Compass Points - Marines on Carriers
More Marines on more ships around the globe
Compass Points - Marines on Carriers
More Marines on more ships around the globe
September 19, 2025
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In their recent article, "Gaps in Amphibious Forces Pose Unnecessary Risks to National Security" two former Marine Corps Commandants, General Charles Krulak and General James Conway, persuasively warn of global gaps in current US amphibious forces. The authors recommend the US should plug the current gaps in amphibious forces by putting Marine units on every deployed aircraft carrier strike group.
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This concept is different than simply putting Marines back aboard Navy ships as part of the crew, as was the case with the traditional Marine Detachments aboard carriers, cruisers, and some tenders. Those detachments were assigned shipboard duties such as protecting special weapons and running the ship’s brig. The concept we are proposing would instead task-organize Marines for a capability set, train them to a standard prior to deployment, and focus them on the mission throughout the deployment. While not nearly as large as a 2,000-man MEU, nor with all the capabilities of a MEU, our force would be a Special Purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF) with capabilities tailored to the mission.
Real world examples of operational deficiencies created by gaps in forward deployed ARGs/MEUs are not hard to spot. One of the best and most recent examples was the hostilities in the Middle East. For most of the time, there was no ARG/MEU in the Eastern Mediterranean, North Arabian Sea, or the Persian Gulf. But there were carriers and other Navy ships in the area. Would it not have been prudent to have a Marine capability deployed on these ships to respond to contingencies such as a limited NEO, rapid reinforcement of an embassy or consulate, rescue of a downed pilot, limited raid against a high value target, or other mission?
-- Charles Krulak & James Conway, "Gaps in Amphibious Forces Pose Unnecessary Risks to National Security"
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The discussion about putting Marines units onboard deployed carrier strike groups is gaining momentum. Compass Points has received online and off dozens of comments, suggestions, and guidance about putting Marines on aircraft carriers today.
Authors and Marines, Jan Huly, Greg Newbold, and Mathew Broderick help expand the discussion about putting Marines on aircraft carriers by relating their own experiences
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The concept that each deployed US carrier strike group may include a Special Purpose MAGTF (mentioned in recent Compass Points) brings memories for us borne of long experience. We are, collectively, a former CO, of a Marine Detachment on a deployed aircraft carrier, and deployed SPMAGTF, BLT and MEU(SOC) commanders with more than 19 cumulative amphibious deployments in the Mediterranean, Caribbean, Arctic, Asia, Southwest Asia, and Africa regions.
One of us was the CO, 22d MEU(SOC) in 1994 working up for deployment to the Mediterranean Sea. During that workup, COMUSACOM, Adm Paul David Miller, directed the 22d MEU and a CVBG to work up and deploy an "Adaptive Force Package," as an experiment. He directed us to split the MEU assets from the amphibious ships and deploy a CH-46 helicopter detachment, a rifle company (-)(rein) and a small headquarters detachment on the aircraft carrier. The MEU was not given any additional assets to form this package but was further "encouraged" to leave our artillery and some armor back in CONUS (that wasn't done). To accommodate the Marines, the aircraft carrier was required to leave some of their airwing in CONUS.
Bosnia and Somalia were both threats and commitments for various missions during the deployment and Eucom, CentCom and COM6th & 5th fleets all wanted beefed up MEUs, extended coverage and separate operations from both the Amphibious Ready and Carrier Battle Groups for those areas. Other than during the workups, once deployed, the aircraft carrier and the MEU never operated as the "Adaptive Force Package." Within 12 hours of sailing east, the CVBG and ARG/MEU in-chopped to ComNavEur & Com6thFleet's AOR and were directed to reconfigure to their original task organizations and amphibious ship assignments and we proceeded on or separate deployment commitments.
For insights on the feasibility of deploying a SPMAGTF on an aircraft carrier, a good place to start is a review of the formal Post Deployment After Action Reports that were compiled by the ARG, MEU and CVBG. The various challenges and issues were submitted and briefed to N3/N5, VCNO, PP&O, and ACMC, General Boomer, at HQMC in 1995.
While the salient issues are too numerous to address here, initial questions to be answered through a thorough scrub through the DOTMLPF process are:
1. Is this a capability that the Combatant Commanders desire/endorse?
2. Is the Navy on board with this concept as they will be required to give up capabilities and capacity on the aircraft carrier?
- To accommodate the size of the envisioned SPMAGTF the aircraft carrier would be required to reduce the size of the carrier air wing by at least 2 squadrons. Space on a ship is always at a premium. How many spaces will the carrier be willing to give up for the Marines to conduct daily classes, briefings, rapid planning, PT, comm suite, weapons/ammunition/demolitions storage, and possibly helicopter portable vehicles?
3. Providing aircraft carriers with a SPMAGTF for workups and deployments, possibly five at a time, would require at least a battalion's worth of infantry and 2 squadrons of MV22s. Where will the manpower structure and assets come from?
4. Will providing SPMAGTFs be used as an argument for fewer amphibious ships/MEUs?
5. What will the mission sets of this capability be?
- Certainly, Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel would be included, but any other mission sets would be limited to V-22 insertion and withdrawal, and inclement weather would prevent little chance of support for medical evacuation, recovery, resupply and commitment of only an internally designated reserve.
6. What will the command relationships be and as equally important, who will have the Operational and Tactical Control of the SPMAGTF?
- Will they adhere to Joint, Navy, and Marine doctrine for amphibious operations?
- The Command and Control relationships will go far beyond the current relationships that exist between a carrier CO and an embarked fixed wing squadron and should not be quickly accepting of any type of current arrangement. Previous proposals to redefine CATF/CLF relationships to a more equitable relationship, i.e., supporting/supported, should be considered.
Innovation and flexibility have long been a hallmark and distinguishing characteristic of Marines and the Marine Corps, but the best of our initiatives were not made casually, but after deliberate and expansive thought. Few things are new under the sun, and perhaps a notion of Marines assigned to carriers is an idea fraught with potential consequences. "He who hesitates is lost" needs to be balanced with "look before you leap," especially in a military environment where something done once is a tradition.
-- LtGen Jan Huly, USMC (Ret)
-- LtGen Greg Newbold, USMC (Ret)
-- BGen Mathew Broderick, USMC (Ret)
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— LtGen Jan Huly is a retired career infantry officer who commanded BLT 1/8 and the 22d MEU (SOC). He was also the Executive Officer RLT 8 and the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policy, and Operations.
— LtGen Greg Newbold is a retired career infantry officer who was Operations Officer of 4th MEB, and commanded 3/2, 15th MEU (SOC) /15th SPMAGTF, and 1st Marine Division.
— BGen Matt Broderick is a retired career infantry officer who commanded BLT 2/8, and the 24th MEU (SOC), was the N3 amphibious planner at COMNAVSURFLANT, and was the Director of Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations.
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Currently the US does not have enough amphibious ships to get Marines forward deployed around the globe. One way to get more Marines to more global crisis zones today is to embark Marine units on every deployed carrier strike group.
Compass Points thanks authors and Marines, Charles Krulak, James Conway, Jan Huly, Greg Newbold, Mathew Broderick, and all those growing the discussion about ways to get more Marines on more ships around the globe.
Global events never wait. The next crisis is coming. The US needs more Marines, on more ships, in more places, today.
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Real Clear Defense - 09/17/2025
Gaps in Amphibious Forces Pose Unnecessary Risks to National Security
By Charles Krulak & James Conway
General Charles (Chuck) Krulak (U.S. Marine Corps, ret.) is a career infantry officer. He served as the 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps.
General James (Jim) Conway (U.S. Marine Corps, ret.) is a career infantry officer. He served as the 34th Commandant of the Marine Corps.
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Compass Points - More Marines
More Marines on More Ships
September 17, 2025
marinecorpscompasspoints.substack.com/p/compass-points-more-marines-6e7
I understand the reservations of the authors. I admire and have served with all three. The discussion revolves around the size and equipment of this force and mission parameters it could be assigned. The choice is nothing or a MEU of which there has not been a fully potent one at sea in a few years. An Aircraft Carrier based Marine Detachment is not a MEU substitute any more than a squad sized patrol beyond the FLOT is a Rifle Company movement to contact.
A unit like this must be light infantry, with small arms explosives and communications for possible CAS without vehicles or tactical helicopter insertions. The mission assigned cannot exceed its capabilities.
I will not bore readers with my personal design of a T/O and T/E or the cube required for ammunition and supplies nor will I comment on billeting space. I can safely say it would not even approach the space of two flying squadrons with 60 officers, 320 enlisted and 16-22 aircraft. A quick comparison of numbers of sailors and aircraft on the last conventional carriers and current nuclear powered carriers is best addressed by current carrier sailors. Why did the last conventionally powered aircraft carrier ( USS John F Kennedy CV-67) have 105 aircraft and modern ones have 80?
What is crystal clear is that current MEUs are hardly a MAGTF and are as rare as hen’s teeth on the world’s oceans. Marines are not in every clime and place. They are virtually unable to be in any clime and place.
Some sort of Marine Units on carriers is better than what the Corps currently brings to the fight.
The Amphibious fleet is moribund. Soon the Marine contribution will be squadrons on carriers and Coastal Defense Artillery Units who have yet to hit a ship.
The Corps is running the potential of slipping into irrelevance on its current trajectory. I would almost suggest creating an Airborne Bn in each Division.
Since the discussion of Marines aboard CVN’s started a few weeks ago, the thought for this writer has been T/O and T/E. Colonel Rape’ helped clarify some of that fog around both T/E and T/O. It seems logical and very doable, to build up a T/E and T/O of rifle company size that could be placed aboard the CVN and sail with the Battle Group. Now, rather than fool around with the SIF and MLR concept, maybe someone in the puzzle palace combined with the occupant in the oldest standing structure in Washington DC, could find the time and energy to work with the Navy and give the experiment another go. It is low lying fruit. One doesn’t need to divest to invest, simply work the organizational issues and logistics and get the Marines onboard a CVN and see what comes of it. Wouldn’t it be ironic, if in the experimental phase of a deployment that the need arose for this unique group to be called on to handle a small NEO, or put down a gun fight between two small warring factions in a region known for brush fires of the sort described. It is not out of the realm of possibility, and sure beats talking about missiles no one has, on islands no one has been on or asking and being denied access to those islands by a host nation as we fight a phantom war with China. Reality versus dreams. Wall Street has a test, “just get the first one built.” Then the money flows. Well anyone want to put a starting pistol in the air and pull the trigger? My special CVN unit has run a 4 minute mile while the FD dudes are still tying their track spikes. Perhaps in this writer’s fever dream of a real and transparent set of war games with the FD crowd, we add in the Marines on the Carriers. One can hear the cries now, “that’s not fair those Marines aren’t supposed to be on carriers!” Yeah and your Marines are supposed to be on islands as sitting ducks, and they aren’t, well actually in this game they are, and they have run out of fire crackers to shoot at no one, run out of chow and water, and no one knows how to get off the islands, but other than it is all going great. It seems like such a low cost effort to codify the principal, and worthy of a real try.