Compass Points - No Issues?
Issues raised to Congress about Force Design and the LSM.
Compass Points - No Issues?
Issues raised to Congress about Force Design and the LSM.
June 18, 2026
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Are there continuing questions about the Marine Corps’ controversial Force Design plan and about the Landing Ship Medium (LSM) that is so much a part of the Force Design plan to place a string of sensor and missile units off the coast of China? The controversial plan has done great damage to the Marine Corps’ combined arms crisis response capabilities. Defenders of the Force Design often say that no issues about Force Design have been raised to Congress. To the contrary, Congress’s most trusted sources of unbiased information on US Marine Corps and US Navy programs has consistently raised a roster of issues to Congress.
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Force Design and EABO Operational Concept
Another potential oversight issue for Congress concerns the merits of Force Design and the EABO operational concept that the LSM is intended to help implement. Debate on the merits of Force Design and the EABO concept has been vigorous and concerns issues such as
• whether Force Design and the EABO concept are focused too exclusively on potential conflict scenarios with China at the expense of other kinds of potential Marine Corps missions;
• the ability of Marine forces to gain access to the islands from which they would operate;
• the ability to resupply Marine forces that are operating on the islands;
• the survivability of Marine forces on the islands and in surrounding waters;
• how much of a contribution the envisioned operations by Marine forces would make in contributing to overall U.S. sea-denial operations; and
• potential alternative ways of using the funding and personnel that would be needed to implement EABO.22
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Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:
• What are the potential benefits, costs, and risks of the EABO concept?
• What work have the Navy and Marine Corps done in terms of analyses and wargames to develop and test the concept?
• Would EABO be more cost effective to implement than other potential uses of the funding and personnel?
-- Congressional Research Service - R46374 - 01/13/2026
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The Congressional Research Service list of concerns are included in the latest CRS review of the Landing Ship Medium. The idea of a small logistics ship to assist the Marine sensor and missile units off the coast of China began roughly 7 years ago and to date not one LSM has been constructed.
The most recent plan is to build an LSM based on a Landing Ship Transport 100 (LST-100) design from the Dutch shipbuilder Damen Naval. The US Navy intends to use a VCM to oversee construction, a civilian vessel construction manager. To date no VCM has been selected.
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Q: The Navy adopted the new VCM program to oversee construction of the new Landing Ship Medium (LSM) vessels you are working on. This is a direct result of what happened with the Constellation class, right?
A: I would definitely think so, because it indicates the whole idea that the Navy is recognizing – instead of applying the typical layers of full team presence in the shipbuilder’s yard, additional layers of engineering design, etc. – we’re saying, ‘Okay, in a case where we want to go fast, let’s make our decisions ahead of time, select the design, check it quickly ahead of time, and assign it as a production-related design in the hands of that VCM, and allow an industry set of characters between the VCM and the shipbuilder to deliver.’
-- The War Zone interview with George Moutafis, CEO of Fincantieri Marine Group
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In its Appendix B, the Congressional Research Service report on the LSM lists several dozen articles that discuss the issues with the Marine Corps’ Force Design and with the Navy’s plan for the LSM.
Recently, two former Marine Corps Commandants raised their own concerns about Force Design and the LSM.
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Yet, decisions taken by the current and previous Marine Commandants regarding the concept of employment for the LSM place Navy crews and embarked Marines at grave risk during hostilities. The Marines will almost exclusively rely on the LSM to provide essential support to Marine units dispersed across the Western Pacific in a war with China. But if LSMs are not survivable inside contested areas, then neither are the Marines who depend upon them for mobility, logistics, and a means of escape.
Before sending our sons and daughters into combat on these vessels, the Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps need to answer two questions to Congress and the American people: (1) have these ships been built to U.S. Navy survivability standards and if not, why not? and (2) how can the LSM survive inside contested areas when the presumption is that other Navy surface ships cannot?
-- General Krulak, General Conway, RADM Picotte
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No issues?
In just one report, Congress’s most trusted source of unbiased information raises a roster of issues. Other reports raise additional issues.
Compass Points salutes the US Navy for working hard to build more ships quickly.
The US Navy fleet is too small. The US Navy needs more ships of all kinds, including logistic ships. If the Navy’s LSM logistic ship ever puts to sea, it will be useful in peacetime. Once the shooting starts, however, the LSM will be too slow to run and too soft to fight.
The LSM is planned to be a slow moving logistic vessel, more than 300 feet long. Marines under fire on islands off the coast of China will be depending on the LSM for reinforcement, supply, and evacuation, but the enemy always gets a vote. Mostly likely in any shooting war, China will quickly transform the slow and lightly armed LSM, from a surface vessel into a submarine.
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Congressional Research Service - R46374 - 01/13/2026
Navy Medium Landing Ship (LSM) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
By Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs
https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R46374/R46374.78.pdf
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The War Zone - 06/16/2026
Fincantieri CEO Opens Up About The Constellation Class Frigate Debacle
Fincantieri Marine Group CEO George Moutafis gives us exclusive insights into what sunk the frigate and what needs to change because of it.
By Howard Altman
https://www.twz.com/sea/fincantieri-ceo-opens-up-about-the-constellation-class-frigate-debacle
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Real Clear Defense - 03/02/2026
Do Not Sacrifice Marines and Sailors on the Altar of Expediency
By Charles Krulak, James Conway, and Leonard Picotte
General Charles Krulak (U.S. Marine Corps, ret.) was a career infantry officer who commanded Marines at every level, including Marine Corps Forces Pacific and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command. His last assignment was the 31st Commandant of the Marine Corps.
General James Conway (U.S. Marine Corps, ret.) was a career infantry officer who commanded Marines at every level, including the I Marine Expeditionary Force during Operation Iraqi Freedom. His last assignment was the 34thCommandant of the Marine Corps.
RADM Leonard Picotte was a career surface warfare officer who commanded four ships, including the USS Marathon (PG-89) in Vietnam and the USS Wasp (LHD-1). His final sea tour was Commander, Amphibious Group Two, in Norfolk, Virginia.
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The LSM is not survivable inside the Chinese WEZ during hostilities. The LST 100 is a slow (14 kts or less), relatively unarmed, commercial ship that is not built to USN survivability standards. Those who defend it will never sail on it in harm's way. Many who defend it hide behind a pseudonym to mask their lack of military experience and/or credible operational experience.
Land based prepositiong in Subic Bay is no less problematical. Huge warehouses of supplies and equipment at known locations are easy targets for mid- to long-range precision missiles.
The SIF concept is bankrupt. Small and widely separated units, lacking firepower and mobility, are neither logistically sustainable nor survivable inside contested areas once the killing starts.
Epic Fury ! When CentCom task MarCent to be prepared to execute an Amphibious Assault on Kharg Island where was the US Code Compliant, USMC trained and equipped MEB ie Amphibious Assault Capable MAGTF? How long did it take to move into CentCom’s AOR? Was the USN able to execute their Amphibious lift mandates?