I am encouraged by the outreach and efforts I am unaware of and do not need to be aware of. Just knowing it is going on is a source of solace.
I do not believe that the Corps can do an about face with the authors of the conflagration remaining on active duty. A significant portion of the senior uniformed leadership must be retired in January. The perpetrators were both active and passive. No way forward without their departure. If this means a selective return to active duty of select leaders so be it.
To reconfigure and modernize three MEFs into MAGTFs will be a huge undertaking of significant cost and complexity. It must be executed in a short time span in light of looming threats across the globe.
A secondary effort must be afforded to accountability. A number of officers violated laws and must answer for their actions. They often acted outside of the realm of their authority, in violation of laws and appropriations and should be taken to task.
The last six years have been like no other in the history of our Corps that I am aware of. The split loyalties of the Civil War are not even close. The combination of delusional incompetence, deception, disloyal deceit, betrayal and irresponsibility have no equal. There can be no return to Esprit De Corps and unity without accountability. A lack of justice is injustice to those dismissed, defamed and marginalized. The degradation to the national defense effort has yet to be fully appreciated. There is no time for half measures. Move quickly and decisively.
Doug Rape is correct. The Marines will not turn the corner on the dark path on which they are currently embarked as long as General Smith is the CMC. He is wedded to FD. He has professed it repeatedly. Only the Commandant has the Title 10 authority to organize, train, and equip the Marine Corps. The next Commandant must adopt a new operating concept that restores the Marine Corps as the Nation's premier global response force across the full Range of Military Operations. Vision 2035 provides the intellectual foundation for the new concept. Congressional support will be essential by funding the necessary capabilities and providing oversight. The good news is that more and more representatives are aware of the problem. Some already want to help. More are needed. All retired Marines who believe FD is bad for the Nation, as I do, should write or seek an audience with their Senators and Representative. Capabilities can be built back over time. Culture and ethos are more fragile. Once they are lost, the Corps is doomed. The clock is ticking.
Comments by LtGen Van Riper, contained in this edition of CP, provides me insight into actions ongoing with certain luminaries that can’t always be written about in our forum. I needed that bit of uplift! Thank you Gen Van Riper & CP, & others who are working this complicated issue, for keeping us posted. Lead on & Semper Fidelis!
Bud, For obvious reasons much of what our team is doing must remain close hold, but believe me we are fully engaged everyday --planning, reaching out, writing, talking, and explaining. Many of us feel we may be at a tipping point and feeling that more than two years of effort will soon pay dividends. PKVR
The US (IHO) currently does not have a “great power competition” (GPC) strategy or a very good deterrent military strategy to counter the CCP. I am getting the feeling that the new political administration is developing a GPC strategy. The current GPC bar is set very low, making that requirement “low hanging fruit”.
The real issue is the US needs to get all of its war planning “stuff’ into one bag. A good military strategy should be the basis for a good war plan…something like the pre-WW2 “Rainbow Plans”. Plan Orange (war with Japan) got the US Navy’s focus for the entire interval between the two World Wars. This planning also provided Admiral Chester Nimitz’s famous post-WW2 remark; “that the war unfolded just as predicted in naval war games applied to the plans as well” (War Plan Orange p. 2).
The list of colors assigned to countries and hypothetical war scenarios were: Blue: United States, Red: Great Britain, Crimson: Canada, Ruby: India, Scarlet: Australia, Garnet: New Zealand, Emerald: Ireland, Black: Germany, Orange: Japan, Yellow: China, Green: Mexico, Gold: France and French Caribbean possessions, Gray: Italy, Brown: Philippines, Tan: Cuba, Purple: South American nations, Violet: Latin America, Indigo: Occupation of Iceland, White: Domestic uprisings within the United States. Seems like a very complete list for post-World War 1 Planning. If you drop out the NATO countries and then consolidated the list based on US Combatant Commanders that would be a good start for war planning purposes. (You would, however, need to add in Africa and the Artic.)
In order to really pull all this together, however, would be the assumption that a CCP war would be a global war. This idea would give all US Combatant Commands a “focus of effort”. The key objective here would be the securing and control of the global SLOCs. This assumption would require the Combatant Commanders to coordinate and communicate their plans avoiding a single regionally focused plan.
I also feel that the war planning would have to abandon the Clausewitz and Mahan notion that destroying the enemy’s armed forces will decide the war. A modern day war plan for the CCP would have to focus on other main objectives. The Plan Orange objective was to deny Japan its SLOC in order to stave Japan to the negotiation table. (Starve? Yes, war is hell and not humane.) Julian Corbett, (noted Naval Strategist) thought that command of the sea as a relative concept, not an absolute one. He distinguished between general and local, temporary and permanent control. Corbett also argued (mostly with his admirals) that achieving absolute command of the sea was often unrealistic. Instead, naval forces should aim for relative control, sufficient to achieve strategic objectives.
Another interesting approach would be a look at J.C. Wylie approach to sea control. Besides emphasizing the need for flexibility and adaptability in naval strategy, he also thought focusing on controlling key areas and chokepoints to deny the enemy freedom of movement and to protect friendly forces is a good strategy.
Just think, if we had a good military strategy, that would keep the US Marine Corps Development Center and the Joint Planning System busy for at least a couple years. Technology is important but it is not a substitute for good planning. Next step might be the new Commandant standing up and saying it is time to get all our military strategy “stuff” into one sea bag. S/F
Refs: War Orange By Edward S. Miller; Some Principles of Maritime Strategy by Julian S. Corbett; Military Strategy by J.C. Wylie
I am encouraged by the outreach and efforts I am unaware of and do not need to be aware of. Just knowing it is going on is a source of solace.
I do not believe that the Corps can do an about face with the authors of the conflagration remaining on active duty. A significant portion of the senior uniformed leadership must be retired in January. The perpetrators were both active and passive. No way forward without their departure. If this means a selective return to active duty of select leaders so be it.
To reconfigure and modernize three MEFs into MAGTFs will be a huge undertaking of significant cost and complexity. It must be executed in a short time span in light of looming threats across the globe.
A secondary effort must be afforded to accountability. A number of officers violated laws and must answer for their actions. They often acted outside of the realm of their authority, in violation of laws and appropriations and should be taken to task.
The last six years have been like no other in the history of our Corps that I am aware of. The split loyalties of the Civil War are not even close. The combination of delusional incompetence, deception, disloyal deceit, betrayal and irresponsibility have no equal. There can be no return to Esprit De Corps and unity without accountability. A lack of justice is injustice to those dismissed, defamed and marginalized. The degradation to the national defense effort has yet to be fully appreciated. There is no time for half measures. Move quickly and decisively.
Let’s add The Vice President of the United States to the list! “Once a Marine, Always a Marine!”.
Doug Rape is correct. The Marines will not turn the corner on the dark path on which they are currently embarked as long as General Smith is the CMC. He is wedded to FD. He has professed it repeatedly. Only the Commandant has the Title 10 authority to organize, train, and equip the Marine Corps. The next Commandant must adopt a new operating concept that restores the Marine Corps as the Nation's premier global response force across the full Range of Military Operations. Vision 2035 provides the intellectual foundation for the new concept. Congressional support will be essential by funding the necessary capabilities and providing oversight. The good news is that more and more representatives are aware of the problem. Some already want to help. More are needed. All retired Marines who believe FD is bad for the Nation, as I do, should write or seek an audience with their Senators and Representative. Capabilities can be built back over time. Culture and ethos are more fragile. Once they are lost, the Corps is doomed. The clock is ticking.
Congressional contacts … consider that request done. Sen. Mark Kelly, USN & Astronaut, and Rep Hamadeh, Iraq vet.
Thank you Lt. Gen. Van Riper and the staff of Compass Points. We have your back. Semper Fidelis.
Comments by LtGen Van Riper, contained in this edition of CP, provides me insight into actions ongoing with certain luminaries that can’t always be written about in our forum. I needed that bit of uplift! Thank you Gen Van Riper & CP, & others who are working this complicated issue, for keeping us posted. Lead on & Semper Fidelis!
Bud, For obvious reasons much of what our team is doing must remain close hold, but believe me we are fully engaged everyday --planning, reaching out, writing, talking, and explaining. Many of us feel we may be at a tipping point and feeling that more than two years of effort will soon pay dividends. PKVR
I sent the VP Elect an X . JD Vance verified. Let’s call it a long shot .
Next Steps? How about a STRATEGY?
The US (IHO) currently does not have a “great power competition” (GPC) strategy or a very good deterrent military strategy to counter the CCP. I am getting the feeling that the new political administration is developing a GPC strategy. The current GPC bar is set very low, making that requirement “low hanging fruit”.
The real issue is the US needs to get all of its war planning “stuff’ into one bag. A good military strategy should be the basis for a good war plan…something like the pre-WW2 “Rainbow Plans”. Plan Orange (war with Japan) got the US Navy’s focus for the entire interval between the two World Wars. This planning also provided Admiral Chester Nimitz’s famous post-WW2 remark; “that the war unfolded just as predicted in naval war games applied to the plans as well” (War Plan Orange p. 2).
The list of colors assigned to countries and hypothetical war scenarios were: Blue: United States, Red: Great Britain, Crimson: Canada, Ruby: India, Scarlet: Australia, Garnet: New Zealand, Emerald: Ireland, Black: Germany, Orange: Japan, Yellow: China, Green: Mexico, Gold: France and French Caribbean possessions, Gray: Italy, Brown: Philippines, Tan: Cuba, Purple: South American nations, Violet: Latin America, Indigo: Occupation of Iceland, White: Domestic uprisings within the United States. Seems like a very complete list for post-World War 1 Planning. If you drop out the NATO countries and then consolidated the list based on US Combatant Commanders that would be a good start for war planning purposes. (You would, however, need to add in Africa and the Artic.)
In order to really pull all this together, however, would be the assumption that a CCP war would be a global war. This idea would give all US Combatant Commands a “focus of effort”. The key objective here would be the securing and control of the global SLOCs. This assumption would require the Combatant Commanders to coordinate and communicate their plans avoiding a single regionally focused plan.
I also feel that the war planning would have to abandon the Clausewitz and Mahan notion that destroying the enemy’s armed forces will decide the war. A modern day war plan for the CCP would have to focus on other main objectives. The Plan Orange objective was to deny Japan its SLOC in order to stave Japan to the negotiation table. (Starve? Yes, war is hell and not humane.) Julian Corbett, (noted Naval Strategist) thought that command of the sea as a relative concept, not an absolute one. He distinguished between general and local, temporary and permanent control. Corbett also argued (mostly with his admirals) that achieving absolute command of the sea was often unrealistic. Instead, naval forces should aim for relative control, sufficient to achieve strategic objectives.
Another interesting approach would be a look at J.C. Wylie approach to sea control. Besides emphasizing the need for flexibility and adaptability in naval strategy, he also thought focusing on controlling key areas and chokepoints to deny the enemy freedom of movement and to protect friendly forces is a good strategy.
Just think, if we had a good military strategy, that would keep the US Marine Corps Development Center and the Joint Planning System busy for at least a couple years. Technology is important but it is not a substitute for good planning. Next step might be the new Commandant standing up and saying it is time to get all our military strategy “stuff” into one sea bag. S/F
Refs: War Orange By Edward S. Miller; Some Principles of Maritime Strategy by Julian S. Corbett; Military Strategy by J.C. Wylie