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Jeffrey Dinsmore's avatar

BGen Holcomb’s article is exactly on point. It prompted a couple things. First, it prompted a review of my mental rolodex to identify those senior officers I know, or know of, on active duty that should be lauded for their integrity and encouraged to maintain their guard against the danger of compromise. Second, it jump-started a theme that I have been wrestling with for several years; an overdue philosophical and academic examination of how senior officer integrity is often compromised in this modern era. This post is my not-ready-for-prime-time academic endeavor, which may turn into another article someday.

This paragraph in BGen Holcomb’s piece especially caught my attention:

"Preparation for and experience in combat develops strong wills. Senior officers motivated by the desire to get the biggest possible piece of the pie for their services are tempted to dissemble to win the internecine budget and policy fights that are the lifeblood of official Washington. When these wills are not properly constrained by higher commitments to integrity and respect for the decision-making province of civilian authorities, generals and admirals can succumb to the temptation to deceive.

These deceptions can take many forms."

When one has a leadership discussion of senior officer integrity, it usually veers into the familiar territory of personal misconduct. “The Bathsheba Syndrome” is go-to PME material. The danger of ethical violations for personal enrichment, witting or unwitting, is a central theme of any commander’s course or general officer orientation.

The deceptions that BGen Holcomb references, however, are much more insidious, and because they have been defined as ethically acceptable and even desirable, are widely practiced among senior officers that are otherwise on guard against appearances of personal misconduct or self-enrichment. These officers were once Lieutenants, Captains and Majors who practiced the selfless leadership they learned at TBS, and understood that the culture within their platoons and companies defined their ability to accomplish the mission. Some of these officers were battalion commanders that demonstrated clear-headed judgment in the most arduous of conditions. What changed from those heady days?

The first factor we must acknowledge is rooted in fundamental leadership values. The Corps has always valued combat-hardened senior officers who could make the cold-blooded decisions to send hundreds of Marines to their certain death, guarding the success of the institution and the mission first. Generals Barrett and Vogel, circa Guadalcanal-1943 come to mind as officers who were reportedly relieved because they couldn’t see the big picture; they valued the welfare of their Marines over the bloody necessities of the mission. The best senior officers (Puller, Wilson, Gray) were able to balance hard combat decisions with genuine down-and-in troop welfare focus and the cultural integrity of their units. Senior officers today, however, seem to be taught to guard the institution at all costs, and to perpetuate any legal and ethical action or order to protect it.

The second factor is now taught in our senior schools, and compounds the idea that we abandon the fundamental tenets of leadership in favor of institutional preservation. The War Colleges repeat a phrase with the attending student Colonels: “What got you here, won’t get you there.” This phrase usually accompanies a discussion of Pentagon programmatic issues and service budgetary interests. The context is that the tactical leadership practices that made you successful up to battalion command will not help you in your new role as a strategic thinker in the halls of the Pentagon.

The above factors are neutral. Neither of these factors should be blamed for integrity compromises in our senior officers. They are both real issues that officers must grapple with as they refine their leadership techniques and move up through the ranks. Again, there are historical examples of general officers that did so masterfully.

Other factors, however, are not neutral. They combine to specifically incentivize the loss of integrity of officers who have been re-educated in these upward-focused values.

Messaging and Information Operations: During a past tumultuous time in our Corps, the Marine Corps chief of strategic communications repeatedly made it clear that public perception of the institution and its favored issues trumps reality and truth-telling. Period. Commstrat advice demonstrably supplanted the judgment of senior leaders of that time. This was 20 years ago, and this ethos has come to full flower of late. Messaging as a leadership ethic has insinuated its way into the otherwise common-sense calculus of our senior leaders’ judgment. When BGen Holcomb writes of obfuscation, half-truths, and ad-hominem attacks, CommStrat is the institutional root of these deceptions.

Service Interests and Tribal approval: “What got you here, won’t get you there.” The National Capital Region has specific values, language, and tribal customs. Those that learn to exhibit those values and speak the language are granted entry into the political tribe. Officers that measure the success of the Corps in budget dollars and NCR prestige are incentivized to gain entry into that tribe. Therefore, those that can speak in CommStrat generated one-liners and present a facade of authority are valued. Many gain their position and promotions based on these facades, whether they have the operational leadership experience to buttress their authority or not.

For those that once selflessly led Marines through combat from Lt through LtCol, the above factors contribute to a break from that TBS ethos in later years. Senior officers charged to guard the institution at all costs can make many personal rationalizations about the legal and ethical orders one carries out on behalf of that institution. The decisions become easier to rationalize when the legal and ethical framework has been redefined to permit falsehoods in support of CommStrat, and fealty to NCR values to maintain service equity in front of Congress. A leader might be able to sleep at night because he hasn’t engaged in personal misconduct, and any untruth he told is protected by the legal and ethical framework of the institution.

To be sure, some deceptions plaguing our modern Corps are practiced by senior officers who lack significant operational leadership experience since TBS and don’t know any better. Like Courtney Massengale, some careers are built on staff work and the ability to present well. Alarmingly, though, is when the deceptions are practiced by combat-proven officers who have been conditioned with the idea that their place is no longer to lead, but to advocate. In either case, these factors have combined to produce habits of deception that compromise our institutional integrity, abandon the intrusive leadership our Marines require, and threaten the ethos and existence of the Corps.

General Gray was famous for many things simultaneously. Stories of his intrusive leadership abound, his unrelenting demands upon subordinate leaders to intimately supervise everything from chow to barracks, his ability to obtain critical equipment for the Corps’ mission, his plain-speaking in the halls of Congress and the Pentagon, and his ability to make hard decisions that preserved the institution, its mission, and its unique place among the service branches.

Like Brute Krulak, he understood that America doesn’t need its Corps to do what the other services can already do, but it wants it--for its ethos, its unfailing alchemy, its integrity.

In my mental rolodex of those who refuse to compromise their integrity in the face of modern-era institutional advocacy are many who have recently left our active ranks. I hope some of their caliber remain. Anyone who thinks that guarding the institution includes becoming like everyone else in the NCR, following the “first-truth wins” messaging fallacy, and forgetting what the leadership culture of the Corps demands, is actually destroying it. America will one day decide it doesn’t want that kind of Marine Corps.

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Jerry McAbee's avatar

Well done to BGen Holcomb for not accusing anyone by name. Those who obfuscate and deceive know who they are - - and so does everyone else

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