Today’s commentary is the most sensible approach to the FD fiasco. Marine Corps leadership should’ve applied this approach from the get go. There was no need to divest from so much firepower to create the SIF. I know, money is the driving factor for the divestment. However, I don’t believe the MC leadership advocated hard enough to increase the Marine Corps budget so the the Missile units could’ve been stood up and integrated into, what is arguably the greatest military concept ever developed, the MAGTF!
One of the many strengths of the MAGTF is its flexibility to grow, contract and task organize based on multiple factors. That adaptability is a remarkable, often under appreciated, characteristic that makes it singularly lethal. The Marine ethos and training approach make this complex versatility look easy. In fact it is honed over decades and becomes an institutional muscle memory executed by competent leaders developed over decades.
It is for that reason that the decisions in 2019 puzzled so many with a lifetime of understanding a MAGTF. As the leadership came to believe that some response to the Chinese Fleet in the South China Sea needed to be developed, doing so in the framework of the MAGTF was only logical and was actually suggested early on. Add a Bn with the ship intradiction mission to each Artillery Regiment and experiment with four versions until such time as the optimal T/O &E emerges. This model has been done repeatedly over the previous decades. Expand, contract, modify, disband, restructure all within the MAGTF concept.
That funding would be required is a given. It light of the overall DoD budget the requested funding would have been modest and precisely what a Commandant is expected to be able to accomplish.
To circumvent the budget request by a misinformed quid pro quo realignment of funding outside of your authority through secrecy, smoke, mirrors, deception and the arbitrary elimination of units and capabilities did not just attempt to catch the Corps flat footed it was an attempt to bypass Congress and the laws concerning appropriations. The fact that it slid through under the radar of a distracted Congress and DoD does not change that it was underhanded, Machiavellian and, with begrudging respect, cunning. The other services chiefs raised no objections because it looked like it would benefit them. Some other Secretaries of Defense would have dragged the CMC into their office to set them straight on the unauthorized midnight end run to the edge of the cliff.
As a former Commander I cannot imagine a subordinate of mine acting in a similar manner and retaining his/her position.
What now? If I were an advisor the the current CMC I would suggest:
1. Place EABO development into the construct and framework of the MAGTF. Request the appropriate funding and end strength increases.
2. Properly request funding for the EABO development from Congress as well as funding and end strength increases.
3. Move swiftly to restore assets and manpower to the MAGTF while developing doctrine on how to support EAOB if it were to execute.
There is little doubt in my mind that Defense Spending is going to increase in light of the growing global threats. A failure to do so rapidly and in a very focused fashion could be very dangerous. The requests in 1 through 3 above will be expensive but not in the overall spending scheme and could yield rapid, globally relevant capabilities . The Marine Corps consumes a very small percentage of the Defense budget. There are fine lines between effectiveness
One of the best examples of the Marine MAGTF flexibility is the 22nd MEU’s operations in Grenada. The Grenada invasion (Operation Urgent Fury) began the morning of 25 October 1983, two days after the 24th MAU, suffered the Marine Barracks bombing in Beirut. The 22nd MAU was diverted to Operation Urgent Fury while in route to Lebanon and its Mediterranean float. After the Grenada invasion, the MAU then continue on its original mission to the Mediterranean.
The 22th MAU initially captured the northern Pearls airfield in Grenada with Echo and Fox Company’s by vertical assault after Navy Seal Team 4 determine the beaches were not suitable for amphibious assault. On 25 October, 250 Marines from G Company landed at Grand Mal Bay equipped with amphibious assault vehicles and four M60 tanks. They relieved the Navy SEALs the following morning, allowing Governor General Paul Scoon, his wife, and nine aides to be safely evacuated. Golf Company also rescued 233 US medical students. The Marine tank crews continued advancing in the face of sporadic resistance, knocking out a BRDM-2 armored car. G Company subsequently defeated and overwhelmed the Grenadian defenders and Cubans at Fort Frederick after running “roughshod” over Grenada.
The Marine Corps, pre-FD, was first and foremost, a combined arms naval expeditionary force. It had the ground force triad of: infantry, armor, and artillery. Considering today's environment, the Marine Corps needs to be brought back to pre-FD capabilities now, with armor and artillery. The MAGTF MEU as we know, is a tailored combined arms force, and the ground combat element can be tailored to the mission. For this reason each Marine artillery regiment should be equipped with a HIMARS battery, if not a full HIMARS battalion. This would give each Marine Division a Deep Strike and an anti-ship capability. Depending on the mission, the MEU could have a HIMARS section or platoon added. Which would be more survivable, a HIMARS as part of an SIF, or HIMARS as part of a MEU? As part of a MEU, the HIMARS will have all the needed assets of the MEU. They can be inserted by LCAC or C-130. This would return the Marine Corps to its true mission of combined arms naval expeditionary warfare, and add the Deep Strike and anti ship mission.
I continue to be amazed at the desire of so many General Officers to try and find a middle ground with the Force Design advocates. It should be obvious to all that this switch from being America's force in readiness to a diminished role of being a "recon for the joint force" has the stench of politics, political ambition and a fool hardy desire to"put their stamp" on the New Marine Corps.
How do you reach a middle ground with a man that says "we're on the righteous path". That person has stopped talking about tactics or logistics or warfighting in general. That person is on a crusade.
When any issue has turned into a quasi-religious debate and the person you're talking to has no ability to look seriously at his plans without it being an attack on his "faith" then you're wasting your breath and your time.
Force Design 2030 is a religion to too many at HQMC. They refuse to see the holes in their design. They will accept no criticism of their baby.
TLDR? You can't reach peace with religious zealots. I remind you again. "we are on a righteous path" is what they told us. Now tell me. Is that a military leader talking or a religious fanatic?
, efficiency, frugality and stupidity. The CMC can make that case to Congress. Currently the Corps is dancing on the edge of the cliff in the dark. Gen Smith can illuminate, step back, get on sure footing and redevelop a powerful MAGTF quickly.
Today’s commentary is the most sensible approach to the FD fiasco. Marine Corps leadership should’ve applied this approach from the get go. There was no need to divest from so much firepower to create the SIF. I know, money is the driving factor for the divestment. However, I don’t believe the MC leadership advocated hard enough to increase the Marine Corps budget so the the Missile units could’ve been stood up and integrated into, what is arguably the greatest military concept ever developed, the MAGTF!
One of the many strengths of the MAGTF is its flexibility to grow, contract and task organize based on multiple factors. That adaptability is a remarkable, often under appreciated, characteristic that makes it singularly lethal. The Marine ethos and training approach make this complex versatility look easy. In fact it is honed over decades and becomes an institutional muscle memory executed by competent leaders developed over decades.
It is for that reason that the decisions in 2019 puzzled so many with a lifetime of understanding a MAGTF. As the leadership came to believe that some response to the Chinese Fleet in the South China Sea needed to be developed, doing so in the framework of the MAGTF was only logical and was actually suggested early on. Add a Bn with the ship intradiction mission to each Artillery Regiment and experiment with four versions until such time as the optimal T/O &E emerges. This model has been done repeatedly over the previous decades. Expand, contract, modify, disband, restructure all within the MAGTF concept.
That funding would be required is a given. It light of the overall DoD budget the requested funding would have been modest and precisely what a Commandant is expected to be able to accomplish.
To circumvent the budget request by a misinformed quid pro quo realignment of funding outside of your authority through secrecy, smoke, mirrors, deception and the arbitrary elimination of units and capabilities did not just attempt to catch the Corps flat footed it was an attempt to bypass Congress and the laws concerning appropriations. The fact that it slid through under the radar of a distracted Congress and DoD does not change that it was underhanded, Machiavellian and, with begrudging respect, cunning. The other services chiefs raised no objections because it looked like it would benefit them. Some other Secretaries of Defense would have dragged the CMC into their office to set them straight on the unauthorized midnight end run to the edge of the cliff.
As a former Commander I cannot imagine a subordinate of mine acting in a similar manner and retaining his/her position.
What now? If I were an advisor the the current CMC I would suggest:
1. Place EABO development into the construct and framework of the MAGTF. Request the appropriate funding and end strength increases.
2. Properly request funding for the EABO development from Congress as well as funding and end strength increases.
3. Move swiftly to restore assets and manpower to the MAGTF while developing doctrine on how to support EAOB if it were to execute.
There is little doubt in my mind that Defense Spending is going to increase in light of the growing global threats. A failure to do so rapidly and in a very focused fashion could be very dangerous. The requests in 1 through 3 above will be expensive but not in the overall spending scheme and could yield rapid, globally relevant capabilities . The Marine Corps consumes a very small percentage of the Defense budget. There are fine lines between effectiveness
Spot on Doug, and a good road map of what needs to be accomplished.
One of the best examples of the Marine MAGTF flexibility is the 22nd MEU’s operations in Grenada. The Grenada invasion (Operation Urgent Fury) began the morning of 25 October 1983, two days after the 24th MAU, suffered the Marine Barracks bombing in Beirut. The 22nd MAU was diverted to Operation Urgent Fury while in route to Lebanon and its Mediterranean float. After the Grenada invasion, the MAU then continue on its original mission to the Mediterranean.
The 22th MAU initially captured the northern Pearls airfield in Grenada with Echo and Fox Company’s by vertical assault after Navy Seal Team 4 determine the beaches were not suitable for amphibious assault. On 25 October, 250 Marines from G Company landed at Grand Mal Bay equipped with amphibious assault vehicles and four M60 tanks. They relieved the Navy SEALs the following morning, allowing Governor General Paul Scoon, his wife, and nine aides to be safely evacuated. Golf Company also rescued 233 US medical students. The Marine tank crews continued advancing in the face of sporadic resistance, knocking out a BRDM-2 armored car. G Company subsequently defeated and overwhelmed the Grenadian defenders and Cubans at Fort Frederick after running “roughshod” over Grenada.
The Marine Corps, pre-FD, was first and foremost, a combined arms naval expeditionary force. It had the ground force triad of: infantry, armor, and artillery. Considering today's environment, the Marine Corps needs to be brought back to pre-FD capabilities now, with armor and artillery. The MAGTF MEU as we know, is a tailored combined arms force, and the ground combat element can be tailored to the mission. For this reason each Marine artillery regiment should be equipped with a HIMARS battery, if not a full HIMARS battalion. This would give each Marine Division a Deep Strike and an anti-ship capability. Depending on the mission, the MEU could have a HIMARS section or platoon added. Which would be more survivable, a HIMARS as part of an SIF, or HIMARS as part of a MEU? As part of a MEU, the HIMARS will have all the needed assets of the MEU. They can be inserted by LCAC or C-130. This would return the Marine Corps to its true mission of combined arms naval expeditionary warfare, and add the Deep Strike and anti ship mission.
I continue to be amazed at the desire of so many General Officers to try and find a middle ground with the Force Design advocates. It should be obvious to all that this switch from being America's force in readiness to a diminished role of being a "recon for the joint force" has the stench of politics, political ambition and a fool hardy desire to"put their stamp" on the New Marine Corps.
How do you reach a middle ground with a man that says "we're on the righteous path". That person has stopped talking about tactics or logistics or warfighting in general. That person is on a crusade.
When any issue has turned into a quasi-religious debate and the person you're talking to has no ability to look seriously at his plans without it being an attack on his "faith" then you're wasting your breath and your time.
Force Design 2030 is a religion to too many at HQMC. They refuse to see the holes in their design. They will accept no criticism of their baby.
TLDR? You can't reach peace with religious zealots. I remind you again. "we are on a righteous path" is what they told us. Now tell me. Is that a military leader talking or a religious fanatic?
You will appreciate a damning critique of the CPG to be available soon, likely on these pages.
A superb article: First Rate. Thank you all and Chowder II
, efficiency, frugality and stupidity. The CMC can make that case to Congress. Currently the Corps is dancing on the edge of the cliff in the dark. Gen Smith can illuminate, step back, get on sure footing and redevelop a powerful MAGTF quickly.