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Alfred Karam's avatar

Today’s commentary is the most sensible approach to the FD fiasco. Marine Corps leadership should’ve applied this approach from the get go. There was no need to divest from so much firepower to create the SIF. I know, money is the driving factor for the divestment. However, I don’t believe the MC leadership advocated hard enough to increase the Marine Corps budget so the the Missile units could’ve been stood up and integrated into, what is arguably the greatest military concept ever developed, the MAGTF!

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Douglas C Rapé's avatar

One of the many strengths of the MAGTF is its flexibility to grow, contract and task organize based on multiple factors. That adaptability is a remarkable, often under appreciated, characteristic that makes it singularly lethal. The Marine ethos and training approach make this complex versatility look easy. In fact it is honed over decades and becomes an institutional muscle memory executed by competent leaders developed over decades.

It is for that reason that the decisions in 2019 puzzled so many with a lifetime of understanding a MAGTF. As the leadership came to believe that some response to the Chinese Fleet in the South China Sea needed to be developed, doing so in the framework of the MAGTF was only logical and was actually suggested early on. Add a Bn with the ship intradiction mission to each Artillery Regiment and experiment with four versions until such time as the optimal T/O &E emerges. This model has been done repeatedly over the previous decades. Expand, contract, modify, disband, restructure all within the MAGTF concept.

That funding would be required is a given. It light of the overall DoD budget the requested funding would have been modest and precisely what a Commandant is expected to be able to accomplish.

To circumvent the budget request by a misinformed quid pro quo realignment of funding outside of your authority through secrecy, smoke, mirrors, deception and the arbitrary elimination of units and capabilities did not just attempt to catch the Corps flat footed it was an attempt to bypass Congress and the laws concerning appropriations. The fact that it slid through under the radar of a distracted Congress and DoD does not change that it was underhanded, Machiavellian and, with begrudging respect, cunning. The other services chiefs raised no objections because it looked like it would benefit them. Some other Secretaries of Defense would have dragged the CMC into their office to set them straight on the unauthorized midnight end run to the edge of the cliff.

As a former Commander I cannot imagine a subordinate of mine acting in a similar manner and retaining his/her position.

What now? If I were an advisor the the current CMC I would suggest:

1. Place EABO development into the construct and framework of the MAGTF. Request the appropriate funding and end strength increases.

2. Properly request funding for the EABO development from Congress as well as funding and end strength increases.

3. Move swiftly to restore assets and manpower to the MAGTF while developing doctrine on how to support EAOB if it were to execute.

There is little doubt in my mind that Defense Spending is going to increase in light of the growing global threats. A failure to do so rapidly and in a very focused fashion could be very dangerous. The requests in 1 through 3 above will be expensive but not in the overall spending scheme and could yield rapid, globally relevant capabilities . The Marine Corps consumes a very small percentage of the Defense budget. There are fine lines between effectiveness

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