Compass Points - More MAGTF
MAGTF gives US global options.
Compass Points - More MAGTF
MAGTF gives US global options.
January 30, 2024
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Military and civilian leaders are reviewing options for how to respond to the deaths of three American soldiers and the injury to dozens of others in recent Middle East attacks. Compass Points sends condolences to the families of the soldiers killed in the latest attacks and best wishes to the soldiers and the families of those injured.
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When a military crisis erupts anywhere around the globe, US leaders need options, they need a range of military options that can be activated immediately.
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Tyler Pager, Yasmeen Abutaleb and Abigail Hauslohne report for the Washington Post.
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President Biden met with top aides Monday to review potential American responses to a drone attack that killed three U.S. service members . . . Biden has promised to “hold all those responsible to account,” but exactly how he plans to do that remains unclear.
The drone attack, which marked the first known time U.S. soldiers have been killed in the fallout from the Israel-Gaza war, killed three Army Reserve members from Fort Moore in Georgia who were stationed at a facility in Jordan and injured dozens more.
-- Washington Post
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Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali writing for Reuters report,
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. . . Biden's response options could range anywhere from targeting Iranian forces outside to even inside Iran, or opting for a more cautious retaliatory attack solely against the Iran-backed militants responsible, experts say. American forces in the Middle East have been attacked more than 150 times by Iran-backed forces in Iraq, Syria, Jordan and off the coast of Yemen since the Israel-Hamas war erupted in October.
But until Sunday's attack on a remote outpost known as Tower 22 near Jordan's northeastern border with Syria, the strikes had not killed U.S. troops nor wounded so many.
-- Reuters
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Brigadier General Jerry McAbee recalls another time when US leaders needed more options. Like today, US leaders needed to get immediate military combat power on the scene.
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“The Marines Have Landed and The Situation is Well in Hand”: Operation Desert Shield
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By Brigadier General Jerry McAbee, USMC (ret)
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In August 1990, I was a team chief on the United States Central Command’s (USCENTCOM) Crisis Action Team (CAT). The CAT had been activated to coordinate the deployment of U.S. military forces to Saudi Arabia in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2. By the second week of August, the movement of U.S. military forces, which had been named Operation Desert Shield, was already well underway. The CENTOM Commander, General Norman Schwarzkopf, had earlier given the priority of airlift to his Army Component, United States Army Forces Central (ARCENT).
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Since ARCENT had priority, almost all the airlift was being used to deploy the Eighteenth Airborne Corps Headquarters, the 82nd Airborne Division Headquarters, and the division’s ready brigade. These forces were being lifted to the vicinity of Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, which was about 200 miles south of the Kuwait border.
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With each passing day, General Schwarzkopf was becoming more concerned about Iraq’s next move. Intelligence reports increasingly indicated the Iraqi Army might cross the Kuwait border and attack into Saudi Arabia. Seven or ten days into the deployment, “Stormin’ Norman” (which none of us would dare call him to his face) asked the Crisis Action Team about options for getting more combat power into theater and quicker. One of the Marines present offered an easy and effective option - - change the priority of airlift to the Marines.
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In the discussions that followed, Marines on the CENTCOM staff and liaison officers from United States Marine Corps Forces Central (MARCENT) explained that Maritime Prepositioning Squadron Two (MPSRON 2) had previously sortied from Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean and was entering the Gulf of Oman, headed for the port of Al Jubail. The port was about 70 miles north of Dhahran and approximately 130 miles south of the Kuwait border. The Marines further explained that only 250 C-141 equivalents of airlift were needed to deploy the Fly-In Echelon (FIE) of the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) to marry up with equipment and supplies aboard the five prepositioning ships. When the commander asked how long the Marines and Sailors needed to offload the ships and form for combat, the Marnes simply replied: “Ten days to offload the ships and standup the 7th MEB for combat, assuming the Air Force can get us to Al Jubail on time.”
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With very little additional discussion, General Schwarzkopf changed the priority of airlift to the Marines. I immediately called the 7th MEB Officer of the Day in California to give him a “heads up” that the first aircraft would be landing at Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, California in 24 hours to begin embarking the MEB. He told me the 7th Marine Regiment (the MEB’s Ground Combat Element) was in the desert at 29 Palms training for desert warfare. He was astounded that the TPFDD (Time Phased Force Deployment Data) had been changed so dramatically, telling me the regiment was not scheduled to deploy for two weeks or more. But in typical Marine Corps fashion, the troops came in from the field, showered, readied their equipment, said their good-byes to family and friends, and boarded the buses. They were standing tall at El Toro when the first aircraft arrived.
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By August 15, the Marines and Sailors were falling in on equipment being offloaded from MPSRON 2 at Al Jubail. Ten days later, the 7th MEB stood up, ready for combat. General Schwarzkopf now had a mechanized, combined arms brigade of 16,500 Marines and Sailors with 30 days of sustainment in position to deter or confront the Iraqi Army. And our friends in the Air Force never missed a beat. Every plane arrived on time and as scheduled. The Marines could not have done it without them.
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One can never prove a negative, but most folks at CENTOM believed then, and probably do today, that the rapid stand up of the 7th MEB just 130 miles south of Kuwait’s border was a major factor in Saddam Hussein’s decision to remain in Kuwait.
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By August 25, the 1st MEB began arriving in theater from Hawaii and fell in on supplies and equipment from MPSRON 3, which had sailed from Guam and Saipan in the Western Pacific. Additional Marine Corps and Navy forces would soon arrive and composite to build a 45,000-man Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF). I MEF was a fully balanced and resilient Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). And as they say, the rest is history.
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Could the Marines do this today? Someone needs to ask the Commandant or Assistant Commandant. The time for asking softball questions is long past.
-- BGen McAbee
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Once again, the US is facing a crisis in the Middle East. The current crisis is different than those the US faced before. But what has not changed is US leaders still need more options. In any crisis, the fully capable, combined arms, upgraded and enhanced, Marine Air Ground (Logistics) Task Force on patrol around the globe, gives the US more options.
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The MAGTF can immediately deter, assist, and strike. Augmented by maritime prepositioning ships and air alert, fly-in-echelons, the MAGTF can rapidly multiply the size of the force. At least that is what the Marine Corps could do until recently. Unfortunately, over the last few years, too many Marine warfighting capabilities have been degraded or lost in a mis-guided "divest to invest" experiment. To ensure the Marine MAGTF is always ready to do more for the Nation, the MAGTF needs to be upgraded and enhanced with more capabilities and more funding.
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Compass Points thanks Brigadier General Jerry McAbee, USMC (ret) for providing the timely lesson that no matter the crisis, when the US needs more options, the US needs more MAGTF.
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Washington Post (washingtonpost.com) 01/29/2024
Biden Faces Treacherous Choices In Responding
By Tyler Pager, Yasmeen Abutaleb and Abigail Hauslohne
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2024/01/29/biden-attacks-iran-mideast/
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Reuters (reuters.com) 01/29/2024
Biden faces pressure to strike Iran after US troops killed
By Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali
Thank you Samuel Whittemore for pointing us to that speech. I appreciated his discussion of necessary change in the context of preserving MAGTF lethality.
The lingering concern that remains, however, is the memory of reading those FD2030 origin documents some 5 years ago. The problem statements of the designers in 2018 were passionately focused in describing the MAGTF of the last 40 years as not just passé, but a destructive strategy to begin with. Their premise was that every commandant for the past 60 years has contributed to perpetuating a flawed and counterproductive Warfighting structure.
Based on those original statements, I don’t know if preservation of the MAGTF was ever a goal. That dismissive, derisive premise certainly explains how the downstream Info Ops efforts easily adopted the ad-hominem strategy against otherwise distinguished and respected past leadership. And unfortunately, it feels a bit naive to attempt to whittle around the edges, especially if the other side’s intent was destruction of your doctrine in the first place.
Key Point: Combined arms, large unit, offensive, and amphibious operational expertise.
The loss of combined arms equipment and amphibious (to include MPF!) shipping is rightly emphasized by many posts. In my view, a more troubling and long-term issue is the loss of operational expertise derived from much practiced, red teamed, evaluated, and in-the-environment exercises.
Prior to Desert Storm, all the Services had spent years and tough field exercises preparing to fight the Soviets in the Cold War. We developed both the equipment and the skills to fight large units … and to sustain long fights. We studied and practiced operational art. From NCOs who knew how-to-do MPF off-loads and the maintenance issues (fuel filters!) to field and general grade officers that knew how to lead and the shape the battlefield for both decisive and sustained large unit operations, the Marine Corps possessed the integrated capability sets to act with speed and true operational readiness.
We are now into five years of equipment cuts (mutilation of the MAGTF in the name of modernization). Serious, yes, but consider the many fine, experienced Marines of many occupational fields who were cut during the past five years: They are not on active duty to pass their hard-earned experience to the rising generation.
Consider five years of promotion and command screening boards that emphasize selection of those with narrow, hyper-specialized FD2030 skill sets over those with broad, combined arms, large unit, and offensive, amphibious expertise. Every day the Marine Corps loses relevant, essential skills and experienced combined arms leaders.