Personal ambition is a doubled edged sword and few things have an adverse impact on integrity like careerism. If a Priest expressed the goal of becoming a Cardinal or the Pope he should probably leave the Church. If an Officer is focused on his own advancement he loses sight of his service and might want to consider a different profession. Yet, we have all, in all walks of life, seen the individual of considerable talent who views the organization or institution as a vehicle for their own advancement. Usually to the detriment of the organization and its more selfless members. The evaluation system that is supposed to differentiate between the highly qualified and most qualified is critical. I do not believe the changes to that system in the mid 1990’s was for the better. Character and integrity were subordinated to the metrics of the moment.
My father once told me that there is nothing more pathetic than a Colonel trying too hard to make General. I only later saw the wisdom of the observation.
I am glad when deserving Marine leaders move to the highest echelons in the Department of Defense. I always hope it was talent and selfless service. I always trust that character and integrity were deciders. I know it is also a good deal of luck and good fortune.
"My father once told me that there is nothing more pathetic than a Colonel trying too hard to make General. " - Yes, as a young Officer I worked with a few of the walking dead...it was shocking to see those Marines white knuckling their careers right off the cliff. It put me off a bit. It was obvious when the Colonels were together. The one lion on the staff was casual and professional; in fact I knew him and he didn't stay 11 months before HQMC sent him somewhere else more fitting. The others always looked like gazelles, jumping at everything. Conversely, at the same duty station, I worked with a LtCol who was clearly at the end of his promotion cycle, but still gave a sh&t about the unit and the Marines. He was a great mentor. He came off as a bit of a old rube, mostly due to age and wear. Some of the senior company grade officers I worked with tended to be dismissive towards him. I quickly saw that behind his appearance concealed a wicked wit and sense of humor. On several occasions, he publicly backed me and privately 'guided' me. I am still amazed at how much I learned about staff leadership from him.
--> As far as the changes to the fitrep in the mid '90s, I have a different opinion. Yes, I lived through the transition. The old fitrep was dead - anything less than top marks was functionally adverse, even if not formally adverse regardless of the what the manual said, at least in 2d MarDiv. It was supposed to be all top marks and then let the 1 of X be the differentiator. Anything was going to be better at that point; the system was corrupted. I don't see how you came to the conclusion that character and integrity were subordinated to the metrics of the moment because of the changes. That problem is a function of the RS and RevO, regardless. The new system provided the possibility of having a much better spread so that different levels of good performance can be id'd without screwing the Marines in the middle who make the bulk of their population. It is also easier to break out top performers so they can be appropriately recognized for promotion and assignment opportunities. Bottom line, provided you can adequately justify it, the new PES made it much easier to tell the story. My $.02.
Please anyone from memory name the last 4 VCJCS. Does the Republic require a VCJCS? The National Command Authority is the POTUS and SECDEF. The Chain of Command Flows from the NCA to the Combatant Commander. Please note the CJCS and the VCJCS nor any Service Chief/Member of the JCS are in the Operational Chain of Command. CMC does not “command” anything other than the Marine Corps Band, Silent Drill Team and HQMC Staff and MCCDC, possibly MCIA, MCSBn. How many Combatant Commanders are US Marine Generals? Just months ago the SecDef was focused on reducing the number of Flag and General Officers, this initiative must continue. For comparison the UK has more Admirals than ships, more ceremonial Horses than Tanks, it would be hard pressed to muster a single Combat Brigade.
Grok:”The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) does not directly command any combat forces. According to Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 154, the VCJCS serves in an advisory and administrative role, supporting the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in providing military advice to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. The VCJCS’s primary responsibilities include overseeing joint requirements, assisting with strategic planning, and ensuring interoperability among the armed forces, as well as acting as Chairman in the Chairman’s absence.
Command of combat forces is typically exercised by the combatant commanders, who lead the Unified Combatant Commands (e.g., U.S. Central Command, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command) under the authority of the Secretary of Defense and the President. The VCJCS, like the Chairman, provides oversight and coordination but does not have operational command authority over combat forces. For further details, refer to Department of Defense directives or the U.S. Code.”…Re the National Security Council…it just took a 100 person cut and the Sec State is its Director.
In addition to the careerism that may pervade the services today, it might also be argued, that the more civilianized the services attempt to become, the less effective the leadership. In order not to “scare” American’s with military ethos some geniuses have come up with the idea of making warriors, less warrior like. After all we don’t want to scare the children. MBA’s and masters degrees of another kind are nice, but what do they have to do with war fighting. Time spent getting civilian degrees feels dilutive of military thinking and training. (General OP SMith went to military schools, some of the hardest in the world at that time, it prepared him for Korea) Further, when one is an Aide de Camp at a young point in their career, they see A LOT of interesting things in the 05/06 world, that many do not get to see. Sitting outside your general’s office, riding next to him in the sedan, being a wall flower at staff meetings, you learn a lot as well. The image of the white knuckle officer in charge of something is real. You can spot the 05 and 06 a mile away that is trying too hard to make general. What is sadder, is watching the spectacle, they have no idea how foolish and obvious they are in their ambition. Whatever you do, don’t screw up, seems to be the mantra, and it seeps into every corner of the command that they are in charge of, regardless of MOS. Colonel Ripley came to 1/2 in spring of 1979. It was a shambles. In a few very short months it was turned around, and it was humming. It was his magnetic personality, his clear devoted love of the Corps and HIS Marines We officers in the regiment not in 1/2 watched in amazement, and perhaps some envy as Colonel Ripley turned that Battalion right around and smartly. He sure didn’t seem worried about his next command, he was concentrating on the here and now. When Sargent Meyer re-enlisted, it was inspiring, and one can only imagine the positive impact he may bring to his unit for both enlisted and officers alike. It was, it is and will be always about the Marine that takes charge and regardless of his own desires delivers on the promise of leading his Marines to the best possible outcomes for the unit. Do a good job regardless of the situation and people take notice and if one is lucky enough after all that, then perhaps they will get that star. But, it ought not be the goal. Perhaps that is where so much has broken down at the flag level, they have broken their promise to put their Marines and the Corps first, and taken the vanity route to a flag, more is the pity.
Fromr the review: “The ramifications of this shift became apparent in the post-9/11 era. By that time, the US military had embraced the agenda of humane war, driven both by the availability of precision weaponry and the need to protect its image. The battle shifted from the streets to the courtroom, where the tactics of the war on terror were litigated but its foundational assumptions went without serious challenge. These trends only accelerated during the Obama and Trump presidencies. Even as the two administrations spoke of American power and morality in radically different tones, they ushered in the second decade of the “forever” war.”
In my experience, another issue with the careerist is they tend to be micro-managers and "gatekeepers", especially when one of their subordinates show the very valued leadership trait of initiative. This is leadership based on mistrust vis TRUST. S/F
I have seen an officer or two who make Colonel and go into decisions fright. They become afraid their decision won’t be what their supervisors would want and how it would affect them.
Instead of asking the reporting senior if one of his officers was more concerned about his career than the men under him, the men under him should be able to report on that issue on the reporting senior.
Personal ambition is a doubled edged sword and few things have an adverse impact on integrity like careerism. If a Priest expressed the goal of becoming a Cardinal or the Pope he should probably leave the Church. If an Officer is focused on his own advancement he loses sight of his service and might want to consider a different profession. Yet, we have all, in all walks of life, seen the individual of considerable talent who views the organization or institution as a vehicle for their own advancement. Usually to the detriment of the organization and its more selfless members. The evaluation system that is supposed to differentiate between the highly qualified and most qualified is critical. I do not believe the changes to that system in the mid 1990’s was for the better. Character and integrity were subordinated to the metrics of the moment.
My father once told me that there is nothing more pathetic than a Colonel trying too hard to make General. I only later saw the wisdom of the observation.
I am glad when deserving Marine leaders move to the highest echelons in the Department of Defense. I always hope it was talent and selfless service. I always trust that character and integrity were deciders. I know it is also a good deal of luck and good fortune.
"My father once told me that there is nothing more pathetic than a Colonel trying too hard to make General. " - Yes, as a young Officer I worked with a few of the walking dead...it was shocking to see those Marines white knuckling their careers right off the cliff. It put me off a bit. It was obvious when the Colonels were together. The one lion on the staff was casual and professional; in fact I knew him and he didn't stay 11 months before HQMC sent him somewhere else more fitting. The others always looked like gazelles, jumping at everything. Conversely, at the same duty station, I worked with a LtCol who was clearly at the end of his promotion cycle, but still gave a sh&t about the unit and the Marines. He was a great mentor. He came off as a bit of a old rube, mostly due to age and wear. Some of the senior company grade officers I worked with tended to be dismissive towards him. I quickly saw that behind his appearance concealed a wicked wit and sense of humor. On several occasions, he publicly backed me and privately 'guided' me. I am still amazed at how much I learned about staff leadership from him.
--> As far as the changes to the fitrep in the mid '90s, I have a different opinion. Yes, I lived through the transition. The old fitrep was dead - anything less than top marks was functionally adverse, even if not formally adverse regardless of the what the manual said, at least in 2d MarDiv. It was supposed to be all top marks and then let the 1 of X be the differentiator. Anything was going to be better at that point; the system was corrupted. I don't see how you came to the conclusion that character and integrity were subordinated to the metrics of the moment because of the changes. That problem is a function of the RS and RevO, regardless. The new system provided the possibility of having a much better spread so that different levels of good performance can be id'd without screwing the Marines in the middle who make the bulk of their population. It is also easier to break out top performers so they can be appropriately recognized for promotion and assignment opportunities. Bottom line, provided you can adequately justify it, the new PES made it much easier to tell the story. My $.02.
"My father once told me that there is nothing more pathetic than a Colonel trying too hard to make General."
I lived this. It was unbelievably heinous dealing with that man. To be honest, wouldn't piXX on him if he were on fire to this day....24 years later!
Please anyone from memory name the last 4 VCJCS. Does the Republic require a VCJCS? The National Command Authority is the POTUS and SECDEF. The Chain of Command Flows from the NCA to the Combatant Commander. Please note the CJCS and the VCJCS nor any Service Chief/Member of the JCS are in the Operational Chain of Command. CMC does not “command” anything other than the Marine Corps Band, Silent Drill Team and HQMC Staff and MCCDC, possibly MCIA, MCSBn. How many Combatant Commanders are US Marine Generals? Just months ago the SecDef was focused on reducing the number of Flag and General Officers, this initiative must continue. For comparison the UK has more Admirals than ships, more ceremonial Horses than Tanks, it would be hard pressed to muster a single Combat Brigade.
Grok:”The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) does not directly command any combat forces. According to Title 10, U.S. Code, Section 154, the VCJCS serves in an advisory and administrative role, supporting the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in providing military advice to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. The VCJCS’s primary responsibilities include overseeing joint requirements, assisting with strategic planning, and ensuring interoperability among the armed forces, as well as acting as Chairman in the Chairman’s absence.
Command of combat forces is typically exercised by the combatant commanders, who lead the Unified Combatant Commands (e.g., U.S. Central Command, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command) under the authority of the Secretary of Defense and the President. The VCJCS, like the Chairman, provides oversight and coordination but does not have operational command authority over combat forces. For further details, refer to Department of Defense directives or the U.S. Code.”…Re the National Security Council…it just took a 100 person cut and the Sec State is its Director.
In addition to the careerism that may pervade the services today, it might also be argued, that the more civilianized the services attempt to become, the less effective the leadership. In order not to “scare” American’s with military ethos some geniuses have come up with the idea of making warriors, less warrior like. After all we don’t want to scare the children. MBA’s and masters degrees of another kind are nice, but what do they have to do with war fighting. Time spent getting civilian degrees feels dilutive of military thinking and training. (General OP SMith went to military schools, some of the hardest in the world at that time, it prepared him for Korea) Further, when one is an Aide de Camp at a young point in their career, they see A LOT of interesting things in the 05/06 world, that many do not get to see. Sitting outside your general’s office, riding next to him in the sedan, being a wall flower at staff meetings, you learn a lot as well. The image of the white knuckle officer in charge of something is real. You can spot the 05 and 06 a mile away that is trying too hard to make general. What is sadder, is watching the spectacle, they have no idea how foolish and obvious they are in their ambition. Whatever you do, don’t screw up, seems to be the mantra, and it seeps into every corner of the command that they are in charge of, regardless of MOS. Colonel Ripley came to 1/2 in spring of 1979. It was a shambles. In a few very short months it was turned around, and it was humming. It was his magnetic personality, his clear devoted love of the Corps and HIS Marines We officers in the regiment not in 1/2 watched in amazement, and perhaps some envy as Colonel Ripley turned that Battalion right around and smartly. He sure didn’t seem worried about his next command, he was concentrating on the here and now. When Sargent Meyer re-enlisted, it was inspiring, and one can only imagine the positive impact he may bring to his unit for both enlisted and officers alike. It was, it is and will be always about the Marine that takes charge and regardless of his own desires delivers on the promise of leading his Marines to the best possible outcomes for the unit. Do a good job regardless of the situation and people take notice and if one is lucky enough after all that, then perhaps they will get that star. But, it ought not be the goal. Perhaps that is where so much has broken down at the flag level, they have broken their promise to put their Marines and the Corps first, and taken the vanity route to a flag, more is the pity.
Careerism does lead to attempts to implement “the idea of making warriors, less warrior like”. The below book and articles supports that argument.
Humane: How the United States Abandoned Peace and Reinvented War by Samual Moyn
https://www.amazon.com/Humane-United-States-Abandoned-Reinvented/dp/0374173702/ref=sr_1_1?crid=3W1RQB6W1MSZA&dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.EPpPY2vSqYFtO2CZSdISXA.rmM7Y__C2HbAMgnUxNtqMp12qkf7JjqZVAmz8gcyzEQ&dib_tag=se&keywords=Humane&qid=1750938226&s=books&sprefix=humane%2Cstripbooks%2C315&sr=1-1
Fromr the review: “The ramifications of this shift became apparent in the post-9/11 era. By that time, the US military had embraced the agenda of humane war, driven both by the availability of precision weaponry and the need to protect its image. The battle shifted from the streets to the courtroom, where the tactics of the war on terror were litigated but its foundational assumptions went without serious challenge. These trends only accelerated during the Obama and Trump presidencies. Even as the two administrations spoke of American power and morality in radically different tones, they ushered in the second decade of the “forever” war.”
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2012/01/02/strategic-legalism/
https://warchronicle.com/theyarenotkillers/caseforsquadleader_ssgtwuterich_haditha_25july08_321-2/
Yep!
In my experience, another issue with the careerist is they tend to be micro-managers and "gatekeepers", especially when one of their subordinates show the very valued leadership trait of initiative. This is leadership based on mistrust vis TRUST. S/F
Be glad to exchange views off line or over the phone relative to fitreps.
I have seen an officer or two who make Colonel and go into decisions fright. They become afraid their decision won’t be what their supervisors would want and how it would affect them.
Instead of asking the reporting senior if one of his officers was more concerned about his career than the men under him, the men under him should be able to report on that issue on the reporting senior.