Greg nails it. His sage strategic insights will fall on deaf ears. The Marine leadership has the target fixation of a mouse focused on cheese. The challenge will be global. Focus on the choke points.
I’ve thought a little more about this issue. IMO the two Corps units that will be the most important will be I MEF and II MEF.
I think I MEF will be tasked with securing the Arctic AOA and the Caribbean AOA, and II MEF will be tasked with securing the Mediterranean, Africa and maybe even the Indian Ocean AOA.
The Indian Ocean AOA SHOULD be assigned to III MEF, but as currently configured III MEF IMO can’t handle any battle with any Chinese force without a return to the tried and true tested MAGTF configuration with organic tubed artillery, armor, amphibious assault vehicles, bridging, and assault engineering. The above return to the previous MAGTF configuration also goes for both I MEF and II MEF.
I’m an artillery officer by profession and the support requirement for any infantry regiment is one tubed artillery battalion per each committed infantry regiment. That hasn’t changed for either the Corps or the Army. The Army’s use of rocket and missile units even as far back as their use of the Lance and Pershing were layered onto their tubed artillery organizations, and not as a replacement. If anyone remembers the amount of units and rounds, and not just HE, but specialized rounds such as smoke, and WP, required to service targets in any program of fires, they would quickly realize that missiles can’t begin to provide either the density, length, types or spread of fires required for suppression and especially for destruction of targets.
The Corps’s plan (none that I can see) for indirect fire support is built on a house of cards.
But whatever MEF we’re discussing we still have a critical shortage of amphibious lift and logistical support capability needed to secure any AOA.
China will sooner or later land forces on Taiwan, and if that works go on to invade the Senkakus, Guam, Okinawa, etc. (Eventually Midway? Hawaii? The sea is an open highway.) The US will need to TAKE THEM BACK the old fashioned way, by amphibious assault. MAGTFs at least.
The folly of FD2030 knows no bounds... VISION2035 is a MUST to restore our Corps' MAGTF lethality, viability, and capabilities!
Greg is absolutely correct!
Greg nails it. His sage strategic insights will fall on deaf ears. The Marine leadership has the target fixation of a mouse focused on cheese. The challenge will be global. Focus on the choke points.
Doug:
I’ve thought a little more about this issue. IMO the two Corps units that will be the most important will be I MEF and II MEF.
I think I MEF will be tasked with securing the Arctic AOA and the Caribbean AOA, and II MEF will be tasked with securing the Mediterranean, Africa and maybe even the Indian Ocean AOA.
The Indian Ocean AOA SHOULD be assigned to III MEF, but as currently configured III MEF IMO can’t handle any battle with any Chinese force without a return to the tried and true tested MAGTF configuration with organic tubed artillery, armor, amphibious assault vehicles, bridging, and assault engineering. The above return to the previous MAGTF configuration also goes for both I MEF and II MEF.
I’m an artillery officer by profession and the support requirement for any infantry regiment is one tubed artillery battalion per each committed infantry regiment. That hasn’t changed for either the Corps or the Army. The Army’s use of rocket and missile units even as far back as their use of the Lance and Pershing were layered onto their tubed artillery organizations, and not as a replacement. If anyone remembers the amount of units and rounds, and not just HE, but specialized rounds such as smoke, and WP, required to service targets in any program of fires, they would quickly realize that missiles can’t begin to provide either the density, length, types or spread of fires required for suppression and especially for destruction of targets.
The Corps’s plan (none that I can see) for indirect fire support is built on a house of cards.
But whatever MEF we’re discussing we still have a critical shortage of amphibious lift and logistical support capability needed to secure any AOA.
Excellent article, Greg. Bravo Zulu!
Clausewitz would say your leaders lost the plot—tech’s a tool, not a plan, MAGTF overwhelms
China will sooner or later land forces on Taiwan, and if that works go on to invade the Senkakus, Guam, Okinawa, etc. (Eventually Midway? Hawaii? The sea is an open highway.) The US will need to TAKE THEM BACK the old fashioned way, by amphibious assault. MAGTFs at least.
I appreciate your opinion,although I do not agree in the inevitability of the CCP/PRC offensive you describe.