Thank you Samuel Whittemore for pointing us to that speech. I appreciated his discussion of necessary change in the context of preserving MAGTF lethality.
The lingering concern that remains, however, is the memory of reading those FD2030 origin documents some 5 years ago. The problem statements of the designers in 2018 were passionately focused in describing the MAGTF of the last 40 years as not just passé, but a destructive strategy to begin with. Their premise was that every commandant for the past 60 years has contributed to perpetuating a flawed and counterproductive Warfighting structure.
Based on those original statements, I don’t know if preservation of the MAGTF was ever a goal. That dismissive, derisive premise certainly explains how the downstream Info Ops efforts easily adopted the ad-hominem strategy against otherwise distinguished and respected past leadership. And unfortunately, it feels a bit naive to attempt to whittle around the edges, especially if the other side’s intent was destruction of your doctrine in the first place.
Key Point: Combined arms, large unit, offensive, and amphibious operational expertise.
The loss of combined arms equipment and amphibious (to include MPF!) shipping is rightly emphasized by many posts. In my view, a more troubling and long-term issue is the loss of operational expertise derived from much practiced, red teamed, evaluated, and in-the-environment exercises.
Prior to Desert Storm, all the Services had spent years and tough field exercises preparing to fight the Soviets in the Cold War. We developed both the equipment and the skills to fight large units … and to sustain long fights. We studied and practiced operational art. From NCOs who knew how-to-do MPF off-loads and the maintenance issues (fuel filters!) to field and general grade officers that knew how to lead and the shape the battlefield for both decisive and sustained large unit operations, the Marine Corps possessed the integrated capability sets to act with speed and true operational readiness.
We are now into five years of equipment cuts (mutilation of the MAGTF in the name of modernization). Serious, yes, but consider the many fine, experienced Marines of many occupational fields who were cut during the past five years: They are not on active duty to pass their hard-earned experience to the rising generation.
Consider five years of promotion and command screening boards that emphasize selection of those with narrow, hyper-specialized FD2030 skill sets over those with broad, combined arms, large unit, and offensive, amphibious expertise. Every day the Marine Corps loses relevant, essential skills and experienced combined arms leaders.
Once upon a time approximately 34 years ago Uncle Sam’s Meanest Children pulled off an instant deployment starting a 0 and ending in a massive multi division MAGTF on land and a MEB Afloat. Here is the General Boomer’s recollection. We should ask the Current CMC “What now General FD 2030, you have 167,000 Marines on Active Duty, you have NO armor, Artillery, Engineers, MPs, Bridging Capability, Operable Ospreys, etc etc.. What do you do? Pls use the browser of your choice USNI has the article.
“Inside the Storm”
For the 20th anniversary of ground combat in Operation Desert Storm, we asked the commander of U.S. Marines in theater at the time for an exclusive behind-the-scenes account of how the planning proceeded for what later was called “the 100-Hour War.”
By General Walter E. Boomer, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
February 2011 Proceedings Vol. 137/2/1,296
ARTICLE
COMMENTS
On 2 August 1990, I was driving to California to assume command of the I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and the Marine base at Camp Pendleton. Somewhere in west Texas I heard on my car radio that Iraq had invaded Kuwait. We hurried on to Pendleton, and a few days later I was on my way to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
Prior to arriving in California, I knew MEF headquarters was not prepared to direct such a force in combat. It was undermanned on the premise that the Marine Corps was unlikely to fight as a MEF, and manpower was too precious to
We worked long and hard to get the Corps to the point where it could respond in that manner. All I hear today is a lot of word salad about wishful thinking and things to come. The disgraceful evolution of the ACV is an example of incompetence at a level that was never associated with Marines. Semper Fi
CENTCOM changed the deployment priority a number of times and what CENTCOM (and all the Military Services) learned was the only way they could change priority was to follow the proper procedures of the JOINT Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). JOPES took a lot of complaints from the Military Services especially the Army (for example) that it didn’t work. The real problem was nearly no one knew how to use it or understood the procedures. I have to say that the Marine Corps understood the TPFDD procedures a lot better than the Army and Air Force.
The point I want to make is with a lack of amphib shipping the Joint Deployment System becomes very important to the USMC, Semper Fi
Well done Jerry! Spot on! I remember those days well. I went from trout fishing in the AZ mountains to Saudi in less than 35 hrs... went straight to work in the MODA building. The strategic mobility we have lost is mind boggling.... Just saying.... Knute
‘General Patrick Sanders, chief of staff of the British Army, recently commented that “You can’t cyber your way across a river.” That is obviously true. No computer hack can reliably injure or kill enemy combatants. Cyber offense cannot transport one’s troops, nor can it conquer or hold territory. Cyber offense cannot generate damage that will be self-evident to observers. “ SF SW
Proud to be a member of Task Force Ripper, unfortunately unless this ship changes course, rough shoals ahead in Fantasy 2030, just sayin, respectfully,
Second Bite of the apple, Lt General George Smith Retired and extraordinary Marine, spoke the truth regarding the emasculation of I MEF and the MAGTF prior to his retirement. In a righteous world he should have been the new Commandant. I will find his speech and post it or a way to find it. Compass Points is saving the USMC and the Republic one post at a time. Get your Marine Brothers and Sisters to join.
Re Amphibs, ck out USNI to read the embeded report. Report to Congress on U.S. Amphibious Warship Programs
U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE STAFF
JANUARY 31, 2024 10:11 AM - UPDATED: JANUARY 31, 2024 10:13 AM
The following is the Jan. 29, 2024, Congressional Research Service report, Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs: Background and Issues for Congress.
From the report
The Navy is currently building two types of larger amphibious ships: LPD-17 Flight II class amphibious ships, and LHA-type amphibious assault ships. Both types are built by Huntington Ingalls Industries/Ingalls Shipbuilding (HII/Ingalls) of Pascagoula, MS. Oversight issues for Congress regarding larger amphibious ships include the Navy’s plans for procuring LPD-17 Flight II class ships in FY2024 and subsequent years, and associated projected numbers of larger amphibious ships; Navy proposals for retiring older LSD-41/49 class amphibious ships; the Navy’s non-use of LHA-LPD-17 block-buy procurement authority provided by Congress; technical and cost risk in the LPD-17 Flight II and LHA programs; and the operational readiness of in-service larger amphibious ships.
The Navy’s 355-ship force-level goal, released in December 2016, calls for achieving and maintaining a force of 38 larger amphibious ships, including 12 LHA/LHD-type amphibious assault ships, 13 LPD-17 Flight I class ships, and 13 LPD-17 Flight II class ships (i.e., 12+13+13). The Navy and the office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) have been working since 2019 to develop a new force-level goal to replace the 355-ship force-level goal. The Marine Corps supports a successor amphibious ship force-level goal with 31 larger amphibious ships, including 10 LHA/LHD-type ships, 13 LPD-17 Flight I class ships, and 8 LPD-17 Flight II class ships (i.e., 10+13+8). Marine Corps officials have stated that a force with fewer than 31 larger amphibious ships would increase operational risks for meeting requests from U.S. regional combatant commanders for amphibious ships for day-to-day forward presence or responding to contingencies. The Navy also nominally supports a force-level goal of 31 larger amphibious ships. Section 1023 of the FY2023 NDAA amended 10 U.S.C. 8062 to require the Navy to include not less than 31 operational larger amphibious ships, including 10 LHA/LHD-type ships and 21 LPD-type or older LSD-type amphibious ships.
The reason we possessed MPF was the fact that we knew we would never have enough USN ships! The Army Airborne was out of chow after 3 days, they were subsisting on local economy Fast Food Outlets. Marines feed them. What is the status of MPF today? Where are 2ND LT Bobo, PFC Williams, 1st Lt Lopez, 1st Lt Button? What happened to the 30 days of Supplies and equipment for the MAGTF?
General Smith’s speech was terrific and also prescient, he spoke of “leadership” not “management” and expected a call from “Washington”, one might image the short remonstration, “get on the team or off it General Smith.” So he got off the team, more is the pity.
Further General Boomer’s USNI article makes the point, even the feint of an amphibious assault tied down enormous manpower and assets in the attack on Iraqi forces in Kuwait City. The Iraqi “stand in forces” were tied down forces, unable to be freed to support other defending ground operations. Imagine if the Marine Corps had littoral regiments strung out all over the presumptive Indo-Pacific theater that the “pacing guidance” was supposedly dictating. They are not even stand in forces as they are by passed and starved of assets of every kind. Once the long range rockets are launched and the regiment no longer can support defense in depth what use are they to any Combatant Commander other than a drain on already strained men and material resources. There is that ugly word again, logistics. Some serious thought needs to given to allowing XBox and Gameboy planning to rule the future. “Let our advanced worrying, lead to advanced thinking and advanced planning.” Winston Churchill had that right, and at least we are at the advanced worrying and thinking stages. Hopefully relentless efforts to correct the current deficiencies will yield positive results well beyond 2030.
FOOD FOR THOUGHT: We are a frustrated lot, and for very good reasons. We must get past our anger, and get on with solving this problem of a Marine Corps that, presently, cannot fight for long in a mid-to-high intensity environment. As we FORM, STORM, NORM, & PERFORM, let’s not forget our veteran organizations, I.e. American Legion & VFW, and remember they are well positioned to help by petitioning Congress & other governmental agencies as we right our list g ship. This may well be an KC a soon in which former Marines and Sailors, along with “Gray Beards” can be of substantial assistance to our active duty Marines!
Thank you Samuel Whittemore for pointing us to that speech. I appreciated his discussion of necessary change in the context of preserving MAGTF lethality.
The lingering concern that remains, however, is the memory of reading those FD2030 origin documents some 5 years ago. The problem statements of the designers in 2018 were passionately focused in describing the MAGTF of the last 40 years as not just passé, but a destructive strategy to begin with. Their premise was that every commandant for the past 60 years has contributed to perpetuating a flawed and counterproductive Warfighting structure.
Based on those original statements, I don’t know if preservation of the MAGTF was ever a goal. That dismissive, derisive premise certainly explains how the downstream Info Ops efforts easily adopted the ad-hominem strategy against otherwise distinguished and respected past leadership. And unfortunately, it feels a bit naive to attempt to whittle around the edges, especially if the other side’s intent was destruction of your doctrine in the first place.
Key Point: Combined arms, large unit, offensive, and amphibious operational expertise.
The loss of combined arms equipment and amphibious (to include MPF!) shipping is rightly emphasized by many posts. In my view, a more troubling and long-term issue is the loss of operational expertise derived from much practiced, red teamed, evaluated, and in-the-environment exercises.
Prior to Desert Storm, all the Services had spent years and tough field exercises preparing to fight the Soviets in the Cold War. We developed both the equipment and the skills to fight large units … and to sustain long fights. We studied and practiced operational art. From NCOs who knew how-to-do MPF off-loads and the maintenance issues (fuel filters!) to field and general grade officers that knew how to lead and the shape the battlefield for both decisive and sustained large unit operations, the Marine Corps possessed the integrated capability sets to act with speed and true operational readiness.
We are now into five years of equipment cuts (mutilation of the MAGTF in the name of modernization). Serious, yes, but consider the many fine, experienced Marines of many occupational fields who were cut during the past five years: They are not on active duty to pass their hard-earned experience to the rising generation.
Consider five years of promotion and command screening boards that emphasize selection of those with narrow, hyper-specialized FD2030 skill sets over those with broad, combined arms, large unit, and offensive, amphibious expertise. Every day the Marine Corps loses relevant, essential skills and experienced combined arms leaders.
Once upon a time approximately 34 years ago Uncle Sam’s Meanest Children pulled off an instant deployment starting a 0 and ending in a massive multi division MAGTF on land and a MEB Afloat. Here is the General Boomer’s recollection. We should ask the Current CMC “What now General FD 2030, you have 167,000 Marines on Active Duty, you have NO armor, Artillery, Engineers, MPs, Bridging Capability, Operable Ospreys, etc etc.. What do you do? Pls use the browser of your choice USNI has the article.
“Inside the Storm”
For the 20th anniversary of ground combat in Operation Desert Storm, we asked the commander of U.S. Marines in theater at the time for an exclusive behind-the-scenes account of how the planning proceeded for what later was called “the 100-Hour War.”
By General Walter E. Boomer, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
February 2011 Proceedings Vol. 137/2/1,296
ARTICLE
COMMENTS
On 2 August 1990, I was driving to California to assume command of the I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and the Marine base at Camp Pendleton. Somewhere in west Texas I heard on my car radio that Iraq had invaded Kuwait. We hurried on to Pendleton, and a few days later I was on my way to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
Prior to arriving in California, I knew MEF headquarters was not prepared to direct such a force in combat. It was undermanned on the premise that the Marine Corps was unlikely to fight as a MEF, and manpower was too precious to
We worked long and hard to get the Corps to the point where it could respond in that manner. All I hear today is a lot of word salad about wishful thinking and things to come. The disgraceful evolution of the ACV is an example of incompetence at a level that was never associated with Marines. Semper Fi
Some talk about TFPDDs and the Combatant Commander's Changing Priorities
Again : "If you want a new idea, read an old book".
So Many, So Much, So Far, So Fast: United States Transportation Command and Strategic Deployment for Operation Desert Shield/ Desert Storm p.22-26 by DR. James K. Matthews (USTRANSCOM Historian) https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Monographs/Transcom.pdf
CENTCOM changed the deployment priority a number of times and what CENTCOM (and all the Military Services) learned was the only way they could change priority was to follow the proper procedures of the JOINT Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). JOPES took a lot of complaints from the Military Services especially the Army (for example) that it didn’t work. The real problem was nearly no one knew how to use it or understood the procedures. I have to say that the Marine Corps understood the TPFDD procedures a lot better than the Army and Air Force.
The point I want to make is with a lack of amphib shipping the Joint Deployment System becomes very important to the USMC, Semper Fi
Well done Jerry! Spot on! I remember those days well. I went from trout fishing in the AZ mountains to Saudi in less than 35 hrs... went straight to work in the MODA building. The strategic mobility we have lost is mind boggling.... Just saying.... Knute
Offensive Cyber Operations As a Tool of War
by Lior Tabansky January 2024
Cyber War: What is It Good For?
‘General Patrick Sanders, chief of staff of the British Army, recently commented that “You can’t cyber your way across a river.” That is obviously true. No computer hack can reliably injure or kill enemy combatants. Cyber offense cannot transport one’s troops, nor can it conquer or hold territory. Cyber offense cannot generate damage that will be self-evident to observers. “ SF SW
You Tube “Marines' Memorial Association 2023 Lecture Series - LtGen George W. Smith, Jr. USMC - CG, I MEF”!
Proud to be a member of Task Force Ripper, unfortunately unless this ship changes course, rough shoals ahead in Fantasy 2030, just sayin, respectfully,
Semper Fi
Spot on, Mate. Semper Fi!
Second Bite of the apple, Lt General George Smith Retired and extraordinary Marine, spoke the truth regarding the emasculation of I MEF and the MAGTF prior to his retirement. In a righteous world he should have been the new Commandant. I will find his speech and post it or a way to find it. Compass Points is saving the USMC and the Republic one post at a time. Get your Marine Brothers and Sisters to join.
Re Amphibs, ck out USNI to read the embeded report. Report to Congress on U.S. Amphibious Warship Programs
U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE STAFF
JANUARY 31, 2024 10:11 AM - UPDATED: JANUARY 31, 2024 10:13 AM
The following is the Jan. 29, 2024, Congressional Research Service report, Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs: Background and Issues for Congress.
From the report
The Navy is currently building two types of larger amphibious ships: LPD-17 Flight II class amphibious ships, and LHA-type amphibious assault ships. Both types are built by Huntington Ingalls Industries/Ingalls Shipbuilding (HII/Ingalls) of Pascagoula, MS. Oversight issues for Congress regarding larger amphibious ships include the Navy’s plans for procuring LPD-17 Flight II class ships in FY2024 and subsequent years, and associated projected numbers of larger amphibious ships; Navy proposals for retiring older LSD-41/49 class amphibious ships; the Navy’s non-use of LHA-LPD-17 block-buy procurement authority provided by Congress; technical and cost risk in the LPD-17 Flight II and LHA programs; and the operational readiness of in-service larger amphibious ships.
The Navy’s 355-ship force-level goal, released in December 2016, calls for achieving and maintaining a force of 38 larger amphibious ships, including 12 LHA/LHD-type amphibious assault ships, 13 LPD-17 Flight I class ships, and 13 LPD-17 Flight II class ships (i.e., 12+13+13). The Navy and the office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) have been working since 2019 to develop a new force-level goal to replace the 355-ship force-level goal. The Marine Corps supports a successor amphibious ship force-level goal with 31 larger amphibious ships, including 10 LHA/LHD-type ships, 13 LPD-17 Flight I class ships, and 8 LPD-17 Flight II class ships (i.e., 10+13+8). Marine Corps officials have stated that a force with fewer than 31 larger amphibious ships would increase operational risks for meeting requests from U.S. regional combatant commanders for amphibious ships for day-to-day forward presence or responding to contingencies. The Navy also nominally supports a force-level goal of 31 larger amphibious ships. Section 1023 of the FY2023 NDAA amended 10 U.S.C. 8062 to require the Navy to include not less than 31 operational larger amphibious ships, including 10 LHA/LHD-type ships and 21 LPD-type or older LSD-type amphibious ships.
Re reference for effects of Cyber War, https://jstribune.com/tabansky-offensive-cyber-operations-as-a-tool-of-war/
The reason we possessed MPF was the fact that we knew we would never have enough USN ships! The Army Airborne was out of chow after 3 days, they were subsisting on local economy Fast Food Outlets. Marines feed them. What is the status of MPF today? Where are 2ND LT Bobo, PFC Williams, 1st Lt Lopez, 1st Lt Button? What happened to the 30 days of Supplies and equipment for the MAGTF?
Another Older Marine once said:
“It takes considerable knowledge just to realize the extent of your own ignorance.”
~Thomas Sowell, American economist
General Smith’s speech was terrific and also prescient, he spoke of “leadership” not “management” and expected a call from “Washington”, one might image the short remonstration, “get on the team or off it General Smith.” So he got off the team, more is the pity.
Further General Boomer’s USNI article makes the point, even the feint of an amphibious assault tied down enormous manpower and assets in the attack on Iraqi forces in Kuwait City. The Iraqi “stand in forces” were tied down forces, unable to be freed to support other defending ground operations. Imagine if the Marine Corps had littoral regiments strung out all over the presumptive Indo-Pacific theater that the “pacing guidance” was supposedly dictating. They are not even stand in forces as they are by passed and starved of assets of every kind. Once the long range rockets are launched and the regiment no longer can support defense in depth what use are they to any Combatant Commander other than a drain on already strained men and material resources. There is that ugly word again, logistics. Some serious thought needs to given to allowing XBox and Gameboy planning to rule the future. “Let our advanced worrying, lead to advanced thinking and advanced planning.” Winston Churchill had that right, and at least we are at the advanced worrying and thinking stages. Hopefully relentless efforts to correct the current deficiencies will yield positive results well beyond 2030.
FOOD FOR THOUGHT: We are a frustrated lot, and for very good reasons. We must get past our anger, and get on with solving this problem of a Marine Corps that, presently, cannot fight for long in a mid-to-high intensity environment. As we FORM, STORM, NORM, & PERFORM, let’s not forget our veteran organizations, I.e. American Legion & VFW, and remember they are well positioned to help by petitioning Congress & other governmental agencies as we right our list g ship. This may well be an KC a soon in which former Marines and Sailors, along with “Gray Beards” can be of substantial assistance to our active duty Marines!