities.
Today, as part of the Joint Force, the Marine Corps is delivering precisely the kind of distributed, persistent, and cost-effective “fort effects” that complicate enemy naval operations. In fact, the very concerns people raise about what Iran might achieve against U.S. naval forces in the Gulf are exactly the kinds of dilemmas Marine Stand-in Forces are imposing on the PLA inside the First Island Chain. It’s the same playbook—just applied more precisely, at greater scale, and within a joint and networked framework.
The Marine Corps is not chasing expensive platforms—the are fielding affordable, agile options that create dilemmas for adversaries and buy time and maneuver space for the Joint Force. Littoral mobility, sensing, strike, and sea denial—all on a budget the taxpayer can live with. That’s the modern Marine Corps contribution to solving the “ship versus fort” challenge. We know the problem well—because we’ve seen both sides of it.
Bottom line: yes, the Iranians are making it hard on the US Navy and USMC. Yes, we are making it hard on the PLA. Especially because our “forts” are mobile, low signature, etc.
Glad to see you realizing the logic of FD.
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/navy-houthis-maritime-war-5517a127?mod=djem10point
Cpl an amazing fantasy on your part.
Samuel’s observation is spot on. We have not put US warships in the Persian Gulf for good reason, to wit: Iran is not without means to bring about heavy damage on US Naval forces in those restricted waters. Iran has every reason to inflict such injury since the US made this a conflict of CHOICE rather than one of NECESSITY. Moreover, while no agency denies Iran’s refinement of fissile materials, apparently, both the US Intelligence community & the IAEA (just this morning) have said they have detected no Iranian decision to actually build a nuclear weapon …. My hunch is that scenario will now change, and they will build it. So, in all this “stuff” where do we see a Marine Corps/Navy force able to engage/respond? Recent history tells me we’ve now done two NEO’s with pick up teams of Special Operators precisely because we lacked that traditionally deployed Navy-Marine
Team to do the job. We should avoid bluster as fact. I doubt we yet know how badly Iran has been hurt. But, what WE DO KNOW is our Navy/MAGTF robustness is vastly reduced in combat power, and putting our Marines ashore against Persian forces may be asking the impossible of our best troops.
That scenario is scaring!
Marines & Friends of Marines … I just saw the SecDef paying honors to the following for participations in yesterday’s strike on Iran: Air Force pilots of bomber, fighter, and refuelers; Sailors on Submarines and surface combatants; and Soldiers throughout the region manning various posts. Bravo & well deserved! Not one word of Marines. Don’t they have a role to play in the joint fight? This man has been in office for over six months … does he even know we have a Marine Corps by the peoples choice, and an Amphibious requirement as a national imperative? If so, very good - what is he doing about the issue at hand?
I’ll just hang this here. . .
https://defensescoop.com/2025/06/18/trump-nominates-marine-gen-christopher-mahoney-joint-chiefs-vice-chairman/
See the trend?
FIVE years of claims that Force Design “emasculated” the Corps, yet every recent posture hearing delivered praise for Marine performance and direction.
Then Chowder II gets their big meeting with a “very senior member of the administration”… and POTUS selects the ACMC—fully tied to FD—as Vice Chairman.
Loss after loss—and not one of you stops to ask why.
If your anti FD narrative is so compelling, why no gains? Why no legislative changes?
A serious question that deserves a serious answer.
Fair question. I do not know the precise answer to that one. I was not in that meeting to which you refer. I do, however, have a relevant opinion about the issue before us. Our current war of choice into which we have invited ourselves offers several point of relevant consideration. First, the missile exchanges between two of the three antagonists is pretty hi-tech stuff. Likewise, the strikes by a joint force of US aircraft & Submarine launched missiles is another example of hi-tech gadgetary at work. But, the fact that we have zero naval shipping in the Persian Gulf tells me some old traditional ways of doing battle at sea still work very nicely. Further, even at this late date in the conflict, observe on your evening news Israeli Combined Arms Teams in action in Gaza, & in other sectors of the Levant. Now, shift your sights to Ukraine to witness combined arms operations daily. My conclusion? Just because we have not engaged in combined arms - read MAGTF LEVEL STUFF - in a while does NOT invalidate its usefulness. Lastly, recall the late General Robert Barrow’s testimony before the SASC IN 1981, to wit: “You can destroy the Marine Corps if you wish …. But, when you need it, you’ll have to rebuild it.” I would hope high level officials to whom you refer would value that insight, but have no confidence they will. After all, as Army General Gordon Sullivan wrote “Hope Is Not A Strategy”. Semper Fidelis!