Force Design 2030 designers felt rockets not artillery were the future of the modern battle space. Hmmm, whatever could be wrong with that assumption? Guess it never came up in the XBox scenarios they ran, after signing their NDA’s. The number of rounds is staggering, the impact on the tubes alone much be having an impact. Perhaps now, some of the propeller heads will begin to admit that maybe, just maybe they got things wrong, and return to reconstituting MAGTF strengths, to include the logistics needed for sustained forward operations.
Decades ago as I was beginning my study of military history I noted that I had yet to find a war in which the participants discovered that prewar ammo consumption projections were not too low. Sixty years of study later, it's still true.
On 12-14 September 1942, LtCol Merritt A. Edson’s 1st Raider Bn with the attached and decimated 1st Para-Marine Bn fought the battle of Edson’s Ridge. The 1st Para-Marine Bn had taken heavy causalities (more than 50% including their Bn CO) seizing the Gavutu-Tanambogo Islands located across Iron Bottom Bay and the Guadalcanal airfield.
On 7 September, LtCol Edson conducted a Raid on Tasimboka, a small village east of the airfield. Tasimboka was the staging area for a reinforced Japanese Brigade under orders to attack and capture the Guadalcanal airfield. When the “Raiders and Chutes” landed they discovered and captured a large Japanese supply base. They also discovered that the Jap attack force had departed on their approach march to Henderson Field. Besides food, medical supplies, and ammunition, they also captured the plans for the Japanese attack on Henderson Field. The plans showed that the Japanese attack would hit Lunga Ridge.
Once Edson returned to Henderson Field with the Jap plans there was two discussions. The first concern was the question that the Japanese plans might be a deception. Edson and the 1st Division Operations Officer convinced General Vandergrift they were authentic. The second discussion was who should defend Lunga Ridge. LtCol Edson stated it should be his “Raiders and Chutes”, provided he had the full support of the Division artillery and those brand new rapid firing 105 howitzers.
Initially Edson spread his defensive line to cover the ridge and the (swampy) heavy jungle area between the ridge and the Lunga River. On the day of the first night attack, Edson gave orders not to fire unless fire upon. His Marines reported that day Japanese probes observing their defensive positions. The first night attack hit the Raider Bn defensive line between the Ridge and the Lunga River. The Japanese penetrate the defensive line but it was a night attack in heavy jungle. The Japanese Commander could not exploit the break through because of the confusion and loss of control of his troops.
On the 2nd day, Edson pulled the ridge defensive line back to the ridge highpoint, Hill 120 where his CP was located and gave the orders to dig in. When the Japanese night attack started it was met by salvos of 105 artillery strikes breaking up their attacking battalions. His defensive line still had to deal with the “leakers” with small arms and grenades. A “Chute” SNCO, while moving up the ridge to grab another case of grenades, witnessed Edson sitting on a log with a field phone, calling in artillery strikes, with tracers whizzing and flares burning, like he was on a training day field shoot.
The next day, a common comment by the Raiders and Para-Marines was, if it was not for the Division artillery, we could not have held the ridge. Lunga Ridge also earned a couple new names; Edson’s Ridge and “Bloody Ridge”.
LtCol Edison had an interesting career. In 1922, he graduated from flight school as a designated Naval Aviator. He also deployed to WW1 France with the 11th Marines as an artillery officer. Hmmm…seems Edson was a bit of an “artillery” ringer for the Japanese.
When officials announced historic sweeping changes to the Air Force and Space Force's structure last week to prepare for potential conflict with China, it seemed they had thought of everything.
Artillery’s long pole in their tent has been and will be logistics. A howitzer is pig iron w/o ammo. BN and BTRY CO’’s always looked for more 97 pound projos take up a lot of the gross tonnage in supply ships.
Force Design 2030 designers felt rockets not artillery were the future of the modern battle space. Hmmm, whatever could be wrong with that assumption? Guess it never came up in the XBox scenarios they ran, after signing their NDA’s. The number of rounds is staggering, the impact on the tubes alone much be having an impact. Perhaps now, some of the propeller heads will begin to admit that maybe, just maybe they got things wrong, and return to reconstituting MAGTF strengths, to include the logistics needed for sustained forward operations.
Congress must “Force” them to do so!
Decades ago as I was beginning my study of military history I noted that I had yet to find a war in which the participants discovered that prewar ammo consumption projections were not too low. Sixty years of study later, it's still true.
Source Strategic Forecasting. Why do we only have 1 ARG W MEU AT SEA?Carrier Strike Groups?
CVN 42: The USs Dwight D. Lisarhewer is underway in the Red Sea.
CVN70:TheUSSCarlVireerlamooredInFeurlHarler.
CVN 71: The USS Theodore Racemall l underway in the Pacific Cumar,
VNT2:TheUSSAbratemLinoonleunderwaynthePacifteCeer
SVNooThuussseorpeWaiirglorIsurdereuyinthoAtlmricCawan.
CVN 75: The USS Harry S. Truman is underway In the Atlantic Ocean.
• Amphibious Ready Croups/Marne Expedtionary Unis
LHEsTheussBadaansurervainttsAeoualtSua.
Status O In home port
• At sea/other port
Carrier Strike Groups (home port)
• CVN 68 Nimitz (Kitsap-Bremerton, WA)
• CVN 69 Dwight: 12, Elseneer (Norfolk, VA)
• CVY 20 CoM Vinson (San Diego, CA)
• SVN71 Thoodore Roosevelt (San Diego, CA)
• CVN 72 Abrahan Lincaln (San Diego, CA)
c7aGeoreeWashinwkonfNorioik,VAi
• CVN 74 John C. Stennis (Norfolk, VA)
•CVV75Hany&.Trarnam(Norfolk,VAj
• CVN 76 Ronald Reagan (Yokosuka, Japan)
• CVN 77 George H.W. Bush (Norfolk, VA)
• CVN 78 Gerald R. Ford (Norfolk, VA)
AmtlrtlbiouskesdyGroupa（horeport）
• LHA 6 America (Sasebo, Japan)
• LHA 7 Tripoli (San Diego, CA)
• LHD 1 Wasp (Norfolk, VA)
• LHD 2 Essex (San Diego, CA)
• LHD 3 Kearsarge (Norfolk, VA)
• LHD 4 Boxer (San Diego, CA)
•LHlaiaamfNorfoik,V/）
• LHD 7 Iwo Jima (Mayport, FL)
• LHD 8 Makin Island (San Diego, CA)
The Naval Update Map shows approximate current and recent locations.
Copyright RANE 2024
Here is an artillery story.
On 12-14 September 1942, LtCol Merritt A. Edson’s 1st Raider Bn with the attached and decimated 1st Para-Marine Bn fought the battle of Edson’s Ridge. The 1st Para-Marine Bn had taken heavy causalities (more than 50% including their Bn CO) seizing the Gavutu-Tanambogo Islands located across Iron Bottom Bay and the Guadalcanal airfield.
On 7 September, LtCol Edson conducted a Raid on Tasimboka, a small village east of the airfield. Tasimboka was the staging area for a reinforced Japanese Brigade under orders to attack and capture the Guadalcanal airfield. When the “Raiders and Chutes” landed they discovered and captured a large Japanese supply base. They also discovered that the Jap attack force had departed on their approach march to Henderson Field. Besides food, medical supplies, and ammunition, they also captured the plans for the Japanese attack on Henderson Field. The plans showed that the Japanese attack would hit Lunga Ridge.
Once Edson returned to Henderson Field with the Jap plans there was two discussions. The first concern was the question that the Japanese plans might be a deception. Edson and the 1st Division Operations Officer convinced General Vandergrift they were authentic. The second discussion was who should defend Lunga Ridge. LtCol Edson stated it should be his “Raiders and Chutes”, provided he had the full support of the Division artillery and those brand new rapid firing 105 howitzers.
Initially Edson spread his defensive line to cover the ridge and the (swampy) heavy jungle area between the ridge and the Lunga River. On the day of the first night attack, Edson gave orders not to fire unless fire upon. His Marines reported that day Japanese probes observing their defensive positions. The first night attack hit the Raider Bn defensive line between the Ridge and the Lunga River. The Japanese penetrate the defensive line but it was a night attack in heavy jungle. The Japanese Commander could not exploit the break through because of the confusion and loss of control of his troops.
On the 2nd day, Edson pulled the ridge defensive line back to the ridge highpoint, Hill 120 where his CP was located and gave the orders to dig in. When the Japanese night attack started it was met by salvos of 105 artillery strikes breaking up their attacking battalions. His defensive line still had to deal with the “leakers” with small arms and grenades. A “Chute” SNCO, while moving up the ridge to grab another case of grenades, witnessed Edson sitting on a log with a field phone, calling in artillery strikes, with tracers whizzing and flares burning, like he was on a training day field shoot.
The next day, a common comment by the Raiders and Para-Marines was, if it was not for the Division artillery, we could not have held the ridge. Lunga Ridge also earned a couple new names; Edson’s Ridge and “Bloody Ridge”.
LtCol Edison had an interesting career. In 1922, he graduated from flight school as a designated Naval Aviator. He also deployed to WW1 France with the 11th Marines as an artillery officer. Hmmm…seems Edson was a bit of an “artillery” ringer for the Japanese.
Look at the answers for numbers 1&5, it’s no surprise. https://breakingdefense.com/2023/02/a-year-into-ukraine-looking-back-at-5-prewar-predictions/
Perhaps not to the logisticians, but it certainly is to the politicians.
Air Force Says Its New China-Focused Reorganization 'Not Best Optimized' for Middle East
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A B-1B Lancer disengages from a KC-135 Stratotanker
A B-1B Lancer disengages from a KC-135 Stratotanker after refueling Sept. 27, 2014. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Ciara Wymbs)
Military.com | By Thomas Novelly
Published February 21, 2024 at 5:49pm ET
When officials announced historic sweeping changes to the Air Force and Space Force's structure last week to prepare for potential conflict with China, it seemed they had thought of everything.
What is the logistics tail for HiMars? What site prep is required? Most importantly how “adaptable” is it to multiple different mission environments?
Artillery’s long pole in their tent has been and will be logistics. A howitzer is pig iron w/o ammo. BN and BTRY CO’’s always looked for more 97 pound projos take up a lot of the gross tonnage in supply ships.