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Douglas C Rapé's avatar

Forward deployed if you are mobile makes sense. Forward deployed if you lack mobility is a tripwire of blood and guts.

We do not need to have Marine units closer to the Chinese strengths if they are fixed in place. It is a Wake Island effect. The Berlin Brigade had very little chance of impacting a Soviet Invasion. It was a symbolic commitment of resolve and intent. You do not charge the light brigade into Russian artillery. The Marine Corps is an attacking force not a stay behind sniper effort that thinks it will not be detected and eliminated.

In 1982 I had a conversation with a German Armored Brigade Cmdr in Hamburg. I asked about his tasks to retreat and attrit invading Warsaw Pact Forces and he acknowledged that was the official policy. In fact he and the Danish Brigade would attack to the East. The logic was that the Warsaw Pact was not flexible enough to deal with that and that the arrival of West German and Danish Forces would cause locals and Warsaw Pact Forces to turn on the Russians.

A conventional fight with China ( hard for me to grasp) is a Navy- USAF fight. A III MEF MAGTF held in reserve on amphibious shipping and out of range has innumerable options to strike at the right place at the right time over vast distances be it an amphibious assault or offload in friendly nations. The challenge to China is not the short range, immobile, coastal defense missile batteries trying to hide and survive in the jungle or on coral islands. A MEF afloat disbursed between the Aleutians and New Zealand is another story.

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Polarbear's avatar

Naval Air Defense

I have to commend the participants on CP for exposing the US Navy’s failed ship building and maintenance programs. However, I have to say that the Navy has done a very good job on anti-air defense. This has been documented on a “60 Minutes” show here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRRJmOTCqqQ The “youtube” clip is important because of its strategic approach. 60 Minutes first stresses the strategic importance of the Red Sea SLOC and then touts the success of the US Navy’s 5th Fleet. If you watch and listen closely there is a comparison between Red Sea Houthi attacks and the Iranian drone and missile land attacks. IMHO the difference is striking in casualties and effects.

This clip demonstrated the successful coordination and complexity of today’s network centric anti-air defense: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TAX7UjO3A0E .

I do not like the cost benefit analysis of $50,000 drones compared to $3,000,000 US Navy “Standard Missile 2”. The analysis leaves out the potential drone damage and the cost of losing control of a major SLOC. I do have to salute the Navy Captain’s decision to use to the Phalanx “Close-in” System (CIWS) to destroy the four follow up drones following the missile attack. A decision like that represents a significant “trust” level not only in the Captain’s weapons system but also his crew members and leaders.

The US Navy’s approach to this layered defense is not new. It was actually developed in Navy’s WW2 Pacific War campaigns. The layers of long range (Navy fighter aircraft), intermediate (5-inch dual-purpose guns and 40mm Bofors “POM-POM” Guns), and close-in (20mm automate anti-aircraft guns) was develop and use extensively in WW2. The Navy actually built 8 Atlantic Class anti-aircraft light cruisers, (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atlanta-class_cruiser ) with every inch of deck space covered with one of these weapon systems. I should note the Atlantic Class cruisers were very important in establishing air superiority in amphibious pre-landing operations in the Leyte Gulf, Iwo Jima and the Okinawa campaigns.

The bad news is the US Navy started to forget about this lesson learned and was abruptly reminded by a US Marine Officer (Retired) in the Millennium Challenge 2002 war game. The wargame objective “was designed to test the military's new concepts of "network-centric warfare," in which advanced technology would give U.S. forces an overwhelming advantage. It was the most expensive war game in U.S. military history, costing $250 million.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Challenge_2002

The bad news is; “Red, commanded by retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper, adopted an asymmetric strategy, in particular, simulating using old methods to evade Blue's sophisticated electronic surveillance network. Van Riper simulated using motorcycle messengers to transmit orders to front-line troops and World-War-II-style light signals to launch airplanes without radio communications in the model.” In the opening scenario not only were Blue Force Carrier Strike Groups and Amphibious TFs defeated; they were sunk by inferior “Red” forces.

For these reasons I do not understand why folks argue that the CCP A2/D2 marks the end of amphibious operations. I cannot buy that assumption. A peer-to-peer conflict with the CCP will require amphibious operations that will require at least local air superiority and SLOC control. The US Navy has recently demonstrated it can achieve SLOC control and air superiority in the Red Sea. If the US Navy can protect their carriers and the SLOC they can certainly protect an Amphibious TF (maybe add a few Arleigh-Burk Destroyers to the Amphibious TF and practice air and sea control in pre-landing operations).

The US Navy got a wakeup call in 2002. I suspect that General Van Riper never received a “that a Boy” from the US Navy or Joint Force leadership for his efforts in Millennium Challenge. Understanding the old joke about military leadership that “One Ah S__t! wipes out five that a boys”, the Navy needs to look at its history and find those “that a boys’ to counterbalance their ship building and maintenance issues.

S/F

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