“One of the munitions used to sink the Tarawa was the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile, or LRASM, which was fired from a Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet. The missile can also be fired from Air Force B-1 bombers.”
“In a partnership with the U.S. Navy, a U.S. Air Force B-2 Spirit stealth bomber proved a low-cost, air-delivered method for defeating surface vessels through a QUICKSINK demonstration, as part of the second SINKEX,” U.S. 3rd Fleet said in the release.”
NOW WE ARE TALKING!
Both General Berger and Smith had no problem using the JOINT word to add to the justification of the “disassembly” of the US Marine Corps as the “first in” force. Instead of attempting to figure out how to develop an anti-ship missile for the HIMARS (and other tactical vehicles) and the MLR, the Marine Corps should have been working on a JOINT Command and Control suite to coordinate a Joint Strike Force of US Navy ships, F18s, F35s, P8s, B1s, B52s and US Army Multi-Domain Brigades. In 2002 General Paul Van Riper proved at the Naval War College annual war game that “swarming” anti-ship missiles works. https://www.sandboxx.us/news/that-time-a-marine-general-led-a-fictional-iran-against-the-us-military-and-won/
For example, a better idea might be to seize a small Pacific Island between the Philippines and Japan with an amphibious assault or raid with this Joint Strike Command and Control suite. This scenario makes the island chain strategy look a little better. I mention raid because one of the justifications of Design 2030 was the WW2 US Marine 3rd Parachute Battalion raid on Choiseul Island. This was a deception raid in prep for the amphibious assault on Bougainville. I am still looking for the connection of this operation to the MLR idea. BTW, if you want or need to enhance deterrence, execute an MPF off-load with this C&C suite on Taiwan. Now that would be an attention getter.
The other sin committed by our Commandants and SECDEF is they have created a hole in our Joint Force deployment planning and execution capability by not building and maintaining amphibs and the MPFs. During Desert Shield in 1990, the US Marine Corps deployed two MPFs and amphibious forces into Saudi Arabia between August 2nd and mid-September. The next deployment priority was the US Army’s 24ID that was not fully deployed and operational until the end of Nov. You would think that the SECDEF would be able to recognize this issue and ask some questions.
Doug R. has it right with his list of conceptual questionable ideas about the yet to be developed land based anti-ship missiles. Another bad idea was the removal of tanks from the Marine Corps T/O. General Smith has publically stated that removal of Marine tank battalions was justified because the “Javelin” anti-tank system out range the tank. With that thinking, isn’t the Javelin out ranged by tube artillery? Isn’t tube artillery a good suppression weapon for man packed anti-tank missiles? I thought one reason the Marine Corps went to 155mm tube artillery was that a 90 pound 155 projectile will ruin a tankers day.
Let’s keep the comments and discussion going…Semper Fi
In the Naval Institute Proceedings article, "To Upgun Seapower in the Indo Pacific, You Need an Army" (USNI Proceedings 2/2/24) General Charles Flynn and Lt. Colonel Tim Devine, discuss the development of the Army's Multi-Domain Task Force. In response to China's A2/AD barrier, they point out that in 2017, Admiral Harry Harris, then Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, requested that the Army begin to sink ships. With that request, "The Army has pursued that goal ever since." It must be noted that the Admiral did not request that the Marine Corps sink ships. He specifically put the request out to the Army. The article suggests that "Army fires would complement the Marine Corps' concept of stand-in forces, not only by adjoining more firing platforms-adding much needed capacity to counter PLA's mass-but also by linking those expeditionary forces with the accompanying Army support...." We have read numerous times in CP that the Marine Corps' anti-shipping missile capabilities are not up to the same capabilities as Army weapons. With a smaller budget, why is the Marine Corps duplicating what the Army is doing? If the Marine Corps was not at SINKEX, what is the point of having a missile Marine force? Why did we give up our combined arms capability? If the Marine Corps wants to contribute to the fight, then do something no other force is doing. I point to an article from a posting I made yesterday by Marine Major, Jake Yeager, "Expeditionary Advance Maritime Operations: How the Marine Corps Can Avoid Becoming a Second Land Army in the Pacific." Written in December 2019, the article describes how Marine Pacific forces can be organized to conduct offensive maritime raids against Chinese naval ports and facilities. With China seeking port and naval facilities globally, this would take the battle to the Chinese and attack them where they least expect it. By not participating in SINKEX, the Marine Corps shot itself in the foot. We got rid of our combined arms capability and have nothing to show for it.
It's amazing that under one Commandant so much damage has been done to our Corps. Germans, Japanese, North Koreans, Chinese, North Vietnamese, and Middle East terrorists did not do as much structural damage to the United States Marine Corps, as has been done under the tenure of Commandant Berger. Yet, for all the hype of the Littoral Regiments, and Stand-in-Forces, there is very little to show for it. Very sad.
The superiority of aircraft in firing long range precision missiles cannot be disputed. They move, cover great distances at high speeds and have mature communications capabilities. They exist.
The entire Marine concept is based on multiple questionable ideas:
1. entry concepts.
2. remaining undetected.
3. Resupply and medical evacuation.
4. Relocating or redeployment
5. Shipping that remains undetected and is mission capable.
6. The ability to “disrupt”
7. Target acquisition, identification and engagement
8. Range of the missiles
9. Ability to defend against air or ground attacks
10. Congressional funding
I note that the RIMPAC command structure released no information on the state of the Tarawa prior to the sinkex and what it actually took to sink her. For sure only what weaponry was not involved.
It is not too late for HQMC to review its entire
Understanding of the legislation regarding roles and missions, the RD&A process, Congressional funding and budgeting and the needs of the Warfighting commanders. It is not too late to subject many assumptions to rigorous review and scrutiny using established processes and procedures.
It is perhaps too late to get the funding to rebuild tube artillery, armored forces, aviation cuts, amphibious shipping required, MPS shipping, infantry Bn’s and innumerable other castrations. But, it is time to commence that rebuild and restructure.
It is certainly time to create 4 Battalions, one each in each Artillery Regiment to do the full analysis of rapidly deployable USMC ship sinking missile units.
On 22 March 1983, four OV-10D aircraft from VMO-2 launched from the deck of USS TARAWA LHA 1. One aircraft carried eight Hellfire missiles. Enough to cause damage, casualties, and perhaps sink a similar type ship from which it launched. Now, forty- one years later, the US MARINE CORPS has progressed so far that:
1. The Corps has no OV-10s, no VMOs
2. Less aviation, no tanks, less artillery, less combat engineering and less infantry.
3. The Corps also has less amphibious ships and assault capability.
What has been truly accomplished in the intervening years? Most certainly, there is no Stand In Forces1, no hyper- sonic missiles, and no international agreements to allow the Corps to occupy other countries islands. Force Design 2030 is a failed, unnecessary experiment driven by failed leadership.
What we have achieved is a less capable, less useful Marine Corps.... and the USS Tarawa lays on the bottom of the ocean as a reminder of a Corps that once was.
“One of the munitions used to sink the Tarawa was the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile, or LRASM, which was fired from a Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet. The missile can also be fired from Air Force B-1 bombers.”
“In a partnership with the U.S. Navy, a U.S. Air Force B-2 Spirit stealth bomber proved a low-cost, air-delivered method for defeating surface vessels through a QUICKSINK demonstration, as part of the second SINKEX,” U.S. 3rd Fleet said in the release.”
NOW WE ARE TALKING!
Both General Berger and Smith had no problem using the JOINT word to add to the justification of the “disassembly” of the US Marine Corps as the “first in” force. Instead of attempting to figure out how to develop an anti-ship missile for the HIMARS (and other tactical vehicles) and the MLR, the Marine Corps should have been working on a JOINT Command and Control suite to coordinate a Joint Strike Force of US Navy ships, F18s, F35s, P8s, B1s, B52s and US Army Multi-Domain Brigades. In 2002 General Paul Van Riper proved at the Naval War College annual war game that “swarming” anti-ship missiles works. https://www.sandboxx.us/news/that-time-a-marine-general-led-a-fictional-iran-against-the-us-military-and-won/
For example, a better idea might be to seize a small Pacific Island between the Philippines and Japan with an amphibious assault or raid with this Joint Strike Command and Control suite. This scenario makes the island chain strategy look a little better. I mention raid because one of the justifications of Design 2030 was the WW2 US Marine 3rd Parachute Battalion raid on Choiseul Island. This was a deception raid in prep for the amphibious assault on Bougainville. I am still looking for the connection of this operation to the MLR idea. BTW, if you want or need to enhance deterrence, execute an MPF off-load with this C&C suite on Taiwan. Now that would be an attention getter.
The other sin committed by our Commandants and SECDEF is they have created a hole in our Joint Force deployment planning and execution capability by not building and maintaining amphibs and the MPFs. During Desert Shield in 1990, the US Marine Corps deployed two MPFs and amphibious forces into Saudi Arabia between August 2nd and mid-September. The next deployment priority was the US Army’s 24ID that was not fully deployed and operational until the end of Nov. You would think that the SECDEF would be able to recognize this issue and ask some questions.
Doug R. has it right with his list of conceptual questionable ideas about the yet to be developed land based anti-ship missiles. Another bad idea was the removal of tanks from the Marine Corps T/O. General Smith has publically stated that removal of Marine tank battalions was justified because the “Javelin” anti-tank system out range the tank. With that thinking, isn’t the Javelin out ranged by tube artillery? Isn’t tube artillery a good suppression weapon for man packed anti-tank missiles? I thought one reason the Marine Corps went to 155mm tube artillery was that a 90 pound 155 projectile will ruin a tankers day.
Let’s keep the comments and discussion going…Semper Fi
In the Naval Institute Proceedings article, "To Upgun Seapower in the Indo Pacific, You Need an Army" (USNI Proceedings 2/2/24) General Charles Flynn and Lt. Colonel Tim Devine, discuss the development of the Army's Multi-Domain Task Force. In response to China's A2/AD barrier, they point out that in 2017, Admiral Harry Harris, then Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, requested that the Army begin to sink ships. With that request, "The Army has pursued that goal ever since." It must be noted that the Admiral did not request that the Marine Corps sink ships. He specifically put the request out to the Army. The article suggests that "Army fires would complement the Marine Corps' concept of stand-in forces, not only by adjoining more firing platforms-adding much needed capacity to counter PLA's mass-but also by linking those expeditionary forces with the accompanying Army support...." We have read numerous times in CP that the Marine Corps' anti-shipping missile capabilities are not up to the same capabilities as Army weapons. With a smaller budget, why is the Marine Corps duplicating what the Army is doing? If the Marine Corps was not at SINKEX, what is the point of having a missile Marine force? Why did we give up our combined arms capability? If the Marine Corps wants to contribute to the fight, then do something no other force is doing. I point to an article from a posting I made yesterday by Marine Major, Jake Yeager, "Expeditionary Advance Maritime Operations: How the Marine Corps Can Avoid Becoming a Second Land Army in the Pacific." Written in December 2019, the article describes how Marine Pacific forces can be organized to conduct offensive maritime raids against Chinese naval ports and facilities. With China seeking port and naval facilities globally, this would take the battle to the Chinese and attack them where they least expect it. By not participating in SINKEX, the Marine Corps shot itself in the foot. We got rid of our combined arms capability and have nothing to show for it.
It's amazing that under one Commandant so much damage has been done to our Corps. Germans, Japanese, North Koreans, Chinese, North Vietnamese, and Middle East terrorists did not do as much structural damage to the United States Marine Corps, as has been done under the tenure of Commandant Berger. Yet, for all the hype of the Littoral Regiments, and Stand-in-Forces, there is very little to show for it. Very sad.
The superiority of aircraft in firing long range precision missiles cannot be disputed. They move, cover great distances at high speeds and have mature communications capabilities. They exist.
The entire Marine concept is based on multiple questionable ideas:
1. entry concepts.
2. remaining undetected.
3. Resupply and medical evacuation.
4. Relocating or redeployment
5. Shipping that remains undetected and is mission capable.
6. The ability to “disrupt”
7. Target acquisition, identification and engagement
8. Range of the missiles
9. Ability to defend against air or ground attacks
10. Congressional funding
I note that the RIMPAC command structure released no information on the state of the Tarawa prior to the sinkex and what it actually took to sink her. For sure only what weaponry was not involved.
It is not too late for HQMC to review its entire
Understanding of the legislation regarding roles and missions, the RD&A process, Congressional funding and budgeting and the needs of the Warfighting commanders. It is not too late to subject many assumptions to rigorous review and scrutiny using established processes and procedures.
It is perhaps too late to get the funding to rebuild tube artillery, armored forces, aviation cuts, amphibious shipping required, MPS shipping, infantry Bn’s and innumerable other castrations. But, it is time to commence that rebuild and restructure.
It is certainly time to create 4 Battalions, one each in each Artillery Regiment to do the full analysis of rapidly deployable USMC ship sinking missile units.
On 22 March 1983, four OV-10D aircraft from VMO-2 launched from the deck of USS TARAWA LHA 1. One aircraft carried eight Hellfire missiles. Enough to cause damage, casualties, and perhaps sink a similar type ship from which it launched. Now, forty- one years later, the US MARINE CORPS has progressed so far that:
1. The Corps has no OV-10s, no VMOs
2. Less aviation, no tanks, less artillery, less combat engineering and less infantry.
3. The Corps also has less amphibious ships and assault capability.
What has been truly accomplished in the intervening years? Most certainly, there is no Stand In Forces1, no hyper- sonic missiles, and no international agreements to allow the Corps to occupy other countries islands. Force Design 2030 is a failed, unnecessary experiment driven by failed leadership.
What we have achieved is a less capable, less useful Marine Corps.... and the USS Tarawa lays on the bottom of the ocean as a reminder of a Corps that once was.
Semper Fi,W3