60 years ago today on Okinawa, my battery, Whiskey 2/12 with 107 mm Howtars, got the word from RLT9, to prepare to mount out for Vietnam. Break out the "good gear" from the mount-out boxes, line up and get the shots, including the maple syrump consistancy Gamma Globulin shot is the butt, PM all the vehicles, and...wait...wit We went thru that three times in the next two weeks until we got the word to head to White Beach where the APAs we moored and we spent the next three days loading and getting ready to sail. We landed in DaNang harbor and unloaded on July 5th. During the 30 months in country I spent as an artillery forward observer, AO, working with the first CAP unit in Phu Bai, my second tour as the artillery advisor with the Vietnamese Marines supporting Tony Zinni and other outstanding future Marine Corps leaders, and during a third tour as battery commander of Kilo 4/11 starting on January 20, 1968 on Hill 65 at the start of TET, I think about thoses experiences almost daily. That was my Marine Corps
Glad CP posted this reminder. I’ve held off my fire as of late especially when reading some (never mind, I will check fire) condescending comments that neither move forward nor regress the discussion about the direction “our” Marine Corps took.
I appreciate all the thoughtful pro/con comments, but when I detect BS and outright disrespect, well I have the urge to go for the jugular…I’m glad I have the discipline not to.
Keep up the outstanding work CP. Again, thanks for the reminder to be professional!
I thank Compass Points for keeping the fires of intelligent discussion about Marine Corps issues alive. Like other Marines, the Corps has a very special place in my life. This is from my initial writings about my 22 years in the Corps:
“I joined the Marines when I was 15 with an eighth-grade education. My high school was Boot Camp at Parris Island. My college was Officer Candidates School and The Basic School at Quantico. My graduate studies were five years at Headquarters, Marine Corps filling billets designated for graduates of the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey. The Marines literally raised me, teaching me about life and instilling in me all their leadership traits and principles. Senior Marines mentored me, like good parents. This education served me well, not only in the Marines but equally in my civilian careers. I have now been a Marine for 72 years and remain exceptionally proud of my cultural heritage.”
Fine sentiments, but the "Marine Corps" has always been dominated by a collection of self-selected cliques dedicated to furthering their personal interests. Their guiding principle is not "He who is not against us is for us," but "He who is not one of us is against us." That is why we are in the mess we are in now.
The new Tomahawk (ship launched) has a range of approximately 1600 km, or approximately 994 miles. Great news for the US Navy, especially when it comes to maintaining control of the SLOC mission for the Joint Force. The Commandant’s NMESIS has a range of approximately 115 miles. Now the question is with this range difference why bother completing the development of NMESIS, the primary justifications for the MLR and elimination of tube artillery?
I am hoping that the Commandant is not thinking that we will just strap the new Tomahawk onto the JLVT. The current Tomahawk weighs between 2900 to 3500 lbs depending on variant. I can imagine the new Tomahawk might weigh-out the JLVT. The US Army has also just announced they plan to end the JLVT Program. The vehicle that is designated to carry NMESIS once deployed to small pacific islands in the SIF WEZ.
This take misses the mark entirely — and misunderstands both Force Design and joint warfighting. The Commandant isn’t confused, and the Corps isn’t holding a wet paintbrush — they are helping paint the bigger picture.
Yes, the new Tomahawk has a much longer range than NMESIS, but that’s the point: different tools for different roles. NMESIS isn’t meant to outrange ship-launched missiles. It’s meant to operate forward, inside contested terrain, from land, creating dilemma and depth for the adversary. It complicates the enemy’s targeting, stretches their ISR, and imposes distributed risk. NMESIS is a pacing tool, not a replacement for strategic cruise missiles.
Also — this comparison ignores that NMESIS uses the Naval Strike Missile, not Tomahawk. Its range (~115–150 miles) is designed for tactical-level maritime denial, from expeditionary positions the Navy can’t always reach or persist in. It helps hold key terrain, enables naval freedom of maneuver, and supports distributed maritime operations.
The elimination of some tube artillery wasn’t a trade for range alone — it was part of a shift toward mobility, survivability, and precision in a Pacific fight where legacy systems would be dead weight.
So the real question isn’t “why develop NMESIS?” It’s: do you understand how the USMC fits into the joint force in the Pacific? Because if not, you’re the one in the corner — with no brush at all.
Distances to the Taiwan Strait from Okinawa and much of the Ryukyu's as well as Luzon are on the order of 500-700 miles, how does your 150 mile MAXIMUM range Naval Strike Missile fit in to that picture? Also, neither Taiwan nor Japan nor the Philippines have signaled any intent to allow their countries to be used as fire bases.
An NSM buy would not be a complete waste, the F-35 can carry two internally, AND launch them close enough to hit ships. The NMESIS has no value and in reality exists as a single prototype that may win an award as the most traveled missile launcher in world history. Not a single piece of steel has been cut to ship this launcher anywhere as well, at the rate shipbuilding has regressed it could be ten years before anything commissions. The tens of billions to be spent on equipment and personnel to implement FD have several thousand better uses.
On top of all that FD has failed to accomplish, the US ARMY is in the middle of fitting out missile units that can and will do what FD will never accomplish either in theory or in the more difficult realm of the real world.
Who is the audience that you are preaching to post after post? I hardly think any one here buys in to weak attempts at shooting the messengers.
Your critique of NMESIS and Force Design (FD) overlooks key operational, strategic, and political realities — not to mention some recent facts.
1. “NMESIS is irrelevant because it only has a 150-mile range.”
Please click on the Wall Street Journal article I posted a few days back. It has a great map I believe will help you understand the following. .
You’re applying blue-water logic to a littoral fight. NMESIS is designed to operate inside the enemy’s weapons engagement zone, as part of a Stand-In Force (SIF). That’s the point — it provides tactical, persistent, and lethal presence from island chains and maritime chokepoints, forcing the adversary to think twice. It doesn’t replace long-range Navy fires like Tomahawk — it complements them by denying maritime space through distributed, hard-to-target fires that are networked with joint sensors and C2.
2. “No one has signaled permission to host U.S. fires.”
Actually, they have — and continue to. The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the Philippines gives the U.S. access to key northern sites on Luzon within range of the Taiwan Strait. Japan, too, has increased bilateral cooperation significantly, including the U.S. deployment of MQ-9s to Kagoshima, PAC-3 upgrades on Yonaguni, and a growing embrace of island defense operations. Meanwhile, Taiwan just signed off on expanded U.S. training and presence. The political will exists, because regional partners see the same threat we do — and they want persistent U.S. presence short of war.
3. “NMESIS doesn’t exist in numbers.”
While still ramping up, 3rd MLR has received low-rate initial production NMESIS systems, and 12th MLR is next. Congress has funded these efforts, and full-rate production begins soon. The system has already demonstrated live-fire success — multiple times — from ground platforms and JLTVs. This isn’t PowerPoint — it’s a fielded, tested, and validated capability. Forward-deployed. Real.
4. “Nothing has been done about logistics or shipping.”
Another miss. While Landing Ship Medium (LSM) production will take time, the Marine Corps has never said it would wait for perfect platforms to deploy. We are already leveraging leased vessels, connectors, and expeditionary basing concepts with available assets. The MLR isn’t some future promise — it is deployed now. Operating, learning, adjusting.
5. “The Army is doing it better.”
That’s not a competition — that’s the joint fight working as it should. Army Typhon and Mid-Range Capability batteries offer long-range strike. The Marine Corps offers mobile, persistent, distributed maritime denial. Different tools for different missions. That’s not duplication — that’s joint integration. And it’s exactly what INDOPACOM commanders have asked for.
6. “Who is your audience?”
You, my brother. And others like you. You love the Corps. You should hear both sides of the argument. This site has been an echo chamber since it started. Any voices that disagree are banned. I will be soon. You just deserve better. You should be proud of your Marines and you should celebrate their success. Hold them accountable, but hear both sides.
You may dislike the change, but the facts don’t support the idea that FD is failing. It’s not perfect, and no plan survives contact unscathed. But FD is testing, adapting, and scaling. That’s what modern warfighting looks like.
The real question is not whether we can fight like it’s 1991. It’s whether we can outmaneuver an adversary that’s betting we can’t change. FD proves that we can — and already have.
LOL. Hey, I am the quintessential Marine Rifleman, I got the Expert Badge and multiple award bars in my dad’s old foot locker, trust me; I seldom miss my target. I do, however, sometimes worry when I use the word “quintessential”, it causes my friends to do comparative thinking of Wily Coyote as the quintessential engineer.
I clearly understand that General Berger’s intent was to “help paint a bigger and new picture”. However, that idea is failing for many reasons. I feel one of the reasons is because the MLR is not helping the Joint Force Combatant Commanders and that includes INDOPACOM. In addition, the MLR is a long way from a littoral commander wargame.
OOPs, I just read your reply to Tom’s reply comments. The fundamental assumption that FD2030 misses, in both of your replies (to Polarbear and Tom), is a conflict with the CCP will be a conflict fought over SLOC no matter if it a local or global conflict. If the enemy gets into NMESIS range, you have already lost the SLOC. If you don’t own the SLOC any tactical solution will be quickly neutralized and/or bypassed. The US Joint Force basically re-established control of the Red Sea SLOC after the Yemen Houthis closed it with tactical drones and missiles. The MLR is a defensive concept failing to fill the offensive strategic and tactical requirements for all the Combatant Commanders.
Even if you have all the LSMs you need, you will not be able to sail them unless you control the SLOC. After the LSMs are funded and built, I will predict, once a conflict begins, they will not be used for MLR sustainment. Instead, they will be pressed into service to delivered sustainment to the Navy’s surface and submarine fleet. I was thinking that the EPF would help with sustainment requirements, but the US Navy is now deactivating EPFs.
Remember, the MLR concept is not new. At the start of WW2 the Marine Corps had plans for 29 Defense Battalions, Wake Island and amphibious assaults took all the Defense Battalions off the drawing board.
3d MLR is in a SLOC now. During the threat window. Ready to fight as part of tje joint force. You must see the value in that.
Additionally. .
Everyone keeps obsessing over NMESIS like it’s the only thing that gives the Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) its value. That’s a misread. The lethality of the MLR isn’t just in the missile — it’s in its role as a forward-deployed sensor and enabler for the Joint Force.
The MLR functions like a reconnaissance team or forward observer, operating inside contested space with the ability to sense, persist, and direct fires across domains. It doesn’t have to fire the missile — it can cue a Navy destroyer, an Air Force bomber, or even allied platforms to take the shot. That’s what makes it dangerous.
This is about complicating the PLA’s ISR and targeting, not just putting more launchers ashore. NMESIS is a tool — but the real power is in the MLR’s ability to find, fix, and feed targets to the broader Joint kill web while surviving long enough to do it again.
In short: Comparing a Marine Littoral Regiment to a WWII-era Marine Defense Battalion is like comparing a DDG to a wooden man-of-war. The MLR wasn’t designed to plug into an old playbook — it’s meant to rewrite it, to match what the adversary and battlefield demand now. The MLR is not a missile battery — it’s a persistent, networked, littoral sensor-shooter node that extends the reach and lethality of the entire Joint Force.
If you focus solely on NMESIS you are missing the point.
Most of the Marines I know and served with signed up to take the fight to the enemy, not sit on the defense on isolated islands waiting for an enemy ship to pass by.. FD2030 is in the process of changing the very ethos of the Corps and not to the good.
I am not focused on NMESIS I am focused on its strategic value along with the bad Island Chain Strategy. Your statement that NMESIS is sitting on a SLOC now holds no value. It is now deployed in a non-combat environment defending the first island chain (and not Taiwan BTW). So what? Either way the CCP probably knows exactly where it is along with any other SIF units and sites. If you don’t own the SLOC, any tactical defensive solution will be quickly neutralized and/or bypassed. Including any other reconnaissance or military capability present with the MLR. The Yemen Houthis originally closed the Red Sea SLOC with tactical drones and missiles. As an example, the US Joint Force basically re-established control of the Red Sea SLOC by destroying their drone and missile sites because we had control of the SLOC and they didn't. The MLR is a defensive concept failing to fill the offensive strategic and tactical requirements for all the Combatant Commanders. Instead of FD2030, the Marine Corps should be focused on distributed MAGTF operations, especially our Air Wings, and distributed logistic support with the US Navy. FD2030 won't survive after the first day of enemy air and missile attacks. S/F
Marine Defense Battalions are the perfect historical analogy to today’s MLRs. The difference between then and today is that in WW II the Marine Corps still had conventional offensive forces. Today Corps leadership is trying to saddle members of the Corps with defensive forces and a defensive mindset.
60 years ago today on Okinawa, my battery, Whiskey 2/12 with 107 mm Howtars, got the word from RLT9, to prepare to mount out for Vietnam. Break out the "good gear" from the mount-out boxes, line up and get the shots, including the maple syrump consistancy Gamma Globulin shot is the butt, PM all the vehicles, and...wait...wit We went thru that three times in the next two weeks until we got the word to head to White Beach where the APAs we moored and we spent the next three days loading and getting ready to sail. We landed in DaNang harbor and unloaded on July 5th. During the 30 months in country I spent as an artillery forward observer, AO, working with the first CAP unit in Phu Bai, my second tour as the artillery advisor with the Vietnamese Marines supporting Tony Zinni and other outstanding future Marine Corps leaders, and during a third tour as battery commander of Kilo 4/11 starting on January 20, 1968 on Hill 65 at the start of TET, I think about thoses experiences almost daily. That was my Marine Corps
Glad CP posted this reminder. I’ve held off my fire as of late especially when reading some (never mind, I will check fire) condescending comments that neither move forward nor regress the discussion about the direction “our” Marine Corps took.
I appreciate all the thoughtful pro/con comments, but when I detect BS and outright disrespect, well I have the urge to go for the jugular…I’m glad I have the discipline not to.
Keep up the outstanding work CP. Again, thanks for the reminder to be professional!
Semper Fidelis!
I thank Compass Points for keeping the fires of intelligent discussion about Marine Corps issues alive. Like other Marines, the Corps has a very special place in my life. This is from my initial writings about my 22 years in the Corps:
“I joined the Marines when I was 15 with an eighth-grade education. My high school was Boot Camp at Parris Island. My college was Officer Candidates School and The Basic School at Quantico. My graduate studies were five years at Headquarters, Marine Corps filling billets designated for graduates of the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey. The Marines literally raised me, teaching me about life and instilling in me all their leadership traits and principles. Senior Marines mentored me, like good parents. This education served me well, not only in the Marines but equally in my civilian careers. I have now been a Marine for 72 years and remain exceptionally proud of my cultural heritage.”
Semper Fidelis. Keep up the good work.
Fine sentiments, but the "Marine Corps" has always been dominated by a collection of self-selected cliques dedicated to furthering their personal interests. Their guiding principle is not "He who is not against us is for us," but "He who is not one of us is against us." That is why we are in the mess we are in now.
Based on the recent US Navy’s press release, why does the Commandant continue down the FD2030’s irrelevant path? I am sure he is wondering how he got the Marine Corps maneuvered into a “dry corner holding a wet paint brush”, when he reads this news release. https://www.stripes.com/theaters/us/2025-05-30/us-navy-antiship-tomahawk-september-17965991.html
The new Tomahawk (ship launched) has a range of approximately 1600 km, or approximately 994 miles. Great news for the US Navy, especially when it comes to maintaining control of the SLOC mission for the Joint Force. The Commandant’s NMESIS has a range of approximately 115 miles. Now the question is with this range difference why bother completing the development of NMESIS, the primary justifications for the MLR and elimination of tube artillery?
I am hoping that the Commandant is not thinking that we will just strap the new Tomahawk onto the JLVT. The current Tomahawk weighs between 2900 to 3500 lbs depending on variant. I can imagine the new Tomahawk might weigh-out the JLVT. The US Army has also just announced they plan to end the JLVT Program. The vehicle that is designated to carry NMESIS once deployed to small pacific islands in the SIF WEZ.
This article demonstrates the Commandant’s flexibility and adaptability when he states he is sticking with the JLVT requirement. https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2025/05/20/marines-sticking-with-jltv-after-army-cancels-future-vehicle-buys/
Great Caesar’s Ghost! Where are the modern day LtCol Pete Ellis officers when we need them?
Brother Polarbear-
This take misses the mark entirely — and misunderstands both Force Design and joint warfighting. The Commandant isn’t confused, and the Corps isn’t holding a wet paintbrush — they are helping paint the bigger picture.
Yes, the new Tomahawk has a much longer range than NMESIS, but that’s the point: different tools for different roles. NMESIS isn’t meant to outrange ship-launched missiles. It’s meant to operate forward, inside contested terrain, from land, creating dilemma and depth for the adversary. It complicates the enemy’s targeting, stretches their ISR, and imposes distributed risk. NMESIS is a pacing tool, not a replacement for strategic cruise missiles.
Also — this comparison ignores that NMESIS uses the Naval Strike Missile, not Tomahawk. Its range (~115–150 miles) is designed for tactical-level maritime denial, from expeditionary positions the Navy can’t always reach or persist in. It helps hold key terrain, enables naval freedom of maneuver, and supports distributed maritime operations.
The elimination of some tube artillery wasn’t a trade for range alone — it was part of a shift toward mobility, survivability, and precision in a Pacific fight where legacy systems would be dead weight.
So the real question isn’t “why develop NMESIS?” It’s: do you understand how the USMC fits into the joint force in the Pacific? Because if not, you’re the one in the corner — with no brush at all.
Distances to the Taiwan Strait from Okinawa and much of the Ryukyu's as well as Luzon are on the order of 500-700 miles, how does your 150 mile MAXIMUM range Naval Strike Missile fit in to that picture? Also, neither Taiwan nor Japan nor the Philippines have signaled any intent to allow their countries to be used as fire bases.
An NSM buy would not be a complete waste, the F-35 can carry two internally, AND launch them close enough to hit ships. The NMESIS has no value and in reality exists as a single prototype that may win an award as the most traveled missile launcher in world history. Not a single piece of steel has been cut to ship this launcher anywhere as well, at the rate shipbuilding has regressed it could be ten years before anything commissions. The tens of billions to be spent on equipment and personnel to implement FD have several thousand better uses.
On top of all that FD has failed to accomplish, the US ARMY is in the middle of fitting out missile units that can and will do what FD will never accomplish either in theory or in the more difficult realm of the real world.
Who is the audience that you are preaching to post after post? I hardly think any one here buys in to weak attempts at shooting the messengers.
Your critique of NMESIS and Force Design (FD) overlooks key operational, strategic, and political realities — not to mention some recent facts.
1. “NMESIS is irrelevant because it only has a 150-mile range.”
Please click on the Wall Street Journal article I posted a few days back. It has a great map I believe will help you understand the following. .
You’re applying blue-water logic to a littoral fight. NMESIS is designed to operate inside the enemy’s weapons engagement zone, as part of a Stand-In Force (SIF). That’s the point — it provides tactical, persistent, and lethal presence from island chains and maritime chokepoints, forcing the adversary to think twice. It doesn’t replace long-range Navy fires like Tomahawk — it complements them by denying maritime space through distributed, hard-to-target fires that are networked with joint sensors and C2.
2. “No one has signaled permission to host U.S. fires.”
Actually, they have — and continue to. The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the Philippines gives the U.S. access to key northern sites on Luzon within range of the Taiwan Strait. Japan, too, has increased bilateral cooperation significantly, including the U.S. deployment of MQ-9s to Kagoshima, PAC-3 upgrades on Yonaguni, and a growing embrace of island defense operations. Meanwhile, Taiwan just signed off on expanded U.S. training and presence. The political will exists, because regional partners see the same threat we do — and they want persistent U.S. presence short of war.
3. “NMESIS doesn’t exist in numbers.”
While still ramping up, 3rd MLR has received low-rate initial production NMESIS systems, and 12th MLR is next. Congress has funded these efforts, and full-rate production begins soon. The system has already demonstrated live-fire success — multiple times — from ground platforms and JLTVs. This isn’t PowerPoint — it’s a fielded, tested, and validated capability. Forward-deployed. Real.
4. “Nothing has been done about logistics or shipping.”
Another miss. While Landing Ship Medium (LSM) production will take time, the Marine Corps has never said it would wait for perfect platforms to deploy. We are already leveraging leased vessels, connectors, and expeditionary basing concepts with available assets. The MLR isn’t some future promise — it is deployed now. Operating, learning, adjusting.
5. “The Army is doing it better.”
That’s not a competition — that’s the joint fight working as it should. Army Typhon and Mid-Range Capability batteries offer long-range strike. The Marine Corps offers mobile, persistent, distributed maritime denial. Different tools for different missions. That’s not duplication — that’s joint integration. And it’s exactly what INDOPACOM commanders have asked for.
6. “Who is your audience?”
You, my brother. And others like you. You love the Corps. You should hear both sides of the argument. This site has been an echo chamber since it started. Any voices that disagree are banned. I will be soon. You just deserve better. You should be proud of your Marines and you should celebrate their success. Hold them accountable, but hear both sides.
You may dislike the change, but the facts don’t support the idea that FD is failing. It’s not perfect, and no plan survives contact unscathed. But FD is testing, adapting, and scaling. That’s what modern warfighting looks like.
The real question is not whether we can fight like it’s 1991. It’s whether we can outmaneuver an adversary that’s betting we can’t change. FD proves that we can — and already have.
LOL. Hey, I am the quintessential Marine Rifleman, I got the Expert Badge and multiple award bars in my dad’s old foot locker, trust me; I seldom miss my target. I do, however, sometimes worry when I use the word “quintessential”, it causes my friends to do comparative thinking of Wily Coyote as the quintessential engineer.
I clearly understand that General Berger’s intent was to “help paint a bigger and new picture”. However, that idea is failing for many reasons. I feel one of the reasons is because the MLR is not helping the Joint Force Combatant Commanders and that includes INDOPACOM. In addition, the MLR is a long way from a littoral commander wargame.
OOPs, I just read your reply to Tom’s reply comments. The fundamental assumption that FD2030 misses, in both of your replies (to Polarbear and Tom), is a conflict with the CCP will be a conflict fought over SLOC no matter if it a local or global conflict. If the enemy gets into NMESIS range, you have already lost the SLOC. If you don’t own the SLOC any tactical solution will be quickly neutralized and/or bypassed. The US Joint Force basically re-established control of the Red Sea SLOC after the Yemen Houthis closed it with tactical drones and missiles. The MLR is a defensive concept failing to fill the offensive strategic and tactical requirements for all the Combatant Commanders.
Even if you have all the LSMs you need, you will not be able to sail them unless you control the SLOC. After the LSMs are funded and built, I will predict, once a conflict begins, they will not be used for MLR sustainment. Instead, they will be pressed into service to delivered sustainment to the Navy’s surface and submarine fleet. I was thinking that the EPF would help with sustainment requirements, but the US Navy is now deactivating EPFs.
This is a good article that everyone should read. https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2025/06/02/restoring_american_maritime_dominance_a_national_imperative_1113757.html
Remember, the MLR concept is not new. At the start of WW2 the Marine Corps had plans for 29 Defense Battalions, Wake Island and amphibious assaults took all the Defense Battalions off the drawing board.
3d MLR is in a SLOC now. During the threat window. Ready to fight as part of tje joint force. You must see the value in that.
Additionally. .
Everyone keeps obsessing over NMESIS like it’s the only thing that gives the Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) its value. That’s a misread. The lethality of the MLR isn’t just in the missile — it’s in its role as a forward-deployed sensor and enabler for the Joint Force.
The MLR functions like a reconnaissance team or forward observer, operating inside contested space with the ability to sense, persist, and direct fires across domains. It doesn’t have to fire the missile — it can cue a Navy destroyer, an Air Force bomber, or even allied platforms to take the shot. That’s what makes it dangerous.
This is about complicating the PLA’s ISR and targeting, not just putting more launchers ashore. NMESIS is a tool — but the real power is in the MLR’s ability to find, fix, and feed targets to the broader Joint kill web while surviving long enough to do it again.
In short: Comparing a Marine Littoral Regiment to a WWII-era Marine Defense Battalion is like comparing a DDG to a wooden man-of-war. The MLR wasn’t designed to plug into an old playbook — it’s meant to rewrite it, to match what the adversary and battlefield demand now. The MLR is not a missile battery — it’s a persistent, networked, littoral sensor-shooter node that extends the reach and lethality of the entire Joint Force.
If you focus solely on NMESIS you are missing the point.
Lastly,
Most of the Marines I know and served with signed up to take the fight to the enemy, not sit on the defense on isolated islands waiting for an enemy ship to pass by.. FD2030 is in the process of changing the very ethos of the Corps and not to the good.
I am not focused on NMESIS I am focused on its strategic value along with the bad Island Chain Strategy. Your statement that NMESIS is sitting on a SLOC now holds no value. It is now deployed in a non-combat environment defending the first island chain (and not Taiwan BTW). So what? Either way the CCP probably knows exactly where it is along with any other SIF units and sites. If you don’t own the SLOC, any tactical defensive solution will be quickly neutralized and/or bypassed. Including any other reconnaissance or military capability present with the MLR. The Yemen Houthis originally closed the Red Sea SLOC with tactical drones and missiles. As an example, the US Joint Force basically re-established control of the Red Sea SLOC by destroying their drone and missile sites because we had control of the SLOC and they didn't. The MLR is a defensive concept failing to fill the offensive strategic and tactical requirements for all the Combatant Commanders. Instead of FD2030, the Marine Corps should be focused on distributed MAGTF operations, especially our Air Wings, and distributed logistic support with the US Navy. FD2030 won't survive after the first day of enemy air and missile attacks. S/F
Polarbear:
Marine Defense Battalions are the perfect historical analogy to today’s MLRs. The difference between then and today is that in WW II the Marine Corps still had conventional offensive forces. Today Corps leadership is trying to saddle members of the Corps with defensive forces and a defensive mindset.