Forward deployed if you are mobile makes sense. Forward deployed if you lack mobility is a tripwire of blood and guts.
We do not need to have Marine units closer to the Chinese strengths if they are fixed in place. It is a Wake Island effect. The Berlin Brigade had very little chance of impacting a Soviet Invasion. It was a symbolic commitment of resolve and intent. You do not charge the light brigade into Russian artillery. The Marine Corps is an attacking force not a stay behind sniper effort that thinks it will not be detected and eliminated.
In 1982 I had a conversation with a German Armored Brigade Cmdr in Hamburg. I asked about his tasks to retreat and attrit invading Warsaw Pact Forces and he acknowledged that was the official policy. In fact he and the Danish Brigade would attack to the East. The logic was that the Warsaw Pact was not flexible enough to deal with that and that the arrival of West German and Danish Forces would cause locals and Warsaw Pact Forces to turn on the Russians.
A conventional fight with China ( hard for me to grasp) is a Navy- USAF fight. A III MEF MAGTF held in reserve on amphibious shipping and out of range has innumerable options to strike at the right place at the right time over vast distances be it an amphibious assault or offload in friendly nations. The challenge to China is not the short range, immobile, coastal defense missile batteries trying to hide and survive in the jungle or on coral islands. A MEF afloat disbursed between the Aleutians and New Zealand is another story.
You correctly identify the danger of creating a "Wake Island effect"—small units placed within the enemy’s missile range that are easily fixed, targeted, and eliminated.
FD 2030's Assumption: The current strategy assumes its smaller Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs) will achieve survivability through dispersion and low-signature operations, constantly hopping between austere, small bases.
Your Counter-Logic: This theory relies heavily on the enemy's inability to detect and track these units (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance or ISR). If China's ISR is robust, the MLRs are not mobile enough to escape, turning them into expensive, immobile targets rather than the agile "Stand-in Forces" (SIF) they are intended to be. They sacrifice the proven power of combined arms maneuver for unproven survivability.
2. The Nature of the Fight (Navy-USAF First)
You argue that a conventional conflict with China would primarily be a Navy-USAF fight for air and sea control, making a reserve MEF Afloat a more valuable asset than land-based, short-range Marine missile batteries.
The Power of the MEF Afloat: A full MEF held on amphibious shipping, out of immediate missile range, represents a massive strategic reserve that can be launched as a decisive attack force—whether for an amphibious assault or to seize critical terrain—at a time and place of its choosing. This mobility presents a profound, unpredictable threat to Chinese planners that fixed island units do not.
FD 2030's Rationale: The Marine Corps believes its traditional large amphibious ships are too vulnerable to be held in reserve and that the MLRs must act as the "blunt layer," providing sensors and anti-ship fires from land bases to help the Navy achieve sea control.
Conclusion: The Need for an Offensive Mindset
Your analysis reframes the debate around the Marine Corps' identity—it is an attacking, offensive force. The danger of FD 2030, as you see it, is that it transforms the Marine Corps from a flexible offensive tool into a defensive coastal defense force relying on stealth and survival.
This leads back to the Hybrid Solution: The Marine Corps needs to ensure that any forces placed forward possess either true, rapid mobility (which requires more LAW ships and better logistics) or enough combined arms depth to achieve a decisive effect. If the MEF Afloat is indeed the most potent offensive threat, that capability should be protected and modernized, not divested to fund a specialized, high-risk island-chain defense.
They need lighter ground vehicles and as much or more air transport for those vehicles along with a transport much faster than LSM. There really isn't any reason the stern lander couldn't be faster.
The WOTR article highlights the need for more hulls to support Force Design 2030, but from my perspective as a career Marine SNCO, I don’t fully agree with all of FD 2030’s underlying assumptions. In my view, a hybrid approach might be more effective—using Marine Littoral Regiments as stay-behind forces, similar to the Australian Coastwatchers of WWII, while keeping the bulk of III MEF afloat or positioned in a hardened Okinawa.
I have to commend the participants on CP for exposing the US Navy’s failed ship building and maintenance programs. However, I have to say that the Navy has done a very good job on anti-air defense. This has been documented on a “60 Minutes” show here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRRJmOTCqqQ The “youtube” clip is important because of its strategic approach. 60 Minutes first stresses the strategic importance of the Red Sea SLOC and then touts the success of the US Navy’s 5th Fleet. If you watch and listen closely there is a comparison between Red Sea Houthi attacks and the Iranian drone and missile land attacks. IMHO the difference is striking in casualties and effects.
I do not like the cost benefit analysis of $50,000 drones compared to $3,000,000 US Navy “Standard Missile 2”. The analysis leaves out the potential drone damage and the cost of losing control of a major SLOC. I do have to salute the Navy Captain’s decision to use to the Phalanx “Close-in” System (CIWS) to destroy the four follow up drones following the missile attack. A decision like that represents a significant “trust” level not only in the Captain’s weapons system but also his crew members and leaders.
The US Navy’s approach to this layered defense is not new. It was actually developed in Navy’s WW2 Pacific War campaigns. The layers of long range (Navy fighter aircraft), intermediate (5-inch dual-purpose guns and 40mm Bofors “POM-POM” Guns), and close-in (20mm automate anti-aircraft guns) was develop and use extensively in WW2. The Navy actually built 8 Atlantic Class anti-aircraft light cruisers, (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atlanta-class_cruiser ) with every inch of deck space covered with one of these weapon systems. I should note the Atlantic Class cruisers were very important in establishing air superiority in amphibious pre-landing operations in the Leyte Gulf, Iwo Jima and the Okinawa campaigns.
The bad news is the US Navy started to forget about this lesson learned and was abruptly reminded by a US Marine Officer (Retired) in the Millennium Challenge 2002 war game. The wargame objective “was designed to test the military's new concepts of "network-centric warfare," in which advanced technology would give U.S. forces an overwhelming advantage. It was the most expensive war game in U.S. military history, costing $250 million.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Challenge_2002
The bad news is; “Red, commanded by retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper, adopted an asymmetric strategy, in particular, simulating using old methods to evade Blue's sophisticated electronic surveillance network. Van Riper simulated using motorcycle messengers to transmit orders to front-line troops and World-War-II-style light signals to launch airplanes without radio communications in the model.” In the opening scenario not only were Blue Force Carrier Strike Groups and Amphibious TFs defeated; they were sunk by inferior “Red” forces.
For these reasons I do not understand why folks argue that the CCP A2/D2 marks the end of amphibious operations. I cannot buy that assumption. A peer-to-peer conflict with the CCP will require amphibious operations that will require at least local air superiority and SLOC control. The US Navy has recently demonstrated it can achieve SLOC control and air superiority in the Red Sea. If the US Navy can protect their carriers and the SLOC they can certainly protect an Amphibious TF (maybe add a few Arleigh-Burk Destroyers to the Amphibious TF and practice air and sea control in pre-landing operations).
The US Navy got a wakeup call in 2002. I suspect that General Van Riper never received a “that a Boy” from the US Navy or Joint Force leadership for his efforts in Millennium Challenge. Understanding the old joke about military leadership that “One Ah S__t! wipes out five that a boys”, the Navy needs to look at its history and find those “that a boys’ to counterbalance their ship building and maintenance issues.
Finally!!! Someone else has raised very successful WW II TTP’s at sea, of course plussed up with the latest systems & technology … and, while we at it, let’s not forget Advance Force Operations as we peal back the onion! Semper Fidelis!
If you look at the bigger picture the U.S. has been moving the center of its ground combat power away from the PRC .
In 1971 as the U. S. pulled out of Vietnam, instead of relocating the 3rd Marines back to Okinawa where they were prior to Vietnam, they moved it eastward away from the locus of power to enable a check on the PRC.
As the pressure increased on the U.S. to reduce its footprint on Okinawa, in the early 2000s, the U.S. relocated elements of the 9th Marines to Australia, away from the locus of power necessary to check the PRC.
Now in the first quarter of this century the remainder of 9th Marines, elements of 3rd MAW, and support elements for both are relocating to Guam, away from the location of the locus of power necessary to check the PRC.
In all of these instances to get Marines back to the necessary location of the locus of power is the need for amphibious shipping which over time has atrophied.
Now the Navy can’t provide the amphibious shipping to float 3 battalions of Marines. Now the Marine Corps can’t even provide 3 combined arms MEUs to man those ships.
Back in WW II it required air power followed by ground forces to negate our presence in the Pacific. Now it only takes rocket and missile forces to deny our access to WESTPAC UNLESS we have the capability to force ground combat power back to the location of the required locus of power, South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines.
And that’s not even beginning to address the worldwide requirements of afloat ARG/MEUs.
General George S. Patton once said something to the effect that: "a good plan today is better than a perfect plan tomorrow." With that being said, the Marine Corps better get to it. The current CMC wants to eliminate the 3rd MEF as a ground fighting force, hence the plan to eliminate infantry regiments and tubed arty. Instead, to create a littoral force I suggest the Marine Corps buy Swedish CB90 assault boats. Perfect vessels for conducting raids and conducting mischief on enemy locations. LCACs can be used to ferry HIMARS to remote locations for missile attacks on PLAN shipping and bases. We don't need NMESIS. We have HIMARS PrSM. We also have LCACs, Expeditionary Fast Transports, and C-130s for intra-theater mobility. These assets and a few more off the shelf systems, would get the 3rd MEF into a truly offensive expeditionary force, short of being a combined arms force. So, let's get to it
The Marines have trained with the Finns who have the slightly larger Jehu class (watercat M18) that can carry 24 Marines and crew of 5 vs CB90 18 plus crew of 3. Swap 2 seats on Jehu and you are moving 2 full squads per boat. Also tested in well deck.
I know the weights work on a SSC (LCAC replacement) for 4 Himars per sortie, but I don't know if you can arrange them that way on deck. You definitely could do that with a ROGUE-Fires whether mounted with NSM or LBASM/PRSM Blk II. You can also move them via H-53 in addition to C-130. Your range moving a NMESIS/Rogue Fires via C-130 is also greatly enhanced vs the heavier Himars launcher.
I have always believed that a fast insertion craft like the CB90 or the Jehu Class boat would be perfect for the Marine Corps. Perfect for an amphibious expeditionary force.
The HIMARs is ready now, and they have combined a HIMARs on the ROGUE vehicle. That would make a perfect expeditionary missile vehicle.
I agree with your coast watcher mindset for the stand in forces. Only that they have a significant sting first with dispersed small forces with offensive fight tonight systems. Then progressing to being sensor nodes in the kill chains denying China exits to the first island chain. As Marines are still thinking of formations that are far too large.
Kudos to all the authors but: "...A dozen Stern Landing Vessels..."?? Why are we pounding our head on th etable with respect to these? The authors advocate for it with no material information other than 'we learned something'. Stern landers are great solutions for prepared landing sites. Watching the HOS Resolution bob around the Pacific for a year with nothing but puff pieces tells me...'we tried it". No need to burn money on a "from the ground up" Australian Prototype and pretend it's a production capability. Bow landers are proven; if we only have a dollar for ships...spend it wisely.
Stern landers have been in use in Australia for years, The ship is already built. Try it. Not saying it will be a success, but built for purpose will obviously outperform a conversion.
Forward deployed if you are mobile makes sense. Forward deployed if you lack mobility is a tripwire of blood and guts.
We do not need to have Marine units closer to the Chinese strengths if they are fixed in place. It is a Wake Island effect. The Berlin Brigade had very little chance of impacting a Soviet Invasion. It was a symbolic commitment of resolve and intent. You do not charge the light brigade into Russian artillery. The Marine Corps is an attacking force not a stay behind sniper effort that thinks it will not be detected and eliminated.
In 1982 I had a conversation with a German Armored Brigade Cmdr in Hamburg. I asked about his tasks to retreat and attrit invading Warsaw Pact Forces and he acknowledged that was the official policy. In fact he and the Danish Brigade would attack to the East. The logic was that the Warsaw Pact was not flexible enough to deal with that and that the arrival of West German and Danish Forces would cause locals and Warsaw Pact Forces to turn on the Russians.
A conventional fight with China ( hard for me to grasp) is a Navy- USAF fight. A III MEF MAGTF held in reserve on amphibious shipping and out of range has innumerable options to strike at the right place at the right time over vast distances be it an amphibious assault or offload in friendly nations. The challenge to China is not the short range, immobile, coastal defense missile batteries trying to hide and survive in the jungle or on coral islands. A MEF afloat disbursed between the Aleutians and New Zealand is another story.
Challenging the Logic of FD 2030
1. The Tripwire vs. Maneuver Dilemma
You correctly identify the danger of creating a "Wake Island effect"—small units placed within the enemy’s missile range that are easily fixed, targeted, and eliminated.
FD 2030's Assumption: The current strategy assumes its smaller Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs) will achieve survivability through dispersion and low-signature operations, constantly hopping between austere, small bases.
Your Counter-Logic: This theory relies heavily on the enemy's inability to detect and track these units (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance or ISR). If China's ISR is robust, the MLRs are not mobile enough to escape, turning them into expensive, immobile targets rather than the agile "Stand-in Forces" (SIF) they are intended to be. They sacrifice the proven power of combined arms maneuver for unproven survivability.
2. The Nature of the Fight (Navy-USAF First)
You argue that a conventional conflict with China would primarily be a Navy-USAF fight for air and sea control, making a reserve MEF Afloat a more valuable asset than land-based, short-range Marine missile batteries.
The Power of the MEF Afloat: A full MEF held on amphibious shipping, out of immediate missile range, represents a massive strategic reserve that can be launched as a decisive attack force—whether for an amphibious assault or to seize critical terrain—at a time and place of its choosing. This mobility presents a profound, unpredictable threat to Chinese planners that fixed island units do not.
FD 2030's Rationale: The Marine Corps believes its traditional large amphibious ships are too vulnerable to be held in reserve and that the MLRs must act as the "blunt layer," providing sensors and anti-ship fires from land bases to help the Navy achieve sea control.
Conclusion: The Need for an Offensive Mindset
Your analysis reframes the debate around the Marine Corps' identity—it is an attacking, offensive force. The danger of FD 2030, as you see it, is that it transforms the Marine Corps from a flexible offensive tool into a defensive coastal defense force relying on stealth and survival.
This leads back to the Hybrid Solution: The Marine Corps needs to ensure that any forces placed forward possess either true, rapid mobility (which requires more LAW ships and better logistics) or enough combined arms depth to achieve a decisive effect. If the MEF Afloat is indeed the most potent offensive threat, that capability should be protected and modernized, not divested to fund a specialized, high-risk island-chain defense.
Thanks Rob. I think we are in agreement.
They need lighter ground vehicles and as much or more air transport for those vehicles along with a transport much faster than LSM. There really isn't any reason the stern lander couldn't be faster.
Its interesting this articles timing misses this very relevant WotR article on III MEF experiments in mobility and the need to just get on with it, ASAP. https://warontherocks.com/2025/10/flood-the-zone-iii-marine-expeditionary-forces-mobility-mandate/
The WOTR article highlights the need for more hulls to support Force Design 2030, but from my perspective as a career Marine SNCO, I don’t fully agree with all of FD 2030’s underlying assumptions. In my view, a hybrid approach might be more effective—using Marine Littoral Regiments as stay-behind forces, similar to the Australian Coastwatchers of WWII, while keeping the bulk of III MEF afloat or positioned in a hardened Okinawa.
The world-wide, globally responsive MEF (1st& 2nd) is truly a threat to China.
Certainly to China’s far flung interests.
Amen!
Naval Air Defense
I have to commend the participants on CP for exposing the US Navy’s failed ship building and maintenance programs. However, I have to say that the Navy has done a very good job on anti-air defense. This has been documented on a “60 Minutes” show here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRRJmOTCqqQ The “youtube” clip is important because of its strategic approach. 60 Minutes first stresses the strategic importance of the Red Sea SLOC and then touts the success of the US Navy’s 5th Fleet. If you watch and listen closely there is a comparison between Red Sea Houthi attacks and the Iranian drone and missile land attacks. IMHO the difference is striking in casualties and effects.
This clip demonstrated the successful coordination and complexity of today’s network centric anti-air defense: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TAX7UjO3A0E .
I do not like the cost benefit analysis of $50,000 drones compared to $3,000,000 US Navy “Standard Missile 2”. The analysis leaves out the potential drone damage and the cost of losing control of a major SLOC. I do have to salute the Navy Captain’s decision to use to the Phalanx “Close-in” System (CIWS) to destroy the four follow up drones following the missile attack. A decision like that represents a significant “trust” level not only in the Captain’s weapons system but also his crew members and leaders.
The US Navy’s approach to this layered defense is not new. It was actually developed in Navy’s WW2 Pacific War campaigns. The layers of long range (Navy fighter aircraft), intermediate (5-inch dual-purpose guns and 40mm Bofors “POM-POM” Guns), and close-in (20mm automate anti-aircraft guns) was develop and use extensively in WW2. The Navy actually built 8 Atlantic Class anti-aircraft light cruisers, (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atlanta-class_cruiser ) with every inch of deck space covered with one of these weapon systems. I should note the Atlantic Class cruisers were very important in establishing air superiority in amphibious pre-landing operations in the Leyte Gulf, Iwo Jima and the Okinawa campaigns.
The bad news is the US Navy started to forget about this lesson learned and was abruptly reminded by a US Marine Officer (Retired) in the Millennium Challenge 2002 war game. The wargame objective “was designed to test the military's new concepts of "network-centric warfare," in which advanced technology would give U.S. forces an overwhelming advantage. It was the most expensive war game in U.S. military history, costing $250 million.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millennium_Challenge_2002
The bad news is; “Red, commanded by retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General Paul K. Van Riper, adopted an asymmetric strategy, in particular, simulating using old methods to evade Blue's sophisticated electronic surveillance network. Van Riper simulated using motorcycle messengers to transmit orders to front-line troops and World-War-II-style light signals to launch airplanes without radio communications in the model.” In the opening scenario not only were Blue Force Carrier Strike Groups and Amphibious TFs defeated; they were sunk by inferior “Red” forces.
For these reasons I do not understand why folks argue that the CCP A2/D2 marks the end of amphibious operations. I cannot buy that assumption. A peer-to-peer conflict with the CCP will require amphibious operations that will require at least local air superiority and SLOC control. The US Navy has recently demonstrated it can achieve SLOC control and air superiority in the Red Sea. If the US Navy can protect their carriers and the SLOC they can certainly protect an Amphibious TF (maybe add a few Arleigh-Burk Destroyers to the Amphibious TF and practice air and sea control in pre-landing operations).
The US Navy got a wakeup call in 2002. I suspect that General Van Riper never received a “that a Boy” from the US Navy or Joint Force leadership for his efforts in Millennium Challenge. Understanding the old joke about military leadership that “One Ah S__t! wipes out five that a boys”, the Navy needs to look at its history and find those “that a boys’ to counterbalance their ship building and maintenance issues.
S/F
Finally!!! Someone else has raised very successful WW II TTP’s at sea, of course plussed up with the latest systems & technology … and, while we at it, let’s not forget Advance Force Operations as we peal back the onion! Semper Fidelis!
Common sense is an uncommon virtue these days - glad these authors still have some.
If you look at the bigger picture the U.S. has been moving the center of its ground combat power away from the PRC .
In 1971 as the U. S. pulled out of Vietnam, instead of relocating the 3rd Marines back to Okinawa where they were prior to Vietnam, they moved it eastward away from the locus of power to enable a check on the PRC.
As the pressure increased on the U.S. to reduce its footprint on Okinawa, in the early 2000s, the U.S. relocated elements of the 9th Marines to Australia, away from the locus of power necessary to check the PRC.
Now in the first quarter of this century the remainder of 9th Marines, elements of 3rd MAW, and support elements for both are relocating to Guam, away from the location of the locus of power necessary to check the PRC.
In all of these instances to get Marines back to the necessary location of the locus of power is the need for amphibious shipping which over time has atrophied.
Now the Navy can’t provide the amphibious shipping to float 3 battalions of Marines. Now the Marine Corps can’t even provide 3 combined arms MEUs to man those ships.
Back in WW II it required air power followed by ground forces to negate our presence in the Pacific. Now it only takes rocket and missile forces to deny our access to WESTPAC UNLESS we have the capability to force ground combat power back to the location of the required locus of power, South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines.
And that’s not even beginning to address the worldwide requirements of afloat ARG/MEUs.
Need more of this conversation. Head-hurting, to be sure, but, reality, me thinks.
General George S. Patton once said something to the effect that: "a good plan today is better than a perfect plan tomorrow." With that being said, the Marine Corps better get to it. The current CMC wants to eliminate the 3rd MEF as a ground fighting force, hence the plan to eliminate infantry regiments and tubed arty. Instead, to create a littoral force I suggest the Marine Corps buy Swedish CB90 assault boats. Perfect vessels for conducting raids and conducting mischief on enemy locations. LCACs can be used to ferry HIMARS to remote locations for missile attacks on PLAN shipping and bases. We don't need NMESIS. We have HIMARS PrSM. We also have LCACs, Expeditionary Fast Transports, and C-130s for intra-theater mobility. These assets and a few more off the shelf systems, would get the 3rd MEF into a truly offensive expeditionary force, short of being a combined arms force. So, let's get to it
The Marines have trained with the Finns who have the slightly larger Jehu class (watercat M18) that can carry 24 Marines and crew of 5 vs CB90 18 plus crew of 3. Swap 2 seats on Jehu and you are moving 2 full squads per boat. Also tested in well deck.
I know the weights work on a SSC (LCAC replacement) for 4 Himars per sortie, but I don't know if you can arrange them that way on deck. You definitely could do that with a ROGUE-Fires whether mounted with NSM or LBASM/PRSM Blk II. You can also move them via H-53 in addition to C-130. Your range moving a NMESIS/Rogue Fires via C-130 is also greatly enhanced vs the heavier Himars launcher.
I have always believed that a fast insertion craft like the CB90 or the Jehu Class boat would be perfect for the Marine Corps. Perfect for an amphibious expeditionary force.
The HIMARs is ready now, and they have combined a HIMARs on the ROGUE vehicle. That would make a perfect expeditionary missile vehicle.
I agree with your coast watcher mindset for the stand in forces. Only that they have a significant sting first with dispersed small forces with offensive fight tonight systems. Then progressing to being sensor nodes in the kill chains denying China exits to the first island chain. As Marines are still thinking of formations that are far too large.
Kudos to all the authors but: "...A dozen Stern Landing Vessels..."?? Why are we pounding our head on th etable with respect to these? The authors advocate for it with no material information other than 'we learned something'. Stern landers are great solutions for prepared landing sites. Watching the HOS Resolution bob around the Pacific for a year with nothing but puff pieces tells me...'we tried it". No need to burn money on a "from the ground up" Australian Prototype and pretend it's a production capability. Bow landers are proven; if we only have a dollar for ships...spend it wisely.
Stern landers have been in use in Australia for years, The ship is already built. Try it. Not saying it will be a success, but built for purpose will obviously outperform a conversion.
No, there are no off the shelf Australian stern landers for undeveloped landing sites.