This post is a sad commentary of Force Design and SIF. Those who led us down this destructive path will be scorned by future Marines and judged harshly by historiafns. Those who knew the path chosen would wreck the Corps but failed to speak out will have to live with their apathy.
Four years in and a mountain of facts bury a delusional concept and the leadership remains obstinate and hostile. This is not tenacity or the behavior of professionals. It is spoiled brat behavior throwing tantrums and demanding to be listened to. That sort of stubbornness is not admirable. It is refusing to accept responsibility. The drunk loser at the roulette table in Vegas keeps doubling down with no chance of winning. The facts be damned, full speed ahead. I hope I am able to witness the leaders being held accountable. There must be consequences for these actions. Those who were silent must understand that silence is consent and they are still responsible.
Last spring I went back to Okinawa for the first time in 17 years. Wife wanted to visit family. As I was at the airport ready to leave, I met up with a LtCol from HQMC. We had quite the conversation about the entire direction of the Corps. Apparently, if you voice any sort of opposition to the directive given....you are not looked upon "favorably" at any board.
He was all aboard with it. He was part of the GATO/R radar folks. I really wanted to ask him how an active radar system was stealthy enough for a SIF that is supposed to be "hiding" on some island with short range missiles. However, the flight was called and we headed aboard.
Yeah - I've heard the same concerns about poisoning perception with any kind of substantive questioning - not active opposition, just professionally pointing out concerns and gaps to be addressed.
-The AN/TPS-80 is a good upgrade and leap forward for capability, especially the Joint networking capabilities. It's one bright spot in the 'invest' and I think the AD would wear 'teletubbie' costumes if it meant getting that system/capability. They know they aren't going to be stealthing an active radar that doesn't have a passive mode (and networking passive radars has it's own challenges for remaining undetected). Because of that, I am hopeful that practical pressure moves the needle when it comes to doctrine and mission planning. If trying to make SIF work the way it's briefed runs headlong into the 'that's not how it works' and 'that's just unsupportable' wall...it'll have to change. Just think what it must be like trying to squeeze this through a MCPP session right now at the MLR / MarDiv / MEF level. Imagine actually briefing the ConOps to Pacom for deploying SIF with EABO. oh, I am sure they are trying to use the 'FD Acronym Guidebook'...but I have a feeling the horse being sold doesn't match the advertising. (Note:The good thing about the bluewater maginot line is that it is much harder to logistically 'fake it til you make it' than it was in the original)
In my opinion, it defies common sense and logic, that CMC Smith is still standing firm on the whole FD concept. If you want missiles, just add missiles to the arty regiments. But to demolish the whole Marine Corps mission and force structure to have a missile force is insane. HQMC is duplicating what the Air Force, Army, and Navy are already good at. The Marine Corps is a global force and not a regional force, focusing on just one threat. In return, the Marine Corps has abandoned its global expeditionary mission and the United States now lacks a credible and robust naval expeditionary force, ready to respond to any crisis.
I always thought that the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command could have been tagged to form anti-ship batteries that could be protected by Marine detachments from the pre-FD units.
Now, how you move them and supply them in the face of Chinese forces is another question altogether.
The former CMC will only be remembered for this misguided debacle. The current CMC can save his legacy by taking an immediate about face and start the rebuilding.
Recently, the HOS Resolution finally headed north, after almost a month in Naha. No PR releases, no updates for a half year. Hornbeck (the contractor) did use a nice (6+ months old) photo of the Resolution for it's 2025 Happy New Year Post on Facebook. There's also a Japanese fan club posting photos of the Resolution in and around Naha. Otherwise, it's radio silence on this thing. The hull jacks and ramp, while they seem to work, haven't been shown yet to provide a match or advantage over bow ramps (The idea is that the stern landing system is supposed to provide more flexible and faster approach, deploy, and withdraw performance over other potential craft).
One of the simple business management principles is the Project Management Triangle. The “Triangle” consists of the three legs of “Scope, Time and Cost”. The initial planning establishes the acceptable balance of these three project essential elements. If one leg is adjusted, due to a planned or unplanned change, the other two legs will also change and adjust by the appropriate relational increase or decrease. Military strategic planning, weather due to new weapon tactics, technology, or organization, is very similar. However, the three relational legs are “lethality, survivability, and affordability” and these represent the “Tradeoff Triangle". The objective here is to provide lethality and survivability at the best affordable cost. FD2030 misses and fails on all three legs of the tradeoff triangle. Lethality is missed with short range missiles. Survivability is missed with the engagement zone vulnerability and lack of an acceptably logistics concept. Affordability is missed not only in dollars sunk on a bad concept, but also the cost of cutting capabilities of the MAGTF. What is ignored, missed and forgotten in FD2030 is the cutting of capabilities is not part of the "Tradeoff Triangle". S/F
We are back to where we have been until now. Now meaning new SecDef and SecNav, here shortly. The starting line to this writers thinking isn’t so much how dead SIF/EABO and FD2030 is, that corpse is heading for room temperature fast. It is that in order to survive as the Marine Corps we have to be different. This has not been a problem up to the last 5 years. So the big question is whether the SecDef and SecNav will allow the Corps to go back to the MAGTF concept and give it the budget to do so. As an aside and as if this CMC and any officer that supports the latest experiment in recruit training, the Marine Corps Times is reporting that mixed gender DI’s are on the job. At some point pandering to nihilistic congress people with their she/he/they/them hobucky has to stop. IOC is a classic example, it needs to stop. Someone needs to put their stars on the desk over it. Sadly the current resident of the oldest standing structure in Washington DC., has demonstrated a decided lack of moral courage. You can all be sure if General Louis Wilson were in the same pickle, he may have been fired over his stand, but some people would have had such a tongue lashing on his way out the door that their backsides would feel sore from the spanking,.
Gonna put on my “go ahead and stand before Congress with that” hat—you want to get Congress to not listen, go ahead and talk about women at boot camp or women at IOC. Go ahead and mix that, which is utterly unrelated to Force Design, with SIF and EABO, and see which data point gets all the attention. Go ahead and do that when Sgt Nicole Gee joined her fellow Marines in death at Abbey Gate when all of them were trying to accomplish an impossible mission, regardless of gender. Go ahead and tell Congress that Sgt Gee needs to go somewhere else in order to “get back to the MAGTF.”
I circle back to the A4 discussion—this isn’t the late 90s and raging about third rail topics from 30 years ago does nothing to advance your own argument and will only make Congress switch you off. The Marine Corps of today isn’t the Corps of 1998, just as the Corps of 1998 wasn’t the Corps of 1978. You want to talk to Congress about SIF and missiles? Do that. You want to complain about women being where you don’t think they should be, then enjoy the sound of silence emanating from congressional offices.
United States Marine Corps 10 U.S. Code 8053- United States Marine Corps: composite;functions . NOT United States Short Range Duplicative SIF Missile Corps!
this blog loves to link articles that support the opinion of the author, while completely leaving out articles that go against it's preconceived notions.
the 3rd Littoral Regiment received their first NEMESIS systems on Nov 26, 2024, in Hawaii. that's less than two months ago. so while "there are still zero operational deployed Marine missile units." may be technically true, they have active missiles in the pacom theater, and they're transportable by Marine C-130s, so that statement is misleading at best. I also doubt the marines are publicizing, even to you, exactly where and when they'll "deploy" the first ones further west than hawaii.
moving on, you selectively quote again. "The Army missile units include a variety of missiles including the PrSM, SM-6, MST, and LRHW. The theoretical Marine missile units depend mostly on the NSM - Navy Strike Missile - which is much slower and has a shorter range."
no mention that the army only got the PrSM one year before marines got the NEMESIS, on December 8, 2023, and they only confirmed they fired their first multi-missile PrSM salvo on November 20, 2024, again, less than two months ago. one of these systems has been widely trialed, the other is still getting its feet wet. you leave the reader with the opposite impression of which is which. there's also no readily available info on whether the army's PrSM has ever even deployed or made it as far west as hawaii.
this post is also just leaving out that the army's tomahawk is only transportable via multiple C-17s but the marines tomahawk is based on a JLTV and is C-130 transportable, leaves out how many runways in the region exist for each, and what that does to deployability in a conflict.
best we can get from the post is a ..."mostly" .... and a "theoretical" about a unit that the marines activated a year and half ago, in August 2023, and could be anywhere in theater in a day, onto a dirt strip.
"The theoretical Marine missile units depend mostly on the NSM - Navy Strike Missile - which is much slower and has a shorter range."
As a Marine Officer I'm about to say what I think is the Truth but it will be extremely difficult for many Marines to accept. The Marine Corps Leadership needs to accept the fact that the Stand In Force Concept is dead. Navy, Air Force and Army units with long range fires capabilities are better suited to the function. But this raises another even larger concern: the further integration of the Marine Corps elements into the Army, Navy and Air Force. We need rapidly deployable Marine Air & Ground Units; but the rationale for a separate Service Branch is past & the sizable cost of the duplication of efforts between the Services can no longer be afforded.
Mike, been thinking about your comment. You bring up a good point, and it's definitely something to consider. The USMC has always been first on the 'make the orchestra more efficient' cutting block. That said, I think the modern USMC still has value as a separate service, provided it focuses on it's unique, evolved identity as the most inherently Joint service. I think there is also arguable value for a global facing Nation to have different services develop different solutions to similar problems (USMC MarPat vs USA Universal Camo (pre-MultiCam pattern as a simple example)) under different mission sets.
I agree with your comments. Historically the Marines are not just the first to fight but also the first to be on the chopping block. An Integrated Force in Readiness with a high esprit d' corps is required; and the Marine Corps with its Ground, Sea to Shore and Air capabilities fits that mission. What I am calling for is not the end of the Corps - but the moving of Marine Corps units into the Army, Navy and Air Force structure to reduce duplication of services and costs. This by itself will be extremely challenging and fraught with difficulty. But I have something else to add. I think the changes needed in the DOD are applicable across all the services; that in the end there should be no duplication of functions in Headquarters and Staff elements - that a single Ground, Air, Sea & Space Readiness Command should exist to provide forces to the Unified Commands. This would be the biggest change in the history of the DOD - bigger than the 1947 National Security Act that set up the current structure of the Dept. We are living through a technology revolution trying to get ready for WW5 with a force structure built around a WW2 Model.
I think we were blessed in 1940 and 41 to have the Military Staff and Leaders in the Navy and War Dept's to learn the lessons that had to be learned. The Marines had Pete Ellis that saw what was needed in the Pacific years before; the Navy was understanding Carrier and Submarine War; the Army was coming up with better TO&Es than the Germans. That's not to say they made mistakes but they were learning. WW3 was the Cold War; WW4 the War Against Terror and now WW5 is to me is what we are seeing in the Ukraine and Mid East. Drones, Ballistic Missiles, Detection Systems and Asymmetric Warfare will be a part of WW5. Are we doing enough in these areas today today? In terms of force ratios we have more Generals and Admirals than we ever had; we also have more expensive weapons; more delayed programs - $1 Billion Bombers; $80 Million Fighters. We have 2 separate ground forces, 4 separate air forces and at least 6 separate Billion Dollar R&D & Procurement Organizations. Yet we have shortfalls across every munition category. Where is the money going? Is this the best Establishment we can't afford? Time for Change Sir.
*(8 CVN's require replacements only after CVN-71 in 2036)
Separate production of a CCA~8tAviation/MH60~14tHelicopter frigate mix completely eliminates the value of light carrier LHA air expeditionary operations in favor of a modern CVE equivalnet, future LPVD/LSB's also would incorporate limited CCA/helicopters-tiltrotors.
Beyond 2050, a Navy of 4,000/10,000/25,000 ton ships would be possible if technology to achieve sufficient Marine mobile-protected-firepower is programmed as a long term objective.
Tom- could you clarify your proposal? Note, not even the Ford Class CVN's are 144k tons displacement (typo?). Are you suggesting a mega conventional powered carrier? Note- well decks have been validated as neccessary for amphibs over time (most of the new LHAs are scheduled to be built with well decks). Still no good replacement. Vertical lift and amphib lift complement each other's capabilities.
Space and posting limitations make it difficult to present a proposal or discussion argument to any great depth, part of the reason for a bullet point approach, with unfortunately formatting issues that make the result hard to follow.
Yes, the CVM would be a 27knot diesel-electric mega-carrier, the largest vessel size that could pass through the widened Panama canal locks, about the size of a medium container ship. Nuclear propulsion carries with it large overhead crew costs, the most expensive item in the lifecycle of a warship, and fleet aircraft carriers are the least efficient type to apply it to. The air group consumes more fuel than propulsion in a large ship, this CVM would carry 20-24k tons of fuel and have as much real endurance as a CVN.
The CVM would not operate in the littorals, but the LPD's, LWT/(LST)'s, LSB's and other elements of the expeditionary Marine force would form a component of a large operation, the LPD's would still have well decks and function in the inshore zone as a critical element of securing lines of communication with the airmobile deployment. The CVM bears a degree of similarity to the Queen Elizabeth class CVS in an even greater large economy size that is big enough to operate full tactical transports ferried in to move the medium armor ashore.
The greatest deficiency with OMFTS and Vision 2035 is a lack of mass and range to the assault force, the high cost of continuously maintaining the force at sea, and its lack of any meaningful air warfare capability to secure the skies above the force. An added benefit of a large CVM would be its ability to operate in support of the naval attack aircraft carrier force, since its large capacity would allow it to function similarly to the RN's R08 and R09 if they formed a combined naval warfare battlegroup.
Missile duplication will underscore the redundancy of the Marine Corps other than small units focused on relief operations, and even that may not be enough to preserve the Corps itself since it could be performed by contractors and similar cheap and expedient responses to disasters that already are a big part of how the world responds to them. Decades and centuries of institutional insight, however obstinate and resistant to change it is, will be lost only to be reclaimed through as much time and a large price in blood and treasure. It is not possible to simply unf*** the nature of such a f*** up.
This post is a sad commentary of Force Design and SIF. Those who led us down this destructive path will be scorned by future Marines and judged harshly by historiafns. Those who knew the path chosen would wreck the Corps but failed to speak out will have to live with their apathy.
Four years in and a mountain of facts bury a delusional concept and the leadership remains obstinate and hostile. This is not tenacity or the behavior of professionals. It is spoiled brat behavior throwing tantrums and demanding to be listened to. That sort of stubbornness is not admirable. It is refusing to accept responsibility. The drunk loser at the roulette table in Vegas keeps doubling down with no chance of winning. The facts be damned, full speed ahead. I hope I am able to witness the leaders being held accountable. There must be consequences for these actions. Those who were silent must understand that silence is consent and they are still responsible.
Last spring I went back to Okinawa for the first time in 17 years. Wife wanted to visit family. As I was at the airport ready to leave, I met up with a LtCol from HQMC. We had quite the conversation about the entire direction of the Corps. Apparently, if you voice any sort of opposition to the directive given....you are not looked upon "favorably" at any board.
He was all aboard with it. He was part of the GATO/R radar folks. I really wanted to ask him how an active radar system was stealthy enough for a SIF that is supposed to be "hiding" on some island with short range missiles. However, the flight was called and we headed aboard.
Yeah - I've heard the same concerns about poisoning perception with any kind of substantive questioning - not active opposition, just professionally pointing out concerns and gaps to be addressed.
-The AN/TPS-80 is a good upgrade and leap forward for capability, especially the Joint networking capabilities. It's one bright spot in the 'invest' and I think the AD would wear 'teletubbie' costumes if it meant getting that system/capability. They know they aren't going to be stealthing an active radar that doesn't have a passive mode (and networking passive radars has it's own challenges for remaining undetected). Because of that, I am hopeful that practical pressure moves the needle when it comes to doctrine and mission planning. If trying to make SIF work the way it's briefed runs headlong into the 'that's not how it works' and 'that's just unsupportable' wall...it'll have to change. Just think what it must be like trying to squeeze this through a MCPP session right now at the MLR / MarDiv / MEF level. Imagine actually briefing the ConOps to Pacom for deploying SIF with EABO. oh, I am sure they are trying to use the 'FD Acronym Guidebook'...but I have a feeling the horse being sold doesn't match the advertising. (Note:The good thing about the bluewater maginot line is that it is much harder to logistically 'fake it til you make it' than it was in the original)
In my opinion, it defies common sense and logic, that CMC Smith is still standing firm on the whole FD concept. If you want missiles, just add missiles to the arty regiments. But to demolish the whole Marine Corps mission and force structure to have a missile force is insane. HQMC is duplicating what the Air Force, Army, and Navy are already good at. The Marine Corps is a global force and not a regional force, focusing on just one threat. In return, the Marine Corps has abandoned its global expeditionary mission and the United States now lacks a credible and robust naval expeditionary force, ready to respond to any crisis.
I always thought that the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command could have been tagged to form anti-ship batteries that could be protected by Marine detachments from the pre-FD units.
Now, how you move them and supply them in the face of Chinese forces is another question altogether.
The former CMC will only be remembered for this misguided debacle. The current CMC can save his legacy by taking an immediate about face and start the rebuilding.
Recently, the HOS Resolution finally headed north, after almost a month in Naha. No PR releases, no updates for a half year. Hornbeck (the contractor) did use a nice (6+ months old) photo of the Resolution for it's 2025 Happy New Year Post on Facebook. There's also a Japanese fan club posting photos of the Resolution in and around Naha. Otherwise, it's radio silence on this thing. The hull jacks and ramp, while they seem to work, haven't been shown yet to provide a match or advantage over bow ramps (The idea is that the stern landing system is supposed to provide more flexible and faster approach, deploy, and withdraw performance over other potential craft).
One of the simple business management principles is the Project Management Triangle. The “Triangle” consists of the three legs of “Scope, Time and Cost”. The initial planning establishes the acceptable balance of these three project essential elements. If one leg is adjusted, due to a planned or unplanned change, the other two legs will also change and adjust by the appropriate relational increase or decrease. Military strategic planning, weather due to new weapon tactics, technology, or organization, is very similar. However, the three relational legs are “lethality, survivability, and affordability” and these represent the “Tradeoff Triangle". The objective here is to provide lethality and survivability at the best affordable cost. FD2030 misses and fails on all three legs of the tradeoff triangle. Lethality is missed with short range missiles. Survivability is missed with the engagement zone vulnerability and lack of an acceptably logistics concept. Affordability is missed not only in dollars sunk on a bad concept, but also the cost of cutting capabilities of the MAGTF. What is ignored, missed and forgotten in FD2030 is the cutting of capabilities is not part of the "Tradeoff Triangle". S/F
We are back to where we have been until now. Now meaning new SecDef and SecNav, here shortly. The starting line to this writers thinking isn’t so much how dead SIF/EABO and FD2030 is, that corpse is heading for room temperature fast. It is that in order to survive as the Marine Corps we have to be different. This has not been a problem up to the last 5 years. So the big question is whether the SecDef and SecNav will allow the Corps to go back to the MAGTF concept and give it the budget to do so. As an aside and as if this CMC and any officer that supports the latest experiment in recruit training, the Marine Corps Times is reporting that mixed gender DI’s are on the job. At some point pandering to nihilistic congress people with their she/he/they/them hobucky has to stop. IOC is a classic example, it needs to stop. Someone needs to put their stars on the desk over it. Sadly the current resident of the oldest standing structure in Washington DC., has demonstrated a decided lack of moral courage. You can all be sure if General Louis Wilson were in the same pickle, he may have been fired over his stand, but some people would have had such a tongue lashing on his way out the door that their backsides would feel sore from the spanking,.
Gonna put on my “go ahead and stand before Congress with that” hat—you want to get Congress to not listen, go ahead and talk about women at boot camp or women at IOC. Go ahead and mix that, which is utterly unrelated to Force Design, with SIF and EABO, and see which data point gets all the attention. Go ahead and do that when Sgt Nicole Gee joined her fellow Marines in death at Abbey Gate when all of them were trying to accomplish an impossible mission, regardless of gender. Go ahead and tell Congress that Sgt Gee needs to go somewhere else in order to “get back to the MAGTF.”
I circle back to the A4 discussion—this isn’t the late 90s and raging about third rail topics from 30 years ago does nothing to advance your own argument and will only make Congress switch you off. The Marine Corps of today isn’t the Corps of 1998, just as the Corps of 1998 wasn’t the Corps of 1978. You want to talk to Congress about SIF and missiles? Do that. You want to complain about women being where you don’t think they should be, then enjoy the sound of silence emanating from congressional offices.
United States Marine Corps 10 U.S. Code 8053- United States Marine Corps: composite;functions . NOT United States Short Range Duplicative SIF Missile Corps!
this blog loves to link articles that support the opinion of the author, while completely leaving out articles that go against it's preconceived notions.
the 3rd Littoral Regiment received their first NEMESIS systems on Nov 26, 2024, in Hawaii. that's less than two months ago. so while "there are still zero operational deployed Marine missile units." may be technically true, they have active missiles in the pacom theater, and they're transportable by Marine C-130s, so that statement is misleading at best. I also doubt the marines are publicizing, even to you, exactly where and when they'll "deploy" the first ones further west than hawaii.
https://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/3980303/3d-marine-littoral-regiment-receives-nmesis/
moving on, you selectively quote again. "The Army missile units include a variety of missiles including the PrSM, SM-6, MST, and LRHW. The theoretical Marine missile units depend mostly on the NSM - Navy Strike Missile - which is much slower and has a shorter range."
no mention that the army only got the PrSM one year before marines got the NEMESIS, on December 8, 2023, and they only confirmed they fired their first multi-missile PrSM salvo on November 20, 2024, again, less than two months ago. one of these systems has been widely trialed, the other is still getting its feet wet. you leave the reader with the opposite impression of which is which. there's also no readily available info on whether the army's PrSM has ever even deployed or made it as far west as hawaii.
https://www.army.mil/article/272301/army_announces_first_precision_strike_missiles_delivery
https://www.defensenews.com/land/2024/11/20/us-army-fires-precision-strike-missile-in-salvo-shot-for-first-time/
it's hard to take posts like this seriously when you can easily google info that refutes the narrative this blog tries so hard to push.
this post is also just leaving out that the army's tomahawk is only transportable via multiple C-17s but the marines tomahawk is based on a JLTV and is C-130 transportable, leaves out how many runways in the region exist for each, and what that does to deployability in a conflict.
best we can get from the post is a ..."mostly" .... and a "theoretical" about a unit that the marines activated a year and half ago, in August 2023, and could be anywhere in theater in a day, onto a dirt strip.
"The theoretical Marine missile units depend mostly on the NSM - Navy Strike Missile - which is much slower and has a shorter range."
Don't be silly. Opposition to Force Design is just a bunch of zombies who can't get with the PowerPoint presentations.
You need to put a warning in front of your comments to prevent violent laughter induced coffee spray. Where do I send the bill for a new keyboard?
As a Marine Officer I'm about to say what I think is the Truth but it will be extremely difficult for many Marines to accept. The Marine Corps Leadership needs to accept the fact that the Stand In Force Concept is dead. Navy, Air Force and Army units with long range fires capabilities are better suited to the function. But this raises another even larger concern: the further integration of the Marine Corps elements into the Army, Navy and Air Force. We need rapidly deployable Marine Air & Ground Units; but the rationale for a separate Service Branch is past & the sizable cost of the duplication of efforts between the Services can no longer be afforded.
Mike, been thinking about your comment. You bring up a good point, and it's definitely something to consider. The USMC has always been first on the 'make the orchestra more efficient' cutting block. That said, I think the modern USMC still has value as a separate service, provided it focuses on it's unique, evolved identity as the most inherently Joint service. I think there is also arguable value for a global facing Nation to have different services develop different solutions to similar problems (USMC MarPat vs USA Universal Camo (pre-MultiCam pattern as a simple example)) under different mission sets.
I agree with your comments. Historically the Marines are not just the first to fight but also the first to be on the chopping block. An Integrated Force in Readiness with a high esprit d' corps is required; and the Marine Corps with its Ground, Sea to Shore and Air capabilities fits that mission. What I am calling for is not the end of the Corps - but the moving of Marine Corps units into the Army, Navy and Air Force structure to reduce duplication of services and costs. This by itself will be extremely challenging and fraught with difficulty. But I have something else to add. I think the changes needed in the DOD are applicable across all the services; that in the end there should be no duplication of functions in Headquarters and Staff elements - that a single Ground, Air, Sea & Space Readiness Command should exist to provide forces to the Unified Commands. This would be the biggest change in the history of the DOD - bigger than the 1947 National Security Act that set up the current structure of the Dept. We are living through a technology revolution trying to get ready for WW5 with a force structure built around a WW2 Model.
Are you sure we didn't fight WW2 with a WW5 model? ;)
I think we were blessed in 1940 and 41 to have the Military Staff and Leaders in the Navy and War Dept's to learn the lessons that had to be learned. The Marines had Pete Ellis that saw what was needed in the Pacific years before; the Navy was understanding Carrier and Submarine War; the Army was coming up with better TO&Es than the Germans. That's not to say they made mistakes but they were learning. WW3 was the Cold War; WW4 the War Against Terror and now WW5 is to me is what we are seeing in the Ukraine and Mid East. Drones, Ballistic Missiles, Detection Systems and Asymmetric Warfare will be a part of WW5. Are we doing enough in these areas today today? In terms of force ratios we have more Generals and Admirals than we ever had; we also have more expensive weapons; more delayed programs - $1 Billion Bombers; $80 Million Fighters. We have 2 separate ground forces, 4 separate air forces and at least 6 separate Billion Dollar R&D & Procurement Organizations. Yet we have shortfalls across every munition category. Where is the money going? Is this the best Establishment we can't afford? Time for Change Sir.
Don't agree with the solution, but I get where you're coming from.
Giving Manueuver from the Sea a Foundation and a Reason for Maintaining the Marine Corps
Marine Assault Ship Cost-Capacity
======================
Designation LHA CVM
Displacement 45,000t 144,000t
Cost $4B $9B
Ship Crew 800 800
Max.Air Crew 800 3000+
Max.Marines 1800 3000+
Marine Units LtInf/TowedArty Arm/Inf/Cav/SPG
Min.Air/Mar. 200 200
Ferry In 0 4000+
Magazine Depth 400t 2000t+
Strike Range 450nm (F-35B) 1500nm (UA-36E)
Max.Lift Range 100nm (CH-53) 1000nm (C-130N/C-230M/V-330-70%)
Max.Lift Mass 10t 25/35t
Survivability
-------------
Ship 1 2+
Lost Ship
---------
Air Group 30% 70%
Redeployability 30% 90%
Cost 10 CVN / 10 LHA = $180B (Greater At Sea Cost / Lower Projection Capacity)
Cost 8 CVN / 8 CVM = $176B (Greater Aircraft Cost / Lower At Sea Cost)*
*(8 CVN's require replacements only after CVN-71 in 2036)
Separate production of a CCA~8tAviation/MH60~14tHelicopter frigate mix completely eliminates the value of light carrier LHA air expeditionary operations in favor of a modern CVE equivalnet, future LPVD/LSB's also would incorporate limited CCA/helicopters-tiltrotors.
Beyond 2050, a Navy of 4,000/10,000/25,000 ton ships would be possible if technology to achieve sufficient Marine mobile-protected-firepower is programmed as a long term objective.
Tom- could you clarify your proposal? Note, not even the Ford Class CVN's are 144k tons displacement (typo?). Are you suggesting a mega conventional powered carrier? Note- well decks have been validated as neccessary for amphibs over time (most of the new LHAs are scheduled to be built with well decks). Still no good replacement. Vertical lift and amphib lift complement each other's capabilities.
Space and posting limitations make it difficult to present a proposal or discussion argument to any great depth, part of the reason for a bullet point approach, with unfortunately formatting issues that make the result hard to follow.
Yes, the CVM would be a 27knot diesel-electric mega-carrier, the largest vessel size that could pass through the widened Panama canal locks, about the size of a medium container ship. Nuclear propulsion carries with it large overhead crew costs, the most expensive item in the lifecycle of a warship, and fleet aircraft carriers are the least efficient type to apply it to. The air group consumes more fuel than propulsion in a large ship, this CVM would carry 20-24k tons of fuel and have as much real endurance as a CVN.
The CVM would not operate in the littorals, but the LPD's, LWT/(LST)'s, LSB's and other elements of the expeditionary Marine force would form a component of a large operation, the LPD's would still have well decks and function in the inshore zone as a critical element of securing lines of communication with the airmobile deployment. The CVM bears a degree of similarity to the Queen Elizabeth class CVS in an even greater large economy size that is big enough to operate full tactical transports ferried in to move the medium armor ashore.
The greatest deficiency with OMFTS and Vision 2035 is a lack of mass and range to the assault force, the high cost of continuously maintaining the force at sea, and its lack of any meaningful air warfare capability to secure the skies above the force. An added benefit of a large CVM would be its ability to operate in support of the naval attack aircraft carrier force, since its large capacity would allow it to function similarly to the RN's R08 and R09 if they formed a combined naval warfare battlegroup.
Formatting seriously screwed up the alignment of columns
Missile duplication will underscore the redundancy of the Marine Corps other than small units focused on relief operations, and even that may not be enough to preserve the Corps itself since it could be performed by contractors and similar cheap and expedient responses to disasters that already are a big part of how the world responds to them. Decades and centuries of institutional insight, however obstinate and resistant to change it is, will be lost only to be reclaimed through as much time and a large price in blood and treasure. It is not possible to simply unf*** the nature of such a f*** up.