I am encouraged by the flexible thinking and analysis of Marines and how to fight. Marines are often ahead of the institution which can be slow to adjust. Gen Gray took on this exact type of institutional inertia when he challenged Quantico to get out in front vise lagging behind and during a Renaissance period assigned highly talented individuals.
When I attended TBS in 1974 much of the formal instruction was highly “ Vietnam Oriented”. But, the winds were already shifting and the CO TBS was pushing the shift towards battlefields unknown. Then Col Schulze was a brilliant leader and our Instructors ( Maj Wylie) and Company Commander ( Maj Ebbert) and my SPC ( Capt Neubauer) all were very clear that the shift would entail a fight with a near peer. By the time I arrived at 1/8 the leadership was squarely focused on anti tank needs, artillery, close air and the endless ways to leverage them. We focused on transmission brevity, codes, how we could be jammed, operating in radio silence, air parity environments, NBC environments, counter battery fire etc. Majors Radcliff, Sutton and LtCol Cerreta were superb in pushing the skills we’d need in Central or Northern Europe. The Scout Sniper platoon rebuilt and gave itself missions appropriate to different a battlefield.
Our training was also driven by our own readings on combat in Europe in WWII and detailed study of Warsaw Pact equipment, weapons and doctrine as well as the dusty lessons learned complied by the Army in the aftermath of the German-Soviet front 1941-45. Gen Gray’s 4th MAB knew of and strongly encouraged our approach which culminated with the Brigade deployment to Europe.
None of our initiatives or self imposed standards were force fed to us from Quantico. We were well aware of our equipment, weapons and mobility shortfalls and how to work around them. We did not hesitate to modify, or discard published doctrine because we knew doctrine. Being young and highly energetic we constantly pumped ideas, suggestions and recommendations into a big black hole and never knew when the ideas just slid into garbage cans.
When we arrived in England we quickly adopted the Wooly Pully without hesitation and Marines happily spent to money to upgrade their own kit. The house to house techniques were learned from 41 and 42 Commando, Royal Marines were quickly adopted fully aware that N Ireland would be a different environment than Gdańsk.
My point is simple. When you have the right Marines, as we have, the adjustments and change happen. It is ideal if the entire institution can react in a similar fashion.
The last 20 years have highlighted the right examples in adjustment from the fireteam to Quantico. It has also revealed some sad failures when the clear needs on the battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan were not acknowledged thousands of miles away. The MRAP would be a worthy lessons learned subject.
Looking at the modern battle space, the Marines that would/will be tasked with fighting in a conflict similar to the current conflict in Ukraine examined what they would need and how they would employ that which was needed. Ad hoc, on the run. They understood what General William DePuy preached circa 1973-1977 based on his own combat experiences and some deep thinking. "If you can be seen, you will be hit, if you are hit you will be killed." While to some degree his postulation was generated by a large Soviet Warsaw Pact armor and Mechanized infantry scenario, it applied to all elements of a combat force. It was discussed and disseminated at TBS and at IOC circa 1978. Clearly while the weapons have changed in speed and lethality and the new innovations keep coming, nothing much has changed. But heartening to see the that the young minds are aggressively at work doing work arounds of a self inflected wound. Bravo to the young deep thinkers on active and otherwise duty.
Foolishly ignoring sensitivity of seniors, why is nothing NOW being done to repair holes in Marine capabilities? Picking two examples, why has nothing been done to "recover" our M-1 tanks and tube artillery? Add ammo procurement. Have the weapons been reduced to scrap, sold or given away? Can we identify those who are trained to use and maintain these weapons? Can we "reacquire most, some or none of them"? What deep thinking is required here? Can funding be identified rapidly, new and reallocated? Are such actions opposed by current leadership? On what grounds?
Tom, These are the right questions but there is no evidence anyone inside the Marine Corps is asking them let alone trying to answer them. Members of Chowder Society II continue to urge the Commandant to reorient the Corps away from its fixation on small teams with missiles to a force able to fight as MEBs and MEFs as it did in the past. We also engage members of Congress on these same issues. Progress has been slow but we will not give up on the fight. PKVR
Remember the two squadrons worth of AH-1Z helicopters that were given to Jordan? Or all the M777 tube artillery given to Ukraine? That should answer your question about where those items went.
Well this is the best news I have read in a long while. “Marines are smart and innovative. They are very practical and always willing to improve the Marine Corps.” DUH! And the Commandant is “awestruck” by this discovery after his 30+ year career.
I frequently read Bruce Gudmundsson’s excellent Tactical Note Book. I did not know about the “Marine Infantry Website”. A quick review of the publications leaves me very impressed. The M32A2 Grenadier Primer is excellent and covers a hole in my company training back in the day. Ammo training allocations use to be extremely low especially for the 203. The Fieldcraft Book also got my attention and I would recommend it replaces the old Marine Hand Book that was issued at Boot Camp.
Much of the information the Fieldcraft Book contains is usually learned by Marines in the field from other Marines or their NCOs. However, there are many more great ideas to be taught and learned than in my days as a Rifle Company CO. In my day most Battalion Supply Officers kept a wall locker in their office, secured with a lock and chain, full of “grunt candy”. What is grunt candy? Asked the Company CO. It is camo sticks, chem lights, black electric tape, etc. and the wall locker is to be open only in the event of war. I remember having to buy my own camo paint at TBS. Got it at sporting goods store. It came in a little green compact complete with three colors and a tiny mirror. I remember my company gunny scrounging inner tubes to cut in strips and placed on our helmets to help with camouflage. Based on the “782 gear” I am now seeing, I acknowledge that Marines are a long way from the old 1941 canvas assault pack. For the young Marines read the book “Battle Cry” and the description of the comfort that little green monster provides.
But let’s be clear, Infantry Marines still need artillery to suppress while they maneuver. There is going to be times that infantry Marines will need a tank to help clear out strong points. They are also going to need lots and lots of air support. Infantry Marines will not be better than satellite or strategic drone reconnaissance. Marines will not be better than US Navy towed SOSUS arrays or over the horizon radars. Marines will not be better than the US Navy’s anti-ship missiles and anti-missile defense. Infantry Marines are always good at innovation when it comes to closing and destroying the enemy by fire and maneuver. Semper Fi.
In the '...detailed 126-page handbook....' of scenarios was there a scenario of an enemy using a highly contagious virus, (deadly/incapacitating)? Admittedly, Marines are a hardy and watchful bunch, yet a sturdy virus could be delivered by contact with vegetation, or as an aerosol by a high-flying drone; difficult, not impossible.
My point? To be 'smart and innovative' requires divergent thinking to begin, and a great deal of flexibility to implement.
Ancient Greek Sophists practiced 'Premeditatio Malorum,' aka 'Prepare for all Evils.' In preparing for the very worst in battle, both sides seek personnel, weapons, tactics, and strategies with the greatest capacity to kill, and the hardest to defend against. And, also the least expected.
I am encouraged by the flexible thinking and analysis of Marines and how to fight. Marines are often ahead of the institution which can be slow to adjust. Gen Gray took on this exact type of institutional inertia when he challenged Quantico to get out in front vise lagging behind and during a Renaissance period assigned highly talented individuals.
When I attended TBS in 1974 much of the formal instruction was highly “ Vietnam Oriented”. But, the winds were already shifting and the CO TBS was pushing the shift towards battlefields unknown. Then Col Schulze was a brilliant leader and our Instructors ( Maj Wylie) and Company Commander ( Maj Ebbert) and my SPC ( Capt Neubauer) all were very clear that the shift would entail a fight with a near peer. By the time I arrived at 1/8 the leadership was squarely focused on anti tank needs, artillery, close air and the endless ways to leverage them. We focused on transmission brevity, codes, how we could be jammed, operating in radio silence, air parity environments, NBC environments, counter battery fire etc. Majors Radcliff, Sutton and LtCol Cerreta were superb in pushing the skills we’d need in Central or Northern Europe. The Scout Sniper platoon rebuilt and gave itself missions appropriate to different a battlefield.
Our training was also driven by our own readings on combat in Europe in WWII and detailed study of Warsaw Pact equipment, weapons and doctrine as well as the dusty lessons learned complied by the Army in the aftermath of the German-Soviet front 1941-45. Gen Gray’s 4th MAB knew of and strongly encouraged our approach which culminated with the Brigade deployment to Europe.
None of our initiatives or self imposed standards were force fed to us from Quantico. We were well aware of our equipment, weapons and mobility shortfalls and how to work around them. We did not hesitate to modify, or discard published doctrine because we knew doctrine. Being young and highly energetic we constantly pumped ideas, suggestions and recommendations into a big black hole and never knew when the ideas just slid into garbage cans.
When we arrived in England we quickly adopted the Wooly Pully without hesitation and Marines happily spent to money to upgrade their own kit. The house to house techniques were learned from 41 and 42 Commando, Royal Marines were quickly adopted fully aware that N Ireland would be a different environment than Gdańsk.
My point is simple. When you have the right Marines, as we have, the adjustments and change happen. It is ideal if the entire institution can react in a similar fashion.
The last 20 years have highlighted the right examples in adjustment from the fireteam to Quantico. It has also revealed some sad failures when the clear needs on the battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan were not acknowledged thousands of miles away. The MRAP would be a worthy lessons learned subject.
Looking at the modern battle space, the Marines that would/will be tasked with fighting in a conflict similar to the current conflict in Ukraine examined what they would need and how they would employ that which was needed. Ad hoc, on the run. They understood what General William DePuy preached circa 1973-1977 based on his own combat experiences and some deep thinking. "If you can be seen, you will be hit, if you are hit you will be killed." While to some degree his postulation was generated by a large Soviet Warsaw Pact armor and Mechanized infantry scenario, it applied to all elements of a combat force. It was discussed and disseminated at TBS and at IOC circa 1978. Clearly while the weapons have changed in speed and lethality and the new innovations keep coming, nothing much has changed. But heartening to see the that the young minds are aggressively at work doing work arounds of a self inflected wound. Bravo to the young deep thinkers on active and otherwise duty.
Foolishly ignoring sensitivity of seniors, why is nothing NOW being done to repair holes in Marine capabilities? Picking two examples, why has nothing been done to "recover" our M-1 tanks and tube artillery? Add ammo procurement. Have the weapons been reduced to scrap, sold or given away? Can we identify those who are trained to use and maintain these weapons? Can we "reacquire most, some or none of them"? What deep thinking is required here? Can funding be identified rapidly, new and reallocated? Are such actions opposed by current leadership? On what grounds?
Tom, These are the right questions but there is no evidence anyone inside the Marine Corps is asking them let alone trying to answer them. Members of Chowder Society II continue to urge the Commandant to reorient the Corps away from its fixation on small teams with missiles to a force able to fight as MEBs and MEFs as it did in the past. We also engage members of Congress on these same issues. Progress has been slow but we will not give up on the fight. PKVR
Remember the two squadrons worth of AH-1Z helicopters that were given to Jordan? Or all the M777 tube artillery given to Ukraine? That should answer your question about where those items went.
Well this is the best news I have read in a long while. “Marines are smart and innovative. They are very practical and always willing to improve the Marine Corps.” DUH! And the Commandant is “awestruck” by this discovery after his 30+ year career.
I frequently read Bruce Gudmundsson’s excellent Tactical Note Book. I did not know about the “Marine Infantry Website”. A quick review of the publications leaves me very impressed. The M32A2 Grenadier Primer is excellent and covers a hole in my company training back in the day. Ammo training allocations use to be extremely low especially for the 203. The Fieldcraft Book also got my attention and I would recommend it replaces the old Marine Hand Book that was issued at Boot Camp.
Much of the information the Fieldcraft Book contains is usually learned by Marines in the field from other Marines or their NCOs. However, there are many more great ideas to be taught and learned than in my days as a Rifle Company CO. In my day most Battalion Supply Officers kept a wall locker in their office, secured with a lock and chain, full of “grunt candy”. What is grunt candy? Asked the Company CO. It is camo sticks, chem lights, black electric tape, etc. and the wall locker is to be open only in the event of war. I remember having to buy my own camo paint at TBS. Got it at sporting goods store. It came in a little green compact complete with three colors and a tiny mirror. I remember my company gunny scrounging inner tubes to cut in strips and placed on our helmets to help with camouflage. Based on the “782 gear” I am now seeing, I acknowledge that Marines are a long way from the old 1941 canvas assault pack. For the young Marines read the book “Battle Cry” and the description of the comfort that little green monster provides.
But let’s be clear, Infantry Marines still need artillery to suppress while they maneuver. There is going to be times that infantry Marines will need a tank to help clear out strong points. They are also going to need lots and lots of air support. Infantry Marines will not be better than satellite or strategic drone reconnaissance. Marines will not be better than US Navy towed SOSUS arrays or over the horizon radars. Marines will not be better than the US Navy’s anti-ship missiles and anti-missile defense. Infantry Marines are always good at innovation when it comes to closing and destroying the enemy by fire and maneuver. Semper Fi.
In the '...detailed 126-page handbook....' of scenarios was there a scenario of an enemy using a highly contagious virus, (deadly/incapacitating)? Admittedly, Marines are a hardy and watchful bunch, yet a sturdy virus could be delivered by contact with vegetation, or as an aerosol by a high-flying drone; difficult, not impossible.
My point? To be 'smart and innovative' requires divergent thinking to begin, and a great deal of flexibility to implement.
Ancient Greek Sophists practiced 'Premeditatio Malorum,' aka 'Prepare for all Evils.' In preparing for the very worst in battle, both sides seek personnel, weapons, tactics, and strategies with the greatest capacity to kill, and the hardest to defend against. And, also the least expected.