The CMC is delusional. The little missile out fits, not one of which has been fielded after six years, and not one of which has demonstrated the ability to acquire, target, hit and sink a ship are one trick ponies. They have zero versatility and have nothing to do with the infantry except for the few dedicated to protecting the pony from others. Their only mission is so narrow as to be useless. We don’t even have a viable plan to get them there, support them or retrieve them. In truth they are a no trick pony.
In the thorough bred horse breeding business there is a “teaser pony”. His sole purpose is to prance around the mares in a futile hope he will be allowed to mate. His hormones fill the air. He is not physically able to mate with full sized horses and true purpose is to prepare them to receive the real stallions. He does not know his real purpose. EABO is the teaser pony. Cannot consummate the deal.
In other news, Day 8 of the HOS Resolution (MCWL Stern Landing test Bed) ensuring the pier in Subic Bay does not move. I asked the Official Spokesman for FD(2030) about it. He told me I should call his section and ask for a PRC-E8 to explain it. Does anyone know what he's talking about...are there PRC-E8s in MCWL or Public Affairs? Has anyone ever even seen a PRC-E8? ;)
As an after thought, where are our friends in Congress? Why aren't the Congressional Marines pushing back on this debacle? Have they become afraid of the Administration to voice push back? Marine Congressmen saved the Corps in 1948. Where are you Marines now? Come out of the shadows and do the right thing!
Senator Sullivan a retired Reserve Colonel well understands the shortcomings of FD 2030. A few others such as Senator Cotton appear to be generally aware. Chowder Society II members are in constance correspondence with members, especially those on the SASC and HASC. We are slowly fighting through the story the 38 CMC told nearly six years ago--the Corps will modernize and will divest to invest, so it will cost nothing. That is a powerful message on the Hill. In addition he wined and dined key members in CMCs home, which always has an effect. This is one of those situations where we need to stay at it until we reach a critical mass and Congress demands action. We have no plans to let up!
Having testified before legislative bodies in Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont and Massachusetts on complicated issues regarding modern electric utilities, it so that the message needs to be brightly presented, simple, clear and one needs to be prepared to repeat the message many many times. The more complicated the subject the more simple the message. The more times it bears repeating. Senator Sullivan in the brief videos of his efforts to get the 38th CMC to clarify FD2030 and its progress was met with a pretty hostile commandant, who was clearly annoyed that a lowly colonel despite being a federal senator duly elected by the people of Alaska would dare challenge his brilliant plan. There is an odd level of arrogance associated with acolytes of FD2030. We are right you are wrong sit down and be silent. A classic example of the Corps having to respond to something that is NOT a one domain fight with a peer foe is the deployment of 2/7 to the city of Los Angeles. Drone footage of them traing up for the mission is astounding, and we can only be really proud of these Marines, who will no doubt be more than up to the task, which at best is difficult, their professionalism will carry the day. They deserve the best we out here can do for them. So indeed General “never give up, never give in”
Ahhh. There is the broader and deeper thinking i am here for.
You’re asking the wrong question. It’s not “Where are the Marine members of Congress?” It’s: “Why, after five years of ‘meetings with principals’ and access to the ‘highest levels of the administration,’ has Chowder II accomplished nothing?”
No change in direction. No reversal of policy. No votes moved. No legislation passed. Maybe it’s time to stop questioning the courage of sitting Congressmen—and start questioning the effectiveness of the messengers.
I totally believe there were meetings. No doubt.
But. . .
If Chowder II has the access, the connections, and the experience they claim—why are they batting zero after five years? Maybe it’s not that Congress is afraid. Maybe Congress just isn’t buying what they’re selling.
It’s not surprising that these acolytes for FD will not change or acknowledge facts…Their limited intellect and experience can’t allow it. Perhaps, those Marines returning home in body bags, will. Semper Fi
On a side note, the Australian Army is receiving some M1074 Joint Assault Bridging vehicles and some M1150 Armored Breaching Vehicles (could they be former Marine vehicles??). I thought armored vehicles were being made obsolete by drones. Also, Australia operates in a littoral environment.
One more comment from cfrog. Actually a question. "In 2025, what makes the Marine Corps special with respect to the Joint Force?". I am really hoping some of the pro-FD lurkers weigh in with some real 'fight tonight' capability that is unique.
I like the part where the NMESIS said 'it's Morbin time". On a serious note, that is good news. Be better if it was two launchers and the JLTV lead vehicle for the section. Not a big fan, but we have to use what we have. I do hope it is something more than the launcher equivalent of PME books in a guys' bookshelf that are there for looks but never read.
The CMC cannot make up his mind as to what he wants the Marine Corps to be. On one hand, "Force Design remains our strategic priority." The he comments that the MEU & ARG "is the most versatile, flexible, and lethal global response force the United States has to offer." Finally he says everything is to support the rifleman. How can supporting the rifleman in a versatile, flexible, and lethal response force be of value when CMC Berger divested of everything which supported the infantryman? If FD was just about adding the anti-ship mission, there would be no problem. However removing the teeth of the global response force has made the Marine Corps a neutered force. With little artillery, the heaviest ground support weapon is the battalion 81mm mortar. If the Army goes to war in Europe or the Middle East again, what can the Marine Corps offer other than a light infantry force? To be a credible global lethal response force, the Marine Corps needs the equipment to make it lethal and responsive.
SO one Trick Pony ISRAEL just Struck Iran! What now CMC ? Where is the MEF?Grok:”As of 06:05 PM PDT on Thursday, June 12, 2025, reports indicate that Israel has launched strikes on Iran, marking a significant escalation in the region. Based on available information from web sources, here’s what I know:
- **Timing and Execution**: Multiple sources, including The Times of Israel and Iran International, report that Israel initiated a “precise, preemptive strike” on Iran in the early hours of Friday, June 13, 2025 (local time), with explosions heard in Tehran. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed the operation targeted Iran’s nuclear program and military sites, involving dozens of Israeli Air Force aircraft striking various locations across Iran.
- **Targets**: The strikes focused on nuclear-related sites and other military facilities, aiming to disrupt Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Specific targets include uranium enrichment facilities, though exact locations like Fordow and Natanz are not detailed in real-time reports.
- **Context**: This action follows months of heightened tensions, with Israel preparing for a potential strike amid stalled U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations. President Donald Trump has acknowledged the possibility, stating on June 12 that an Israeli strike “could very well happen,” while expressing a preference for diplomacy. The U.S. has signaled it will not directly participate, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirming no U.S. involvement and prioritizing American force protection.
- **Iranian Response**: Iran’s state TV reported explosions, and its airspace was closed, with Imam Khomeini Airport canceling flights. Iran has vowed a forceful retaliation, with IRGC commanders warning of a “history-making” response, potentially targeting Israeli and U.S. assets. The Houthis and other Iranian proxies may also join the fray.
- **U.S. and Regional Reactions**: The U.S. has withdrawn diplomats from Iraq and authorized voluntary evacuation of military families across the Middle East, reflecting concerns about Iranian retaliation. The aircraft carrier Carl Vinson remains in the Arabian Sea, but no major force adjustments have been made. Israeli Defense Minister Ian Katz warned of an expected missile and drone counterattack on Israel.
- **Uncertainty**: The strike’s scope (limited or extensive) remains unclear, as does the full extent of damage or Iran’s counterstrike capacity. Reports suggest a U.S.-led campaign lulled Iran into underestimating the timing, and Netanyahu’s son’s wedding postponement hints at prolonged operations.
This information comes from recent web reports, reflecting a fluid situation with potential for rapid escalation. Treat these details as preliminary, as real-time developments may alter the narrative. If you need updates or specific aspects (e.g., military tactics, U.S. policy), I can search X or the web further—let me know!”
Grok re IDF COMBINED ARMS …“### Summary of Israeli Combined Arms Operations in Gaza, Syria, Judea, and Samaria (West Bank)
#### Gaza
- **Initial Stage (Post-October 7, 2023)**: Following Hamas’s attack, Israel launched combined arms operations with air, ground, and cyber elements. By October 27, 2023, the 162nd Armored Division entered Gaza, using Merkava tanks with Trophy active protection systems, Roem wheeled artillery for rapid strikes, and Hermes 900 drones for reconnaissance and targeting. F-35I jets and Apache helicopters provided air support, while cyber units disrupted Hamas communications.
- **Ongoing Operations (2024–2025)**: Tanks shelled Rafah and Khan Younis during “Operation Gideon’s Chariots” (May 2025), supported by unmanned M113 APCs and D9 bulldozers for terrain clearance. Artillery targeted tunnel networks, with Roem systems enhancing precision. Drones countered Hamas UAVs, integrating with networked warfare for real-time coordination. Infantry, including Golani Brigade, cleared urban areas, while naval corvettes patrolled coasts to block smuggling.
#### Syria
- **Post-Assad Fall (December 2024–2025)**: Israel employed combined arms to secure the Golan Heights. Merkava tanks occupied Quneitra and Mount Hermon, backed by artillery strikes on Iranian-backed smuggling routes. F-16I jets and Hermes drones conducted airstrikes (e.g., April–May 2025) targeting Syrian air defenses and Hezbollah assets. Special forces executed raids, supported by cyber operations to disrupt militant communications, ensuring rapid dominance of buffer zones.
#### Judea and Samaria (West Bank)
- **Operation Iron Wall (2024–2025)**: Combined arms focused on counterterrorism. In February 2025, Merkava tanks entered Jenin, Tulkarem, and Nablus, a rare deployment, supported by infantry raids and drone surveillance. Light artillery was absent, with emphasis on small arms and armored vehicles like Eitan APCs. Air support was minimal, but cyber units monitored militant networks, enabling precise arrests and infrastructure disruption.
### Notes
- **Sources**: Army University Press, Breaking Defense, The Times of Israel, Reuters, ensuring neutrality and avoiding biased claims.”
No matter what song the Commandant sings, it is way off key! The sad thing is that he actually thinks he is singing as well as Andrea Bocelli. Colonel Jay Vargas (a friend of mine) has it spot on with the direction Berger and Smith is taking the Corps. Maybe those Marines placed on the littoral island while foraging, can use homemade sling shots to knock out the Chinese drones.
Maybe it’s not the Commandant’s singing that’s off-key—maybe some folks are just tone deaf. Because the song Force Design is singing resonates clearly with his Marines, the Joint Force, combatant commanders, our allies, and yes—elected officials.
And it’s not a one-note melody. It’s a deliberate, evolving tune that balances the urgent need for modernization with the enduring requirements of crisis response. The idea that we can only do one or the other is a false choice—and frankly, the Corps has never been a one-trick act.
So if you’re mocking it with sling shots and 21st century foraging (you should google that) jokes, maybe take a closer listen. This isn’t about fantasy. It’s about building a force that can survive and win in the next fight—and be forward, ready, and relevant tonight.
I think he takes it seriously; he just doesn't agree with us. He thinks there is a 'there' there. And nothing wrong with him dishing out a little of what he was getting by calling out a cheap shot regarding using homemade sling shots to take out drones. Now, I could get behind a good Gilligan's Island joke from either Col Howell or Cpl Grable.
I look at the current world situation and ask the question “if called upon, could the Corps conduct operations in an AOR with our current T/O and T/E”?
EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN- Could we support and operate anywhere in the Eastern Mediterranean? - No amphibious lift, no supporting arms, and no way to scale up from a MEU to a MEB.
NORWAY, DENMARK, FINLAND, SWEDEN, ESTONIA, LATVIA, LITHUANIA - Could we go toe to toe with Russia? Russia, thanks to PRC’s assistance, manufactures more ammunition in THREE MONTHS than all of NATO COMBINED, IN A YEAR. Russia allocates 6.7% of its GDP towards defense spending, while NATO members are only encouraged to allocate 2%. It is estimated that Russia will have the capability to attack a NATO member in five years. Could the Corps conduct operations in that AOR under FD?
AFRICA - Could the Corps insert a MEU to conduct NEO if called upon today? No, because there’s no MEU afloat in either the Western or Eastern Mediterranean.
INDIAN OCEAN- Could the Corps conduct operations in the IO? Could the Corps even protect Diego Garcia? No, because the Corps, first lacks any nearby formations organized to conduct anything other than being a “sensor node” or part of a “kill chain”. We have no III MEF or I MAW that can project combat power ashore, because this Commandant has continued the reckless pursuit of no tubed artillery, no bridging or assault engineer units, insufficient assault amphibious support, and reduced rotary and fixed wing support. But we have a silly short ranged, subsonic missile that the Commandant and his sycophants say is our new “save the world” weapon.
RED SEA - Israel has preemptively attacked Iran. Regardless of whether we personally think it was a good idea, if the President directed a MEU(SOC) to conduct Iranian oil rig operations to seize and destroy them, does the Corps CURRENTLY have a projectable combat presence in the Red Sea? Of course not. The same questions are just as relevant to a raid into Yemen.
The bottom line is this Commandant has continued on the perilous path of defanging the Nation’s only multi-mission, scalable 911 force.
I’ll close with this. Hold your EGA in your hand and look at it. The Eagle represents our Nation, the ribbon held in its beak represents our Corps, the globe represents our worldwide service, and the fouled anchor represents our naval heritage.
Given the symbolism of the EGA, does anyone think that we’re still able to operate worldwide and can we do it as a naval force?
Grok: “Precise casualty breakdowns by artillery versus drones in the Russia-Ukraine conflict are tough to nail down due to limited official data, varying estimates, and both sides’ secrecy. Below is a summary of available information on artillery and drone-related casualties by year, based on sources like Western media, Ukrainian reports, and think tanks. Percentages reflect the estimated proportion of total casualties caused by each weapon type, where data exists.
### 2022
- **Artillery**: Dominant weapon, causing ~80% of casualties on both sides (Council on Foreign Relations, Reuters). Heavy Russian barrages and Ukraine’s use of Western-supplied howitzers (e.g., M777) drove high losses.
- **Drones**: Limited impact, ~5-10% of casualties. Early use of Bayraktar TB2 drones by Ukraine was effective but small-scale; FPV drones were rare.
- **Notes**: Artillery’s dominance reflected conventional warfare tactics, with drones mainly used for reconnaissance.
### 2023
- **Artillery**: Still primary, causing ~70-75% of casualties (Imperial War Museums, CSIS). Intense shelling in battles like Bakhmut led to high losses.
- **Drones**: Growing role, ~15-20% of casualties. FPV drones emerged, with Ukraine scaling production. Russian Lancet drones targeted armor.
- **Total Casualties (Estimates)**:
- Russian: ~315,000 dead/injured by year-end (U.S. intelligence).
- **Notes**: Drone usage surged, but artillery remained the main killer due to sheer firepower.
### 2024
- **Artillery**: Declining share, ~40-50% of casualties (The New York Times, Army Technology). Ammunition shortages and drone proliferation reduced reliance.
- **Drones**: Major rise, ~50-70% of casualties in some battles (Business Insider, Ukrainian commanders). FPV drones caused up to 80% of Russian frontline losses (Ukrainian claims).
- **Total Casualties (Estimates)**:
- Russian: ~700,000–1,000,000 dead/injured, ~250,000 killed (Ukrainian claims, Al Jazeera).
The CMC does not need to sing about Force Design because FD is happening. Let’s take a biased free look at what happened yesterday.
A notable takeaway from the recent House Armed Services Committee hearing on the Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 2026 Budget Request was Rep. Moulton’s (D-MA) observation that he was “more impressed than I imagined” with the Marine Corps’ progress in Force Design following his recent visit to the Philippines. [TIMESTAMP: 01:33:30] This positive assessment occurred amidst broader concerns regarding amphibious warfare capabilities and the integration of unmanned systems, which were central themes throughout the proceedings, chaired by Rep. Mike Rogers (R-AL) and ranking member Rep. Adam Smith (D-WA).
The hearing revealed a significant disconnect between the Marine Corps’ operational needs and the Navy’s ability to support them, particularly concerning the availability of amphibious ships. Several Representatives, including Rep. Wittman (R-VA), underscored the necessity of maintaining at least 31 operational amphibs to meet global crisis response demands, citing recent shortfalls in AFRICOM. Admiral Kilby affirmed the importance of a 3.0 MEU presence and stated the Navy would require 46 amphibious ships to reliably achieve it. [TIMESTAMP: 01:21:53] Rep. Rogers specifically emphasized the critical role of these forces in the INDOPACOM region, noting that our amphibious forces are “the bedrock of our rapid response force and essential for the projection of power.” [TIMESTAMP: 00:41:15] Despite these needs, the Navy’s recent assessment questioned the necessity of a consistent 3.0 ARG/MEU deployment, a point Admiral Kilby clarified he did not agree with.
The committee also focused heavily on the potential of unmanned aerial systems (UAS). Rep. Moulton (D-MA) drew a stark parallel to the conflict in Ukraine – where drones account for over 70% of casualties – and pressed Gen. Smith on the Marine Corps’ investment in this area. [TIMESTAMP: 01:36:54] While acknowledging current spending is relatively low, Gen. Smith conceded that doubling the drone budget would undoubtedly increase the Corps’ lethality.
Discussions revealed the Marine Corps is at the forefront of offensive drone experimentation, as noted by Rep. Vindman (D-VA). [TIMESTAMP: 03:53:25] However, Gen. Smith admitted the Corps is still seeking effective solutions for countering enemy drones at the small unit level, exploring innovative approaches like “drone-on-drone” engagements and disrupting autonomous systems, acknowledging “we don’t have a solution for yet.”
Positive feedback wasn’t limited to Force Design. Rep. Wilson (R-SC) praised the Marine Corps’ adaptability in personnel management after a visit to Parris Island. [TIMESTAMP: 01:12:34] Finally, the importance of maintaining the current Marine Corps posture on Okinawa was underscored, with Gen. Smith advising against any changes that could increase risk to regional security plans. [TIMESTAMP: 02:13:23]
I appreciate your add. Of course, I have a different take...I expect the CMC's testimony to be nothing short of a karaoke session to the tune of "Everything is Awesome". That's typically the deal unless there is a full on crisis. And yes, as I've pointed out here before, there is solid Congressional support for FD. To that point though, they praise FD, but it may as well be a container word with respect to actual capabilities. we could replace 'FD' with 'Operational Maneuver from the Sea' or 'blitzkrieg' in the transcript and it would read the same. Regarding UAS/sUAS/FPV; the work is good, very agreed on this bright spot. Mark it F or G for Performance on the fitrep and keep it going. However, that has zero need to be attached to Force Design as implemented.
I may back the CMC of the USMC, but I also support the future and don't want to see it undermined by bad choices. No one backs an RS CO who missed production. No one unifies with the Company CO whose grunts dodn't have water/ammo, and whose vehicles didn't have JP8 so they can't effectively fight. Positive words don't get a Recon Team locking out of sub to shore if everyone is fat, lazy, and complacent. It's pretty simple...those things get called out to get addressed. It's a practical matter. LCpls get called out all the time for shortfalls, vice 'backing' and 'being a unifying force'. It's nothing new. In my younger days, I wrote a white paper calling out the USMC in 1992 over the restructuring of Marine Reconnaissance. I called it out as 'breaking' the Recon community, and that the proposed plan would only result in proving why the existing structure was the right structure. I forecast exactly what happened....all the shortfalls would come home to roost, and by formal or informal method, the Recon Community would reform back to the Bns and active Force Companies. I didn't get it right because I was so smart; I just knew how to observe, listen to smart people, and look at the practicals.
As for calling out CMCs, How many CMC's in the past 20 years have been called out over the sad saga of the 'Tatoo Policy' alone? "Ma' sleeves!" is important, but capability is even more important.
Rep. Moulton’s (D-MA) observation that he was “more impressed than I imagined” with the Marine Corps’ progress in Force Design following his recent visit to the Philippines.
What was he impressed by? A non shooting NMESIS sitting on a beach for a photo op?
Obviously not—he was likely there during Balikatan and saw firsthand what the Stand-In Force can do.
This gets to one of the toughest parts of this debate: some things can’t be discussed here. You can call that deception—or accept it as the reality of modern operations.
If you really want clarity, don’t just stay on this forum. Go to a Marine installation. Walk into a recruiting station. Ask Marines what they’re doing. Ask about their last deployment. Ask about their barracks. Get it from the source.
Too many veterans and retirees have mistaken this echo chamber for the full picture. Start asking the hard questions outside this bubble.
Challenge Force Design if you want—but don’t let one loud narrative turn you against your own Corps.
I will NEVER be against the only organization that gave me a chance when no others would. I just do not want them to fall into irrelevancy because of a misguided thought process. What was wrong with just adding the capabilities to the existing force structure instead of completely changing and reorganizing it?
The CMC is delusional. The little missile out fits, not one of which has been fielded after six years, and not one of which has demonstrated the ability to acquire, target, hit and sink a ship are one trick ponies. They have zero versatility and have nothing to do with the infantry except for the few dedicated to protecting the pony from others. Their only mission is so narrow as to be useless. We don’t even have a viable plan to get them there, support them or retrieve them. In truth they are a no trick pony.
In the thorough bred horse breeding business there is a “teaser pony”. His sole purpose is to prance around the mares in a futile hope he will be allowed to mate. His hormones fill the air. He is not physically able to mate with full sized horses and true purpose is to prepare them to receive the real stallions. He does not know his real purpose. EABO is the teaser pony. Cannot consummate the deal.
Plus, in our case they gave away the real stallions for the Clydesdales which never arrived.
In other news, Day 8 of the HOS Resolution (MCWL Stern Landing test Bed) ensuring the pier in Subic Bay does not move. I asked the Official Spokesman for FD(2030) about it. He told me I should call his section and ask for a PRC-E8 to explain it. Does anyone know what he's talking about...are there PRC-E8s in MCWL or Public Affairs? Has anyone ever even seen a PRC-E8? ;)
As an after thought, where are our friends in Congress? Why aren't the Congressional Marines pushing back on this debacle? Have they become afraid of the Administration to voice push back? Marine Congressmen saved the Corps in 1948. Where are you Marines now? Come out of the shadows and do the right thing!
Senator Sullivan a retired Reserve Colonel well understands the shortcomings of FD 2030. A few others such as Senator Cotton appear to be generally aware. Chowder Society II members are in constance correspondence with members, especially those on the SASC and HASC. We are slowly fighting through the story the 38 CMC told nearly six years ago--the Corps will modernize and will divest to invest, so it will cost nothing. That is a powerful message on the Hill. In addition he wined and dined key members in CMCs home, which always has an effect. This is one of those situations where we need to stay at it until we reach a critical mass and Congress demands action. We have no plans to let up!
Having testified before legislative bodies in Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont and Massachusetts on complicated issues regarding modern electric utilities, it so that the message needs to be brightly presented, simple, clear and one needs to be prepared to repeat the message many many times. The more complicated the subject the more simple the message. The more times it bears repeating. Senator Sullivan in the brief videos of his efforts to get the 38th CMC to clarify FD2030 and its progress was met with a pretty hostile commandant, who was clearly annoyed that a lowly colonel despite being a federal senator duly elected by the people of Alaska would dare challenge his brilliant plan. There is an odd level of arrogance associated with acolytes of FD2030. We are right you are wrong sit down and be silent. A classic example of the Corps having to respond to something that is NOT a one domain fight with a peer foe is the deployment of 2/7 to the city of Los Angeles. Drone footage of them traing up for the mission is astounding, and we can only be really proud of these Marines, who will no doubt be more than up to the task, which at best is difficult, their professionalism will carry the day. They deserve the best we out here can do for them. So indeed General “never give up, never give in”
Ahhh. There is the broader and deeper thinking i am here for.
You’re asking the wrong question. It’s not “Where are the Marine members of Congress?” It’s: “Why, after five years of ‘meetings with principals’ and access to the ‘highest levels of the administration,’ has Chowder II accomplished nothing?”
No change in direction. No reversal of policy. No votes moved. No legislation passed. Maybe it’s time to stop questioning the courage of sitting Congressmen—and start questioning the effectiveness of the messengers.
I totally believe there were meetings. No doubt.
But. . .
If Chowder II has the access, the connections, and the experience they claim—why are they batting zero after five years? Maybe it’s not that Congress is afraid. Maybe Congress just isn’t buying what they’re selling.
I don't agree on the underlying reasons, but Grable makes a good point.
Maybe too good of a point. Was suspended for it!
I refuse NJP and demand court martial!
It’s not surprising that these acolytes for FD will not change or acknowledge facts…Their limited intellect and experience can’t allow it. Perhaps, those Marines returning home in body bags, will. Semper Fi
We must stop FD prior to any Dead Marines!
On a side note, the Australian Army is receiving some M1074 Joint Assault Bridging vehicles and some M1150 Armored Breaching Vehicles (could they be former Marine vehicles??). I thought armored vehicles were being made obsolete by drones. Also, Australia operates in a littoral environment.
One more comment from cfrog. Actually a question. "In 2025, what makes the Marine Corps special with respect to the Joint Force?". I am really hoping some of the pro-FD lurkers weigh in with some real 'fight tonight' capability that is unique.
But, but , but I read here that the PI would never allow the USMC to keep NMESIS there?!?!?
https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/nation/948938/nmesis-philippines-balikatan-2025/story/
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2025/06/11/asia-pacific/us-weapons-philippines-china/
I like the part where the NMESIS said 'it's Morbin time". On a serious note, that is good news. Be better if it was two launchers and the JLTV lead vehicle for the section. Not a big fan, but we have to use what we have. I do hope it is something more than the launcher equivalent of PME books in a guys' bookshelf that are there for looks but never read.
The CMC cannot make up his mind as to what he wants the Marine Corps to be. On one hand, "Force Design remains our strategic priority." The he comments that the MEU & ARG "is the most versatile, flexible, and lethal global response force the United States has to offer." Finally he says everything is to support the rifleman. How can supporting the rifleman in a versatile, flexible, and lethal response force be of value when CMC Berger divested of everything which supported the infantryman? If FD was just about adding the anti-ship mission, there would be no problem. However removing the teeth of the global response force has made the Marine Corps a neutered force. With little artillery, the heaviest ground support weapon is the battalion 81mm mortar. If the Army goes to war in Europe or the Middle East again, what can the Marine Corps offer other than a light infantry force? To be a credible global lethal response force, the Marine Corps needs the equipment to make it lethal and responsive.
SO one Trick Pony ISRAEL just Struck Iran! What now CMC ? Where is the MEF?Grok:”As of 06:05 PM PDT on Thursday, June 12, 2025, reports indicate that Israel has launched strikes on Iran, marking a significant escalation in the region. Based on available information from web sources, here’s what I know:
- **Timing and Execution**: Multiple sources, including The Times of Israel and Iran International, report that Israel initiated a “precise, preemptive strike” on Iran in the early hours of Friday, June 13, 2025 (local time), with explosions heard in Tehran. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) confirmed the operation targeted Iran’s nuclear program and military sites, involving dozens of Israeli Air Force aircraft striking various locations across Iran.
- **Targets**: The strikes focused on nuclear-related sites and other military facilities, aiming to disrupt Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Specific targets include uranium enrichment facilities, though exact locations like Fordow and Natanz are not detailed in real-time reports.
- **Context**: This action follows months of heightened tensions, with Israel preparing for a potential strike amid stalled U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations. President Donald Trump has acknowledged the possibility, stating on June 12 that an Israeli strike “could very well happen,” while expressing a preference for diplomacy. The U.S. has signaled it will not directly participate, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirming no U.S. involvement and prioritizing American force protection.
- **Iranian Response**: Iran’s state TV reported explosions, and its airspace was closed, with Imam Khomeini Airport canceling flights. Iran has vowed a forceful retaliation, with IRGC commanders warning of a “history-making” response, potentially targeting Israeli and U.S. assets. The Houthis and other Iranian proxies may also join the fray.
- **U.S. and Regional Reactions**: The U.S. has withdrawn diplomats from Iraq and authorized voluntary evacuation of military families across the Middle East, reflecting concerns about Iranian retaliation. The aircraft carrier Carl Vinson remains in the Arabian Sea, but no major force adjustments have been made. Israeli Defense Minister Ian Katz warned of an expected missile and drone counterattack on Israel.
- **Uncertainty**: The strike’s scope (limited or extensive) remains unclear, as does the full extent of damage or Iran’s counterstrike capacity. Reports suggest a U.S.-led campaign lulled Iran into underestimating the timing, and Netanyahu’s son’s wedding postponement hints at prolonged operations.
This information comes from recent web reports, reflecting a fluid situation with potential for rapid escalation. Treat these details as preliminary, as real-time developments may alter the narrative. If you need updates or specific aspects (e.g., military tactics, U.S. policy), I can search X or the web further—let me know!”
Grok re IDF COMBINED ARMS …“### Summary of Israeli Combined Arms Operations in Gaza, Syria, Judea, and Samaria (West Bank)
#### Gaza
- **Initial Stage (Post-October 7, 2023)**: Following Hamas’s attack, Israel launched combined arms operations with air, ground, and cyber elements. By October 27, 2023, the 162nd Armored Division entered Gaza, using Merkava tanks with Trophy active protection systems, Roem wheeled artillery for rapid strikes, and Hermes 900 drones for reconnaissance and targeting. F-35I jets and Apache helicopters provided air support, while cyber units disrupted Hamas communications.
- **Ongoing Operations (2024–2025)**: Tanks shelled Rafah and Khan Younis during “Operation Gideon’s Chariots” (May 2025), supported by unmanned M113 APCs and D9 bulldozers for terrain clearance. Artillery targeted tunnel networks, with Roem systems enhancing precision. Drones countered Hamas UAVs, integrating with networked warfare for real-time coordination. Infantry, including Golani Brigade, cleared urban areas, while naval corvettes patrolled coasts to block smuggling.
#### Syria
- **Post-Assad Fall (December 2024–2025)**: Israel employed combined arms to secure the Golan Heights. Merkava tanks occupied Quneitra and Mount Hermon, backed by artillery strikes on Iranian-backed smuggling routes. F-16I jets and Hermes drones conducted airstrikes (e.g., April–May 2025) targeting Syrian air defenses and Hezbollah assets. Special forces executed raids, supported by cyber operations to disrupt militant communications, ensuring rapid dominance of buffer zones.
#### Judea and Samaria (West Bank)
- **Operation Iron Wall (2024–2025)**: Combined arms focused on counterterrorism. In February 2025, Merkava tanks entered Jenin, Tulkarem, and Nablus, a rare deployment, supported by infantry raids and drone surveillance. Light artillery was absent, with emphasis on small arms and armored vehicles like Eitan APCs. Air support was minimal, but cyber units monitored militant networks, enabling precise arrests and infrastructure disruption.
### Notes
- **Sources**: Army University Press, Breaking Defense, The Times of Israel, Reuters, ensuring neutrality and avoiding biased claims.”
-
No matter what song the Commandant sings, it is way off key! The sad thing is that he actually thinks he is singing as well as Andrea Bocelli. Colonel Jay Vargas (a friend of mine) has it spot on with the direction Berger and Smith is taking the Corps. Maybe those Marines placed on the littoral island while foraging, can use homemade sling shots to knock out the Chinese drones.
Maybe it’s not the Commandant’s singing that’s off-key—maybe some folks are just tone deaf. Because the song Force Design is singing resonates clearly with his Marines, the Joint Force, combatant commanders, our allies, and yes—elected officials.
And it’s not a one-note melody. It’s a deliberate, evolving tune that balances the urgent need for modernization with the enduring requirements of crisis response. The idea that we can only do one or the other is a false choice—and frankly, the Corps has never been a one-trick act.
So if you’re mocking it with sling shots and 21st century foraging (you should google that) jokes, maybe take a closer listen. This isn’t about fantasy. It’s about building a force that can survive and win in the next fight—and be forward, ready, and relevant tonight.
Cpl G Doth Protest too Much!
I think he takes it seriously; he just doesn't agree with us. He thinks there is a 'there' there. And nothing wrong with him dishing out a little of what he was getting by calling out a cheap shot regarding using homemade sling shots to take out drones. Now, I could get behind a good Gilligan's Island joke from either Col Howell or Cpl Grable.
I look at the current world situation and ask the question “if called upon, could the Corps conduct operations in an AOR with our current T/O and T/E”?
EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN- Could we support and operate anywhere in the Eastern Mediterranean? - No amphibious lift, no supporting arms, and no way to scale up from a MEU to a MEB.
NORWAY, DENMARK, FINLAND, SWEDEN, ESTONIA, LATVIA, LITHUANIA - Could we go toe to toe with Russia? Russia, thanks to PRC’s assistance, manufactures more ammunition in THREE MONTHS than all of NATO COMBINED, IN A YEAR. Russia allocates 6.7% of its GDP towards defense spending, while NATO members are only encouraged to allocate 2%. It is estimated that Russia will have the capability to attack a NATO member in five years. Could the Corps conduct operations in that AOR under FD?
AFRICA - Could the Corps insert a MEU to conduct NEO if called upon today? No, because there’s no MEU afloat in either the Western or Eastern Mediterranean.
INDIAN OCEAN- Could the Corps conduct operations in the IO? Could the Corps even protect Diego Garcia? No, because the Corps, first lacks any nearby formations organized to conduct anything other than being a “sensor node” or part of a “kill chain”. We have no III MEF or I MAW that can project combat power ashore, because this Commandant has continued the reckless pursuit of no tubed artillery, no bridging or assault engineer units, insufficient assault amphibious support, and reduced rotary and fixed wing support. But we have a silly short ranged, subsonic missile that the Commandant and his sycophants say is our new “save the world” weapon.
RED SEA - Israel has preemptively attacked Iran. Regardless of whether we personally think it was a good idea, if the President directed a MEU(SOC) to conduct Iranian oil rig operations to seize and destroy them, does the Corps CURRENTLY have a projectable combat presence in the Red Sea? Of course not. The same questions are just as relevant to a raid into Yemen.
The bottom line is this Commandant has continued on the perilous path of defanging the Nation’s only multi-mission, scalable 911 force.
I’ll close with this. Hold your EGA in your hand and look at it. The Eagle represents our Nation, the ribbon held in its beak represents our Corps, the globe represents our worldwide service, and the fouled anchor represents our naval heritage.
Given the symbolism of the EGA, does anyone think that we’re still able to operate worldwide and can we do it as a naval force?
Grok: “Precise casualty breakdowns by artillery versus drones in the Russia-Ukraine conflict are tough to nail down due to limited official data, varying estimates, and both sides’ secrecy. Below is a summary of available information on artillery and drone-related casualties by year, based on sources like Western media, Ukrainian reports, and think tanks. Percentages reflect the estimated proportion of total casualties caused by each weapon type, where data exists.
### 2022
- **Artillery**: Dominant weapon, causing ~80% of casualties on both sides (Council on Foreign Relations, Reuters). Heavy Russian barrages and Ukraine’s use of Western-supplied howitzers (e.g., M777) drove high losses.
- **Drones**: Limited impact, ~5-10% of casualties. Early use of Bayraktar TB2 drones by Ukraine was effective but small-scale; FPV drones were rare.
- **Total Casualties (Estimates)**:
- Russian: ~100,000–180,000 dead/injured (U.S. intelligence, BBC).
- Ukrainian: ~70,000–100,000 dead/injured (U.S. estimates).
- **Notes**: Artillery’s dominance reflected conventional warfare tactics, with drones mainly used for reconnaissance.
### 2023
- **Artillery**: Still primary, causing ~70-75% of casualties (Imperial War Museums, CSIS). Intense shelling in battles like Bakhmut led to high losses.
- **Drones**: Growing role, ~15-20% of casualties. FPV drones emerged, with Ukraine scaling production. Russian Lancet drones targeted armor.
- **Total Casualties (Estimates)**:
- Russian: ~315,000 dead/injured by year-end (U.S. intelligence).
- Ukrainian: ~190,000 dead/injured (U.S. estimates).
- **Notes**: Drone usage surged, but artillery remained the main killer due to sheer firepower.
### 2024
- **Artillery**: Declining share, ~40-50% of casualties (The New York Times, Army Technology). Ammunition shortages and drone proliferation reduced reliance.
- **Drones**: Major rise, ~50-70% of casualties in some battles (Business Insider, Ukrainian commanders). FPV drones caused up to 80% of Russian frontline losses (Ukrainian claims).
- **Total Casualties (Estimates)**:
- Russian: ~700,000–1,000,000 dead/injured, ~250,000 killed (Ukrainian claims, Al Jazeera).
- Ukrainian: ~400,000 dead/injured, ~43,000–70,000 killed (Zelensky, Butusov).
- **Notes**: Ukraine produced 1 million+ FPV drones; Russia claimed 4,000 daily. Drones became cheaper and more precise than artillery.
### 2025 (to June)
- **Artillery**: Further reduced, ~20-30% of casualties (extrapolated from trends, no direct data). Continued use but overshadowed by drones.
- **Drones**: Dominant, ~70-80% of casualties in many battles (The New York Times, Ukrainian Gen. Staff on X). FPV drones now primary threat.
- **Total Casualties (Estimates)**:
- Russian: ~1,000,000+ dead/injured, ~250,000–300,000 killed (Ukrainian claims, BBC/Mediazona).
- Ukrainian: ~450,000–500,000 dead/injured, ~43,000–105,000 killed (Zelensky, Butusov).
- **Notes**: Daily Russian losses (~1,020–1,250, X posts) heavily drone-driven, with 2/3 of casualties attributed to drones in some reports.
### Sources
- **Media**: The New York Times, BBC, Reuters, Business Insider, Al Jazeera.
- **Think Tanks**: CSIS, Imperial War Museums, Army Technology.
- **Official**: Ukrainian General Staff (X posts), Zelensky statements, U.S. intelligence leaks.
- **Independent**: BBC Russian/Mediazona (106,745 confirmed Russian deaths by May 2025, estimating 164,000–237,000 total).
### Caveats
- Data is incomplete; no side releases verified drone vs. artillery casualty splits.
- Estimates rely on open-source analysis, Ukrainian claims, and Western intelligence.
- Both sides likely inflate enemy losses and underreport their own.
- Drone casualty share is higher in 2024–2025 due to tactical shifts, but exact yearly splits are rough.”
So very wrong based on current casualties.
I know you want to believe that. I know your argument is based on that.
It is just not accurate.
The CMC does not need to sing about Force Design because FD is happening. Let’s take a biased free look at what happened yesterday.
A notable takeaway from the recent House Armed Services Committee hearing on the Department of the Navy Fiscal Year 2026 Budget Request was Rep. Moulton’s (D-MA) observation that he was “more impressed than I imagined” with the Marine Corps’ progress in Force Design following his recent visit to the Philippines. [TIMESTAMP: 01:33:30] This positive assessment occurred amidst broader concerns regarding amphibious warfare capabilities and the integration of unmanned systems, which were central themes throughout the proceedings, chaired by Rep. Mike Rogers (R-AL) and ranking member Rep. Adam Smith (D-WA).
The hearing revealed a significant disconnect between the Marine Corps’ operational needs and the Navy’s ability to support them, particularly concerning the availability of amphibious ships. Several Representatives, including Rep. Wittman (R-VA), underscored the necessity of maintaining at least 31 operational amphibs to meet global crisis response demands, citing recent shortfalls in AFRICOM. Admiral Kilby affirmed the importance of a 3.0 MEU presence and stated the Navy would require 46 amphibious ships to reliably achieve it. [TIMESTAMP: 01:21:53] Rep. Rogers specifically emphasized the critical role of these forces in the INDOPACOM region, noting that our amphibious forces are “the bedrock of our rapid response force and essential for the projection of power.” [TIMESTAMP: 00:41:15] Despite these needs, the Navy’s recent assessment questioned the necessity of a consistent 3.0 ARG/MEU deployment, a point Admiral Kilby clarified he did not agree with.
The committee also focused heavily on the potential of unmanned aerial systems (UAS). Rep. Moulton (D-MA) drew a stark parallel to the conflict in Ukraine – where drones account for over 70% of casualties – and pressed Gen. Smith on the Marine Corps’ investment in this area. [TIMESTAMP: 01:36:54] While acknowledging current spending is relatively low, Gen. Smith conceded that doubling the drone budget would undoubtedly increase the Corps’ lethality.
Discussions revealed the Marine Corps is at the forefront of offensive drone experimentation, as noted by Rep. Vindman (D-VA). [TIMESTAMP: 03:53:25] However, Gen. Smith admitted the Corps is still seeking effective solutions for countering enemy drones at the small unit level, exploring innovative approaches like “drone-on-drone” engagements and disrupting autonomous systems, acknowledging “we don’t have a solution for yet.”
Positive feedback wasn’t limited to Force Design. Rep. Wilson (R-SC) praised the Marine Corps’ adaptability in personnel management after a visit to Parris Island. [TIMESTAMP: 01:12:34] Finally, the importance of maintaining the current Marine Corps posture on Okinawa was underscored, with Gen. Smith advising against any changes that could increase risk to regional security plans. [TIMESTAMP: 02:13:23]
You can find the full hearing record and timestamps here: https://armedservices.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=5174
There is common ground here. Back your Commandant. Be a unifying force.
I appreciate your add. Of course, I have a different take...I expect the CMC's testimony to be nothing short of a karaoke session to the tune of "Everything is Awesome". That's typically the deal unless there is a full on crisis. And yes, as I've pointed out here before, there is solid Congressional support for FD. To that point though, they praise FD, but it may as well be a container word with respect to actual capabilities. we could replace 'FD' with 'Operational Maneuver from the Sea' or 'blitzkrieg' in the transcript and it would read the same. Regarding UAS/sUAS/FPV; the work is good, very agreed on this bright spot. Mark it F or G for Performance on the fitrep and keep it going. However, that has zero need to be attached to Force Design as implemented.
I may back the CMC of the USMC, but I also support the future and don't want to see it undermined by bad choices. No one backs an RS CO who missed production. No one unifies with the Company CO whose grunts dodn't have water/ammo, and whose vehicles didn't have JP8 so they can't effectively fight. Positive words don't get a Recon Team locking out of sub to shore if everyone is fat, lazy, and complacent. It's pretty simple...those things get called out to get addressed. It's a practical matter. LCpls get called out all the time for shortfalls, vice 'backing' and 'being a unifying force'. It's nothing new. In my younger days, I wrote a white paper calling out the USMC in 1992 over the restructuring of Marine Reconnaissance. I called it out as 'breaking' the Recon community, and that the proposed plan would only result in proving why the existing structure was the right structure. I forecast exactly what happened....all the shortfalls would come home to roost, and by formal or informal method, the Recon Community would reform back to the Bns and active Force Companies. I didn't get it right because I was so smart; I just knew how to observe, listen to smart people, and look at the practicals.
As for calling out CMCs, How many CMC's in the past 20 years have been called out over the sad saga of the 'Tatoo Policy' alone? "Ma' sleeves!" is important, but capability is even more important.
Rep. Moulton’s (D-MA) observation that he was “more impressed than I imagined” with the Marine Corps’ progress in Force Design following his recent visit to the Philippines.
What was he impressed by? A non shooting NMESIS sitting on a beach for a photo op?
Obviously not—he was likely there during Balikatan and saw firsthand what the Stand-In Force can do.
This gets to one of the toughest parts of this debate: some things can’t be discussed here. You can call that deception—or accept it as the reality of modern operations.
If you really want clarity, don’t just stay on this forum. Go to a Marine installation. Walk into a recruiting station. Ask Marines what they’re doing. Ask about their last deployment. Ask about their barracks. Get it from the source.
Too many veterans and retirees have mistaken this echo chamber for the full picture. Start asking the hard questions outside this bubble.
Challenge Force Design if you want—but don’t let one loud narrative turn you against your own Corps.
I will NEVER be against the only organization that gave me a chance when no others would. I just do not want them to fall into irrelevancy because of a misguided thought process. What was wrong with just adding the capabilities to the existing force structure instead of completely changing and reorganizing it?