My sentiments mirror the comments of the first reader quoted in today’s Compass Points. His comments were in response to an article published in “War on the Rocks” on August 7, 2025 titled “The Marine Corps Americans Want Can’t Be Delivered by a Fake Crisis.”
Like many proponents of Force Design, the author of this article suffers a bad of CDS or Chowder Derangement Syndrome. His hatred of all things Chowder is on full display in the 2nd paragraph of the article, where he states: “… a small but vocal group of retired Marine officers have howled about Berger miring the Marine Corps in a crisis. They call themselves “Chowder II” … Their methods have been unprecedented. They have employed doomsday rhetoric and distortions with such shameless fervor you’d think Force Design 2030 was a Chinese plot and not a strategy to stop one.” With these few sentences, one can surely conclude that all objectivity to focus on the concerns raised by Chowder II has been eclipsed by the typical approach to vilify, demagogue, and denigrate the messenger. In his efforts to follow suit, the author does not disappoint.
Also like many armchair generals who have never worn the cloth of the nation, the author is quick to pontificate on the role of the Marine Corps in the national defense and how it should be organized, manned, and equipped to carry out its mission. How did he become so knowledge about national defense and Marine Corps roles and missions? He tells us how - - by reading books. In case you think I’m wrong, consider the following statements he makes during his discussion of “Defense and Offense in Marine and Military Thought,” during which he attempts to defend the defensive nature of Stand-in Forces:
“During the fight for Guadalcanal, the Marine Corps fought and won two primarily defensive battles: Tenaru and Edson’s Ridge, which were critical to prevailing in the Solomon Islands and the war in the Pacific. And let’s not forget the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir against China during the Korean War. For those who say the Marine Corps only finds true meaning in the offensive, the least offensive thing I can say in reply is this: Read a book! Defense, Offense, and the Stand-in Force.”
Of course, those of us who truly understand Marine Corps history, operations, and strategy, know that Guadalcanal was America’s first offensive operation of World War II. And the Chosin Reservoir was a continuation of offensive operations that began at Pusan and progressed through Inchon, Seoul, and Wonsan. And the Chosin Reservoir was never a defensive battle. It was an offensive fight, up and back or in the words of Major General Oliver P. Smith, “Retreat Hell, we are just attacking in a different direction.” So most of the Marines I know would instead say - - offense, defense, global response. Live it and read a book. You cannot become a Marine or even understand Marines by reading a book. You have to be a Marine to know Marines.
By the way, my father - - who served on Guadalcanal and at Pusan, Inchon, Seoul, Wonsan, and Chosin - - would chime in to agree with me if he was not presently guarding the streets of heaven.
I requested Grok to provide an energetic reminder of a Great Marine General:## Holland McTyeire Smith: A Short Biography
## Holland McTyeire Smith: A Short Biography
Holland McTyeire Smith, born on April 20, 1882, in Hatchechubbee, Alabama, was a distinguished U.S. Marine Corps general widely recognized as the "father of modern U.S. amphibious warfare." After earning a Bachelor of Science from Auburn University in 1901 and a law degree from the University of Alabama in 1903, he practiced law briefly before enlisting in the Marine Corps in 1905. His early military service in the Philippines and the Dominican Republic earned him the nickname "Howlin' Mad" due to his intense leadership style.
Smith's most notable contributions came during World War II, where he played a pivotal role in the Pacific theater. Commanding the V Amphibious Corps, he led critical amphibious assaults on the Gilbert Islands, Marshall Islands, Saipan, Tinian, and Iwo Jima. His innovative strategies and rigorous training methods were instrumental in shaping the Marine Corps' success in these operations.
In his memoir, **_Coral and Brass_** (1949), Smith provides a detailed and candid reflection on his experiences. He emphasized the significance of the Battle of Saipan, stating:
> "I have always considered Saipan the decisive battle of the Pacific offensive…(it was) the naval and military heart and brain of the Japanese defence strategy."
Smith also highlighted the importance of discipline, noting:
> "In our corps without responsibility and discipline we would not have won the Battle of Iwo Jima."
Additionally, he expressed frustration with inter-service rivalries, writing:
> "We had generals who were admirals and admirals who wanted to be generals. Generals acting as admirals are bad enough, but it was the admirals who wanted to be generals who imperiled victory among the coral islands."
After retiring in 1946, Smith settled in La Jolla, California, where he lived until his death on January 12, 1967. His legacy endures through his groundbreaking contributions to amphibious warfare and the insights shared in **_Coral and Brass_**, which remains a valuable historical account of the Pacific War.
Holland McTyeire Smith, born on April 20, 1882, in Hatchechubbee, Alabama, was a distinguished U.S. Marine Corps general widely recognized as the "father of modern U.S. amphibious warfare." After earning a Bachelor of Science from Auburn University in 1901 and a law degree from the University of Alabama in 1903, he practiced law briefly before enlisting in the Marine Corps in 1905. His early military service in the Philippines and the Dominican Republic earned him the nickname "Howlin' Mad" due to his intense leadership style.
Smith's most notable contributions came during World War II, where he played a pivotal role in the Pacific theater. Commanding the V Amphibious Corps, he led critical amphibious assaults on the Gilbert Islands, Marshall Islands, Saipan, Tinian, and Iwo Jima. His innovative strategies and rigorous training methods were instrumental in shaping the Marine Corps' success in these operations.
In his memoir, **_Coral and Brass_** (1949), Smith provides a detailed and candid reflection on his experiences. He emphasized the significance of the Battle of Saipan, stating:
> "I have always considered Saipan the decisive battle of the Pacific offensive…(it was) the naval and military heart and brain of the Japanese defence strategy."
Smith also highlighted the importance of discipline, noting:
> "In our corps without responsibility and discipline we would not have won the Battle of Iwo Jima."
Additionally, he expressed frustration with inter-service rivalries, writing:
> "We had generals who were admirals and admirals who wanted to be generals. Generals acting as admirals are bad enough, but it was the admirals who wanted to be generals who imperiled victory among the coral islands."
After retiring in 1946, Smith settled in La Jolla, California, where he lived until his death on January 12, 1967. His legacy endures through his groundbreaking contributions to amphibious warfare and the insights shared in **_Coral and Brass_**, which remains a valuable historical account of the Pacific War.”!
Good to hear something positive about the inside game going on. I admit, I get worried when the "don't worry we got it and that's all the info you get" starts getting thrown around on the 'contra-FD' side of the scrimmage line. I know I am not the only one, whether on or off active duty.
What mystical and magical knowledge do former CMC Berger and current CMC Smith have, that over 100 retired Marine Generals all retired CMCs don't have? I don't think warfare has changed that much. I would like to see a Congressional hearing similar to the one by Commandant Vandergrift's. These are important points:
My sentiments mirror the comments of the first reader quoted in today’s Compass Points. His comments were in response to an article published in “War on the Rocks” on August 7, 2025 titled “The Marine Corps Americans Want Can’t Be Delivered by a Fake Crisis.”
Like many proponents of Force Design, the author of this article suffers a bad of CDS or Chowder Derangement Syndrome. His hatred of all things Chowder is on full display in the 2nd paragraph of the article, where he states: “… a small but vocal group of retired Marine officers have howled about Berger miring the Marine Corps in a crisis. They call themselves “Chowder II” … Their methods have been unprecedented. They have employed doomsday rhetoric and distortions with such shameless fervor you’d think Force Design 2030 was a Chinese plot and not a strategy to stop one.” With these few sentences, one can surely conclude that all objectivity to focus on the concerns raised by Chowder II has been eclipsed by the typical approach to vilify, demagogue, and denigrate the messenger. In his efforts to follow suit, the author does not disappoint.
Also like many armchair generals who have never worn the cloth of the nation, the author is quick to pontificate on the role of the Marine Corps in the national defense and how it should be organized, manned, and equipped to carry out its mission. How did he become so knowledge about national defense and Marine Corps roles and missions? He tells us how - - by reading books. In case you think I’m wrong, consider the following statements he makes during his discussion of “Defense and Offense in Marine and Military Thought,” during which he attempts to defend the defensive nature of Stand-in Forces:
“During the fight for Guadalcanal, the Marine Corps fought and won two primarily defensive battles: Tenaru and Edson’s Ridge, which were critical to prevailing in the Solomon Islands and the war in the Pacific. And let’s not forget the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir against China during the Korean War. For those who say the Marine Corps only finds true meaning in the offensive, the least offensive thing I can say in reply is this: Read a book! Defense, Offense, and the Stand-in Force.”
Of course, those of us who truly understand Marine Corps history, operations, and strategy, know that Guadalcanal was America’s first offensive operation of World War II. And the Chosin Reservoir was a continuation of offensive operations that began at Pusan and progressed through Inchon, Seoul, and Wonsan. And the Chosin Reservoir was never a defensive battle. It was an offensive fight, up and back or in the words of Major General Oliver P. Smith, “Retreat Hell, we are just attacking in a different direction.” So most of the Marines I know would instead say - - offense, defense, global response. Live it and read a book. You cannot become a Marine or even understand Marines by reading a book. You have to be a Marine to know Marines.
By the way, my father - - who served on Guadalcanal and at Pusan, Inchon, Seoul, Wonsan, and Chosin - - would chime in to agree with me if he was not presently guarding the streets of heaven.
I requested Grok to provide an energetic reminder of a Great Marine General:## Holland McTyeire Smith: A Short Biography
## Holland McTyeire Smith: A Short Biography
Holland McTyeire Smith, born on April 20, 1882, in Hatchechubbee, Alabama, was a distinguished U.S. Marine Corps general widely recognized as the "father of modern U.S. amphibious warfare." After earning a Bachelor of Science from Auburn University in 1901 and a law degree from the University of Alabama in 1903, he practiced law briefly before enlisting in the Marine Corps in 1905. His early military service in the Philippines and the Dominican Republic earned him the nickname "Howlin' Mad" due to his intense leadership style.
Smith's most notable contributions came during World War II, where he played a pivotal role in the Pacific theater. Commanding the V Amphibious Corps, he led critical amphibious assaults on the Gilbert Islands, Marshall Islands, Saipan, Tinian, and Iwo Jima. His innovative strategies and rigorous training methods were instrumental in shaping the Marine Corps' success in these operations.
In his memoir, **_Coral and Brass_** (1949), Smith provides a detailed and candid reflection on his experiences. He emphasized the significance of the Battle of Saipan, stating:
> "I have always considered Saipan the decisive battle of the Pacific offensive…(it was) the naval and military heart and brain of the Japanese defence strategy."
Smith also highlighted the importance of discipline, noting:
> "In our corps without responsibility and discipline we would not have won the Battle of Iwo Jima."
Additionally, he expressed frustration with inter-service rivalries, writing:
> "We had generals who were admirals and admirals who wanted to be generals. Generals acting as admirals are bad enough, but it was the admirals who wanted to be generals who imperiled victory among the coral islands."
After retiring in 1946, Smith settled in La Jolla, California, where he lived until his death on January 12, 1967. His legacy endures through his groundbreaking contributions to amphibious warfare and the insights shared in **_Coral and Brass_**, which remains a valuable historical account of the Pacific War.
Holland McTyeire Smith, born on April 20, 1882, in Hatchechubbee, Alabama, was a distinguished U.S. Marine Corps general widely recognized as the "father of modern U.S. amphibious warfare." After earning a Bachelor of Science from Auburn University in 1901 and a law degree from the University of Alabama in 1903, he practiced law briefly before enlisting in the Marine Corps in 1905. His early military service in the Philippines and the Dominican Republic earned him the nickname "Howlin' Mad" due to his intense leadership style.
Smith's most notable contributions came during World War II, where he played a pivotal role in the Pacific theater. Commanding the V Amphibious Corps, he led critical amphibious assaults on the Gilbert Islands, Marshall Islands, Saipan, Tinian, and Iwo Jima. His innovative strategies and rigorous training methods were instrumental in shaping the Marine Corps' success in these operations.
In his memoir, **_Coral and Brass_** (1949), Smith provides a detailed and candid reflection on his experiences. He emphasized the significance of the Battle of Saipan, stating:
> "I have always considered Saipan the decisive battle of the Pacific offensive…(it was) the naval and military heart and brain of the Japanese defence strategy."
Smith also highlighted the importance of discipline, noting:
> "In our corps without responsibility and discipline we would not have won the Battle of Iwo Jima."
Additionally, he expressed frustration with inter-service rivalries, writing:
> "We had generals who were admirals and admirals who wanted to be generals. Generals acting as admirals are bad enough, but it was the admirals who wanted to be generals who imperiled victory among the coral islands."
After retiring in 1946, Smith settled in La Jolla, California, where he lived until his death on January 12, 1967. His legacy endures through his groundbreaking contributions to amphibious warfare and the insights shared in **_Coral and Brass_**, which remains a valuable historical account of the Pacific War.”!
Good to hear something positive about the inside game going on. I admit, I get worried when the "don't worry we got it and that's all the info you get" starts getting thrown around on the 'contra-FD' side of the scrimmage line. I know I am not the only one, whether on or off active duty.
What mystical and magical knowledge do former CMC Berger and current CMC Smith have, that over 100 retired Marine Generals all retired CMCs don't have? I don't think warfare has changed that much. I would like to see a Congressional hearing similar to the one by Commandant Vandergrift's. These are important points:
1-FD was developed with nondisclosure acts
for the developers. This shows dishonesty
2-The Army, and other nations have similar
organizations. Why is the Marine Corps
duplicating what is already being
done? The Army, Navy, and Air Force have
been in the missile business for decades
3- The Army missile systems are superior to
the Marine system. After 5 years there is
still not one single anti-ship battery in the
Marine Corps.
4-The Marine Corps is the only combined-arms
robust, naval expeditionary force in the
world. If it is weakened, it hurts the Nation.
A fully equipped pre-FD Marine Corps can
also include anti-ship units.
5-While China is the pacing threat, it is not the
only danger America faces.
6-China has many interests in the world. Only
a robust combined-arms force can deal with
this issue.