While achnowledgement of the designation as a Special Purpose MAGTF for this rotation is certainly laudatory unfortunately I believe this statement at the top is inaccurate: "One US Marine Corps unit has earned a significant honor, designation as a SOC qualified Special Purpose MAGTF."
If not mistaken I believe "SOC" designations ceased to exist for USMC units when MARSOC was created (having been a MEU OPSO, two time CO within MARSOC and still on staff at SOCOM HQ I think I would have seen if the designation came out of retirement).
Separately, as much as I love the bravado of the Corps we sometimes cherry-pick data to engineer arguments to our satisfaction (who doesn't?). The author of "The Inside Story of Why MEU's are Special Operations Capable" has done a bit of this with select quotes from MajGen Myatt.
For one, the Commandant at the time of the creation of SOCOM was Gen P.X. Kelley not Gen Gray. Gen Kelley's notes and recollections were as critical to staying out of SOCOM in the 80s and the standup of MARSOC decades later as Gen Gray's. Both were intererviewed numerous times by the HQMC team at POE-30 between 2002-2005.
Second, as a "shooter" in a Force Platoon in the late 80's early 90's it is probably appropriate to caveat the mission set specifically discussed in the article as "IN-EXTREMIS hostage rescue." With the "in-extremis" designation came numerous restrictions, unique circumstances, and an extraordinary confluence of world events that would have to exist for a Marine Force (typically MSPF) to be given the green light in lieu of the National Mission Force.
Interesting .. I'll check further tomorrow for some sense of what the designation entails (while certification as such in the past was granted by authorized Marine Corps entities the criteria was agreed to by SOCOM).
Not sure what circumstance would have necessitated resurrecting the term the obvious factor would be the absence of SOF at sea.
The Col at the Warfighting Lab is correct that "optimizing the sensor-to-shooter kill chain" is complex but hasn't that been the eternal case? Systems like AFATDS helped us cannon cockers do just that. It seems to me we have the connectivity and automated systems to solve the sensor to shooter dynamic, just not enough shooters to service the targets. I would ask the Col what specific problem do we have in that arena that the Marine Corps needs to solve and which ones do we need to ask other agencies to solve. Not everything is a Marine Corps problem to solve, and we should focus on those, hence my objection to the anti shipping mission.
Only the East Coast MEUs use the SOC certification designation. While noteworthy, it is still not the same qualification standard Neil was describing.
Additionally, MRF-D is not SOC-certified, so I am trying to understand how the author arrived at that conclusion.
I will see if I can find an unclassified description of exactly what MRF-D was certified in, assuming it is not CUI. In the meantime, I will say their demonstrated ability to fight and operate within the Corps’ evolving Force Design concepts is top shelf.
Regardless, BZ to every Marine and Sailor forward deployed with the MRF-D SPMAGTF. Good hunting.
And a sincere thanks to CP for highlighting another example of Force Design at work and operating in the main effort theatre. Rumor is COM INDOPACOM just visited and complimented MRF-D on exactly that.
I am speechless. The Corps is spinning out of control and into a delusional twilight zone. This is getting embarrassing. “ Wouldn’t be great if we could….” Perhaps our leaders could design pro football playbooks. You know, the double reverse, lateral, fake fumble, hand off back to the QB and 60 yard pass into the end zone. On defense everyone lays down to confuse them, avoid blocks and then we jump up to make the tackle….
"Throughout the exercise in a variety of simulated scenarios, the team proved their ability to successfully reinforce an embassy, assist the U.S. Department of State in evacuating American citizens from a foreign country in a time of crisis, evacuate casualties, provide immediate and advanced medical care, support aviation nodes, and support expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO)."
Sounds like the certification is a WEU-SOC light with some FD2030 thrown in.
While achnowledgement of the designation as a Special Purpose MAGTF for this rotation is certainly laudatory unfortunately I believe this statement at the top is inaccurate: "One US Marine Corps unit has earned a significant honor, designation as a SOC qualified Special Purpose MAGTF."
If not mistaken I believe "SOC" designations ceased to exist for USMC units when MARSOC was created (having been a MEU OPSO, two time CO within MARSOC and still on staff at SOCOM HQ I think I would have seen if the designation came out of retirement).
Separately, as much as I love the bravado of the Corps we sometimes cherry-pick data to engineer arguments to our satisfaction (who doesn't?). The author of "The Inside Story of Why MEU's are Special Operations Capable" has done a bit of this with select quotes from MajGen Myatt.
For one, the Commandant at the time of the creation of SOCOM was Gen P.X. Kelley not Gen Gray. Gen Kelley's notes and recollections were as critical to staying out of SOCOM in the 80s and the standup of MARSOC decades later as Gen Gray's. Both were intererviewed numerous times by the HQMC team at POE-30 between 2002-2005.
Second, as a "shooter" in a Force Platoon in the late 80's early 90's it is probably appropriate to caveat the mission set specifically discussed in the article as "IN-EXTREMIS hostage rescue." With the "in-extremis" designation came numerous restrictions, unique circumstances, and an extraordinary confluence of world events that would have to exist for a Marine Force (typically MSPF) to be given the green light in lieu of the National Mission Force.
Cheers, Neil
Sir, the SOC designation came back in 2023 with the 26th MEU.
Interesting .. I'll check further tomorrow for some sense of what the designation entails (while certification as such in the past was granted by authorized Marine Corps entities the criteria was agreed to by SOCOM).
Not sure what circumstance would have necessitated resurrecting the term the obvious factor would be the absence of SOF at sea.
Thanks
The Col at the Warfighting Lab is correct that "optimizing the sensor-to-shooter kill chain" is complex but hasn't that been the eternal case? Systems like AFATDS helped us cannon cockers do just that. It seems to me we have the connectivity and automated systems to solve the sensor to shooter dynamic, just not enough shooters to service the targets. I would ask the Col what specific problem do we have in that arena that the Marine Corps needs to solve and which ones do we need to ask other agencies to solve. Not everything is a Marine Corps problem to solve, and we should focus on those, hence my objection to the anti shipping mission.
Only the East Coast MEUs use the SOC certification designation. While noteworthy, it is still not the same qualification standard Neil was describing.
Additionally, MRF-D is not SOC-certified, so I am trying to understand how the author arrived at that conclusion.
I will see if I can find an unclassified description of exactly what MRF-D was certified in, assuming it is not CUI. In the meantime, I will say their demonstrated ability to fight and operate within the Corps’ evolving Force Design concepts is top shelf.
Regardless, BZ to every Marine and Sailor forward deployed with the MRF-D SPMAGTF. Good hunting.
And a sincere thanks to CP for highlighting another example of Force Design at work and operating in the main effort theatre. Rumor is COM INDOPACOM just visited and complimented MRF-D on exactly that.
Thanks for clarifying re SOC designation.
I am speechless. The Corps is spinning out of control and into a delusional twilight zone. This is getting embarrassing. “ Wouldn’t be great if we could….” Perhaps our leaders could design pro football playbooks. You know, the double reverse, lateral, fake fumble, hand off back to the QB and 60 yard pass into the end zone. On defense everyone lays down to confuse them, avoid blocks and then we jump up to make the tackle….
"Throughout the exercise in a variety of simulated scenarios, the team proved their ability to successfully reinforce an embassy, assist the U.S. Department of State in evacuating American citizens from a foreign country in a time of crisis, evacuate casualties, provide immediate and advanced medical care, support aviation nodes, and support expeditionary advanced base operations (EABO)."
Sounds like the certification is a WEU-SOC light with some FD2030 thrown in.
I checked, 10 US Code 8063 USMC COMPOSITION AND FUNCTION…does not mention OTSTSKC anywhere.