I don't post to demean Maj Denzel's entree' into the Maneuver Warfare discussion; it is welcome and his writing is reminiscent of the Maneuver Warfare Anthology of the early 90's. I have thought for some time, however, about the seeming generational divide that has become apparent in doctrine and philosophy discussions, and has influenced the FD2030 debate. I might well be wrong, but pretend we're in the Quantico Officer's Club around the fire pit, and I'm speaking extemporaneously among professional colleagues on a Friday night. And please take these flawed observations as grist for further writing and discussion.
-The officers that seem to understand the Corps' fundamental philosophy and doctrine best are those that began their careers pre-2003, and experienced the earliest days of OIF I and II.
-The officers that came into the Corps in the waning years of OIF and the post 2010's seem to see the Corps fundamental philosophy and doctrine as passe' and not relevant to today's warfighting.
These observations are derived from a few realities of the past 23 years:
-I was an instructor at TBS pre-2003. We instructors had weekly discussion sessions on Boyd, MCDP-1, and how to teach Lt's the maneuver warfare philosophy. Our curricula was rich with TDGs and our field exercises were force-on-force freeplay wherever possible. The FINEX was a full force-on-force maneuver exercise.
-Post 2003/2004, our training and education system was gradually distracted from our fundamental philosophy as the Long War wore on. In the mid-2000's, TBS and other Marine Corps PME venues replaced hours of maneuver warfare instruction with classes on culture, language, and the necessities of COIN operations in the Iraq and Afghanistan AOR.
-This lack of education in maneuver warfare was compounded as these Lts reached the FMF. They were enslaved to a "Pre-Deployment Training Plan" which dictated exactly how they would train to deploy, from basic admin classes to marksmanship and combat training. This training was monitored and recorded by HQMC and centrally managed.
-The later years of the Iraq/Afghanistan wars were marked by 1) Frictionless warfare. 2) Certainty. 3) Precision. COIN, in general, was characterized by the ability to gain a target, follow that target for days and weeks, develop a targeting solution, and hit that target precisely. COIN was a slow-moving and predictable effort, which gave the immediate satisfaction of seeing a bad actor obliterated by a precision weapon and marking that actor as dead on an "effects" matrix, then...extrapolate those effects to make predictions on the insurgency as a whole.
-FD2030 as an operating concept is premised on 1) Friction-free warfare (Net-centric, always-on comms), 2) Certainty (Persistent ISR), and 3) Precision to achieve violence-free effects (The idea that we can use a precision weapon on an enemy capital ship...to deter further escalation...flies in the face of the nature of war. The Japanese thought they could deter through precision strikes too.)
-Bottom line: The post-2010's officer (our current field grades) have been systematically deprived of a fundamental education in maneuver warfare philosophy, have not had the experience of its implementation, and have only seen slow-moving, technology-enabled COIN. With this limited warfare experience, they are further educated in the promises of precision, certain, and frictionless technology enabled warfare in our higher education venues, and hear DOD leadership reinforce this with talk about the "character of war changing dramatically."
-Add to this: Where the Vietnam era officers knew we had failed, the Iraq/Afghanistan AAR don't seem acknowledge our failures. There is no Corps-wide sense that we prosecuted those wars to failure, and no Corps'-wide examination of why that might be. Where "righting wrong doctrine" drove maneuver warfare thought in the 1970's, there is no such sense of urgency in the wake of the GWOT. Indeed, we think the slow, certain, precise way in which we fought COIN can be operationalized into a "competition" scenario with a conventional foe.
-This is why I stated, in a previous post, they'll have to learn on their own. This is not an "old man vs. young man" issue, but it is a generational issue. Our senior leaders for the past 25 years, and our schoolhouse instructors contributed to this failure of training and education, and these next generation officers will pay the price.
P.S. Maj Denzel references "The Attritionist Letters," in his article. A review of their specific critiques is in order. Their publication in the late 2000's was appropriate to their time, and were a point-by-point documentation of the erosion of maneuver warfare thought and practice that was happening during that time. They were an eerie and accurate prophesy of the current state of our operating philosophy and doctrine.
Thanks, and I'll buy a round if we're ever at the Quantico Officers Club fire pit.
Great capture of this phenomenon. I recall worrying about the long term effects of those trends that emerged during the long war (change of focus, PTP, Growth of MCTOG / formalization of trng for designated Ops personnel). I understood the (very valid) reasons behind those emergent trends, but was concerned that the shift would wholesale smother macro-flexibility, individual leader training development / management, and nested Command driven Operational Approach. I remember a lively discussion, sparked by the Attiritionist papers 10+ years ago, over these issues. In line with Col. Dinsmore's observation, I noted it in the current field grade officers over the years as they've matured into their current ranks and positions. Add to this the post data science vulnerability I've noted elsewhere and it's a recipe for disaster writ large. (Now, I am not saying that data science itself is a problem [it isn't]. It is a failure to properly appreciate what it can and cannot do in a myriad of given circumstances coupled with devotion to a bad hypothesis). Churning to produce 'mo data' is not a good thing and an easy trap to unwittingly fall into. This is where our current generation of active thought leaders seem to predominately be. I will throw a big rock here and assert that the USMC lost it's uniformly best MAGTF officers when it killed the 1802 MOS. Tank Officers, from the time they were 2dLts, lived in a 'learn the full spectrum of MAGTF Ops and Logistics or die' school of hard knocks - this is not something that would have happened under a 'culture of Manuever'. (The only thing worse was losing the Tank / Tank Maintenance Enlisted Community to the last man). The current group of field grades is very impressive in many aspects across the board, but the trends noted in Col Dinsmore's post are concerning as they constitute a cultural vulnerability that is shaping developmental and reactive thought. Looking at our civilian side for examples, this is cleary a significant danger: see Boeing, Intel, Blackberry, Theranos, WeWork, etc.
Cfrog, you have teased out a couple of details that resonate. When MCTOG was conceived, it had the promise of providing a pre-deployment petrie dish for Opsos and Intel officers to collaborate and refine their analysis of their coming task. I was hopeful that it would re-create what I and my Opso did in a plywood shack in Camp Hit during our PDSS. It quickly degenerated into a TTP factory where they taught the finer points of building POO/POI spreadsheets. It was overhauled in 2019 to a better model, with free-play kriegspiels and battle-staff training as central features, but with FD2030, not sure what state it is in now.
As the tank bn's folded their colors, I was the Div's happy beneficiary of many of the tankers who lat-moved into intel. They are, hands-down, the most operationally fluent MAGTF intel officers I have worked with, and were able to transition directly into the most demanding battalion and regimental S-2's. Intel officers with operational fluency...a phrase I once read in 1994 written by our then Director of Intel. I've gratefully beat that phrase into the ground since then.
I believe Colonel Dinsmore’s assessment is on the mark; at least it seems that way for someone who saw action in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, Lebanon, and Iraq/Kuwait and engaged wholeheartedly in the heated debates that occurred from the late 1970s through the mid-1990s. When I hung around Quantico, LeJeune, Pendleton, and 29 Palms in the first two decades of the 2000s I had a sense the Corps was losing its way intellectually. In some ways it seemed and still seems like the officer corps, overall, has regressed to the Jominian era that Marines left behind after 1989 when they rediscovered Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and John Boyd.
I had a conversation similar to the one in this thread yesterday with an old Marine friend. Below are the words I sent him in the last round of our discussion. I definitely hope we can keep this thread on Compass Points going for more than a day.
“Reflecting on your question this afternoon I think the best background might come from Azar Gat’s A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War. Below is a link to pages with the table of contents of the book. In essence, during the Clausewitzian era there was a reaction to the military thought that came from the Enlightenment, which resulted in a Counter-Enlightenment, the German Movement, or Romanticism. Those from Enlightenment period looked to the natural sciences as a model for studying war. Those who reacted negatively to this approach turned to the humanities. The Prussians and then the Germans were at the forefront in studying war from a humanities point of view. Their understanding prevailed in parts of Europe, but it was largely the mechanistic approaches of Jomini that captured the attention of most militaries. You may recall the story that Civil War generals carried a copy of his book, The Art of War, under their arms. His views certainly prevailed until our own (US Army and US Marine Corps) intellectual revolution after the Vietnam War when US war colleges and command and staff schools introduced Clausewitzian thought. His ideas certainly imbued FMFM-1 and MCDP-1 Warfighting. My observations . . . in talking with current serving officers is that there has been a general backsliding, and the Maneuver Warfare philosophy is only honored in name. We certainly see that in much current professional writing.”
What would Major Denzel prescribe as his method of war fighting if he were Commanding the IDF? As an aside it is interesting to note that General Berger’s predecessor General Neller is spending some of his retirement time advising Billionaire “Shark” Mark Cuban on a battery powered Wing In Ground vehicle w 180 mi range to transport Marines in a FD 2030 type scenario.
Re Maj. Denzel; he would argue that because all warfare is attritional then he would use attrition if he were commanding the IDF to fight a war of attrition.
Re: General Neller, I don't agree with the innuendo or insinuation that General Neller is somehow guilty of something nefarious, especially without proof. He has stated openly in gentlemanly terms that he would have hedged much more when it came to implementing FD2030. This comment is distraction from the task and purpose of this post. Say what you want, I haven't heard or seen General Neller likely guilty of anything beyond being among the the most professionally enthusiastic Marines in a room when it came to discussions of innovative concepts or missions(6th Marines!). Besides, we all know General Neller is best swayed by discussions of the nuanced importance of sandbags. Someone probably told him the wing in ground effect was a great way to resupply an infantry battalion with more sandbags.
A Battery powered WIG full of sandbags may be a new method of Island Construction, lots of WIGs piled on top of each other could eventually provide a new link in the Island Chain.
I’m not sure I have enough smarts to keep up with all this philosophy talk, I just know what I read in Warfighting years ago made sense to me. More sense than what I got from some of my schooling.
I for one am proud of Major Denzel. Seems to me like he is one of the few Marines today thinking and writing about the foundations of our profession. Even if he got some things wrong, he is in the fight while others are off dreaming about how technology is going to change everything, which is nonsense. Yep, he is my man of the hour.
Now the real question. If Major Denzel missed the mark and didn’t frame his article in a logical way, which seems to be what happened, where was the Proceedings editor in all this? Shouldn’t the editor have the professional knowledge to recognize what are obvious flaws in the article. Wasn’t the editor the one who should have actually edited the article to ensure Major Denzel developed his argument clearly or guide him in how to do so?
Bottom line, three cheers for Major Denzel and a smelly boot for the Proceedings editor.
I did a little research on this topic and I came across this youtube discussion on MCDP-1:
The discussion is led by Damien O’ Connell founder of the “Warfighting Society”. In addition to Major Christopher Denzel, he assembled at least five other critics of MCDP-1/Maneuver Warfare. He also had John Schmitt, the author of the 1989 FMFM-1, on the conference call to answer questions. There was also a number of other participants who were given a chance to ask questions but there was limited time.
I got involved in the Maneuver Warfare movement at my first ASW tactics class. Our new instructor told us that he was going to change the way tactics were taught at AWS. Initially, I think the class was skeptical. Our tactics instructor’s (then Major Mike Wyly) statement did not hit home until he invited USAF Col John Boyd into the AWS “bedroom” with the entire AWS Class. Col Boyd’s “Patterns of Conflicts” Brief was advertised as an 8 hour event. The brief started at 8am. At 5pm the class was allow to leave but you could stay for the questions and answer session. I think the brief broke up around 9pm. I have been a Maneuver Warfare guy since. I do however prefer to call myself a “Boydian”. As the Maneuver Warfare debate went on from 1980 to 1989 (I still bare the scares and bruises) with the publication of FMFM-1 Warfighting, I found that the word “Maneuver” just carried to much distracting “luggage”. Shortly after the Boyd brief Major Wyly announced the first AWS Maneuver Warfare Seminar taught by Mr. Bill Lind. I rushed to sign up. I apologize for this paragraph, just an old guy trying to establish some street “cred” on the subject.
Concerning the Damien O’Connell youtube conference, all the critics and John Schmitt agreed that MCDP-1 needed an update. In my opinion, the primary critic’s issue is that when they raised issues with Maneuver Warfare (MCDP-1) they were shut down because it was “DOCTRINE”. The “this is now doctrine” issue did not surprise me because Col John on numerous occasions issued a warning. When he was asked the question why he had not written a book, he stated without hesitation: “As soon as I write the book it will become DOCTRINE; then the doctrine will immediately become DOGMA. The difference being, doctrine is a teaching and dogma is an opinion.” Col Boyd until his death continued to expand and adapt his briefings recognizing that weapons and tactics are always changing. In the Ukraine war the “Javelin” changed armored tactics much like the Soviet wire guided “Sagger” missile changed tactics in the 1973 Egypt and Israel War. We are also now witnessing another change in missile warfare where weapons like the “Iron Dome” (and an Arleigh-Burke Class Destroyer) is an effective anti-missile defense. This same issue occurred when Design 2030 was announced and the word was passed; Marines “keep your seat and keep your criticism to yourself”. As a testament to “Chowder II and CP …that certainly didn’t work.
Major Christopher Denzel mention that one of his concerns came when he looked at the 2003 Invasion of Iraq and felt that it did not fit well into Maneuver Warfare Doctrine. I agree, a failed deception plan and time table, is not Maneuver Warfare. Neither was Desert Storm. If the Marines had been true to their doctrine the positions where we finished the war should have been achieved in the first 24 hours. In the next 48 hours both Divisions should have been on the Kuwait/Iraq border ready to grab the Republican Guard by the nose while the USA 7th Corps kicked them in the ass. What surprised me was that as Marines, we were too busy patting ourselves on the back (and giving out medals) to conduct a CRITICAL critique of Desert Storm. IMHO there was plenty of room for improvements.
The other issue I noticed was many of the folks on the conference seemed to be looking for a “How to Manual”. There is none and there should not be one. Col. Boyd’s warning about doctrine becoming dogma applies because when that happens you become predictable to your enemy. IMO the only way to learn Maneuver Warfare is through battle studies, understanding there is no perfect Maneuver Warfare battles or campaigns. Apply Col Boyd’s techniques, take the battle apart, look at the essential elements, throw the bad stuff away and keep the good stuff that keeps with Maneuver Warfare doctrine.
I pray that Damien O’ Connell, founder of the “Warfighting Society” and the critics keeps those Maneuver Warfare discussions on the front burner. General Van Ripper wrote excellent replies to Major Christopher Denzel article. We need more of those discussions. John Schmitt stated in the WFS Conference that MCDP-1 (and FMFM-1 Warfighting) were not the end but the beginning of the discussion. I should also add that the discussion should not bring scares or bruises to the critics.
Polarbear, reading the previous references to the dilution and gradual degeneration of maneuver warfare in PME, I started thinking about the turning point we began to see in 2005, which coincidentally mirrors your AWS turning point in the reverse. I was at EWS that year, and the hot topic among many critical students was "why are we still stuck teaching conventional maneuver doctrine, when we should be training Capts on how to prosecute COIN!" They were a minority, but I believe as the war dragged on, their critiques began to infiltrate the curriculum. Less Boyd, more IO, Pashtu language training, and how to operate a Company COC.
Another topic we discussed often then was the twisting and misapplication of maneuver philosophy in Desert Storm and OIF I. Schwartzkopf twisted Critical Vulnerabilities into "cutting the head off the snake," a useful targeting strategy, but one that has lived on in COIN and competition as a main effort. Rumsfeld twisted Tempo and putting the enemy on the horns of a dilemma into speed for its own sake and we don't need to worry about Phase IV.
I think our takeaways then from those discussions was that MCDP-1 and our warfighting philosophy must be purposefully studied, taken apart, discussed and debated, over a lifetime, for our officers to properly apply it in training and in warfare. The results of giving the philosophy lip service in our PME settings got us here. Maybe the remnant of former tankers will rescue us in years to come!
The generational divide certainty feels apparent, and it is a problem. Those of us who served in the 70's and 80's were subject to and recipients (good luck?) of being trained and serving with superior officers that had come back from Viet Nam scorched by their combat experiences in country, and the disconnect between the political theories of Washington DC, and the reality of combat in Viet Nam. For them it was like fighting two wars, the one where the fighting and dying happened and then arguing with senior officers and political elites that shaped policy, but didn't know the working end of an assault rifle from a broom handle. They were angry, cynical and determined not to have it happen again. Thusly, General Van Riper's cordial and rather gentle, but complete evisceration of Major Denzel's positions regarding maneuver warfare are a brilliant example of critical thinking leveling the bubbles on the way forward, and out of FD2030.
The generational divide seems to come from the notion that we older knuckle draggers "don't get it." War is now a meeting of policy shapers, the Chairman of the JCS and the President of the US on Tuesday mornings in the situation room at the White House and deciding which bad guy is going to get whacked this week, with a drone strike; and then watch in rapt attention live and in color as another one bites the dust and heads to 72 virgins in paradise. It trickles then flows and then cascades into the thinking of all branches of our military. Ships that can't float, can't be maintained or better still, burn to the waterline while at the dock, tanks and infantry and engineers? Who needs them we have advanced technology gunpowder and firecrackers to fend off a peer foe. They will never find us! No doubt everyone here gets the drift. It cannot be so that the elements of warfare have changed so much that the principals of Carl von Clausewitz no longer apply. (say it ain't so, memorizing MOOSEMUSS was a rite of passage) We have before the house two stark examples of attrition and maneuver warfare in real time. The eastern front in the Ukraine/Russia conflict and the battle for Gaza. Did any of the policy shapers and "great" thinkers in the puzzle palace forecast a total stalemate in the four eastern Oblasts of Ukraine, now Russian held territories? As memory serves they didn't think President Putin would invade Ukraine, until he did. They are now gearing up for a long winter stalemate, again. Seems that attrition is in full flower, in that conflict. Israel and the IDF may have been caught badly off guard, by the surprise and speed of the terror attacks of 7 October, but they responded with a full suite of combined arms utilization, including use of maneuver, and go figure, armor, engineers and artillery. No doubt "surgical" drone strikes and other higher technology are part of the operation in Gaza, but reading accounts from the battle field that are publicly available, it seems reminiscent of other street battles, only throw in the cave systems of Viet Nam, (apparently visitors to that country can now visit a museum heralding the NVA/Viet Cong underground strongholds) and you have a witches brew of a fight. Again by all accounts, the IDF is prevailing. If we allow a Gameboy philosophy of war planning to enter our thinking, and believe that it will not ultimately come down to that Marine rifleman and his weapon to prevail, than defeat in detail is in our future. Sailors that cannot sail a ship, airmen that cannot fly an airplane, riflemen that cannot acquire sight picture and sight alignment are useless, it doesn't matter how much money you throw at the defense budget. If your philosophy of war fighting is wrong you will get your ass kicked.
It seems as if we are only scratching the surface on the subject of Maneuver Warfare and getting the Marine Corps back to it, focused like a laser beam on how to best use it, and the kinds of equipment needed to implement and further execute its effectiveness. One can only hope the beer remains cold and the fire pit burning at high port, and the conversation only started, rather than ended. looking forward to more thought provoking thinking.
"The maneuver warfare approach urges leaders of Marines to think broader, see further, and understand deeper the great challenge of combat." - LtGen P.K. VanRiper
"The essence of maneuver is taking action to generate and exploit some kind of advantage over the enemy as a means of accomplishing our objectives as effectively as possible. That advantage may be psychological, technological, or temporal as well as spatial" - MCDP-1, pg.72
-The critical flaw in Major Denzel's approach is a common failing in the post data science era. It is a failure to account for those points of data that cannot be captured, whether by a lack of awareness, a lack of access, or by their very nature. Data science often fails in meat space where that lack of awareness is unaccounted for in the input, output, and goals that were the purpose of the project in the first place. Data science is a tool to use in maneuver warfare (or a venue for an advantage); it is not the pre-eminent raison d'être for a self licking 'science of attrition' that yins to a maneuver yang.
I don't post to demean Maj Denzel's entree' into the Maneuver Warfare discussion; it is welcome and his writing is reminiscent of the Maneuver Warfare Anthology of the early 90's. I have thought for some time, however, about the seeming generational divide that has become apparent in doctrine and philosophy discussions, and has influenced the FD2030 debate. I might well be wrong, but pretend we're in the Quantico Officer's Club around the fire pit, and I'm speaking extemporaneously among professional colleagues on a Friday night. And please take these flawed observations as grist for further writing and discussion.
-The officers that seem to understand the Corps' fundamental philosophy and doctrine best are those that began their careers pre-2003, and experienced the earliest days of OIF I and II.
-The officers that came into the Corps in the waning years of OIF and the post 2010's seem to see the Corps fundamental philosophy and doctrine as passe' and not relevant to today's warfighting.
These observations are derived from a few realities of the past 23 years:
-I was an instructor at TBS pre-2003. We instructors had weekly discussion sessions on Boyd, MCDP-1, and how to teach Lt's the maneuver warfare philosophy. Our curricula was rich with TDGs and our field exercises were force-on-force freeplay wherever possible. The FINEX was a full force-on-force maneuver exercise.
-Post 2003/2004, our training and education system was gradually distracted from our fundamental philosophy as the Long War wore on. In the mid-2000's, TBS and other Marine Corps PME venues replaced hours of maneuver warfare instruction with classes on culture, language, and the necessities of COIN operations in the Iraq and Afghanistan AOR.
-This lack of education in maneuver warfare was compounded as these Lts reached the FMF. They were enslaved to a "Pre-Deployment Training Plan" which dictated exactly how they would train to deploy, from basic admin classes to marksmanship and combat training. This training was monitored and recorded by HQMC and centrally managed.
-The later years of the Iraq/Afghanistan wars were marked by 1) Frictionless warfare. 2) Certainty. 3) Precision. COIN, in general, was characterized by the ability to gain a target, follow that target for days and weeks, develop a targeting solution, and hit that target precisely. COIN was a slow-moving and predictable effort, which gave the immediate satisfaction of seeing a bad actor obliterated by a precision weapon and marking that actor as dead on an "effects" matrix, then...extrapolate those effects to make predictions on the insurgency as a whole.
-FD2030 as an operating concept is premised on 1) Friction-free warfare (Net-centric, always-on comms), 2) Certainty (Persistent ISR), and 3) Precision to achieve violence-free effects (The idea that we can use a precision weapon on an enemy capital ship...to deter further escalation...flies in the face of the nature of war. The Japanese thought they could deter through precision strikes too.)
-Bottom line: The post-2010's officer (our current field grades) have been systematically deprived of a fundamental education in maneuver warfare philosophy, have not had the experience of its implementation, and have only seen slow-moving, technology-enabled COIN. With this limited warfare experience, they are further educated in the promises of precision, certain, and frictionless technology enabled warfare in our higher education venues, and hear DOD leadership reinforce this with talk about the "character of war changing dramatically."
-Add to this: Where the Vietnam era officers knew we had failed, the Iraq/Afghanistan AAR don't seem acknowledge our failures. There is no Corps-wide sense that we prosecuted those wars to failure, and no Corps'-wide examination of why that might be. Where "righting wrong doctrine" drove maneuver warfare thought in the 1970's, there is no such sense of urgency in the wake of the GWOT. Indeed, we think the slow, certain, precise way in which we fought COIN can be operationalized into a "competition" scenario with a conventional foe.
-This is why I stated, in a previous post, they'll have to learn on their own. This is not an "old man vs. young man" issue, but it is a generational issue. Our senior leaders for the past 25 years, and our schoolhouse instructors contributed to this failure of training and education, and these next generation officers will pay the price.
P.S. Maj Denzel references "The Attritionist Letters," in his article. A review of their specific critiques is in order. Their publication in the late 2000's was appropriate to their time, and were a point-by-point documentation of the erosion of maneuver warfare thought and practice that was happening during that time. They were an eerie and accurate prophesy of the current state of our operating philosophy and doctrine.
Thanks, and I'll buy a round if we're ever at the Quantico Officers Club fire pit.
Great capture of this phenomenon. I recall worrying about the long term effects of those trends that emerged during the long war (change of focus, PTP, Growth of MCTOG / formalization of trng for designated Ops personnel). I understood the (very valid) reasons behind those emergent trends, but was concerned that the shift would wholesale smother macro-flexibility, individual leader training development / management, and nested Command driven Operational Approach. I remember a lively discussion, sparked by the Attiritionist papers 10+ years ago, over these issues. In line with Col. Dinsmore's observation, I noted it in the current field grade officers over the years as they've matured into their current ranks and positions. Add to this the post data science vulnerability I've noted elsewhere and it's a recipe for disaster writ large. (Now, I am not saying that data science itself is a problem [it isn't]. It is a failure to properly appreciate what it can and cannot do in a myriad of given circumstances coupled with devotion to a bad hypothesis). Churning to produce 'mo data' is not a good thing and an easy trap to unwittingly fall into. This is where our current generation of active thought leaders seem to predominately be. I will throw a big rock here and assert that the USMC lost it's uniformly best MAGTF officers when it killed the 1802 MOS. Tank Officers, from the time they were 2dLts, lived in a 'learn the full spectrum of MAGTF Ops and Logistics or die' school of hard knocks - this is not something that would have happened under a 'culture of Manuever'. (The only thing worse was losing the Tank / Tank Maintenance Enlisted Community to the last man). The current group of field grades is very impressive in many aspects across the board, but the trends noted in Col Dinsmore's post are concerning as they constitute a cultural vulnerability that is shaping developmental and reactive thought. Looking at our civilian side for examples, this is cleary a significant danger: see Boeing, Intel, Blackberry, Theranos, WeWork, etc.
Cfrog, you have teased out a couple of details that resonate. When MCTOG was conceived, it had the promise of providing a pre-deployment petrie dish for Opsos and Intel officers to collaborate and refine their analysis of their coming task. I was hopeful that it would re-create what I and my Opso did in a plywood shack in Camp Hit during our PDSS. It quickly degenerated into a TTP factory where they taught the finer points of building POO/POI spreadsheets. It was overhauled in 2019 to a better model, with free-play kriegspiels and battle-staff training as central features, but with FD2030, not sure what state it is in now.
As the tank bn's folded their colors, I was the Div's happy beneficiary of many of the tankers who lat-moved into intel. They are, hands-down, the most operationally fluent MAGTF intel officers I have worked with, and were able to transition directly into the most demanding battalion and regimental S-2's. Intel officers with operational fluency...a phrase I once read in 1994 written by our then Director of Intel. I've gratefully beat that phrase into the ground since then.
I believe Colonel Dinsmore’s assessment is on the mark; at least it seems that way for someone who saw action in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, Lebanon, and Iraq/Kuwait and engaged wholeheartedly in the heated debates that occurred from the late 1970s through the mid-1990s. When I hung around Quantico, LeJeune, Pendleton, and 29 Palms in the first two decades of the 2000s I had a sense the Corps was losing its way intellectually. In some ways it seemed and still seems like the officer corps, overall, has regressed to the Jominian era that Marines left behind after 1989 when they rediscovered Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and John Boyd.
I had a conversation similar to the one in this thread yesterday with an old Marine friend. Below are the words I sent him in the last round of our discussion. I definitely hope we can keep this thread on Compass Points going for more than a day.
“Reflecting on your question this afternoon I think the best background might come from Azar Gat’s A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War. Below is a link to pages with the table of contents of the book. In essence, during the Clausewitzian era there was a reaction to the military thought that came from the Enlightenment, which resulted in a Counter-Enlightenment, the German Movement, or Romanticism. Those from Enlightenment period looked to the natural sciences as a model for studying war. Those who reacted negatively to this approach turned to the humanities. The Prussians and then the Germans were at the forefront in studying war from a humanities point of view. Their understanding prevailed in parts of Europe, but it was largely the mechanistic approaches of Jomini that captured the attention of most militaries. You may recall the story that Civil War generals carried a copy of his book, The Art of War, under their arms. His views certainly prevailed until our own (US Army and US Marine Corps) intellectual revolution after the Vietnam War when US war colleges and command and staff schools introduced Clausewitzian thought. His ideas certainly imbued FMFM-1 and MCDP-1 Warfighting. My observations . . . in talking with current serving officers is that there has been a general backsliding, and the Maneuver Warfare philosophy is only honored in name. We certainly see that in much current professional writing.”
What would Major Denzel prescribe as his method of war fighting if he were Commanding the IDF? As an aside it is interesting to note that General Berger’s predecessor General Neller is spending some of his retirement time advising Billionaire “Shark” Mark Cuban on a battery powered Wing In Ground vehicle w 180 mi range to transport Marines in a FD 2030 type scenario.
Re Maj. Denzel; he would argue that because all warfare is attritional then he would use attrition if he were commanding the IDF to fight a war of attrition.
Re: General Neller, I don't agree with the innuendo or insinuation that General Neller is somehow guilty of something nefarious, especially without proof. He has stated openly in gentlemanly terms that he would have hedged much more when it came to implementing FD2030. This comment is distraction from the task and purpose of this post. Say what you want, I haven't heard or seen General Neller likely guilty of anything beyond being among the the most professionally enthusiastic Marines in a room when it came to discussions of innovative concepts or missions(6th Marines!). Besides, we all know General Neller is best swayed by discussions of the nuanced importance of sandbags. Someone probably told him the wing in ground effect was a great way to resupply an infantry battalion with more sandbags.
A Battery powered WIG full of sandbags may be a new method of Island Construction, lots of WIGs piled on top of each other could eventually provide a new link in the Island Chain.
Okay- that made me laugh. You get a "one free cheap beer" chit.
I’m not sure I have enough smarts to keep up with all this philosophy talk, I just know what I read in Warfighting years ago made sense to me. More sense than what I got from some of my schooling.
I for one am proud of Major Denzel. Seems to me like he is one of the few Marines today thinking and writing about the foundations of our profession. Even if he got some things wrong, he is in the fight while others are off dreaming about how technology is going to change everything, which is nonsense. Yep, he is my man of the hour.
Now the real question. If Major Denzel missed the mark and didn’t frame his article in a logical way, which seems to be what happened, where was the Proceedings editor in all this? Shouldn’t the editor have the professional knowledge to recognize what are obvious flaws in the article. Wasn’t the editor the one who should have actually edited the article to ensure Major Denzel developed his argument clearly or guide him in how to do so?
Bottom line, three cheers for Major Denzel and a smelly boot for the Proceedings editor.
Great discussion on this – CP Maneuver Warfare
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RHysqjySdcs&t=305s
I did a little research on this topic and I came across this youtube discussion on MCDP-1:
The discussion is led by Damien O’ Connell founder of the “Warfighting Society”. In addition to Major Christopher Denzel, he assembled at least five other critics of MCDP-1/Maneuver Warfare. He also had John Schmitt, the author of the 1989 FMFM-1, on the conference call to answer questions. There was also a number of other participants who were given a chance to ask questions but there was limited time.
I got involved in the Maneuver Warfare movement at my first ASW tactics class. Our new instructor told us that he was going to change the way tactics were taught at AWS. Initially, I think the class was skeptical. Our tactics instructor’s (then Major Mike Wyly) statement did not hit home until he invited USAF Col John Boyd into the AWS “bedroom” with the entire AWS Class. Col Boyd’s “Patterns of Conflicts” Brief was advertised as an 8 hour event. The brief started at 8am. At 5pm the class was allow to leave but you could stay for the questions and answer session. I think the brief broke up around 9pm. I have been a Maneuver Warfare guy since. I do however prefer to call myself a “Boydian”. As the Maneuver Warfare debate went on from 1980 to 1989 (I still bare the scares and bruises) with the publication of FMFM-1 Warfighting, I found that the word “Maneuver” just carried to much distracting “luggage”. Shortly after the Boyd brief Major Wyly announced the first AWS Maneuver Warfare Seminar taught by Mr. Bill Lind. I rushed to sign up. I apologize for this paragraph, just an old guy trying to establish some street “cred” on the subject.
Concerning the Damien O’Connell youtube conference, all the critics and John Schmitt agreed that MCDP-1 needed an update. In my opinion, the primary critic’s issue is that when they raised issues with Maneuver Warfare (MCDP-1) they were shut down because it was “DOCTRINE”. The “this is now doctrine” issue did not surprise me because Col John on numerous occasions issued a warning. When he was asked the question why he had not written a book, he stated without hesitation: “As soon as I write the book it will become DOCTRINE; then the doctrine will immediately become DOGMA. The difference being, doctrine is a teaching and dogma is an opinion.” Col Boyd until his death continued to expand and adapt his briefings recognizing that weapons and tactics are always changing. In the Ukraine war the “Javelin” changed armored tactics much like the Soviet wire guided “Sagger” missile changed tactics in the 1973 Egypt and Israel War. We are also now witnessing another change in missile warfare where weapons like the “Iron Dome” (and an Arleigh-Burke Class Destroyer) is an effective anti-missile defense. This same issue occurred when Design 2030 was announced and the word was passed; Marines “keep your seat and keep your criticism to yourself”. As a testament to “Chowder II and CP …that certainly didn’t work.
Major Christopher Denzel mention that one of his concerns came when he looked at the 2003 Invasion of Iraq and felt that it did not fit well into Maneuver Warfare Doctrine. I agree, a failed deception plan and time table, is not Maneuver Warfare. Neither was Desert Storm. If the Marines had been true to their doctrine the positions where we finished the war should have been achieved in the first 24 hours. In the next 48 hours both Divisions should have been on the Kuwait/Iraq border ready to grab the Republican Guard by the nose while the USA 7th Corps kicked them in the ass. What surprised me was that as Marines, we were too busy patting ourselves on the back (and giving out medals) to conduct a CRITICAL critique of Desert Storm. IMHO there was plenty of room for improvements.
The other issue I noticed was many of the folks on the conference seemed to be looking for a “How to Manual”. There is none and there should not be one. Col. Boyd’s warning about doctrine becoming dogma applies because when that happens you become predictable to your enemy. IMO the only way to learn Maneuver Warfare is through battle studies, understanding there is no perfect Maneuver Warfare battles or campaigns. Apply Col Boyd’s techniques, take the battle apart, look at the essential elements, throw the bad stuff away and keep the good stuff that keeps with Maneuver Warfare doctrine.
I pray that Damien O’ Connell, founder of the “Warfighting Society” and the critics keeps those Maneuver Warfare discussions on the front burner. General Van Ripper wrote excellent replies to Major Christopher Denzel article. We need more of those discussions. John Schmitt stated in the WFS Conference that MCDP-1 (and FMFM-1 Warfighting) were not the end but the beginning of the discussion. I should also add that the discussion should not bring scares or bruises to the critics.
Polarbear, reading the previous references to the dilution and gradual degeneration of maneuver warfare in PME, I started thinking about the turning point we began to see in 2005, which coincidentally mirrors your AWS turning point in the reverse. I was at EWS that year, and the hot topic among many critical students was "why are we still stuck teaching conventional maneuver doctrine, when we should be training Capts on how to prosecute COIN!" They were a minority, but I believe as the war dragged on, their critiques began to infiltrate the curriculum. Less Boyd, more IO, Pashtu language training, and how to operate a Company COC.
Another topic we discussed often then was the twisting and misapplication of maneuver philosophy in Desert Storm and OIF I. Schwartzkopf twisted Critical Vulnerabilities into "cutting the head off the snake," a useful targeting strategy, but one that has lived on in COIN and competition as a main effort. Rumsfeld twisted Tempo and putting the enemy on the horns of a dilemma into speed for its own sake and we don't need to worry about Phase IV.
I think our takeaways then from those discussions was that MCDP-1 and our warfighting philosophy must be purposefully studied, taken apart, discussed and debated, over a lifetime, for our officers to properly apply it in training and in warfare. The results of giving the philosophy lip service in our PME settings got us here. Maybe the remnant of former tankers will rescue us in years to come!
The generational divide certainty feels apparent, and it is a problem. Those of us who served in the 70's and 80's were subject to and recipients (good luck?) of being trained and serving with superior officers that had come back from Viet Nam scorched by their combat experiences in country, and the disconnect between the political theories of Washington DC, and the reality of combat in Viet Nam. For them it was like fighting two wars, the one where the fighting and dying happened and then arguing with senior officers and political elites that shaped policy, but didn't know the working end of an assault rifle from a broom handle. They were angry, cynical and determined not to have it happen again. Thusly, General Van Riper's cordial and rather gentle, but complete evisceration of Major Denzel's positions regarding maneuver warfare are a brilliant example of critical thinking leveling the bubbles on the way forward, and out of FD2030.
The generational divide seems to come from the notion that we older knuckle draggers "don't get it." War is now a meeting of policy shapers, the Chairman of the JCS and the President of the US on Tuesday mornings in the situation room at the White House and deciding which bad guy is going to get whacked this week, with a drone strike; and then watch in rapt attention live and in color as another one bites the dust and heads to 72 virgins in paradise. It trickles then flows and then cascades into the thinking of all branches of our military. Ships that can't float, can't be maintained or better still, burn to the waterline while at the dock, tanks and infantry and engineers? Who needs them we have advanced technology gunpowder and firecrackers to fend off a peer foe. They will never find us! No doubt everyone here gets the drift. It cannot be so that the elements of warfare have changed so much that the principals of Carl von Clausewitz no longer apply. (say it ain't so, memorizing MOOSEMUSS was a rite of passage) We have before the house two stark examples of attrition and maneuver warfare in real time. The eastern front in the Ukraine/Russia conflict and the battle for Gaza. Did any of the policy shapers and "great" thinkers in the puzzle palace forecast a total stalemate in the four eastern Oblasts of Ukraine, now Russian held territories? As memory serves they didn't think President Putin would invade Ukraine, until he did. They are now gearing up for a long winter stalemate, again. Seems that attrition is in full flower, in that conflict. Israel and the IDF may have been caught badly off guard, by the surprise and speed of the terror attacks of 7 October, but they responded with a full suite of combined arms utilization, including use of maneuver, and go figure, armor, engineers and artillery. No doubt "surgical" drone strikes and other higher technology are part of the operation in Gaza, but reading accounts from the battle field that are publicly available, it seems reminiscent of other street battles, only throw in the cave systems of Viet Nam, (apparently visitors to that country can now visit a museum heralding the NVA/Viet Cong underground strongholds) and you have a witches brew of a fight. Again by all accounts, the IDF is prevailing. If we allow a Gameboy philosophy of war planning to enter our thinking, and believe that it will not ultimately come down to that Marine rifleman and his weapon to prevail, than defeat in detail is in our future. Sailors that cannot sail a ship, airmen that cannot fly an airplane, riflemen that cannot acquire sight picture and sight alignment are useless, it doesn't matter how much money you throw at the defense budget. If your philosophy of war fighting is wrong you will get your ass kicked.
It seems as if we are only scratching the surface on the subject of Maneuver Warfare and getting the Marine Corps back to it, focused like a laser beam on how to best use it, and the kinds of equipment needed to implement and further execute its effectiveness. One can only hope the beer remains cold and the fire pit burning at high port, and the conversation only started, rather than ended. looking forward to more thought provoking thinking.
Merry Christmas!
We need to fight smarter and not harder.
"The maneuver warfare approach urges leaders of Marines to think broader, see further, and understand deeper the great challenge of combat." - LtGen P.K. VanRiper
"The essence of maneuver is taking action to generate and exploit some kind of advantage over the enemy as a means of accomplishing our objectives as effectively as possible. That advantage may be psychological, technological, or temporal as well as spatial" - MCDP-1, pg.72
-The critical flaw in Major Denzel's approach is a common failing in the post data science era. It is a failure to account for those points of data that cannot be captured, whether by a lack of awareness, a lack of access, or by their very nature. Data science often fails in meat space where that lack of awareness is unaccounted for in the input, output, and goals that were the purpose of the project in the first place. Data science is a tool to use in maneuver warfare (or a venue for an advantage); it is not the pre-eminent raison d'être for a self licking 'science of attrition' that yins to a maneuver yang.