BGen Holcomb’s article is exactly on point. It prompted a couple things. First, it prompted a review of my mental rolodex to identify those senior officers I know, or know of, on active duty that should be lauded for their integrity and encouraged to maintain their guard against the danger of compromise. Second, it jump-started a theme that I have been wrestling with for several years; an overdue philosophical and academic examination of how senior officer integrity is often compromised in this modern era. This post is my not-ready-for-prime-time academic endeavor, which may turn into another article someday.
This paragraph in BGen Holcomb’s piece especially caught my attention:
"Preparation for and experience in combat develops strong wills. Senior officers motivated by the desire to get the biggest possible piece of the pie for their services are tempted to dissemble to win the internecine budget and policy fights that are the lifeblood of official Washington. When these wills are not properly constrained by higher commitments to integrity and respect for the decision-making province of civilian authorities, generals and admirals can succumb to the temptation to deceive.
These deceptions can take many forms."
When one has a leadership discussion of senior officer integrity, it usually veers into the familiar territory of personal misconduct. “The Bathsheba Syndrome” is go-to PME material. The danger of ethical violations for personal enrichment, witting or unwitting, is a central theme of any commander’s course or general officer orientation.
The deceptions that BGen Holcomb references, however, are much more insidious, and because they have been defined as ethically acceptable and even desirable, are widely practiced among senior officers that are otherwise on guard against appearances of personal misconduct or self-enrichment. These officers were once Lieutenants, Captains and Majors who practiced the selfless leadership they learned at TBS, and understood that the culture within their platoons and companies defined their ability to accomplish the mission. Some of these officers were battalion commanders that demonstrated clear-headed judgment in the most arduous of conditions. What changed from those heady days?
The first factor we must acknowledge is rooted in fundamental leadership values. The Corps has always valued combat-hardened senior officers who could make the cold-blooded decisions to send hundreds of Marines to their certain death, guarding the success of the institution and the mission first. Generals Barrett and Vogel, circa Guadalcanal-1943 come to mind as officers who were reportedly relieved because they couldn’t see the big picture; they valued the welfare of their Marines over the bloody necessities of the mission. The best senior officers (Puller, Wilson, Gray) were able to balance hard combat decisions with genuine down-and-in troop welfare focus and the cultural integrity of their units. Senior officers today, however, seem to be taught to guard the institution at all costs, and to perpetuate any legal and ethical action or order to protect it.
The second factor is now taught in our senior schools, and compounds the idea that we abandon the fundamental tenets of leadership in favor of institutional preservation. The War Colleges repeat a phrase with the attending student Colonels: “What got you here, won’t get you there.” This phrase usually accompanies a discussion of Pentagon programmatic issues and service budgetary interests. The context is that the tactical leadership practices that made you successful up to battalion command will not help you in your new role as a strategic thinker in the halls of the Pentagon.
The above factors are neutral. Neither of these factors should be blamed for integrity compromises in our senior officers. They are both real issues that officers must grapple with as they refine their leadership techniques and move up through the ranks. Again, there are historical examples of general officers that did so masterfully.
Other factors, however, are not neutral. They combine to specifically incentivize the loss of integrity of officers who have been re-educated in these upward-focused values.
Messaging and Information Operations: During a past tumultuous time in our Corps, the Marine Corps chief of strategic communications repeatedly made it clear that public perception of the institution and its favored issues trumps reality and truth-telling. Period. Commstrat advice demonstrably supplanted the judgment of senior leaders of that time. This was 20 years ago, and this ethos has come to full flower of late. Messaging as a leadership ethic has insinuated its way into the otherwise common-sense calculus of our senior leaders’ judgment. When BGen Holcomb writes of obfuscation, half-truths, and ad-hominem attacks, CommStrat is the institutional root of these deceptions.
Service Interests and Tribal approval: “What got you here, won’t get you there.” The National Capital Region has specific values, language, and tribal customs. Those that learn to exhibit those values and speak the language are granted entry into the political tribe. Officers that measure the success of the Corps in budget dollars and NCR prestige are incentivized to gain entry into that tribe. Therefore, those that can speak in CommStrat generated one-liners and present a facade of authority are valued. Many gain their position and promotions based on these facades, whether they have the operational leadership experience to buttress their authority or not.
For those that once selflessly led Marines through combat from Lt through LtCol, the above factors contribute to a break from that TBS ethos in later years. Senior officers charged to guard the institution at all costs can make many personal rationalizations about the legal and ethical orders one carries out on behalf of that institution. The decisions become easier to rationalize when the legal and ethical framework has been redefined to permit falsehoods in support of CommStrat, and fealty to NCR values to maintain service equity in front of Congress. A leader might be able to sleep at night because he hasn’t engaged in personal misconduct, and any untruth he told is protected by the legal and ethical framework of the institution.
To be sure, some deceptions plaguing our modern Corps are practiced by senior officers who lack significant operational leadership experience since TBS and don’t know any better. Like Courtney Massengale, some careers are built on staff work and the ability to present well. Alarmingly, though, is when the deceptions are practiced by combat-proven officers who have been conditioned with the idea that their place is no longer to lead, but to advocate. In either case, these factors have combined to produce habits of deception that compromise our institutional integrity, abandon the intrusive leadership our Marines require, and threaten the ethos and existence of the Corps.
General Gray was famous for many things simultaneously. Stories of his intrusive leadership abound, his unrelenting demands upon subordinate leaders to intimately supervise everything from chow to barracks, his ability to obtain critical equipment for the Corps’ mission, his plain-speaking in the halls of Congress and the Pentagon, and his ability to make hard decisions that preserved the institution, its mission, and its unique place among the service branches.
Like Brute Krulak, he understood that America doesn’t need its Corps to do what the other services can already do, but it wants it--for its ethos, its unfailing alchemy, its integrity.
In my mental rolodex of those who refuse to compromise their integrity in the face of modern-era institutional advocacy are many who have recently left our active ranks. I hope some of their caliber remain. Anyone who thinks that guarding the institution includes becoming like everyone else in the NCR, following the “first-truth wins” messaging fallacy, and forgetting what the leadership culture of the Corps demands, is actually destroying it. America will one day decide it doesn’t want that kind of Marine Corps.
Colonel Dinsmore: Superb development of a difficult topic: You provide breadth, depth, recent experience, and creditability.
As I posit in the article, narratives can be quite effective, dangerously effective in that they are easily understandable. They enable those who lack expertise to posture as knowing more than they do. Most narratives lend themselves to "tweets' or 20-second advertising sound bites, facilitating broad dissemination and even indoctrination. Many include a domain specific word or phrase so that the speaker/writer can posture being "in the know."
But, narratives are usually very narrow, and, as such, are dangerous, misleading representations of reality. They tend to focus on just one (frequently superficial) aspect of a problem. They tend to take a small aperture view of the problem and proposed solution set: Small apertures not just with respect to space but perhaps even more importantly to time.
Small aperture examples, both USMC and National, abound. Consider PRC:
Small/narrow: China-Taiwan-First Island Chain versus Global PRC influence structures. (Weiqi article)
Small/narrow: One PRC weapon set (surface ships) of the great many (type and number) PRC has developed and fielded.
Small/narrow: PRC-Taiwan regional conflict versus global war.
Narrative users/developers tend to avoid the great difficulty in understand complex and inter-related matters and the even more difficult task of representing that reality and positing that reality's dynamics over time. And frankly, in today's information culture, there is little reward in striving to understand and represent difficult matters.
Yet, integrity as wholeness/completeness is essential if military organizations are to accomplish missions as the lowest cost in life.
I don’t think that the Nation's militaries will be able develop credible forces and to employ those forces with operational competence and strength of character until senior officers work to create of culture of integrity (both definitions are in the paper). They need to learn (and to model!) the mental toughness to consider the “whole” of problems (good, bad, ugly) and resist narrow narratives.
Tragically, our adversaries recognize that our national leaders are living in deep mental canyons. These adversaries (state and non-state) will take advantage of the great unaddressed spaces surrendered to them by the narrow, the short-sighted, and the self-serving.
As I read BGen Holcomb’s piece re Integrity displayed by senior officers, it occurred to me his thinking may be - in a way more practical than philosophical - the most basic element to take into account as we continue in our “get well” endeavors. The message? First, be true to thyself! I’ve known him since the summer of ‘83; his intellect and integrity have always impressed me. I think he’s on to something in this piece, and it behooves us to ponder its merit.
What is difficult to comprehend is that 1 CMC and a group of cronies, all possessed with unlimited hubris, apparently arrived on scene via careerism on steroids, then left unchecked by similar superiors ignored 2 US Laws and destroyed the Corps in 4 years. “careerism
/kə-rîr′ĭz″əm/
noun
Pursuit of professional advancement as one's chief or sole aim.
The practice of advancing one's career at the expense of one's personal integrity.
The overwhelming desire or urge to advance one's own career or social status, usually at the expense of other personal interests or social growth.
The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, 5th Edition • More at Wordnik”….
General Holcomb cut a a wide swath here. Our leadership failed to understand a basic tenant of science. War is art and science. Science says a person can postulate an idea. Others with credentials in that field then strip that idea down to basics to expose the weaknesses. Those are then amended to make that idea “bulletproof “ It sometimes leads to the abandonment of the idea in total if it cannot be amended.
All of us understand sometimes the “man” , in the art (war)of our profession, plunges ahead. In a semipeace time environment the scientific approach might serve a long term investment in all things military, better.
The hard turn in this case is the people charged with telling the emperor he was off base -naked-were silenced or perhaps said what was expedient to retain their positions
Some organizations would never have seen this type of loyal opposition. BZ General Holcomb
The issue of integrity in a Marine Officer should not even be a topic of discussion, yet, we find ourselves here having it. All the preceding comments and General Holcomb’s valuable assessments are all very valid. But, perhaps a root cause analysis is in order, and it probably ought be done by an entity that has no ties to the military and specifically the Marine Corps. We are different, so we need a particular pail of ice water thrown on us to see what shakes out.
One guess is that when the field grade officers go off to the “Milk and cookie schools” which often seem place holders while the next position of command opens either in the FMF or of some other equally important leadership role, that the schools ought to focus on command, further study of the more complex elements of war fighting, at the battalion, regiment, MEU, MAB and MAF, level; fight a MAGTF, war game half your ARG and MRU sunk by name your local shore bound terror organization. General Van Ripper was the aggressor in once such effort and rumor has it they had to stop the music and reset the rules. Now that is worth going to school to learn. Just a small example of working to change a culture.
Similarly, “Joint” assignments. While it is understandable that the services not repeat mistakes made in the past perhaps due to the services not being well coordinated, the joint system seems that it could become flawed, and ergo, the principle of war “unity of command” goes pear shaped. The withdraw/NEO from Kabul and HKIA and resulting failures accompanying it, give rise to the too many cooks ruin the soup analogy. Further the “blame” gets spread around. We have seen and heard the disgraceful testimony of Secretary Austin, General Milley and General McKenzie. No one was responsible for anything, no one apparently was truly aware of what was actually happening on the ground and then when confronted with the worlds worst tasting sandwich called it the “greatest success” burger. Hold the pickles and the lettuce, special orders don’t upset us. The joint system with deputy Commandant’s et al, seems top heavy. Some 44-45 four star flag officers in a total manpower service T/O of 1.2 million servicemen and women begs the question what do all these flag officers do all day?
Again and redundantly, if one listens to the Marines, officers and enlisted alike, that the podcast Controversy and Clarity published, we can see and hear that there is great hope in this next generation of senior company grade and field grade officers coming along. The challenge it seems is keeping them off the rocks and shoals of self aggrandizement and self serving behavior that is done only for purposes of promotion and advancement or other things as outlined in General Holcomb’s article.
They seem so ready now, too bad they can not be accelerated to senior field grade command and vetted earlier still for general officer positions. Or perhaps better, have 05/06 officers filling General officers billets and reduce costs associated with higher pay grade levels of renumeration. It seems to be coming to some sort of end result. I don’t know perhaps a war with France will tune up the creaking parts of the Viking war vessels. Regardless something needs to give.
One does not need to look any higher than the Secretary of Defense when it comes to a lack of integrity in the ranks. How could the most senior leader of the military be AWOL from his post, when
he went into the hospital and did not notify anyone? His staff did not even know where he was. Not only did the President not ask for his resignation, the Secretary should have offered his resignation. If a junior member of the military did this, they would have been in the brig or stockade.
Question: Does cooperation with the politicization of the military by the senior military leadership represent an integrity failure?
If you study the passing of the Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986), you learn that one of its purposes is to keep the politically sensitive Service Chief’s influence out of combat operations. Goldwater-Nichols established a combat chain of command of the Combatant Commander directly to the SECDEF and POTUS for a reason. I feel that the Goldwater-Nichols Act’s intent is very clear on this.
The Service Chief’s are responsible to organize, equip, and train their individual Service, however, organize, equip, and train does translate into military readiness of deployable military units. I have never heard a Combatant Commander requesting a politically correct or DEI ready unit. Does senior military leaders telling congress that DEI training is contributing to unit readiness an integrity issue?
In the Haditha “war crimes” case, I witnessed a Congressman (Chairman of the Armed Forces Committee), reacting to a bad news story, visit the Sunday morning talk shows accusing an ambushed US Marine squad in a newly deployed battalion of “cracking”, committing cold blooded murder, and attempting a covered up. To add insult to injury, the resulting investigation was “leaked” to the media between the Commandant’s and the Congressman’s Office. How did that happen? Did the Commandant bow to the political ambitions of a US Congressman?
This brings up another question: If the Combatant Commander is responsible for combat operations, why isn’t he the Convening Authority, for alleged “war crime” cases. Goldwater-Nichols did provide the Combatant Commander Court Martial Authority. After all, isn’t an alleged war crime actually a violation of the Combatant Commander’s ROE? How do these Court Martials somehow work their way back to the state side Service Chiefs? I find it interesting that Goldwater-Nichols makes no provisions for Combatant Commanders Service Component Commands like MARCENT.
I think politicization is an integrity issue for two Service Chiefs and a SECNAV civilian authority. The integrity issue (along with the Design 2030) also involves senior military leadership’s courage. First TRUST, then INTEGRITY, and maybe a future CP discussion needs to include the topic of COURAGE.
All great points. Here is an example that addresses some of your points. It may not be unabridged. CENTCOM releases Wanat investigation
By None , U.S. Central Command
MAC DILL AFB, Fla. (June 23, 2010) – The U.S. Central Command investigation into the combat action that occurred at Wanat, Afghanistan, on July 13, 2008 has been released and posted online at CENTCOM’s Freedom of Information Act Reading Room. To view those documents, click here.
Upon recommendation by Department of Defense Inspector General and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed CENTCOM to reinvestigate the combat action that occurred at Wanat. The investigating officer was Lt. Gen. Richard Natonski and the deputy investigating officer was Maj. Gen. David Perkins.
The investigation team conducted interviews and collected evidence during several thousands of investigative hours across three months at Fort Leavenworth, Kans.; Vicenza, Italy; Fort Benning, Ga.; and Norfolk, Va. Forty-eight witnesses from all levels of command were interviewed under oath. The investigation team collected and reviewed thousands of pages of data, to include doctrinal publications; operational reports and summaries; maps; charts; photographs; intelligence summaries; briefings; notes; logs; and the report of the initial investigation directed by the Combined Joint Task Force 101 Commander.
The opinions and conclusions of the investigation report include:
§ No one single person, action, or decision caused this event to occur; it was the result of a confluence of factors and a series of events.
§ There was no intentional wrongdoing on the part of anyone in the chain of command.
§ Dereliction resulted from inaction prior to the battle. Dereliction of duty was found at the Company, Battalion and Brigade Commander levels.
§ A lack of detailed planning and supervision at battalion level and below contributed to the outcome of events at Wanat.
§ The Soldiers at Wanat fought courageously and in the highest traditions of the nation and the U.S. Army. Non-commissioned officer (NCO) leadership was particularly outstanding.
The investigation was completed in January and forwarded to the Department of the Army as a matter under its cognizance, as units involved had redeployed and were no longer under CENTCOM’s command authority.
Copies of the investigation were also forwarded to U.S. Forces - Afghanistan, ISAF and U.S. Joint Forces Command for their use in development of lessons learned and sharing of those lessons.
“This was a thorough investigation done with painstaking attention to detail over three months, reviewing thousands of pages of documents and reams of information,” said Rear Admiral Hal Pittman, a CENTCOM spokesman. “We stand by the investigation’s findings of fact, opinions and recommendations, and we support the process by which it was adjudicated.”
Wow…glad to see someone is also interested in bad tactical leadership. The CENTCOM investigation was good but it also touch off a controversy between the Combatant Commander and the US Army regarding the “Dereliction resulted from inaction prior to the battle. Dereliction of duty was found at the Company, Battalion and Brigade Commander levels.” If I remember correctly, the US Army did not want to punish the three commanding officers when CENTCOM delivered the investigation to the US Army Service. It finally took Congress and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to get involved and have the Service issue letters of reprimand. https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna35252739 We also need to thank “Retired Col. David Brostrom, the father of the deceased platoon leader at Wanat, pressed the Pentagon for more than a year to launch a new probe into the attack, and also enlisted the support of several lawmakers, including Sen. James Webb (D-Va.). Last fall, Gen. David H. Petraeus, the head of U.S. Central Command, named a three-star Marine Corps general to launch a new investigation of the battle, which was completed last week.” The US Army did do an acceptable combat study on the Wanat ambush: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/Wanat.pdf
BGen Holcomb’s article is exactly on point. It prompted a couple things. First, it prompted a review of my mental rolodex to identify those senior officers I know, or know of, on active duty that should be lauded for their integrity and encouraged to maintain their guard against the danger of compromise. Second, it jump-started a theme that I have been wrestling with for several years; an overdue philosophical and academic examination of how senior officer integrity is often compromised in this modern era. This post is my not-ready-for-prime-time academic endeavor, which may turn into another article someday.
This paragraph in BGen Holcomb’s piece especially caught my attention:
"Preparation for and experience in combat develops strong wills. Senior officers motivated by the desire to get the biggest possible piece of the pie for their services are tempted to dissemble to win the internecine budget and policy fights that are the lifeblood of official Washington. When these wills are not properly constrained by higher commitments to integrity and respect for the decision-making province of civilian authorities, generals and admirals can succumb to the temptation to deceive.
These deceptions can take many forms."
When one has a leadership discussion of senior officer integrity, it usually veers into the familiar territory of personal misconduct. “The Bathsheba Syndrome” is go-to PME material. The danger of ethical violations for personal enrichment, witting or unwitting, is a central theme of any commander’s course or general officer orientation.
The deceptions that BGen Holcomb references, however, are much more insidious, and because they have been defined as ethically acceptable and even desirable, are widely practiced among senior officers that are otherwise on guard against appearances of personal misconduct or self-enrichment. These officers were once Lieutenants, Captains and Majors who practiced the selfless leadership they learned at TBS, and understood that the culture within their platoons and companies defined their ability to accomplish the mission. Some of these officers were battalion commanders that demonstrated clear-headed judgment in the most arduous of conditions. What changed from those heady days?
The first factor we must acknowledge is rooted in fundamental leadership values. The Corps has always valued combat-hardened senior officers who could make the cold-blooded decisions to send hundreds of Marines to their certain death, guarding the success of the institution and the mission first. Generals Barrett and Vogel, circa Guadalcanal-1943 come to mind as officers who were reportedly relieved because they couldn’t see the big picture; they valued the welfare of their Marines over the bloody necessities of the mission. The best senior officers (Puller, Wilson, Gray) were able to balance hard combat decisions with genuine down-and-in troop welfare focus and the cultural integrity of their units. Senior officers today, however, seem to be taught to guard the institution at all costs, and to perpetuate any legal and ethical action or order to protect it.
The second factor is now taught in our senior schools, and compounds the idea that we abandon the fundamental tenets of leadership in favor of institutional preservation. The War Colleges repeat a phrase with the attending student Colonels: “What got you here, won’t get you there.” This phrase usually accompanies a discussion of Pentagon programmatic issues and service budgetary interests. The context is that the tactical leadership practices that made you successful up to battalion command will not help you in your new role as a strategic thinker in the halls of the Pentagon.
The above factors are neutral. Neither of these factors should be blamed for integrity compromises in our senior officers. They are both real issues that officers must grapple with as they refine their leadership techniques and move up through the ranks. Again, there are historical examples of general officers that did so masterfully.
Other factors, however, are not neutral. They combine to specifically incentivize the loss of integrity of officers who have been re-educated in these upward-focused values.
Messaging and Information Operations: During a past tumultuous time in our Corps, the Marine Corps chief of strategic communications repeatedly made it clear that public perception of the institution and its favored issues trumps reality and truth-telling. Period. Commstrat advice demonstrably supplanted the judgment of senior leaders of that time. This was 20 years ago, and this ethos has come to full flower of late. Messaging as a leadership ethic has insinuated its way into the otherwise common-sense calculus of our senior leaders’ judgment. When BGen Holcomb writes of obfuscation, half-truths, and ad-hominem attacks, CommStrat is the institutional root of these deceptions.
Service Interests and Tribal approval: “What got you here, won’t get you there.” The National Capital Region has specific values, language, and tribal customs. Those that learn to exhibit those values and speak the language are granted entry into the political tribe. Officers that measure the success of the Corps in budget dollars and NCR prestige are incentivized to gain entry into that tribe. Therefore, those that can speak in CommStrat generated one-liners and present a facade of authority are valued. Many gain their position and promotions based on these facades, whether they have the operational leadership experience to buttress their authority or not.
For those that once selflessly led Marines through combat from Lt through LtCol, the above factors contribute to a break from that TBS ethos in later years. Senior officers charged to guard the institution at all costs can make many personal rationalizations about the legal and ethical orders one carries out on behalf of that institution. The decisions become easier to rationalize when the legal and ethical framework has been redefined to permit falsehoods in support of CommStrat, and fealty to NCR values to maintain service equity in front of Congress. A leader might be able to sleep at night because he hasn’t engaged in personal misconduct, and any untruth he told is protected by the legal and ethical framework of the institution.
To be sure, some deceptions plaguing our modern Corps are practiced by senior officers who lack significant operational leadership experience since TBS and don’t know any better. Like Courtney Massengale, some careers are built on staff work and the ability to present well. Alarmingly, though, is when the deceptions are practiced by combat-proven officers who have been conditioned with the idea that their place is no longer to lead, but to advocate. In either case, these factors have combined to produce habits of deception that compromise our institutional integrity, abandon the intrusive leadership our Marines require, and threaten the ethos and existence of the Corps.
General Gray was famous for many things simultaneously. Stories of his intrusive leadership abound, his unrelenting demands upon subordinate leaders to intimately supervise everything from chow to barracks, his ability to obtain critical equipment for the Corps’ mission, his plain-speaking in the halls of Congress and the Pentagon, and his ability to make hard decisions that preserved the institution, its mission, and its unique place among the service branches.
Like Brute Krulak, he understood that America doesn’t need its Corps to do what the other services can already do, but it wants it--for its ethos, its unfailing alchemy, its integrity.
In my mental rolodex of those who refuse to compromise their integrity in the face of modern-era institutional advocacy are many who have recently left our active ranks. I hope some of their caliber remain. Anyone who thinks that guarding the institution includes becoming like everyone else in the NCR, following the “first-truth wins” messaging fallacy, and forgetting what the leadership culture of the Corps demands, is actually destroying it. America will one day decide it doesn’t want that kind of Marine Corps.
Well done to BGen Holcomb for not accusing anyone by name. Those who obfuscate and deceive know who they are - - and so does everyone else
A lack of integrity obscures incompetence and leads to deception, hence failure.
Colonel Dinsmore: Superb development of a difficult topic: You provide breadth, depth, recent experience, and creditability.
As I posit in the article, narratives can be quite effective, dangerously effective in that they are easily understandable. They enable those who lack expertise to posture as knowing more than they do. Most narratives lend themselves to "tweets' or 20-second advertising sound bites, facilitating broad dissemination and even indoctrination. Many include a domain specific word or phrase so that the speaker/writer can posture being "in the know."
But, narratives are usually very narrow, and, as such, are dangerous, misleading representations of reality. They tend to focus on just one (frequently superficial) aspect of a problem. They tend to take a small aperture view of the problem and proposed solution set: Small apertures not just with respect to space but perhaps even more importantly to time.
Small aperture examples, both USMC and National, abound. Consider PRC:
Small/narrow: China-Taiwan-First Island Chain versus Global PRC influence structures. (Weiqi article)
Small/narrow: One PRC weapon set (surface ships) of the great many (type and number) PRC has developed and fielded.
Small/narrow: PRC-Taiwan regional conflict versus global war.
Narrative users/developers tend to avoid the great difficulty in understand complex and inter-related matters and the even more difficult task of representing that reality and positing that reality's dynamics over time. And frankly, in today's information culture, there is little reward in striving to understand and represent difficult matters.
Yet, integrity as wholeness/completeness is essential if military organizations are to accomplish missions as the lowest cost in life.
I don’t think that the Nation's militaries will be able develop credible forces and to employ those forces with operational competence and strength of character until senior officers work to create of culture of integrity (both definitions are in the paper). They need to learn (and to model!) the mental toughness to consider the “whole” of problems (good, bad, ugly) and resist narrow narratives.
Tragically, our adversaries recognize that our national leaders are living in deep mental canyons. These adversaries (state and non-state) will take advantage of the great unaddressed spaces surrendered to them by the narrow, the short-sighted, and the self-serving.
As I read BGen Holcomb’s piece re Integrity displayed by senior officers, it occurred to me his thinking may be - in a way more practical than philosophical - the most basic element to take into account as we continue in our “get well” endeavors. The message? First, be true to thyself! I’ve known him since the summer of ‘83; his intellect and integrity have always impressed me. I think he’s on to something in this piece, and it behooves us to ponder its merit.
What is difficult to comprehend is that 1 CMC and a group of cronies, all possessed with unlimited hubris, apparently arrived on scene via careerism on steroids, then left unchecked by similar superiors ignored 2 US Laws and destroyed the Corps in 4 years. “careerism
/kə-rîr′ĭz″əm/
noun
Pursuit of professional advancement as one's chief or sole aim.
The practice of advancing one's career at the expense of one's personal integrity.
The overwhelming desire or urge to advance one's own career or social status, usually at the expense of other personal interests or social growth.
The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, 5th Edition • More at Wordnik”….
General Holcomb cut a a wide swath here. Our leadership failed to understand a basic tenant of science. War is art and science. Science says a person can postulate an idea. Others with credentials in that field then strip that idea down to basics to expose the weaknesses. Those are then amended to make that idea “bulletproof “ It sometimes leads to the abandonment of the idea in total if it cannot be amended.
All of us understand sometimes the “man” , in the art (war)of our profession, plunges ahead. In a semipeace time environment the scientific approach might serve a long term investment in all things military, better.
The hard turn in this case is the people charged with telling the emperor he was off base -naked-were silenced or perhaps said what was expedient to retain their positions
Some organizations would never have seen this type of loyal opposition. BZ General Holcomb
The issue of integrity in a Marine Officer should not even be a topic of discussion, yet, we find ourselves here having it. All the preceding comments and General Holcomb’s valuable assessments are all very valid. But, perhaps a root cause analysis is in order, and it probably ought be done by an entity that has no ties to the military and specifically the Marine Corps. We are different, so we need a particular pail of ice water thrown on us to see what shakes out.
One guess is that when the field grade officers go off to the “Milk and cookie schools” which often seem place holders while the next position of command opens either in the FMF or of some other equally important leadership role, that the schools ought to focus on command, further study of the more complex elements of war fighting, at the battalion, regiment, MEU, MAB and MAF, level; fight a MAGTF, war game half your ARG and MRU sunk by name your local shore bound terror organization. General Van Ripper was the aggressor in once such effort and rumor has it they had to stop the music and reset the rules. Now that is worth going to school to learn. Just a small example of working to change a culture.
Similarly, “Joint” assignments. While it is understandable that the services not repeat mistakes made in the past perhaps due to the services not being well coordinated, the joint system seems that it could become flawed, and ergo, the principle of war “unity of command” goes pear shaped. The withdraw/NEO from Kabul and HKIA and resulting failures accompanying it, give rise to the too many cooks ruin the soup analogy. Further the “blame” gets spread around. We have seen and heard the disgraceful testimony of Secretary Austin, General Milley and General McKenzie. No one was responsible for anything, no one apparently was truly aware of what was actually happening on the ground and then when confronted with the worlds worst tasting sandwich called it the “greatest success” burger. Hold the pickles and the lettuce, special orders don’t upset us. The joint system with deputy Commandant’s et al, seems top heavy. Some 44-45 four star flag officers in a total manpower service T/O of 1.2 million servicemen and women begs the question what do all these flag officers do all day?
Again and redundantly, if one listens to the Marines, officers and enlisted alike, that the podcast Controversy and Clarity published, we can see and hear that there is great hope in this next generation of senior company grade and field grade officers coming along. The challenge it seems is keeping them off the rocks and shoals of self aggrandizement and self serving behavior that is done only for purposes of promotion and advancement or other things as outlined in General Holcomb’s article.
They seem so ready now, too bad they can not be accelerated to senior field grade command and vetted earlier still for general officer positions. Or perhaps better, have 05/06 officers filling General officers billets and reduce costs associated with higher pay grade levels of renumeration. It seems to be coming to some sort of end result. I don’t know perhaps a war with France will tune up the creaking parts of the Viking war vessels. Regardless something needs to give.
One does not need to look any higher than the Secretary of Defense when it comes to a lack of integrity in the ranks. How could the most senior leader of the military be AWOL from his post, when
he went into the hospital and did not notify anyone? His staff did not even know where he was. Not only did the President not ask for his resignation, the Secretary should have offered his resignation. If a junior member of the military did this, they would have been in the brig or stockade.
Politicization
Question: Does cooperation with the politicization of the military by the senior military leadership represent an integrity failure?
If you study the passing of the Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986), you learn that one of its purposes is to keep the politically sensitive Service Chief’s influence out of combat operations. Goldwater-Nichols established a combat chain of command of the Combatant Commander directly to the SECDEF and POTUS for a reason. I feel that the Goldwater-Nichols Act’s intent is very clear on this.
The Service Chief’s are responsible to organize, equip, and train their individual Service, however, organize, equip, and train does translate into military readiness of deployable military units. I have never heard a Combatant Commander requesting a politically correct or DEI ready unit. Does senior military leaders telling congress that DEI training is contributing to unit readiness an integrity issue?
In the Haditha “war crimes” case, I witnessed a Congressman (Chairman of the Armed Forces Committee), reacting to a bad news story, visit the Sunday morning talk shows accusing an ambushed US Marine squad in a newly deployed battalion of “cracking”, committing cold blooded murder, and attempting a covered up. To add insult to injury, the resulting investigation was “leaked” to the media between the Commandant’s and the Congressman’s Office. How did that happen? Did the Commandant bow to the political ambitions of a US Congressman?
This brings up another question: If the Combatant Commander is responsible for combat operations, why isn’t he the Convening Authority, for alleged “war crime” cases. Goldwater-Nichols did provide the Combatant Commander Court Martial Authority. After all, isn’t an alleged war crime actually a violation of the Combatant Commander’s ROE? How do these Court Martials somehow work their way back to the state side Service Chiefs? I find it interesting that Goldwater-Nichols makes no provisions for Combatant Commanders Service Component Commands like MARCENT.
I think politicization is an integrity issue for two Service Chiefs and a SECNAV civilian authority. The integrity issue (along with the Design 2030) also involves senior military leadership’s courage. First TRUST, then INTEGRITY, and maybe a future CP discussion needs to include the topic of COURAGE.
All great points. Here is an example that addresses some of your points. It may not be unabridged. CENTCOM releases Wanat investigation
By None , U.S. Central Command
MAC DILL AFB, Fla. (June 23, 2010) – The U.S. Central Command investigation into the combat action that occurred at Wanat, Afghanistan, on July 13, 2008 has been released and posted online at CENTCOM’s Freedom of Information Act Reading Room. To view those documents, click here.
Upon recommendation by Department of Defense Inspector General and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed CENTCOM to reinvestigate the combat action that occurred at Wanat. The investigating officer was Lt. Gen. Richard Natonski and the deputy investigating officer was Maj. Gen. David Perkins.
The investigation team conducted interviews and collected evidence during several thousands of investigative hours across three months at Fort Leavenworth, Kans.; Vicenza, Italy; Fort Benning, Ga.; and Norfolk, Va. Forty-eight witnesses from all levels of command were interviewed under oath. The investigation team collected and reviewed thousands of pages of data, to include doctrinal publications; operational reports and summaries; maps; charts; photographs; intelligence summaries; briefings; notes; logs; and the report of the initial investigation directed by the Combined Joint Task Force 101 Commander.
The opinions and conclusions of the investigation report include:
§ No one single person, action, or decision caused this event to occur; it was the result of a confluence of factors and a series of events.
§ There was no intentional wrongdoing on the part of anyone in the chain of command.
§ Dereliction resulted from inaction prior to the battle. Dereliction of duty was found at the Company, Battalion and Brigade Commander levels.
§ A lack of detailed planning and supervision at battalion level and below contributed to the outcome of events at Wanat.
§ The Soldiers at Wanat fought courageously and in the highest traditions of the nation and the U.S. Army. Non-commissioned officer (NCO) leadership was particularly outstanding.
The investigation was completed in January and forwarded to the Department of the Army as a matter under its cognizance, as units involved had redeployed and were no longer under CENTCOM’s command authority.
Copies of the investigation were also forwarded to U.S. Forces - Afghanistan, ISAF and U.S. Joint Forces Command for their use in development of lessons learned and sharing of those lessons.
“This was a thorough investigation done with painstaking attention to detail over three months, reviewing thousands of pages of documents and reams of information,” said Rear Admiral Hal Pittman, a CENTCOM spokesman. “We stand by the investigation’s findings of fact, opinions and recommendations, and we support the process by which it was adjudicated.”
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Wow…glad to see someone is also interested in bad tactical leadership. The CENTCOM investigation was good but it also touch off a controversy between the Combatant Commander and the US Army regarding the “Dereliction resulted from inaction prior to the battle. Dereliction of duty was found at the Company, Battalion and Brigade Commander levels.” If I remember correctly, the US Army did not want to punish the three commanding officers when CENTCOM delivered the investigation to the US Army Service. It finally took Congress and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to get involved and have the Service issue letters of reprimand. https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna35252739 We also need to thank “Retired Col. David Brostrom, the father of the deceased platoon leader at Wanat, pressed the Pentagon for more than a year to launch a new probe into the attack, and also enlisted the support of several lawmakers, including Sen. James Webb (D-Va.). Last fall, Gen. David H. Petraeus, the head of U.S. Central Command, named a three-star Marine Corps general to launch a new investigation of the battle, which was completed last week.” The US Army did do an acceptable combat study on the Wanat ambush: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/Wanat.pdf
However, what I am talking about is “Strategic Legalism” as defined in Law and War: An American Story by Peter Maguire - https://www.amazon.com/Law-War-Peter-Maguire/dp/0231120508/ref=sr_1_18?crid=11WLV4EVN0S1G&dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.ZWMBF6slWEQEWb6UrRMQeYPe9R9SWMbH0rS04TcMtFfOT1eUTp2A9DAPIBG2hBB8fl9WRnI9IwuMR2HOyLlZag.bCyiDjpthkv6slcbu_sFdfZ9eO9J09lQaBXk0eOGAt8&dib_tag=se&keywords=Law+and+War&qid=1715429741&s=books&sprefix=law+and+war%2Cstripbooks%2C92&sr=1-18
Here is a paper about Strategic Legalism in relation to the Haditha incident: https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/strategic-legalism
Semper Fi
The Abbey Gate Incident that occurred at the Biden, Blinken, Sullivan, Milley, McKensie Kabul Debacle is another ongoing example.