It seems that we here on Compass Points are the Fire Watch, the combination of retired, active duty Marines, Chowder Society II, other interested parties, many intellectually curious and some really experienced senior leaders (age is a number) have been walking watch through the squad bay of the FD of no sense Marine Barracks with a flashlight in hand and sound knowledge of where the buckets of sand are stowed and how to sound the alert, for some time now. They smell thick smoke and are looking for the fire. We have found the fire and it is smoldering, the problem is waking up the squad bay and getting everyone activated. The efforts to reinvigorate the MAGTF are fulsome, but we need more juice. Likely with the distraction of the election cycle it is hard for those elected officials to focus on much other then being returned to office or getting there for the first time. So there is a lull, and maybe this lull is a good opportunity to regroup and figure out to put out the FD no sense fire once and for good. That said, the world isn’t sleeping. There is trouble everywhere, and many of the trouble spots have ARG/MEU welcome mats on their doorsteps. If the various combatant commanders are not so joint commanded blind that they can’t see the absolute brilliance of the MAGTF, than it is no longer just a Marine Corps problem, it is a civilian and defense establishment problem. This all said, we learned that a small group of Marines with a retired Lt. Colonel in the lead, are sorting ways to fight the next conflict such as Ukraine presents today. Imagine if they had a full complement of the MAGTF toolbox. Well they don’t, but it isn’t stopping the deep and innovative thinking. It has been said that nothing clarifies the mind quite like the specter of ones immediate demise on the hanging gallows with the noose around one’s neck. Perhaps as this group of younger Marines look at the prospect of a currently depleted Marine Corps, they are using the time wisely to figure how to fight hard enough and long enough for people to come their senses and get the tools divested back into the Corps. Now where the Hell did I put my spare batteries for the flashlight that was part of the basic issue the very first day of OCS, they are around here somewhere, I’m on watch tonight and for the duration.
Don't ask the Commandant. In his recent CPG, he stated, as he has previously, that the MEF is a force provider. Oh really? The Service Component is the force provider. The MEF is the warfighter. Or it was until Force Design emasculated it.
Amen, Marine. I think we’re getting our sights calibrated. What impresses me an awful lot is in comparing the attitude of getting the Corps right sized/fixed/reoriented now, as compared to the God-Awful fights of the 1920’s when we were trying to teach folks how to spell “Amphibious”, is that we have a lot of senior retired folks who know what they’re talking about, and a lot of us in support. But, we still have a nagging question to address, to with: if we don’t come from the sea, why have a Marine Corps?
I’ve been retired for about 20 years, almost as long as I was on active duty. Four of my 20+ years in the Marine Corps were either deployed on a MEU or part of MEU staff.
I agree with what I believe is the intent of this article. The MAGTF needs a chief marketing officer with a vocal following.
However, I hear from people who are closer to the flagpole that I currently am say things like “the combatant commanders don’t even care where the MEUs are anymore”. I hope this is not true and merely hyperbole.
It’ll be interesting to hear other comments on this subject.
Noticed an article in the Sept 17th issue of Defense News. It was about the fitting of an AGM- 158A onto to an FA-18 Super Hornet from VMFA- 262. Range of the missile is 260 miles. The extended range units AGM- 158 B and C is 620 miles. Makes me wonder about the use of FD 2030. What is the use of putting marines on an island with missiles (not invented yet) when the now non-existent MAGTF could be doing this today. The AGM-158 B and C are for the F-35, but bet a couple of smart Gunnies could fit them to the F/A-18. Even the AH-1Z sank a ship.
There were a number of reasons earlier Marine Corps leadership opted for the Northern Flank commitment. One reason was because one option being considered by national command authorities for Marine Corps employment was to piecemeal Marine combat units to army commands in the event of an European war The Northern Flank option permitted continued MAGTF integrity so Norway prepositioning was pursued.
What Gen.Berget et al have done with FD 2030 is put the piecemeal option for the Marine Corps back on the table for future major conflict considerations. The MLR regiments can still provide infantry battalions for army regiments, or provide an infantry regiment for an army division on any part of the globe.
I read on CP that General Neller, as Commandant, polled the Combatant Commander’s and established a requirement of 50 amphibious ships. In order to be clear, when it comes to selling the MAGTF, and especially the amphibious MAGTF, the USMC Commandant should be leading the charge. General Berger missed movement and that ship sailed without him. General Smith took over his fire watch and now they are both in the wrong squad bay.
The 2030 Design is a misinterpretation of Corbett’s “cumulative” strategy. Corbett won the Seven Years War, the first global war, by supporting allies like Prussia, Spain and others; amphibious raids and operations against French colonies including North America (securing the St. Lawrence entrance and waterway in order to capture Quebec). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seven_Years%27_War The British even launched a campaign from India to capture Manila. All of these actions were offensive land and amphibious actions. In addition, Corbett’s definition of “disposal forces” has also been misinterpreted. Corbett used this term to describe a portion of military strength allocated for specific operations. This definition sounds like it is a very nice fit for the US Marine Corps and its MAGTF doctrine.
The 2030 Design should have been a plan to get back to the necessary number of amphibious ships to support at least two amphibious MEBs. We are soon, regardless of the winner, going to have a new administration. Let’s identify the potential General Officers that will champion not only the MAGTF but also amphibious warfare and then, maybe, we can find a Newt Gingrich that will listen to them. Semper Fi
It seems that we here on Compass Points are the Fire Watch, the combination of retired, active duty Marines, Chowder Society II, other interested parties, many intellectually curious and some really experienced senior leaders (age is a number) have been walking watch through the squad bay of the FD of no sense Marine Barracks with a flashlight in hand and sound knowledge of where the buckets of sand are stowed and how to sound the alert, for some time now. They smell thick smoke and are looking for the fire. We have found the fire and it is smoldering, the problem is waking up the squad bay and getting everyone activated. The efforts to reinvigorate the MAGTF are fulsome, but we need more juice. Likely with the distraction of the election cycle it is hard for those elected officials to focus on much other then being returned to office or getting there for the first time. So there is a lull, and maybe this lull is a good opportunity to regroup and figure out to put out the FD no sense fire once and for good. That said, the world isn’t sleeping. There is trouble everywhere, and many of the trouble spots have ARG/MEU welcome mats on their doorsteps. If the various combatant commanders are not so joint commanded blind that they can’t see the absolute brilliance of the MAGTF, than it is no longer just a Marine Corps problem, it is a civilian and defense establishment problem. This all said, we learned that a small group of Marines with a retired Lt. Colonel in the lead, are sorting ways to fight the next conflict such as Ukraine presents today. Imagine if they had a full complement of the MAGTF toolbox. Well they don’t, but it isn’t stopping the deep and innovative thinking. It has been said that nothing clarifies the mind quite like the specter of ones immediate demise on the hanging gallows with the noose around one’s neck. Perhaps as this group of younger Marines look at the prospect of a currently depleted Marine Corps, they are using the time wisely to figure how to fight hard enough and long enough for people to come their senses and get the tools divested back into the Corps. Now where the Hell did I put my spare batteries for the flashlight that was part of the basic issue the very first day of OCS, they are around here somewhere, I’m on watch tonight and for the duration.
Amen, Charles.
Semper Fi
Don't ask the Commandant. In his recent CPG, he stated, as he has previously, that the MEF is a force provider. Oh really? The Service Component is the force provider. The MEF is the warfighter. Or it was until Force Design emasculated it.
Amen, Marine. I think we’re getting our sights calibrated. What impresses me an awful lot is in comparing the attitude of getting the Corps right sized/fixed/reoriented now, as compared to the God-Awful fights of the 1920’s when we were trying to teach folks how to spell “Amphibious”, is that we have a lot of senior retired folks who know what they’re talking about, and a lot of us in support. But, we still have a nagging question to address, to with: if we don’t come from the sea, why have a Marine Corps?
I’ve been retired for about 20 years, almost as long as I was on active duty. Four of my 20+ years in the Marine Corps were either deployed on a MEU or part of MEU staff.
I agree with what I believe is the intent of this article. The MAGTF needs a chief marketing officer with a vocal following.
However, I hear from people who are closer to the flagpole that I currently am say things like “the combatant commanders don’t even care where the MEUs are anymore”. I hope this is not true and merely hyperbole.
It’ll be interesting to hear other comments on this subject.
Noticed an article in the Sept 17th issue of Defense News. It was about the fitting of an AGM- 158A onto to an FA-18 Super Hornet from VMFA- 262. Range of the missile is 260 miles. The extended range units AGM- 158 B and C is 620 miles. Makes me wonder about the use of FD 2030. What is the use of putting marines on an island with missiles (not invented yet) when the now non-existent MAGTF could be doing this today. The AGM-158 B and C are for the F-35, but bet a couple of smart Gunnies could fit them to the F/A-18. Even the AH-1Z sank a ship.
Formal Corporal john watkins. Now Dr.
There were a number of reasons earlier Marine Corps leadership opted for the Northern Flank commitment. One reason was because one option being considered by national command authorities for Marine Corps employment was to piecemeal Marine combat units to army commands in the event of an European war The Northern Flank option permitted continued MAGTF integrity so Norway prepositioning was pursued.
What Gen.Berget et al have done with FD 2030 is put the piecemeal option for the Marine Corps back on the table for future major conflict considerations. The MLR regiments can still provide infantry battalions for army regiments, or provide an infantry regiment for an army division on any part of the globe.
I read on CP that General Neller, as Commandant, polled the Combatant Commander’s and established a requirement of 50 amphibious ships. In order to be clear, when it comes to selling the MAGTF, and especially the amphibious MAGTF, the USMC Commandant should be leading the charge. General Berger missed movement and that ship sailed without him. General Smith took over his fire watch and now they are both in the wrong squad bay.
The 2030 Design is a misinterpretation of Corbett’s “cumulative” strategy. Corbett won the Seven Years War, the first global war, by supporting allies like Prussia, Spain and others; amphibious raids and operations against French colonies including North America (securing the St. Lawrence entrance and waterway in order to capture Quebec). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seven_Years%27_War The British even launched a campaign from India to capture Manila. All of these actions were offensive land and amphibious actions. In addition, Corbett’s definition of “disposal forces” has also been misinterpreted. Corbett used this term to describe a portion of military strength allocated for specific operations. This definition sounds like it is a very nice fit for the US Marine Corps and its MAGTF doctrine.
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012/april/asymmetric-warfare-american-style
The 2030 Design should have been a plan to get back to the necessary number of amphibious ships to support at least two amphibious MEBs. We are soon, regardless of the winner, going to have a new administration. Let’s identify the potential General Officers that will champion not only the MAGTF but also amphibious warfare and then, maybe, we can find a Newt Gingrich that will listen to them. Semper Fi