In addition, the Vice President needs to be briefed on how bad is the US Navy's ship building and maintenance programs. For starters, let's get back to the requirement goal of 38 amphibs and forget the fiscally constrained inventory minimum of 33 (now 31) that accepts risk in MEB support elements. JFEO (Joint Force Entry Operations) doctrine requires three tailored forces and the sequencing of assault, follow-up and rear echelons. US Marine Corps MEU, MEB and MEF fills that Joint Doctrine requirement nicely.
Polarbear...I'll see your bet and raise. I agree with your points, however, I see the need to amplify. There is good cause to raise the Amphib goal to 50, as a start. The rotation, repair, maintenance, build schedule / replacement, and surge capacity are all part of the rationale. Why 50? Okay, 51.3 ships exactly should be the start goal based on statistical analysis (regressing to the percentage mean in the post WWII era of actual underway amphibs relative to the requirement goal). Trends don't reverse with lukewarm measures. Trying to Blackbelt Six Sigma the shipbuilding is getting us no where in terms of applied policy.
That is only the start. We are already in the oven...getting out is the first step; not the game winner. The US, in order to preserve it's maritime role, must develop, with bipartisan support, a long term plan (10-25 years) to rebuild sustainable shipyard capacity to support long term maritime efforts. It's like the old joke: "best estimates indicate the Pacific Ocean will still be in business in 2038 with some forecasts indicating that positive trend continues well into the 2050's". We should act like we expect it to still be there. As much I'd like otherwise, teleportation and Pelican Dropships won't be functional before 2089 according to my magic 8 ball, so it will be some form of grey hulls and black boats, regardless of the digital etc. revolution. This is a comprehensive issue; it isn't just the yards. A key part of that means growing the workforce, as coffeejoejava has relentlessly pointed out. Not to mention the sailors for those ships.
Yeah, I know, all easier said than done. But I think the War Plan Orange of the modern era is the shipping piece. The fight for 2053 will require hard platforms of some type that need to be physically produced, maintained, and recycled somewhere and somehow. Having those assets at hand will be the key campaign before the campaign. Just as shipbuilding from 1935 to 1965 created the base for the modern era (how do you make a little Navy? Start with a big one)...we need a new foundational policy to build the future fleet the US must have to win.
CFROG that is bold talk! However, I will raise your bet and go “all in” for 65+ amphibious ships. Now that is BOLD talk, especially for a two eyed fat man sitting in North Carolina. As Commandant, General Neller (2015-2019) went to the Combatant Commanders and established the requirement for 50 amphibs.
Working with the Combatant Commanders is much better than war gaming an experimental force focused on just one regional Combatant Commander. Especially when discussing a future global 911 force. The idea of reducing combat power for experimentation is “special”.
The big change since General Neller’s 50 amphib requirement is the CCP has boldly stood up in the global “great power competition” and yelled, GAME ON. The threat has increased, not decreased since General Neller’s days. I am also convinced that Taiwan is just a pawn in the CCP’s global game plan. The real issue is control of the SLOCs and freedom of the seas.
J.C. Wylie when talking about Maritime Strategy states: “The aim of any war is to establish some measure of control over the enemy. The pattern of action by which this control is sought is the strategy of the war… A maritime strategy is one which the world’s maritime communications systems are exploited as the main avenues by way of which strength may be applied to establish control over one’s enemies.” (p.124-125) The CCP seems to be following this strategy and the next question is: why isn’t the US? (Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control by J.C. Wylie; Naval Institute Press, 1967.)
Of the seven Combatant Commanders four need an ARG/MEU: CENTCOM, AFRICOM (Gulf of Guinea), EUCOM (swings between MED and or Baltic), and SOUTHCOM. INDOPACOM (needs two, one for the Pacific and another for the Indian Ocean and especially the Malacca Strait with a sharp eye on the Indonesia Riau Islands). The global requirement also moves the Marine Corps to 3 MEBs vs two. Frankly, each ARG needs to be MEU SOC capable with the fourth “company” drawn from the Marine Raider Regiment. I prefer the Raiders working for MEU Commanders vs Special Operations Command. The other issue is the US needs a couple more LCCs. These were originally built to provide command and control for amphibious operations. I know that the LCC was a big help in Operation Frequent Wind, the Evac of South Viet Nam.
I do believe that solving the US Navy’s ship building problems is not going to help when we can’t maintain the ships we have. I was surprised to learn that the US Navy was retiring the LSDs early. Apparently, they are rotting from the inside out and they are now too expensive to fix. I understand their issue is lack of maintenance time and scheduling.
I think the US Navy needs to take a look at the ship repair and maintenance facilities of our allies. During WW2 it became apparent the ship repair facilities in Hawaii, the US West Coast, New Zealand and Australia were too far from the fight and necessitate the assembly of a service, maintenance and repair fleet that reached a strength of over 500 vessels. https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/b/beans-bullets-black-oil.html Our allies are now long past 1942 ship maintenance and repairs facilities.
Cfrog you have a strong hand, don’t fold. At this point, polarbear’s hand is probably a bluff. S/F
No doubt he is in information overload but, he must be briefed on the State of the Corps after its destruction by CMC Berger and CMC Smith. Many of us may be familiar with the movie “Full Metal Jacket” one of its unforgettable characters Gunnery Sergeant Hartman was recently magically contracted to do a thorough review of the devastation done by FD to what was once America’s Global 911 Force in Readiness. I came upon a copy and after sanitizing I it used X to inform numerous key decision makers to include the VP elect of its results. Out of courtesy I even dropped one off at the USMC X address. Perhaps this unconventional form of dissemination will be like “the Fluttering Wings of a Butterfly” referred to in Chaos Theory. Semper Fidelis
Outstanding! I pray that JD Vance is immediately gonna implement VISION2035 to reverse and restore our MAGTF capabilities that have been ruined by the FD2030 insanity!!!
Nothing against the Vice President Elect, but he was a Sgt. Most probably he was not well versed on the strengths and integral workings of the MAGTF. Same as when he was a Senator, just due to his newness and his workload.
I propose that with the correct preparation that Mr. Vance could be the “Marine Corps Czar”. Further, Mr. Vance needs some outside expertise. In that roll I suggest he enlist the Chowder Society II. Wiith the wealth of expertise and the loyalty to our Corps, already abundantly demonstrated by the members of the Society, I feel very strongly that Mr. Vance would be well served, I believe, by enlisting the Society for expert input.
I hope the Society will at the opportune moment reach out to the VP and offer their services again.
I appreciate your summation and agree with your point that Chowder II have a seat at the table. That said; I recommend keeping the comment about his former rank out of it. It sours the tone of your comment and distracts from your point; frankly, it sounded condescending to a rank that has a full spectrum of Marines with a myriad of intellect and capabilities wearing it (regardless / because of MOS). I don't think that was your intent.
In addition, the Vice President needs to be briefed on how bad is the US Navy's ship building and maintenance programs. For starters, let's get back to the requirement goal of 38 amphibs and forget the fiscally constrained inventory minimum of 33 (now 31) that accepts risk in MEB support elements. JFEO (Joint Force Entry Operations) doctrine requires three tailored forces and the sequencing of assault, follow-up and rear echelons. US Marine Corps MEU, MEB and MEF fills that Joint Doctrine requirement nicely.
Polarbear...I'll see your bet and raise. I agree with your points, however, I see the need to amplify. There is good cause to raise the Amphib goal to 50, as a start. The rotation, repair, maintenance, build schedule / replacement, and surge capacity are all part of the rationale. Why 50? Okay, 51.3 ships exactly should be the start goal based on statistical analysis (regressing to the percentage mean in the post WWII era of actual underway amphibs relative to the requirement goal). Trends don't reverse with lukewarm measures. Trying to Blackbelt Six Sigma the shipbuilding is getting us no where in terms of applied policy.
That is only the start. We are already in the oven...getting out is the first step; not the game winner. The US, in order to preserve it's maritime role, must develop, with bipartisan support, a long term plan (10-25 years) to rebuild sustainable shipyard capacity to support long term maritime efforts. It's like the old joke: "best estimates indicate the Pacific Ocean will still be in business in 2038 with some forecasts indicating that positive trend continues well into the 2050's". We should act like we expect it to still be there. As much I'd like otherwise, teleportation and Pelican Dropships won't be functional before 2089 according to my magic 8 ball, so it will be some form of grey hulls and black boats, regardless of the digital etc. revolution. This is a comprehensive issue; it isn't just the yards. A key part of that means growing the workforce, as coffeejoejava has relentlessly pointed out. Not to mention the sailors for those ships.
Yeah, I know, all easier said than done. But I think the War Plan Orange of the modern era is the shipping piece. The fight for 2053 will require hard platforms of some type that need to be physically produced, maintained, and recycled somewhere and somehow. Having those assets at hand will be the key campaign before the campaign. Just as shipbuilding from 1935 to 1965 created the base for the modern era (how do you make a little Navy? Start with a big one)...we need a new foundational policy to build the future fleet the US must have to win.
I’ll raise!
CFROG that is bold talk! However, I will raise your bet and go “all in” for 65+ amphibious ships. Now that is BOLD talk, especially for a two eyed fat man sitting in North Carolina. As Commandant, General Neller (2015-2019) went to the Combatant Commanders and established the requirement for 50 amphibs.
Working with the Combatant Commanders is much better than war gaming an experimental force focused on just one regional Combatant Commander. Especially when discussing a future global 911 force. The idea of reducing combat power for experimentation is “special”.
The big change since General Neller’s 50 amphib requirement is the CCP has boldly stood up in the global “great power competition” and yelled, GAME ON. The threat has increased, not decreased since General Neller’s days. I am also convinced that Taiwan is just a pawn in the CCP’s global game plan. The real issue is control of the SLOCs and freedom of the seas.
J.C. Wylie when talking about Maritime Strategy states: “The aim of any war is to establish some measure of control over the enemy. The pattern of action by which this control is sought is the strategy of the war… A maritime strategy is one which the world’s maritime communications systems are exploited as the main avenues by way of which strength may be applied to establish control over one’s enemies.” (p.124-125) The CCP seems to be following this strategy and the next question is: why isn’t the US? (Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control by J.C. Wylie; Naval Institute Press, 1967.)
Of the seven Combatant Commanders four need an ARG/MEU: CENTCOM, AFRICOM (Gulf of Guinea), EUCOM (swings between MED and or Baltic), and SOUTHCOM. INDOPACOM (needs two, one for the Pacific and another for the Indian Ocean and especially the Malacca Strait with a sharp eye on the Indonesia Riau Islands). The global requirement also moves the Marine Corps to 3 MEBs vs two. Frankly, each ARG needs to be MEU SOC capable with the fourth “company” drawn from the Marine Raider Regiment. I prefer the Raiders working for MEU Commanders vs Special Operations Command. The other issue is the US needs a couple more LCCs. These were originally built to provide command and control for amphibious operations. I know that the LCC was a big help in Operation Frequent Wind, the Evac of South Viet Nam.
I do believe that solving the US Navy’s ship building problems is not going to help when we can’t maintain the ships we have. I was surprised to learn that the US Navy was retiring the LSDs early. Apparently, they are rotting from the inside out and they are now too expensive to fix. I understand their issue is lack of maintenance time and scheduling.
I think the US Navy needs to take a look at the ship repair and maintenance facilities of our allies. During WW2 it became apparent the ship repair facilities in Hawaii, the US West Coast, New Zealand and Australia were too far from the fight and necessitate the assembly of a service, maintenance and repair fleet that reached a strength of over 500 vessels. https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/b/beans-bullets-black-oil.html Our allies are now long past 1942 ship maintenance and repairs facilities.
Cfrog you have a strong hand, don’t fold. At this point, polarbear’s hand is probably a bluff. S/F
No doubt he is in information overload but, he must be briefed on the State of the Corps after its destruction by CMC Berger and CMC Smith. Many of us may be familiar with the movie “Full Metal Jacket” one of its unforgettable characters Gunnery Sergeant Hartman was recently magically contracted to do a thorough review of the devastation done by FD to what was once America’s Global 911 Force in Readiness. I came upon a copy and after sanitizing I it used X to inform numerous key decision makers to include the VP elect of its results. Out of courtesy I even dropped one off at the USMC X address. Perhaps this unconventional form of dissemination will be like “the Fluttering Wings of a Butterfly” referred to in Chaos Theory. Semper Fidelis
Outstanding! I pray that JD Vance is immediately gonna implement VISION2035 to reverse and restore our MAGTF capabilities that have been ruined by the FD2030 insanity!!!
Nothing against the Vice President Elect, but he was a Sgt. Most probably he was not well versed on the strengths and integral workings of the MAGTF. Same as when he was a Senator, just due to his newness and his workload.
I propose that with the correct preparation that Mr. Vance could be the “Marine Corps Czar”. Further, Mr. Vance needs some outside expertise. In that roll I suggest he enlist the Chowder Society II. Wiith the wealth of expertise and the loyalty to our Corps, already abundantly demonstrated by the members of the Society, I feel very strongly that Mr. Vance would be well served, I believe, by enlisting the Society for expert input.
I hope the Society will at the opportune moment reach out to the VP and offer their services again.
SEMPER FIDELIS!
I appreciate your summation and agree with your point that Chowder II have a seat at the table. That said; I recommend keeping the comment about his former rank out of it. It sours the tone of your comment and distracts from your point; frankly, it sounded condescending to a rank that has a full spectrum of Marines with a myriad of intellect and capabilities wearing it (regardless / because of MOS). I don't think that was your intent.
Nope it wasn’t.