Today’s Marine Corps is the poster child for senior leader “delusion wrapped in denial.” Force Design is a flawed concept. It is a recipe for disaster. It has already destroyed the combined arms and global response capabilities of the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps obviously knows it. The senior leaders have had five years to see the damage done to the operating forces and to the national defense. Yet, the Commandant doubled down on denial in his recent FRAGO 01-2024 where he vowed to “remain firmly committed to our current path.”
This denial has boxed the Marine Corps into a corner, which is evident by the absence of the Commandant’s Planning Guidance. In my humble opinion, the way out of this box could not be more clear - - scrub Force Design and replace it with an operating concept that restores global response in the age of precision weapons. The foundation for this concept have been clearly laid out by General Charles Krulak and General Tony Zinni in Vision 2035: https://nationalinterest.org/feature/vision-2035-global-response-age-precision-munitions-205995.
The damage done the Marine Corps can only be fixed “whole cloth.” Capabilities and equipment cannot be piecemealed back. The Marine Corps needs a new, better operating concept to confront the diverse threats in an increasingly dangerous world. The genius is to get the operating concept right, for from it can be derived the force structure, equipment, doctrine, training and education, and facilities and support needed to defeat these threats. Thanks to General Krulak and General Zinni, the blueprint for the concept is already on the table.
While on active duty the quickest way for a senior flag officer to lose my respect was to state: “That is not politically possible” to explain a lack of candor based on truth. I would think to myself: “Why not give your best possible military advice and let politicians tell us what is not possible?” Why paint false pictures, create mirages and pander? That can become a habit of deception that carries over into war. Integrity matters in battle, on recruiting short falls, in force generation, RD&A, budget submissions, weapon performance and every other aspect of national defense. Directly tied to this charade is accountability. Military leaders must be accountable for what they supported, what they tolerated and policies they embraced. Medals when it turns out well and relief for failure. The more we have decorated our senior leaders to look like S American desk bound dictators the fewer we have held accountable for innumerable failures. Then they publish books to explain why the dead and maimed were not their fault.
Sooner or later, much as the IJN did, we all sit down for a buffet of consequences. I suspect, that if we are correct, the working part of the USMC will start to notice there is no 'there' there for Force Design as an operating concept. They'll be running face first into the logisitcal and Operational shortfalls. You can tell me unmanned paragliders and underwater subs are going to resupply and reinforce me on Hemlock Island all you want, but when push comes to shove. Likewise, Sgt's will eventually start asking: are we really relying primarily on blending with the jungle crabs to hide a center of gravity like a Gator Radar in this or any concept of warfare? Just considering the passive and active measures needed to protect an active radar system will eventually push the operational planning in a different direction. When that reality backs up the pipeline, all the copies of 'Kill Chain' and all the 'secret wargames' won't keep a pivot in concept from happening. (PS- Kill Chain isn't a bad read and presents ideas worthy to consider. But it is far from being a holy scriptual reference for future combat in the Pacific.)
I got this info confidentially. Apparently, this is what actually happened to put the USMC in it's current position:
At the Friday night DoD poker game, where the services play for who gets what, the USMC got up to use the head. When he returned, he got worried:
USMC: Hey! Did you guys look at my cards?
USN: No brother, we're family. (Raises bet...a lot)
USA: Nope. (Matches the raise)
USAF: Not me, buddy. (Matches also)
USSF: 404 not found. (Matches)
SOCOM: (just stares...and matches)
JCS: Relax Marine Corps, it's all good. You're doing fine. Like you say, divest to invest. Now I am going to call and you are going to throw that pair of Aces on the table along with the rest of the hot garbage you're holding.
“Winning A Future War: War Gaming and Victory in the Pacific War” by Norman Friedman and “War in the Pacific: A Study of Navies, Peoples and Battle Problems” by Sutherland Denlinger and Charles B. Gray. (The “Studies of Navies” was published in 1936 and is not available on Amazon, it will take a bit of work to find.)
In light of the 2030 design, I would highly recommend these two books for professional reading (as in “YOU GOTTA READ THESE BOOKS!”). Both books not only describe the method, development, and value of Naval War Gaming before WW2 but also the development of “War Plan Orange”. I should note that both books declare that naval offensive operations in order to block and/or capture SLOCs are the strategic objectives that will win the war.
After WW1 and up to 1934, the Naval War College developed unique procedures and capabilities in the employment of aircraft carriers and amphibious assault using “war games”. The Naval War College was uniquely working directly with the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and not the Naval Schools System. In addition, the Naval War College worked in conjunction with the OPNAV War Plans Division. An interesting fact is the Naval War College did not call them war games. The strategic games were called “Chart Studies” and tactical games were called “Board Studies”. I also thought it interesting that before the game started, the blue team would give three enemy courses of action before they started their planning.
Both books start with the assumption that Japan will most likely be the belligerent in a Pacific Ocean war that starts with attacks on the Philippines and our Pacific Island Possessions. The other assumption is that the Japan will start the war with a surprise attack. They believe that the War will start with Japan’s attack on the Philippines and the probable capture of Guam. They know that Japan as an island nation is dependent on imports and SLOCs for their food and raw materials.
Those assumptions present the strategic problem of getting the fleet from the West Coast and Hawaii to meet the Japanese Fleet in the area of Guam. In order to complete that strategic maneuver, the US Fleet would have to sail through the “Mandates”. At the end of WW1 the League of Nations carved up the German Possessions in the Pacific. The Japanese Mandates was the area consisting of three island groups; the Marshalls (think Kwajalein and Majuro), the Marianas (think Guam, Tinian and Saipan), the Carolines (think Truk and Palau/Peleliu) that Japan seized from Germany in 1914. The League of Nations later awarded Japan a mandate for the groups, on condition that Japan promise not to fortify or establish bases in the mandated territory. (BTW LtCol “Pete” Ellis died on Palau (1923) on his “secret mission” (wink-wink) to spy on the Japanese developments in the Mandates.)
Apparently, when the war planners began looking at the Japanese Mandates, they started to realize they needed to look at seizing islands for advanced Naval Bases. If you want to see a very nice piece of US Marine Staff work generated by the Orange Plan look at FMFRP 12-46 Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia. https://www.theblackvault.com/documents/wwii/marine1/1246.pdf . This work was re-published in 1992 by Deputy Commanding General Marine Corps, Combat Development Command, Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps, A.C. Zinni. I mention this only because I thought it would be nice for Chowder II to know that some Marines do read the Marine History that Chowder II members worked hard to provide when on active duty
The Winning A Future War book focuses on the how, as in “how do we win the war”. They worked out the problems presented in the war games on aircraft launching and recovery. Launching was easy but recovery was taking up 20+ minutes per aircraft. The Navy solved the problem rigging arresting gear between the park planes and the landing area. They also learned that they had to maximize the number of planes on board their carriers. This lesson paid off at the Battle of Midway when our three carriers provided more planes than the Japanese four carriers. Students also learned that carriers were easily knocked out with flight deck damage. Moving forward new carriers were design to enable their crew to repair the flight deck at sea with stored repair materials on board.
The students also realized that the combat aircraft attrition rate would be exceptional high. When they walked that issue back, they discovered that the US aircraft industry would be able to produce the planes needed to keep the carriers operational. However, they also knew that there needed be a supply of trained pilots. The Japanese missed this lesson when they were basically out of naval pilots for the Battle of Leyte Gulf. The Japanese Navy used their remaining air craft carriers to draw off Admiral Halsey and his carries as a deception plan, and it worked.
Part II Coming next "War in the Pacific: A Study of Navies, Peoples and Battle Problems".
As WC Fields responded to a rube in a poker game, when asked if it was a game of chance…”no, not the I play.” As USMC doubled down on chips with a big wide grin and left the aces and hot garbage on the table.
In other news Lt. General James Glynn (wait for it…another deputy dawg commandant, manpower and reserve affairs) announced that a pilot program has been launched for recruitment of cyber and signals Marines. Some may enter the Corps at the rank of E7, just think Gunny Pilsbury Doughboy and his Coke bottle bottom glasses with tape around the one side where a hinge once existed will just float past all other qualified Marines regardless of MOS to the rank of E7. What a great way to build unit cohesion and trust and confidence of the enlisted and officers around these individuals. There is no doubt a lot more to the story found in todays Marine Times, but at this stage who needs the back story. Desperate for recruits to place on small islands in the Philippines with magic sensors, short range ballistic fire crackers that will be resupplied by advanced naval submersible robot crewed machines, these new Marines will be the new poster Marines. Just like say, A real WWI Devil Dog at high port bayonet fixed saying “first to fight!” Or the DI snarling at a recruit saying “we never promised you a rose garden!”
It has to be clear that the senior managers of the Corps have become so over saturated with their own hubris and the foggy bottom smell of failure that they have just given in and given up. If Lt. General Glynn and the CMC think this will help recruitment they are so out of touch that they must have business class tickets on Elon Musk’s first SpaceX rocket to Mars.
What do we know? We know that the ethos of being a Marine, of honor and service earned and never given attracts the overwhelming majority young men and women to our Corps. These clowns and I know we said decorum was important here, but these three and four clowns need a very big bucket of ice water tossed on them to wake them up. This is a casting catastrophe and they seem content to just go along for the ride. This recruitment trick is just another example of how lost these people are, fully in the clutches of DC nonsense, having lost of their bearings and true north has become south.
I agree with the concern. However, I will say that LtGen Glynn is a solid leader. I've served as a contractor in a unit he commanded, and I know others that have served with him as a General Officer. He is most definitely not a chairborne officer or Mr. Hugz. He has a consumate reputation as a professional. If anyone can make lemons from lemonade, he is top of the list. Regarding the program - I've read the Maradmin. I can see how they are tiptoeing through this minefield. For whatever reason, the program wants specialists in uniform, versus contracted SME's. I can also see how the idea percolated through Manpower, when we do something similar to recruit and sustain 'The President's Own'. From that, it looks like they id'd 'E-7' as sweet spot to match the benefits against the skills and level of authority they want. I don't like it, but I understand it. Further, Prior (other) Service and Non Prior service are required to complete recruit training. So they will have to get across the parade deck, though I'll chuckle when I see a graduation where a newly minted Marine is rocking 3up/2 down, no hashmarks and a shooting badge (We'll see how they figure that - in practice I bet they promote after reporting to their first duty station). Reading between the lines, the Maradmin seems to show a strong preference for Prior Marines. Regardless, this clearly isn't a 'just grab the fat computer kid in the hoodie and put the butt in a seat' entry process.
To be clear, I am not a fan of the Marine Corps Talent Acquisition Pilot under Talent Management 2030. Despite that, I do see voices of sanity trying to ensure that the policy is the best it can be and limits potential harm. Of note, from Maradmin 253/24: "Feedback. OccFLD specialists shall provide feedback on the performance of MCTAP Marines and the MCTAP process itself to Headquarters United States Marine Corps at 6 months and 12 months from the date the applicant begins serving in their designated billet.".
A voice of clarity! cfrog much appreciated and I got the joke in terms of trying to match skill with an MOS that it may be difficult to find the right people to fill the MOS and billets. You are there and familiar with the thinking and rationale behind it. But like you I don’t like it, I see problems popping as a newly minted E7 gets thrown into a situation that they are not qualified or prepared for, and difficulties abound. I am sure you see the same possibilities. I would add that they ought to head to the School of Infantry either a first run through or as a tune up. As to Lt. General Glynn good to hear he is solid. The default postion from my perch is they are ALL bad until proven otherwise. Yes, totally unfair and unreasonable but the senior “manager” class has ruined it for the good ones. “Holy Jesus Private Pyle what is this…a doughnut!” Recall the entire platoon paid the price for the doughnut…we all had similar experiences like a bee hive of combo locks that came from unlocked foot and wall lockers in the Squad bay at Camp Upshur…we all paid. So it is my old thinking that paints with a broad brush. But really appreciate your insights and follow up. Old doesn’t mean one can’t change their mind or at least listen.
It is Monday, 8 December 1941. On wake Island, a tiny sprung paper-clip in the Pacific between Hawaii and Guam, Marines of the 1st Defense Battalion are starting another day of the backbreaking war preparations that have gone on for weeks. Out in the triangular lagoon formed by the islets of Peale, Wake, and Wilkes, the huge silver Pan American Airways Philippine Clipper flying boat roars off the water bound for Guam. The trans-Pacific flight will not be completed.
Word of war comes around 0700. Captain Henry S. Wilson, Army Signal Corps, on the island to support the flight ferry of B-17 Flying Fortresses from Hawaii to the Philippines, half runs, half walks toward the tent of Major James P.S. Devereux, commander of the battalion's Wake Detachment. Captain Wilson reports that Hickam Field in Hawaii has been raided.
Devereux immediately orders a "Call to Arms." He quickly assembles his officers, tells them that war has come, that the Japanese have attacked Oahu, and that Wake "could expect the same thing in a very short time."
Major James P.S. Devereux, Commanding Officer of the Wake Detachment of the 1st Defense Battalion (seen here as a POW at Shanghai, circa January 1942), was born in Cuba and educated in the United States and in Switzerland. Devereux enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1923. He saw service at home (Norfolk, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., and Quantico, among other places) and abroad (Cuba, Nicaragua, and China). He was awarded the Navy Cross for his leadership of the Marines at Wake. After his retirement, he served in the U.S. House of Representatives.
It seems, however, that directionless double talk and disassociated ramblings, coming out of DC, that I see on TV and internet screens much of the time do not portend that the USA will reemerge as a nation that is well prepared to defend itself and its interests.
4. Distribution/Availability of Report: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.
5. Name of Performing Organization:
6. Office Symbol:
JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT
7. Address: NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 686 CUSHING ROAD
NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207
8. Title (Include Security Classification) :The Art of War: A Sun Tzu-ian Look at the Operational Functions (JQJ
9. Personal Authors: LtCol Robert W. DeStafney, USMC
11. Date of Report: 16 May 2000 12.PageCount:^5""I12APaperAdvisor(ifany):
13.Supplementary Notation: A paper submitted to the Faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department'. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.
14. Ten key words that relate to your paper:
Sun Tzu, Operational Art, Operational Functions, Joint Military Operations, Logistics, Fires, Leadership, Intelligence, Command and Control, Protection, Synchronization, Continuity
15-Abstract: The Art of War, the best known and most studied philosophy of war in history is regularly overlooked by students of the operational art. Developed by 5th century BC Chinese general Sun Wu, The Art of War finds great popularity in the ranks of junior officers and NCOs, dealing with war at the tactical level. Similarly, Sun's philosophy garners great attention among public officials and senior military officers, including many who never get past his opening statement: "War is a vital matter of the state; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin." Sun's immediate acknowledgement of the critical nature of war lead many to believe The Art of War is merely another recognition of the primacy of politics in warfare. Therefore, unfortunately, most planning or otherwise engaged in the operational level of war simply ignore a vital, invaluable source. While The Art of War is a one of the fundamental building blocks of the Naval War College Strategy and Policy Course, it
gets precious little mention (if any) during the follow-on segment of study, Joint Military Operations.
How unfortunate. Sun Tzu's philosophy has many direct applications to those planning and executing the military art at the operational level. Analysis of the Operational Functions (command and control, fires, intelligence, logistics, protection, and synchronization of operational functions) provides a useful framework from which to examine Sun's understanding of operational level warfare.
16.Distribution / Unclassified Same As Rpt DTIC Users Availability of
Abstract:
17.Abstract Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
18.Name of Responsible Individual: CHAIRMAN, JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT 19.Telephone: 841-6461 20.Office Symbol:
10.Type of Report: FINAL
ABSTRACT
Students of the operational art regularly overlook the Art of War, the best-known and
Today’s Marine Corps is the poster child for senior leader “delusion wrapped in denial.” Force Design is a flawed concept. It is a recipe for disaster. It has already destroyed the combined arms and global response capabilities of the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps obviously knows it. The senior leaders have had five years to see the damage done to the operating forces and to the national defense. Yet, the Commandant doubled down on denial in his recent FRAGO 01-2024 where he vowed to “remain firmly committed to our current path.”
This denial has boxed the Marine Corps into a corner, which is evident by the absence of the Commandant’s Planning Guidance. In my humble opinion, the way out of this box could not be more clear - - scrub Force Design and replace it with an operating concept that restores global response in the age of precision weapons. The foundation for this concept have been clearly laid out by General Charles Krulak and General Tony Zinni in Vision 2035: https://nationalinterest.org/feature/vision-2035-global-response-age-precision-munitions-205995.
The damage done the Marine Corps can only be fixed “whole cloth.” Capabilities and equipment cannot be piecemealed back. The Marine Corps needs a new, better operating concept to confront the diverse threats in an increasingly dangerous world. The genius is to get the operating concept right, for from it can be derived the force structure, equipment, doctrine, training and education, and facilities and support needed to defeat these threats. Thanks to General Krulak and General Zinni, the blueprint for the concept is already on the table.
While on active duty the quickest way for a senior flag officer to lose my respect was to state: “That is not politically possible” to explain a lack of candor based on truth. I would think to myself: “Why not give your best possible military advice and let politicians tell us what is not possible?” Why paint false pictures, create mirages and pander? That can become a habit of deception that carries over into war. Integrity matters in battle, on recruiting short falls, in force generation, RD&A, budget submissions, weapon performance and every other aspect of national defense. Directly tied to this charade is accountability. Military leaders must be accountable for what they supported, what they tolerated and policies they embraced. Medals when it turns out well and relief for failure. The more we have decorated our senior leaders to look like S American desk bound dictators the fewer we have held accountable for innumerable failures. Then they publish books to explain why the dead and maimed were not their fault.
Absolutely spot on.
Sooner or later, much as the IJN did, we all sit down for a buffet of consequences. I suspect, that if we are correct, the working part of the USMC will start to notice there is no 'there' there for Force Design as an operating concept. They'll be running face first into the logisitcal and Operational shortfalls. You can tell me unmanned paragliders and underwater subs are going to resupply and reinforce me on Hemlock Island all you want, but when push comes to shove. Likewise, Sgt's will eventually start asking: are we really relying primarily on blending with the jungle crabs to hide a center of gravity like a Gator Radar in this or any concept of warfare? Just considering the passive and active measures needed to protect an active radar system will eventually push the operational planning in a different direction. When that reality backs up the pipeline, all the copies of 'Kill Chain' and all the 'secret wargames' won't keep a pivot in concept from happening. (PS- Kill Chain isn't a bad read and presents ideas worthy to consider. But it is far from being a holy scriptual reference for future combat in the Pacific.)
I got this info confidentially. Apparently, this is what actually happened to put the USMC in it's current position:
At the Friday night DoD poker game, where the services play for who gets what, the USMC got up to use the head. When he returned, he got worried:
USMC: Hey! Did you guys look at my cards?
USN: No brother, we're family. (Raises bet...a lot)
USA: Nope. (Matches the raise)
USAF: Not me, buddy. (Matches also)
USSF: 404 not found. (Matches)
SOCOM: (just stares...and matches)
JCS: Relax Marine Corps, it's all good. You're doing fine. Like you say, divest to invest. Now I am going to call and you are going to throw that pair of Aces on the table along with the rest of the hot garbage you're holding.
Pre-War War Games: Part I
“Winning A Future War: War Gaming and Victory in the Pacific War” by Norman Friedman and “War in the Pacific: A Study of Navies, Peoples and Battle Problems” by Sutherland Denlinger and Charles B. Gray. (The “Studies of Navies” was published in 1936 and is not available on Amazon, it will take a bit of work to find.)
In light of the 2030 design, I would highly recommend these two books for professional reading (as in “YOU GOTTA READ THESE BOOKS!”). Both books not only describe the method, development, and value of Naval War Gaming before WW2 but also the development of “War Plan Orange”. I should note that both books declare that naval offensive operations in order to block and/or capture SLOCs are the strategic objectives that will win the war.
After WW1 and up to 1934, the Naval War College developed unique procedures and capabilities in the employment of aircraft carriers and amphibious assault using “war games”. The Naval War College was uniquely working directly with the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and not the Naval Schools System. In addition, the Naval War College worked in conjunction with the OPNAV War Plans Division. An interesting fact is the Naval War College did not call them war games. The strategic games were called “Chart Studies” and tactical games were called “Board Studies”. I also thought it interesting that before the game started, the blue team would give three enemy courses of action before they started their planning.
Both books start with the assumption that Japan will most likely be the belligerent in a Pacific Ocean war that starts with attacks on the Philippines and our Pacific Island Possessions. The other assumption is that the Japan will start the war with a surprise attack. They believe that the War will start with Japan’s attack on the Philippines and the probable capture of Guam. They know that Japan as an island nation is dependent on imports and SLOCs for their food and raw materials.
Those assumptions present the strategic problem of getting the fleet from the West Coast and Hawaii to meet the Japanese Fleet in the area of Guam. In order to complete that strategic maneuver, the US Fleet would have to sail through the “Mandates”. At the end of WW1 the League of Nations carved up the German Possessions in the Pacific. The Japanese Mandates was the area consisting of three island groups; the Marshalls (think Kwajalein and Majuro), the Marianas (think Guam, Tinian and Saipan), the Carolines (think Truk and Palau/Peleliu) that Japan seized from Germany in 1914. The League of Nations later awarded Japan a mandate for the groups, on condition that Japan promise not to fortify or establish bases in the mandated territory. (BTW LtCol “Pete” Ellis died on Palau (1923) on his “secret mission” (wink-wink) to spy on the Japanese developments in the Mandates.)
Apparently, when the war planners began looking at the Japanese Mandates, they started to realize they needed to look at seizing islands for advanced Naval Bases. If you want to see a very nice piece of US Marine Staff work generated by the Orange Plan look at FMFRP 12-46 Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia. https://www.theblackvault.com/documents/wwii/marine1/1246.pdf . This work was re-published in 1992 by Deputy Commanding General Marine Corps, Combat Development Command, Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps, A.C. Zinni. I mention this only because I thought it would be nice for Chowder II to know that some Marines do read the Marine History that Chowder II members worked hard to provide when on active duty
The Winning A Future War book focuses on the how, as in “how do we win the war”. They worked out the problems presented in the war games on aircraft launching and recovery. Launching was easy but recovery was taking up 20+ minutes per aircraft. The Navy solved the problem rigging arresting gear between the park planes and the landing area. They also learned that they had to maximize the number of planes on board their carriers. This lesson paid off at the Battle of Midway when our three carriers provided more planes than the Japanese four carriers. Students also learned that carriers were easily knocked out with flight deck damage. Moving forward new carriers were design to enable their crew to repair the flight deck at sea with stored repair materials on board.
The students also realized that the combat aircraft attrition rate would be exceptional high. When they walked that issue back, they discovered that the US aircraft industry would be able to produce the planes needed to keep the carriers operational. However, they also knew that there needed be a supply of trained pilots. The Japanese missed this lesson when they were basically out of naval pilots for the Battle of Leyte Gulf. The Japanese Navy used their remaining air craft carriers to draw off Admiral Halsey and his carries as a deception plan, and it worked.
Part II Coming next "War in the Pacific: A Study of Navies, Peoples and Battle Problems".
Semper Fi
As WC Fields responded to a rube in a poker game, when asked if it was a game of chance…”no, not the I play.” As USMC doubled down on chips with a big wide grin and left the aces and hot garbage on the table.
In other news Lt. General James Glynn (wait for it…another deputy dawg commandant, manpower and reserve affairs) announced that a pilot program has been launched for recruitment of cyber and signals Marines. Some may enter the Corps at the rank of E7, just think Gunny Pilsbury Doughboy and his Coke bottle bottom glasses with tape around the one side where a hinge once existed will just float past all other qualified Marines regardless of MOS to the rank of E7. What a great way to build unit cohesion and trust and confidence of the enlisted and officers around these individuals. There is no doubt a lot more to the story found in todays Marine Times, but at this stage who needs the back story. Desperate for recruits to place on small islands in the Philippines with magic sensors, short range ballistic fire crackers that will be resupplied by advanced naval submersible robot crewed machines, these new Marines will be the new poster Marines. Just like say, A real WWI Devil Dog at high port bayonet fixed saying “first to fight!” Or the DI snarling at a recruit saying “we never promised you a rose garden!”
It has to be clear that the senior managers of the Corps have become so over saturated with their own hubris and the foggy bottom smell of failure that they have just given in and given up. If Lt. General Glynn and the CMC think this will help recruitment they are so out of touch that they must have business class tickets on Elon Musk’s first SpaceX rocket to Mars.
What do we know? We know that the ethos of being a Marine, of honor and service earned and never given attracts the overwhelming majority young men and women to our Corps. These clowns and I know we said decorum was important here, but these three and four clowns need a very big bucket of ice water tossed on them to wake them up. This is a casting catastrophe and they seem content to just go along for the ride. This recruitment trick is just another example of how lost these people are, fully in the clutches of DC nonsense, having lost of their bearings and true north has become south.
I agree with the concern. However, I will say that LtGen Glynn is a solid leader. I've served as a contractor in a unit he commanded, and I know others that have served with him as a General Officer. He is most definitely not a chairborne officer or Mr. Hugz. He has a consumate reputation as a professional. If anyone can make lemons from lemonade, he is top of the list. Regarding the program - I've read the Maradmin. I can see how they are tiptoeing through this minefield. For whatever reason, the program wants specialists in uniform, versus contracted SME's. I can also see how the idea percolated through Manpower, when we do something similar to recruit and sustain 'The President's Own'. From that, it looks like they id'd 'E-7' as sweet spot to match the benefits against the skills and level of authority they want. I don't like it, but I understand it. Further, Prior (other) Service and Non Prior service are required to complete recruit training. So they will have to get across the parade deck, though I'll chuckle when I see a graduation where a newly minted Marine is rocking 3up/2 down, no hashmarks and a shooting badge (We'll see how they figure that - in practice I bet they promote after reporting to their first duty station). Reading between the lines, the Maradmin seems to show a strong preference for Prior Marines. Regardless, this clearly isn't a 'just grab the fat computer kid in the hoodie and put the butt in a seat' entry process.
To be clear, I am not a fan of the Marine Corps Talent Acquisition Pilot under Talent Management 2030. Despite that, I do see voices of sanity trying to ensure that the policy is the best it can be and limits potential harm. Of note, from Maradmin 253/24: "Feedback. OccFLD specialists shall provide feedback on the performance of MCTAP Marines and the MCTAP process itself to Headquarters United States Marine Corps at 6 months and 12 months from the date the applicant begins serving in their designated billet.".
A voice of clarity! cfrog much appreciated and I got the joke in terms of trying to match skill with an MOS that it may be difficult to find the right people to fill the MOS and billets. You are there and familiar with the thinking and rationale behind it. But like you I don’t like it, I see problems popping as a newly minted E7 gets thrown into a situation that they are not qualified or prepared for, and difficulties abound. I am sure you see the same possibilities. I would add that they ought to head to the School of Infantry either a first run through or as a tune up. As to Lt. General Glynn good to hear he is solid. The default postion from my perch is they are ALL bad until proven otherwise. Yes, totally unfair and unreasonable but the senior “manager” class has ruined it for the good ones. “Holy Jesus Private Pyle what is this…a doughnut!” Recall the entire platoon paid the price for the doughnut…we all had similar experiences like a bee hive of combo locks that came from unlocked foot and wall lockers in the Squad bay at Camp Upshur…we all paid. So it is my old thinking that paints with a broad brush. But really appreciate your insights and follow up. Old doesn’t mean one can’t change their mind or at least listen.
A Magnificent Fight:
Marines in the Battle for Wake Island
Marines in World War II
Commemorative Series
by Robert J. Cressman
A Magnificent Fight:
Marines in the Battle for Wake Island
by Robert J. Cressman
It is Monday, 8 December 1941. On wake Island, a tiny sprung paper-clip in the Pacific between Hawaii and Guam, Marines of the 1st Defense Battalion are starting another day of the backbreaking war preparations that have gone on for weeks. Out in the triangular lagoon formed by the islets of Peale, Wake, and Wilkes, the huge silver Pan American Airways Philippine Clipper flying boat roars off the water bound for Guam. The trans-Pacific flight will not be completed.
Word of war comes around 0700. Captain Henry S. Wilson, Army Signal Corps, on the island to support the flight ferry of B-17 Flying Fortresses from Hawaii to the Philippines, half runs, half walks toward the tent of Major James P.S. Devereux, commander of the battalion's Wake Detachment. Captain Wilson reports that Hickam Field in Hawaii has been raided.
Devereux immediately orders a "Call to Arms." He quickly assembles his officers, tells them that war has come, that the Japanese have attacked Oahu, and that Wake "could expect the same thing in a very short time."
Major James P.S. Devereux, Commanding Officer of the Wake Detachment of the 1st Defense Battalion (seen here as a POW at Shanghai, circa January 1942), was born in Cuba and educated in the United States and in Switzerland. Devereux enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1923. He saw service at home (Norfolk, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., and Quantico, among other places) and abroad (Cuba, Nicaragua, and China). He was awarded the Navy Cross for his leadership of the Marines at Wake. After his retirement, he served in the U.S. House of Representatives.
THIS essay makes sense.
It seems, however, that directionless double talk and disassociated ramblings, coming out of DC, that I see on TV and internet screens much of the time do not portend that the USA will reemerge as a nation that is well prepared to defend itself and its interests.
CONDITION RED:
MARINE DEFENSE BATTALIONSI N
WORLDWARI I
MARINESI N
WORLDWARI I COMMEMORATIVE SERIES……..
24 years ago..
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE Newport, R.I.
The Art of War: A Sun Tzu-ian Look at the Operational Functions by
Robert W. DeStafhey LtCol, United States Marines
ApapersubmittedtotheFacultyoftheNavalWarCollegeinpartialsatisfactionofthe requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.
The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NavalWarCollegeortheDepartmentoftheNavy. ik
Signature:
16 May 2000
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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 1. Report Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
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4. Distribution/Availability of Report: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.
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6. Office Symbol:
JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT
7. Address: NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 686 CUSHING ROAD
NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207
8. Title (Include Security Classification) :The Art of War: A Sun Tzu-ian Look at the Operational Functions (JQJ
9. Personal Authors: LtCol Robert W. DeStafney, USMC
11. Date of Report: 16 May 2000 12.PageCount:^5""I12APaperAdvisor(ifany):
13.Supplementary Notation: A paper submitted to the Faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department'. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.
14. Ten key words that relate to your paper:
Sun Tzu, Operational Art, Operational Functions, Joint Military Operations, Logistics, Fires, Leadership, Intelligence, Command and Control, Protection, Synchronization, Continuity
15-Abstract: The Art of War, the best known and most studied philosophy of war in history is regularly overlooked by students of the operational art. Developed by 5th century BC Chinese general Sun Wu, The Art of War finds great popularity in the ranks of junior officers and NCOs, dealing with war at the tactical level. Similarly, Sun's philosophy garners great attention among public officials and senior military officers, including many who never get past his opening statement: "War is a vital matter of the state; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin." Sun's immediate acknowledgement of the critical nature of war lead many to believe The Art of War is merely another recognition of the primacy of politics in warfare. Therefore, unfortunately, most planning or otherwise engaged in the operational level of war simply ignore a vital, invaluable source. While The Art of War is a one of the fundamental building blocks of the Naval War College Strategy and Policy Course, it
gets precious little mention (if any) during the follow-on segment of study, Joint Military Operations.
How unfortunate. Sun Tzu's philosophy has many direct applications to those planning and executing the military art at the operational level. Analysis of the Operational Functions (command and control, fires, intelligence, logistics, protection, and synchronization of operational functions) provides a useful framework from which to examine Sun's understanding of operational level warfare.
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Abstract:
17.Abstract Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
18.Name of Responsible Individual: CHAIRMAN, JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT 19.Telephone: 841-6461 20.Office Symbol:
10.Type of Report: FINAL
ABSTRACT
Students of the operational art regularly overlook the Art of War, the best-known and