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Polarbear's avatar

“One of the munitions used to sink the Tarawa was the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile, or LRASM, which was fired from a Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet. The missile can also be fired from Air Force B-1 bombers.”

“In a partnership with the U.S. Navy, a U.S. Air Force B-2 Spirit stealth bomber proved a low-cost, air-delivered method for defeating surface vessels through a QUICKSINK demonstration, as part of the second SINKEX,” U.S. 3rd Fleet said in the release.”

NOW WE ARE TALKING!

Both General Berger and Smith had no problem using the JOINT word to add to the justification of the “disassembly” of the US Marine Corps as the “first in” force. Instead of attempting to figure out how to develop an anti-ship missile for the HIMARS (and other tactical vehicles) and the MLR, the Marine Corps should have been working on a JOINT Command and Control suite to coordinate a Joint Strike Force of US Navy ships, F18s, F35s, P8s, B1s, B52s and US Army Multi-Domain Brigades. In 2002 General Paul Van Riper proved at the Naval War College annual war game that “swarming” anti-ship missiles works. https://www.sandboxx.us/news/that-time-a-marine-general-led-a-fictional-iran-against-the-us-military-and-won/

For example, a better idea might be to seize a small Pacific Island between the Philippines and Japan with an amphibious assault or raid with this Joint Strike Command and Control suite. This scenario makes the island chain strategy look a little better. I mention raid because one of the justifications of Design 2030 was the WW2 US Marine 3rd Parachute Battalion raid on Choiseul Island. This was a deception raid in prep for the amphibious assault on Bougainville. I am still looking for the connection of this operation to the MLR idea. BTW, if you want or need to enhance deterrence, execute an MPF off-load with this C&C suite on Taiwan. Now that would be an attention getter.

The other sin committed by our Commandants and SECDEF is they have created a hole in our Joint Force deployment planning and execution capability by not building and maintaining amphibs and the MPFs. During Desert Shield in 1990, the US Marine Corps deployed two MPFs and amphibious forces into Saudi Arabia between August 2nd and mid-September. The next deployment priority was the US Army’s 24ID that was not fully deployed and operational until the end of Nov. You would think that the SECDEF would be able to recognize this issue and ask some questions.

Doug R. has it right with his list of conceptual questionable ideas about the yet to be developed land based anti-ship missiles. Another bad idea was the removal of tanks from the Marine Corps T/O. General Smith has publically stated that removal of Marine tank battalions was justified because the “Javelin” anti-tank system out range the tank. With that thinking, isn’t the Javelin out ranged by tube artillery? Isn’t tube artillery a good suppression weapon for man packed anti-tank missiles? I thought one reason the Marine Corps went to 155mm tube artillery was that a 90 pound 155 projectile will ruin a tankers day.

Let’s keep the comments and discussion going…Semper Fi

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Randy Shetter's avatar

In the Naval Institute Proceedings article, "To Upgun Seapower in the Indo Pacific, You Need an Army" (USNI Proceedings 2/2/24) General Charles Flynn and Lt. Colonel Tim Devine, discuss the development of the Army's Multi-Domain Task Force. In response to China's A2/AD barrier, they point out that in 2017, Admiral Harry Harris, then Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, requested that the Army begin to sink ships. With that request, "The Army has pursued that goal ever since." It must be noted that the Admiral did not request that the Marine Corps sink ships. He specifically put the request out to the Army. The article suggests that "Army fires would complement the Marine Corps' concept of stand-in forces, not only by adjoining more firing platforms-adding much needed capacity to counter PLA's mass-but also by linking those expeditionary forces with the accompanying Army support...." We have read numerous times in CP that the Marine Corps' anti-shipping missile capabilities are not up to the same capabilities as Army weapons. With a smaller budget, why is the Marine Corps duplicating what the Army is doing? If the Marine Corps was not at SINKEX, what is the point of having a missile Marine force? Why did we give up our combined arms capability? If the Marine Corps wants to contribute to the fight, then do something no other force is doing. I point to an article from a posting I made yesterday by Marine Major, Jake Yeager, "Expeditionary Advance Maritime Operations: How the Marine Corps Can Avoid Becoming a Second Land Army in the Pacific." Written in December 2019, the article describes how Marine Pacific forces can be organized to conduct offensive maritime raids against Chinese naval ports and facilities. With China seeking port and naval facilities globally, this would take the battle to the Chinese and attack them where they least expect it. By not participating in SINKEX, the Marine Corps shot itself in the foot. We got rid of our combined arms capability and have nothing to show for it.

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