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Douglas C Rapé's avatar

I am encouraged by the flexible thinking and analysis of Marines and how to fight. Marines are often ahead of the institution which can be slow to adjust. Gen Gray took on this exact type of institutional inertia when he challenged Quantico to get out in front vise lagging behind and during a Renaissance period assigned highly talented individuals.

When I attended TBS in 1974 much of the formal instruction was highly “ Vietnam Oriented”. But, the winds were already shifting and the CO TBS was pushing the shift towards battlefields unknown. Then Col Schulze was a brilliant leader and our Instructors ( Maj Wylie) and Company Commander ( Maj Ebbert) and my SPC ( Capt Neubauer) all were very clear that the shift would entail a fight with a near peer. By the time I arrived at 1/8 the leadership was squarely focused on anti tank needs, artillery, close air and the endless ways to leverage them. We focused on transmission brevity, codes, how we could be jammed, operating in radio silence, air parity environments, NBC environments, counter battery fire etc. Majors Radcliff, Sutton and LtCol Cerreta were superb in pushing the skills we’d need in Central or Northern Europe. The Scout Sniper platoon rebuilt and gave itself missions appropriate to different a battlefield.

Our training was also driven by our own readings on combat in Europe in WWII and detailed study of Warsaw Pact equipment, weapons and doctrine as well as the dusty lessons learned complied by the Army in the aftermath of the German-Soviet front 1941-45. Gen Gray’s 4th MAB knew of and strongly encouraged our approach which culminated with the Brigade deployment to Europe.

None of our initiatives or self imposed standards were force fed to us from Quantico. We were well aware of our equipment, weapons and mobility shortfalls and how to work around them. We did not hesitate to modify, or discard published doctrine because we knew doctrine. Being young and highly energetic we constantly pumped ideas, suggestions and recommendations into a big black hole and never knew when the ideas just slid into garbage cans.

When we arrived in England we quickly adopted the Wooly Pully without hesitation and Marines happily spent to money to upgrade their own kit. The house to house techniques were learned from 41 and 42 Commando, Royal Marines were quickly adopted fully aware that N Ireland would be a different environment than Gdańsk.

My point is simple. When you have the right Marines, as we have, the adjustments and change happen. It is ideal if the entire institution can react in a similar fashion.

The last 20 years have highlighted the right examples in adjustment from the fireteam to Quantico. It has also revealed some sad failures when the clear needs on the battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan were not acknowledged thousands of miles away. The MRAP would be a worthy lessons learned subject.

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Charles Wemyss, Jr.'s avatar

Looking at the modern battle space, the Marines that would/will be tasked with fighting in a conflict similar to the current conflict in Ukraine examined what they would need and how they would employ that which was needed. Ad hoc, on the run. They understood what General William DePuy preached circa 1973-1977 based on his own combat experiences and some deep thinking. "If you can be seen, you will be hit, if you are hit you will be killed." While to some degree his postulation was generated by a large Soviet Warsaw Pact armor and Mechanized infantry scenario, it applied to all elements of a combat force. It was discussed and disseminated at TBS and at IOC circa 1978. Clearly while the weapons have changed in speed and lethality and the new innovations keep coming, nothing much has changed. But heartening to see the that the young minds are aggressively at work doing work arounds of a self inflected wound. Bravo to the young deep thinkers on active and otherwise duty.

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