Compass Points – Narco Boat Hits Oki
Autonomous supply vessel
Compass Points – Narco Boat Hits Oki
Autonomous supply vessel
October 18, 2024
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There is nothing more fun than getting to experiment with a new piece of gear. As reported in Military.com, Marines on Okinawa are getting to test the recently arrived, new experimental boat.
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The Autonomous Low-Profile Vessel, or ALPV, is a roughly 60-foot-long watercraft meant to lurk with a low profile on the water to avoid detection and deliver logistics to Marine units dispersed on islands throughout the region.
--Military.com
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Often called the “narco” boat because this type of craft was used by drug smugglers, the boat is an interesting piece of gear, but it can only transport 5 tons of supply. The boat does not begin to answer the many serious questions about supplying Marine missile units on islands in the Pacific.
What logistics questions?
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“Show me how the MEF will support each mission. Do not ‘fairy dust’ it. How are we getting there? By sea? By air? What types of aircraft or ships? How many? When? How long will this take? What quality of roads, bridges, ports, and airfields exist where we will operate? How are we sustaining these units before and during the fight? How far back will we need to reach to tie into theater logistics? Where will we get our maintenance capabilities? Walk me through how we will reload a salvo of long-range missiles. How much fuel will our squadrons consume? How vulnerable will our logistics be during each phase? At what point do we risk culminating?”
-- Lt Col Brian Donlon, USMC, Proceedings, Vol. 149/11/1,449
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Additional issues are raised by aviation logistics.
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When Marines go ashore, they require maneuver, fire support, and sustainment. This creates the operational reach dilemma: No matter how you plan to support distributed forces, you require more assets to solve the problem, not fewer.
As an example of the challenges of operational reach, the stand-in forces in the Asia Pacific would have to maneuver to islands in and around the Philippines or Japan. To do this they must account for average distances of between 300 and 800 miles for insertion and sustainment. The logistics, casualty evacuation, and maneuver space in the Philippines alone encompasses over 1,000 miles from north to south. A cursory look at inserting a battalion of 800 Marines in one wave from Okinawa with the basic sustainment capabilities would take four MV-22 tilt rotor squadrons (40 aircraft) and 6-8 KC-130 cargo aircraft at those distances. To insert additional capabilities, such as rocket and missile launchers and munitions, would take another two squadrons of tiltrotor and heavy lift helicopters with the same number of KC-130s.
-- MajGen Christopher Owens, "The Radical Redesign and Restructuring of the United States Marine Corps."
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How much supply and logistics will the small Marine missile units require? One logistician has estimated a total of nearly 1,000 tons.
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As described, the proposed vignettes will each require significant logistical support to provide an enduring presence. Furthermore, the anticipated scale of EABO means simultaneous execution of the vignettes. The result is that their logistics requirements are additive, there is no economy of scale to be gained, and they will likely compete for priority of logistics support. The vignettes’ combination results in a daily sustainment requirement of 928 tons, establishing the logistics requirement for EABO.
. . . While not all-inclusive, these selected functions demonstrate more competition for logistics priority within EABO. These competing logistics priorities are subject to the same distribution complexity resulting from inefficient distribution networks, losses to enemy actions, and unforecasted requirements. Moreover, logistics support will compete with the movement and maneuver operational function for the same surface or air assets. These factors only further complicate the daily challenge of distributing 928 tons of supplies, making EABO at scale unsupportable in a modern, high-end conflict.
-- Maj Daniel Katzma, “Sustaining Stand-in Forces - Evaluating the logistical supportability for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations”
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There is nothing more fun than getting to experiment with a new piece of gear. Compass Points salutes the Okinawa based, III MEF Marines who get to experiment with the narco boat.
Unfortunately, the narco boat can never be a serious answer to the persistent questions about logistically supporting small Marine missile units on Pacific islands. It is not the narco boat that is a flawed idea, it is the island bound missile units. Before getting stuck on a semi-submersible narco boat racing to missile island, the Marine Corps needs to climb back onboard the global, combined arms, MAGTF.
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Military.com - 10/16/2024
Marine Corps' Unmanned 'Narco-Boat' Is Now Plying the Waters Around Okinawa
By Drew F. Lawrence
Let me suggest the book The Jungle in Neutral by Chapman. Surviving in Malaysian coastal regions on minimal logistical support is a nightmare scenario and not for the faint of heart. Just small arms and limited ammunition become a huge burden. Initial EABO suggested living off of the land and purchases from locals. Don’t hear much about that any more. Logistics is the base consideration and I have yet to see a viable solution. “Not logistically supportable” has killed many a course of action.
It is time to put this fantasy to rest. Not a Marine mission, all other services can do it better, the USMC can do it better with Quicksink bombs carried by F-35’s and the concept is not logistically supportable. The SecNav needs to step up and put this to rest. Time to send some people into retirement.
The Marines are running out of sound ideas on how to position, reposition, and logistically support (including emergency medical evacuation) isolated and widely dispersed SIFs. Instead of admitting that logistics is a bridge too far and changing operational concepts, the senior leadership buries their collective heads in the sand and plows forward to the inevitable cliff.