And BZ to the Army Patriot soldiers who bravely stood in the breach and shot down the incoming Iranian missiles targeting the American base in Qatar. And to the Navy submariners who flawlessly executed their TLAM mission. Our Nation is blessed to have such wonderful men and women standing the watch while we are allowed to sleep comfortably in our warm beds.
"All that said, if a member of a NATO military were hypothetically to ask me whether NATO countries should acquire first-person view drone capabilities, based on my experience and given the current state of the technology, I would probably say no, whether they are radio-controlled or fiber-optic. The vast majority of first-person view drone missions can be completed more cheaply, effectively, or reliably by other assets. Furthermore, other authors have noted that drones still do not come close to matching the effects that can be achieved by massed artillery fires. Additionally, experts on artillery systems consistently note the greater reliability and range of artillery."
I appreciate the link and the frontline AAR. Truly.
Here is a link for you to consider:
“In May, drones were responsible for over 75% of Russian battlefield casualties,compared to an estimated 20% by artillery and 5% from small arms. Ukraine struck more than 89,000 targets with drones in May, which includes manpower, equipment, and vehicles, a 7.2% increase from 83,000 in April.”
Wow! 75% of casualties from drones last month? Where did I hear that before? Oh, I know. It was in a posture hearing (that I gave you a summary of in an earlier post) when a principal stated the same stats to CMC.
I’m glad the Marine Corps is well on its way to having both artillery and FPV.
Remember, drones can not replace traditional artillery. Drones cannot suppress the enemy. They can only support artillery. In high intensity combined arms combat traditional artillery is the best.
Due to space constraints of Substack I have provided Grok’s summary paragraph on the FPV vs Artillery use. “# Summary
- **Ukraine**: ~1,600 artillery pieces (mixed 152mm/155mm), firing ~2,000 rounds/day; 2.5–3 million FPV drones annually, heavily relied upon due to shell shortages. Limited to no capacity for new artillery tubes.
- **Russia**: Thousands of artillery systems, firing >10,000 rounds/day; significant but lower FPV drone production (~6,000 Shahed drones by mid-2025). Relies on foreign ammunition.
- **US Production**: 36,000 155mm shells/month (2024), targeting 100,000/month by late 2025.
- **NATO Production**: ~1.7–2 million 155mm shells/year (2024), aiming for 2.6–3 million by late 2025. Systems include M777, PzH2000, CAESAR, but production of new units is limited.
- **Strategic Outlook**: Russia’s artillery advantage is countered by Ukraine’s drone innovation, but NATO’s slow production ramps and Ukraine’s reliance on foreign aid remain critical vulnerabilities. Domestic tube production in Ukraine is not yet viable.”….
Another tool that should be available to the Combatant Commander is the AMPHIBIOUS RAID. When General Grey set up the MEUSOC he added a fourth rifle company to the MEUSOC. Instead of topping off an ARG with a fourth rifle company let’s consider increasing its capability with a Marine Raider Platoon (Rein). Below is a repeated comment, apologies I am getting lazy in my old age.
If you want an example of the flexibility and adaptability of the Marine MAGTF (and Operational Maneuver from the Sea), read this paper on TF 58. As the CIA’s take down of Afghanistan developed, Marine/Naval General and Flag Officers on the Joint Staff and Combatant Commands wanted to get the Marines and Navy into the fight. This effort was initiated after the CENTCOM Combatant Commander stated that Naval Forces could not be used because Afghanistan was a landlocked country.
Originally given the mission of planning amphibious raids into Afghanistan in the winter of 2001 in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (against the Taliban), TF58’s Joint Force staff planning and coordination, both operationally and logistically, is amazing. The coordination included two Amphibious MEUs, Army and Navy Special Forces, AFCENT, Armed Forces of Britain and Australia, Pakistan, USCENTCOM, Joint Staff and SECDEF.
Here is the list of TF58 seized objectives and operations locations by date: 1. FOB Rhino (25 Nov 2001), 2. Patrol Base Pentagon (5-13 Dec, 2001), 3. Kabul (10-29 Dec. 2001), Kandahar Airport (14 Dec. – 20 Jan2002), Khost Airfield (16-28 Jan 2002) (Ref. Map p.17). Impressive when you recognize that the TF58 operations represents an extended maneuver of over 400 miles from the sea to Kandahar and Khost. The last distance record I can remember for an airborne assaults was 101st Airborne Division and it’s 175 miles penetration into Iraq during Desert Storm to cut the Iraq MSR. TF58 exceeded that distance by well over 200 miles.
My question and concern is: Was this operation, lessons learned and analysis taken into account during the concept development for FD2030. If not, it is another missed opportunity for the future development of amphibious forces capabilities of the US Military. S/F
Read the article above I just posted. This is written by an American who spent combat time with the Ukrainian drone service. Pretty damning on the drone front
And BZ to the Army Patriot soldiers who bravely stood in the breach and shot down the incoming Iranian missiles targeting the American base in Qatar. And to the Navy submariners who flawlessly executed their TLAM mission. Our Nation is blessed to have such wonderful men and women standing the watch while we are allowed to sleep comfortably in our warm beds.
Amen! Absolutely!
"All that said, if a member of a NATO military were hypothetically to ask me whether NATO countries should acquire first-person view drone capabilities, based on my experience and given the current state of the technology, I would probably say no, whether they are radio-controlled or fiber-optic. The vast majority of first-person view drone missions can be completed more cheaply, effectively, or reliably by other assets. Furthermore, other authors have noted that drones still do not come close to matching the effects that can be achieved by massed artillery fires. Additionally, experts on artillery systems consistently note the greater reliability and range of artillery."
The last sentence........wow.
https://warontherocks.com/2025/06/i-fought-in-ukraine-and-heres-why-fpv-drones-kind-of-suck/?utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm_medium=email&utm_source=sailthru
I appreciate the link and the frontline AAR. Truly.
Here is a link for you to consider:
“In May, drones were responsible for over 75% of Russian battlefield casualties,compared to an estimated 20% by artillery and 5% from small arms. Ukraine struck more than 89,000 targets with drones in May, which includes manpower, equipment, and vehicles, a 7.2% increase from 83,000 in April.”
https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/06/21/frontline-report-drones-become-ukraines-top-killer-in-modern-warfare-outpacing-artillery-in-lethality/?utm_source=chatgpt.com
Wow! 75% of casualties from drones last month? Where did I hear that before? Oh, I know. It was in a posture hearing (that I gave you a summary of in an earlier post) when a principal stated the same stats to CMC.
I’m glad the Marine Corps is well on its way to having both artillery and FPV.
Remember, drones can not replace traditional artillery. Drones cannot suppress the enemy. They can only support artillery. In high intensity combined arms combat traditional artillery is the best.
Due to space constraints of Substack I have provided Grok’s summary paragraph on the FPV vs Artillery use. “# Summary
- **Ukraine**: ~1,600 artillery pieces (mixed 152mm/155mm), firing ~2,000 rounds/day; 2.5–3 million FPV drones annually, heavily relied upon due to shell shortages. Limited to no capacity for new artillery tubes.
- **Russia**: Thousands of artillery systems, firing >10,000 rounds/day; significant but lower FPV drone production (~6,000 Shahed drones by mid-2025). Relies on foreign ammunition.
- **US Production**: 36,000 155mm shells/month (2024), targeting 100,000/month by late 2025.
- **NATO Production**: ~1.7–2 million 155mm shells/year (2024), aiming for 2.6–3 million by late 2025. Systems include M777, PzH2000, CAESAR, but production of new units is limited.
- **Strategic Outlook**: Russia’s artillery advantage is countered by Ukraine’s drone innovation, but NATO’s slow production ramps and Ukraine’s reliance on foreign aid remain critical vulnerabilities. Domestic tube production in Ukraine is not yet viable.”….
TF-58 Raid
Another tool that should be available to the Combatant Commander is the AMPHIBIOUS RAID. When General Grey set up the MEUSOC he added a fourth rifle company to the MEUSOC. Instead of topping off an ARG with a fourth rifle company let’s consider increasing its capability with a Marine Raider Platoon (Rein). Below is a repeated comment, apologies I am getting lazy in my old age.
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/the-mattis-way-of-war.pdf
If you want an example of the flexibility and adaptability of the Marine MAGTF (and Operational Maneuver from the Sea), read this paper on TF 58. As the CIA’s take down of Afghanistan developed, Marine/Naval General and Flag Officers on the Joint Staff and Combatant Commands wanted to get the Marines and Navy into the fight. This effort was initiated after the CENTCOM Combatant Commander stated that Naval Forces could not be used because Afghanistan was a landlocked country.
Originally given the mission of planning amphibious raids into Afghanistan in the winter of 2001 in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (against the Taliban), TF58’s Joint Force staff planning and coordination, both operationally and logistically, is amazing. The coordination included two Amphibious MEUs, Army and Navy Special Forces, AFCENT, Armed Forces of Britain and Australia, Pakistan, USCENTCOM, Joint Staff and SECDEF.
Here is the list of TF58 seized objectives and operations locations by date: 1. FOB Rhino (25 Nov 2001), 2. Patrol Base Pentagon (5-13 Dec, 2001), 3. Kabul (10-29 Dec. 2001), Kandahar Airport (14 Dec. – 20 Jan2002), Khost Airfield (16-28 Jan 2002) (Ref. Map p.17). Impressive when you recognize that the TF58 operations represents an extended maneuver of over 400 miles from the sea to Kandahar and Khost. The last distance record I can remember for an airborne assaults was 101st Airborne Division and it’s 175 miles penetration into Iraq during Desert Storm to cut the Iraq MSR. TF58 exceeded that distance by well over 200 miles.
My question and concern is: Was this operation, lessons learned and analysis taken into account during the concept development for FD2030. If not, it is another missed opportunity for the future development of amphibious forces capabilities of the US Military. S/F
A detailed reference is here: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/the-mattis-way-of-war.pdf
the-mattis-way-of-war.pdf
https://news.usni.org/2025/06/25/attack-of-the-drones?utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm_medium=email&utm_source=sailthru
Maybe the MEU could use some of these, too?
Read the article above I just posted. This is written by an American who spent combat time with the Ukrainian drone service. Pretty damning on the drone front