This Compass Points should give pause to all Marines...both Active Duty and Reserve. As noted, Balikatan was initially a formal exercise designed to enhance the interoperability of Marine Forces and those of the Philippines. It has obviously grown much larger in participation which is, for the Region, a good thing. What is concerning is the fact that the Army's 25th ID appears to have taken over the central role...with a focus on defeating an Amphibious Operation conducted by the PLA/PLAN. 7 years ago, the concept behind Force Design was essentially what the 25th ID demonstrated during Balikatan. To achieve this capability, the Army did not "Divest to Invest"...they did not emasculate existing capability to create what was seen at Balikatan 2026. Instead, they apparently resorted to the Marine Corps tried and true concept of task organizing! Here we are, 7 years + into Force Design and much of what we determined to be the requirements to exercise our EABO effort remain either still on the drawing board or in our hands but not in the quantity or quality needed for the fight we see ahead. Of particular concern is the Stand-in Force and the ability to resupply those Forces and, if necessary, evacuate dead and wounded. Again, 7 years into the Force Design and the long pole in the tent remains Logistics. The failure to initially utilize the MCCDC Combat Development Process to determine requirements prior to divestment has been noted multiple times. At the end of the day, "The Campaign of Learning" has proven to be a poor substitute for the proper use of the Combat Development Process.
Respectfully, your post misses the larger point of Balikatan 2026.
The Marine Corps served as the Joint Task Force headquarters exercising command and control across the combined exercise. That is not a supporting role — it is the central role. The exercise validated the Corps’ ability to integrate allied and joint forces across a distributed maritime battlespace while supporting the broader campaign. It’s exactly how we will fight a war against the PRC in defense of our treaty obligations.
Pointing to the Army’s 25th ID executing an important portion of the scenario and concluding they “took over” the mission is a bit like confusing an outstanding solo performance with conducting the orchestra.
The Army contribution was important. No serious person disputes that. But Balikatan also demonstrated exactly what Force Design was intended to support: distributed maritime operations, joint integration, allied interoperability, naval campaigning, and stand-in forces contributing to sea denial inside a contested environment.
The Marine Corps was not sidelined during Balikatan — it was at the center of the exercise, both operationally and organizationally.
I fully understand the role the Corps played in Balikatan 2026 and it was, indeed, a critical role. No one is disputing that fact. Our concern is focused on the fact that the role of the "JTF Hq exercising command and control across the combined exercise" certainly did not required the emasculation of the combat capability across the Corps caused by the flawed concept of "Divest to Invest." The Marine Corps has served as a JTF Hq exercising command and control before FD was implemented. It was done by simply task organizing the JTF utilizing MEF assets as well as from other Services...thus the "Joint" part of the JTF. To think that FD enabled the Marine Corps to undertake this role is simply wrong. Improvements in sensing, command and control capability were not a result of "Divesting"...it was the natural progression of technology that was on the drawing board of all Services well before the Marine Corps started "Divesting" capability. As an aside, I would have thought that Balikatan 2026 would have provided the Marine Corps the opportunity to "test" its own operational capability as compared to what the Army brought to the table. Perhaps even "gamed" an honest evaluation of the Marine Corps ability to logistically support its own EABO.
No need to comment any further on ship sinking impotence. The Army, Navy and USAF are all much better positioned to sink enemy ships. Just out fitting USMC aviation assets to sink ships would yield benefits by July 4th. Why continue to expend resources to finish a distant fourth place in a four way race in a mission the USMC self selected.
As to the General’s tenure. Human performance center…yawn. 3D parts production. OK, an emergency measure when a flawed system cannot deliver the parts. Yup, no mention of EABO. Logistics is critical. Not in taking care of themselves but getting the right stuff, to the right places, on time.
The 2.75 common Rocket Launchers currently on Marine aircraft are now being tested/production with low cost guided warheads to deal with boat swarms and landing craft along with drones. Much cheaper than Javelins and Hellfires. Just an example of items being fast tracked by DOD that is available for the Marine corps.
The 2.75 rockets would be ideal with a close proximity fuse for drones and an entire volley against a small boat. Sinking war ships is another matter. Warheads too small and range is minimal.
I was using it as an example of items available to all services.., rockets would be/are guided and larger warheads and anti armor, extended range.., etc one hit one kill. Reminded of time US Army M10 tank destroyers sunk ships with their 3" steel shot rounds. The rounds went completely through Japanese equivalent of an LST. Not your grandfather's 2.75".
There have been numerous examples since 2019 of the major flaws in the 38th Commandant’s Force Design 2030, few as pointed as those described in this Compass Points post. Although the 39th Commandant has taken several actions to overcome the mistakes of his predecessor he has failed to articulate the vision and plan needed to again position our Corps as the nation’s “Force in Readiness”—a combined arms air-ground task force ready to respond across the globe with task organized and scalable forces. One must hope that within the next generation of senior Marine officers there is a commandant who can move the Corps forward as did Generals Wilson, Barrow, Gray, and Krulak to create a modernized 9-1-1 force.
How is it possible that the current Commandant doesn't see this as anything more than a slap? Is he even paying attention to what is said about our Corps?
Once again, after 6 years the Marine Corps is still behind the power curve. The Marine Corps is not even in the game. After six years there may be a single operational NMESIS battery. In 2017 PACOM Commander, Admiral Harry Harris suggested that the Army should get into the anti-ship business. He did not even mention the Marine Corps. I do not know why he didn't mention the Marine Corps. But my guess would be that he knew the Marine Corps already had an important mission as a naval expeditionary force. Maybe he knew the Army budget was much bigger than the Marine Corps' and could afford this mission. Or, he was aware that the Army, along with the Navy and Air Force, was already heavily involved in the missile business, and this was not a big leap. Someone should ask the Admiral why he chose the Army. So here we are 6 years into FD and the Army along with Japan, and the Philippines are doing missiles. We are playing catch up and doing a poor job of it.
As a naval expeditionary force what would it take to create an anti-ship tasked MEU? Someone with more experience could draw one up, but I think it could be: half a HIMARS/PrSM battery with reloads, an infantry company for security and reconnaissance, an anti-air section, and logistics elements. Such a MEU could be landed at any PACOM (or anywhere) location without being semi stationary on a specific island or tied to an LST which does not yet exist. This type of MEU could exist now and be more mobile than what we have now. Plus, we would not have divested our firepower to create a force that is still not fully operational.
Not a word about a Force Design Marine Unit? This seems to be a trend in the Force Disaster Marine Corps. This disturbing trend is noted in Marine Corps Logistics Units. No mention of how MLGs have improved or tackled the tough logistics nut of Marine Force Design Units that are not only “unnamed but logistically unsupportable”. For example here are today’s MLG change of command highlights:”Brigadier General Maura M. Hennigan (often abbreviated as BGen Hennigan) is departing her role as Commanding General of the 2nd Marine Logistics Group (2nd MLG) at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, in June 2026 after nearly two years in command. military.com
She assumed command in July 2024 (relieving Brig. Gen. Michael E. McWilliams) and has focused on advancing logistics innovation, human performance, readiness, and joint/allied integration to better support II Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF) operations. military.com
Key Accomplishments and Legacy Highlights
• Innovation Campus: Advanced the II MEF Innovation Campus, emphasizing advanced manufacturing and 3D printing. The team earned the first Education and Workforce Development Award from America Makes for a Marine Logistics Group, developing NDAA-compliant drones, on-demand parts, and solutions to reduce downtime and close supply chain gaps in distributed operations. military.com
• Human Performance Center: Oversaw the full stand-up and expansion of the 2nd MLG Human Performance Center, integrating physical, mental, spiritual, and social fitness resources to boost resilience and readiness. military.com
• Joint and Allied Logistics: In February 2026, assumed command of the Combined Joint Logistics Support Group (CJLSG) during Exercise Cold Response 26 in Norway — the first fully integrated U.S.-Norwegian bilateral logistics headquarters. This strengthened NATO Arctic deterrence and rapid deployment concepts. military.com
• Readiness and Climate: Delivered gains in equipment readiness, maintenance cycles, and command climate surveys, plus strong performance on the Commanding General’s Readiness Inspection. military.com
Her leadership emphasized that logistics innovation and investment in Marines form the foundation for warfighter support. A senior leader described her as “top notch” for balancing innovation with people-focused efforts. military.com.”Logistical Support to Force Design Combat Units is missing in this Marine Times Fitness Report.
What’s missing from this take is that Balikatan 2026 once again showcased the Marine Corps functioning as the Joint Task Force headquarters — exercising command and control over joint, combined, and allied forces in support of U.S. and Philippine aligned objectives.
Who synchronized distributed operations across a vast maritime battlespace?
Who validated the ability to deliver scalable, credible, forward-postured Stand-in Forces augmented by the Joint Force, allies, and partners?
Balikatan 2026 was a resounding success for FD— just as it was last year, when senior U.S. leaders, congressional delegations, and professional staff members returned from the Philippines more convinced than ever that Force Design was moving in the right direction after seeing it executed in the field rather than simply debated online. See my recaps of last year’s CMC testimony.
Likewise, a bipartisan congressional letter supporting Force Design stated plainly:
“The Marine Corps has delivered. It is now time for us to deliver…”
The argument that the Army “took over the central role” ignores what actually occurred: the Marine Corps enabled and integrated the larger joint and allied effort exactly as envisioned in modern campaigning. That is not a failure of Force Design — it is evidence of it working.
Yep, the current Commandant has now made the Corps a force of “arm chair quarterbacks”, rather than what we used to be. Prior to FD if you wanted to find Marines you looked for them in the field occupying fighting holes, servicing targets, controlling CAS, attacking through the objective, spotting naval gunfire, etc. Now? If you want to find Marines you look for them in air conditioned CPs, punching away on a keyboard, giving PowerPoint presentations, releasing slick, untruthful exaggerated PAO statements.
Under this Commandant Marines are more like the old “Hollywood Marines”, not the “in the field dragging our asses back to garrison after a long week in the field Marines”. And it’s not the fault of our Marines. It’s the fault of our top leadership.
Get back to us when we have a FULLY equipped NMESIS battery fully equipped, issued their basic load of NSMs IN THE FIELD and servicing targets, then let’s have a discussion.
Cpl. you can put all the lipstick you want on the pig, but it’s still a pig.
I wonder what the President and Secretary Hegseth want from today’s Marine Corps. At one of the recent news conferences, Secretary Hegseth seemed to identify the 82nd Airborne as America’s quick reaction force. The Marine Corps wasn’t mentioned.
We have MEUs in the Gulf now. Some arguing against Force Design also worry those Marines would fare poorly in an attack against Kharg Island. That’s hard to believe, but I was Medical Corps so I don’t really know.
We’re trying to avoid a war with China. Recent turbulence among Chinese military leadership suggests that the war may be put off for awhile if it happens, but we don’t really know and have to be ready.
It looks like the Army is rapidly getting ready for the fight. Will the Marines be ready to make a contribution or will they be sidelined? Articles and comments like those below tend to suggest the latter.
Neither the Marine Corps nor its admittedly distinguished retirees get to choose the mission. Seek clarification from higher authority if you like, but then it’s time to roger up and make it work.
Bill, you’re exactly correct. And Congress has clarified the Marine Corps mission, codified in 10 USC, Section 8063.
“United States Marine Corps: composition; functions
(a) The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct. However, these additional duties may not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized.
(b) The Marine Corps shall develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations that pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment used by landing forces.
(c) The Marine Corps is responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.”
Under the current Commandant’s direction the Corps is unable to meet those requirements. For example, the requirement to have 3 divisions is not happening today. The 3rd MarDiv, headquartered in Okinawa Japan, has 1 partial infantry regiment, 4th Marines. The other two legacy infantry regiments, 9th Marines and 3rd Marines, have been deactivated or redesignated as a Marine Littoral Regiment, which is unable and not designed by either the Table of Organization, or by its Table of Equipment, of conducting operations as an infantry regiment. 3rd MarDiv also does not have an artillery regiment. 12th Marines, the division’s artillery regiment, has also been converted to an MLR.
Failure to adhere to 10 USC, Section 8063 which is law, obviates the Corps from meeting its statutory requirements.
Thanks, Greg. I remember this from getting my FMF pin during one of my tours at TQ. Are you asserting that Force Design, as currently constructed, was implemented without Congressional authorization or even awareness this past 7 years? That would be amazing. I had thought this was the policy of both Trump administrations as well as the Biden administration, remarkable when they agreed on anything. Did any of these institutions consider themselves out of compliance with the statute you referenced?
It doesn’t seem likely this matter could be tested in court. I’m not a lawyer but I think there would be issues of standing and separation of powers. Perhaps Congress needs to tidy up the statute and properly equip the Marines for the mission in the Pacific. I’m just a layman, but it looks like the Army is getting better missiles. If that is the case, it would be something worth arguing about.
This Compass Points should give pause to all Marines...both Active Duty and Reserve. As noted, Balikatan was initially a formal exercise designed to enhance the interoperability of Marine Forces and those of the Philippines. It has obviously grown much larger in participation which is, for the Region, a good thing. What is concerning is the fact that the Army's 25th ID appears to have taken over the central role...with a focus on defeating an Amphibious Operation conducted by the PLA/PLAN. 7 years ago, the concept behind Force Design was essentially what the 25th ID demonstrated during Balikatan. To achieve this capability, the Army did not "Divest to Invest"...they did not emasculate existing capability to create what was seen at Balikatan 2026. Instead, they apparently resorted to the Marine Corps tried and true concept of task organizing! Here we are, 7 years + into Force Design and much of what we determined to be the requirements to exercise our EABO effort remain either still on the drawing board or in our hands but not in the quantity or quality needed for the fight we see ahead. Of particular concern is the Stand-in Force and the ability to resupply those Forces and, if necessary, evacuate dead and wounded. Again, 7 years into the Force Design and the long pole in the tent remains Logistics. The failure to initially utilize the MCCDC Combat Development Process to determine requirements prior to divestment has been noted multiple times. At the end of the day, "The Campaign of Learning" has proven to be a poor substitute for the proper use of the Combat Development Process.
Respectfully, your post misses the larger point of Balikatan 2026.
The Marine Corps served as the Joint Task Force headquarters exercising command and control across the combined exercise. That is not a supporting role — it is the central role. The exercise validated the Corps’ ability to integrate allied and joint forces across a distributed maritime battlespace while supporting the broader campaign. It’s exactly how we will fight a war against the PRC in defense of our treaty obligations.
Pointing to the Army’s 25th ID executing an important portion of the scenario and concluding they “took over” the mission is a bit like confusing an outstanding solo performance with conducting the orchestra.
The Army contribution was important. No serious person disputes that. But Balikatan also demonstrated exactly what Force Design was intended to support: distributed maritime operations, joint integration, allied interoperability, naval campaigning, and stand-in forces contributing to sea denial inside a contested environment.
The Marine Corps was not sidelined during Balikatan — it was at the center of the exercise, both operationally and organizationally.
I fully understand the role the Corps played in Balikatan 2026 and it was, indeed, a critical role. No one is disputing that fact. Our concern is focused on the fact that the role of the "JTF Hq exercising command and control across the combined exercise" certainly did not required the emasculation of the combat capability across the Corps caused by the flawed concept of "Divest to Invest." The Marine Corps has served as a JTF Hq exercising command and control before FD was implemented. It was done by simply task organizing the JTF utilizing MEF assets as well as from other Services...thus the "Joint" part of the JTF. To think that FD enabled the Marine Corps to undertake this role is simply wrong. Improvements in sensing, command and control capability were not a result of "Divesting"...it was the natural progression of technology that was on the drawing board of all Services well before the Marine Corps started "Divesting" capability. As an aside, I would have thought that Balikatan 2026 would have provided the Marine Corps the opportunity to "test" its own operational capability as compared to what the Army brought to the table. Perhaps even "gamed" an honest evaluation of the Marine Corps ability to logistically support its own EABO.
No need to comment any further on ship sinking impotence. The Army, Navy and USAF are all much better positioned to sink enemy ships. Just out fitting USMC aviation assets to sink ships would yield benefits by July 4th. Why continue to expend resources to finish a distant fourth place in a four way race in a mission the USMC self selected.
As to the General’s tenure. Human performance center…yawn. 3D parts production. OK, an emergency measure when a flawed system cannot deliver the parts. Yup, no mention of EABO. Logistics is critical. Not in taking care of themselves but getting the right stuff, to the right places, on time.
The 2.75 common Rocket Launchers currently on Marine aircraft are now being tested/production with low cost guided warheads to deal with boat swarms and landing craft along with drones. Much cheaper than Javelins and Hellfires. Just an example of items being fast tracked by DOD that is available for the Marine corps.
The 2.75 rockets would be ideal with a close proximity fuse for drones and an entire volley against a small boat. Sinking war ships is another matter. Warheads too small and range is minimal.
I was using it as an example of items available to all services.., rockets would be/are guided and larger warheads and anti armor, extended range.., etc one hit one kill. Reminded of time US Army M10 tank destroyers sunk ships with their 3" steel shot rounds. The rounds went completely through Japanese equivalent of an LST. Not your grandfather's 2.75".
There have been numerous examples since 2019 of the major flaws in the 38th Commandant’s Force Design 2030, few as pointed as those described in this Compass Points post. Although the 39th Commandant has taken several actions to overcome the mistakes of his predecessor he has failed to articulate the vision and plan needed to again position our Corps as the nation’s “Force in Readiness”—a combined arms air-ground task force ready to respond across the globe with task organized and scalable forces. One must hope that within the next generation of senior Marine officers there is a commandant who can move the Corps forward as did Generals Wilson, Barrow, Gray, and Krulak to create a modernized 9-1-1 force.
How is it possible that the current Commandant doesn't see this as anything more than a slap? Is he even paying attention to what is said about our Corps?
Once again, after 6 years the Marine Corps is still behind the power curve. The Marine Corps is not even in the game. After six years there may be a single operational NMESIS battery. In 2017 PACOM Commander, Admiral Harry Harris suggested that the Army should get into the anti-ship business. He did not even mention the Marine Corps. I do not know why he didn't mention the Marine Corps. But my guess would be that he knew the Marine Corps already had an important mission as a naval expeditionary force. Maybe he knew the Army budget was much bigger than the Marine Corps' and could afford this mission. Or, he was aware that the Army, along with the Navy and Air Force, was already heavily involved in the missile business, and this was not a big leap. Someone should ask the Admiral why he chose the Army. So here we are 6 years into FD and the Army along with Japan, and the Philippines are doing missiles. We are playing catch up and doing a poor job of it.
As a naval expeditionary force what would it take to create an anti-ship tasked MEU? Someone with more experience could draw one up, but I think it could be: half a HIMARS/PrSM battery with reloads, an infantry company for security and reconnaissance, an anti-air section, and logistics elements. Such a MEU could be landed at any PACOM (or anywhere) location without being semi stationary on a specific island or tied to an LST which does not yet exist. This type of MEU could exist now and be more mobile than what we have now. Plus, we would not have divested our firepower to create a force that is still not fully operational.
Semper Fidelis! Hand Salute!
Not a word about a Force Design Marine Unit? This seems to be a trend in the Force Disaster Marine Corps. This disturbing trend is noted in Marine Corps Logistics Units. No mention of how MLGs have improved or tackled the tough logistics nut of Marine Force Design Units that are not only “unnamed but logistically unsupportable”. For example here are today’s MLG change of command highlights:”Brigadier General Maura M. Hennigan (often abbreviated as BGen Hennigan) is departing her role as Commanding General of the 2nd Marine Logistics Group (2nd MLG) at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, in June 2026 after nearly two years in command. military.com
She assumed command in July 2024 (relieving Brig. Gen. Michael E. McWilliams) and has focused on advancing logistics innovation, human performance, readiness, and joint/allied integration to better support II Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF) operations. military.com
Key Accomplishments and Legacy Highlights
• Innovation Campus: Advanced the II MEF Innovation Campus, emphasizing advanced manufacturing and 3D printing. The team earned the first Education and Workforce Development Award from America Makes for a Marine Logistics Group, developing NDAA-compliant drones, on-demand parts, and solutions to reduce downtime and close supply chain gaps in distributed operations. military.com
• Human Performance Center: Oversaw the full stand-up and expansion of the 2nd MLG Human Performance Center, integrating physical, mental, spiritual, and social fitness resources to boost resilience and readiness. military.com
• Joint and Allied Logistics: In February 2026, assumed command of the Combined Joint Logistics Support Group (CJLSG) during Exercise Cold Response 26 in Norway — the first fully integrated U.S.-Norwegian bilateral logistics headquarters. This strengthened NATO Arctic deterrence and rapid deployment concepts. military.com
• Readiness and Climate: Delivered gains in equipment readiness, maintenance cycles, and command climate surveys, plus strong performance on the Commanding General’s Readiness Inspection. military.com
Her leadership emphasized that logistics innovation and investment in Marines form the foundation for warfighter support. A senior leader described her as “top notch” for balancing innovation with people-focused efforts. military.com.”Logistical Support to Force Design Combat Units is missing in this Marine Times Fitness Report.
Fascinating perspective . . .
What’s missing from this take is that Balikatan 2026 once again showcased the Marine Corps functioning as the Joint Task Force headquarters — exercising command and control over joint, combined, and allied forces in support of U.S. and Philippine aligned objectives.
Who synchronized distributed operations across a vast maritime battlespace?
Who validated the ability to deliver scalable, credible, forward-postured Stand-in Forces augmented by the Joint Force, allies, and partners?
Balikatan 2026 was a resounding success for FD— just as it was last year, when senior U.S. leaders, congressional delegations, and professional staff members returned from the Philippines more convinced than ever that Force Design was moving in the right direction after seeing it executed in the field rather than simply debated online. See my recaps of last year’s CMC testimony.
Likewise, a bipartisan congressional letter supporting Force Design stated plainly:
“The Marine Corps has delivered. It is now time for us to deliver…”
https://www.rounds.senate.gov/download/force-design-letter
The argument that the Army “took over the central role” ignores what actually occurred: the Marine Corps enabled and integrated the larger joint and allied effort exactly as envisioned in modern campaigning. That is not a failure of Force Design — it is evidence of it working.
#JTACOFTHEJOINTFORCE
Yep, the current Commandant has now made the Corps a force of “arm chair quarterbacks”, rather than what we used to be. Prior to FD if you wanted to find Marines you looked for them in the field occupying fighting holes, servicing targets, controlling CAS, attacking through the objective, spotting naval gunfire, etc. Now? If you want to find Marines you look for them in air conditioned CPs, punching away on a keyboard, giving PowerPoint presentations, releasing slick, untruthful exaggerated PAO statements.
Under this Commandant Marines are more like the old “Hollywood Marines”, not the “in the field dragging our asses back to garrison after a long week in the field Marines”. And it’s not the fault of our Marines. It’s the fault of our top leadership.
Get back to us when we have a FULLY equipped NMESIS battery fully equipped, issued their basic load of NSMs IN THE FIELD and servicing targets, then let’s have a discussion.
Cpl. you can put all the lipstick you want on the pig, but it’s still a pig.
I wonder what the President and Secretary Hegseth want from today’s Marine Corps. At one of the recent news conferences, Secretary Hegseth seemed to identify the 82nd Airborne as America’s quick reaction force. The Marine Corps wasn’t mentioned.
We have MEUs in the Gulf now. Some arguing against Force Design also worry those Marines would fare poorly in an attack against Kharg Island. That’s hard to believe, but I was Medical Corps so I don’t really know.
We’re trying to avoid a war with China. Recent turbulence among Chinese military leadership suggests that the war may be put off for awhile if it happens, but we don’t really know and have to be ready.
It looks like the Army is rapidly getting ready for the fight. Will the Marines be ready to make a contribution or will they be sidelined? Articles and comments like those below tend to suggest the latter.
Neither the Marine Corps nor its admittedly distinguished retirees get to choose the mission. Seek clarification from higher authority if you like, but then it’s time to roger up and make it work.
Bill, you’re exactly correct. And Congress has clarified the Marine Corps mission, codified in 10 USC, Section 8063.
“United States Marine Corps: composition; functions
(a) The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct. However, these additional duties may not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized.
(b) The Marine Corps shall develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations that pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment used by landing forces.
(c) The Marine Corps is responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.”
Under the current Commandant’s direction the Corps is unable to meet those requirements. For example, the requirement to have 3 divisions is not happening today. The 3rd MarDiv, headquartered in Okinawa Japan, has 1 partial infantry regiment, 4th Marines. The other two legacy infantry regiments, 9th Marines and 3rd Marines, have been deactivated or redesignated as a Marine Littoral Regiment, which is unable and not designed by either the Table of Organization, or by its Table of Equipment, of conducting operations as an infantry regiment. 3rd MarDiv also does not have an artillery regiment. 12th Marines, the division’s artillery regiment, has also been converted to an MLR.
Failure to adhere to 10 USC, Section 8063 which is law, obviates the Corps from meeting its statutory requirements.
Thanks, Greg. I remember this from getting my FMF pin during one of my tours at TQ. Are you asserting that Force Design, as currently constructed, was implemented without Congressional authorization or even awareness this past 7 years? That would be amazing. I had thought this was the policy of both Trump administrations as well as the Biden administration, remarkable when they agreed on anything. Did any of these institutions consider themselves out of compliance with the statute you referenced?
It doesn’t seem likely this matter could be tested in court. I’m not a lawyer but I think there would be issues of standing and separation of powers. Perhaps Congress needs to tidy up the statute and properly equip the Marines for the mission in the Pacific. I’m just a layman, but it looks like the Army is getting better missiles. If that is the case, it would be something worth arguing about.