The Army has developed world class short, mid, and long range anti-ship missile capabilities without divesting other needed capabilities. By comparison, Marine Corps anti-ship capabilities are inferior and insignificant - - not only to Army capabilities but also to Navy and Air Force capabilities. The Marine Corps needs to "smell the coffee," change course, and restore its offensive capabilities to respond quickly and effectively to global threats across the range of military operations.
“Writing 120 years ago, just after the U.S. Navy burst on the world stage in the Spanish-American War, Alfred Thayer Mahan said one of the most critical numbers naval planners needed to keep in mind was 3,500. The 3,500 nautical miles from Hawaii to Guam became the “standard distance” at the heart of naval planning for the United States”. Mahan’s “yardstick” is that 3500 (nm) measure.
Pre-WW2 War Planner’s took Admiral Mahan’ warning to heart keeping Mahan’s yardstick as a critical planning factor in the Pacific War Planning. When looking at the history of both the war games and planning, you see maps with spider web lines labeled with distances between all Pacific key ports and harbors. Mahan’s concerned was the movement of the Pacific Fleet the 3500 miles between Hawaii to Guam. One of the planner’s concern at the time was the 3500 mile “yardstick” cuts through the Japanese Mandate Territory Islands of the Marshall, Caroline and Marianas.
This article also discusses the US Navy Carrier Aviation’s retreat from distance. ”In 2015, Jerry Hendrix issued an indictment of U.S. force development decisions in relation to carrier aviation entitled “The Retreat from Range,” tracing the rise and fall of range as a critical requirement at key decision points.4 The same bureaucracy that once developed long-range aircraft such as the A-6 and S-3—and the F-14 that combined aircraft range with sensor and weapon range—now has produced a carrier air wing with less reach than its 1960s counterpart.”
This article asks the question “what might be the “critical distance” for 21st-century naval strategy and operational planning? It also goes on to suggest that the new “yardstick” in now 1000 miles.
Now we learn the US Army has developed a Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) basically using existing technology. I should state that the MDTF development was announced at about the same time as the MLR. The MDTF not only has the capability to fire 1000 mile Tomahawks but also the SM-6 (Standard Missile) with a range of 250 miles, The SM-6 can also double as an anti-air missile. Both missiles can be fired from the HEMETT (Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck) mobile launcher.
If the US Army has the MDTF capability for the Combatant Commander, why does he need (or request) the “hide and seek” MLR? Is the reorganization of the Marine Corps worth the effort?
The bad news after fives of FD Happy Talk and divestiture of combined arms assets the Marine Corps has nothing to show for the effort. Now the good news, the Corps has nothing to show for it. Meaning, if the CMC can find some bottled oxygen, take a breath or two and clear his head, and the planning guidence reduced to “we will reequip and improve the Corps so that it regains full MAGTF capability and can better meet its Title X mandates” than we can get on with it.
Otherwise it is status quo and that is not working well at the moment.
The challenge as always is securing the funds needed to equip the Corps with the needed modern armor, wheeled artillery, new bridging, munitions (including new types such as loitering munitions and the right kind of missiles), and whatever advances there are in assault bridging. Types and numbers need to be based on a new operating concept; those developing such a concept would do well to take a very close look at Vision 2035.
Charles, I like your reasoning. After five years of FD happy talk, the Marine Corps has nothing to show for the effort. It will be that much easier to get back on track and once again be the world's premier combined arms naval expeditionary force.
The time is now for HQMC to stop doubling down on the misguided FD concept. After five years or so, there is nothing to show for it other than a weakened Marine Corps. The Littoral Combat Regiments are offensively weak, the Landing Ship Mediums are non-existent, and the missile program is weaker still. The Marine Corps cannot conduct offensive expeditionary missions, due to divestment of combined arms combat capabilities. Stop going down this rabbit hole. The Marine Corps cannot compete with the Army, Navy, and Air Force in the missile arena because this is their domain. In a few years, the Army will have five Multi-Domain Task Forces dedicated to long-range precision strike deployed to various theaters. However, there is one domain in which the other services cannot compete in: that being a combined arms naval expeditionary force. However as an offensive force in a pre-FD organized Marine Corps, the Marine Corps can still contribute to the precision strike mission by deploying HIRAINS (HIMARS raids). Imagine a traditional pre-FD artillery regiment with an added HIMARS battalion. As part of a MAGTF, HIMARS can be deployed by air or by LCAC to launch areas. Such raids would possibly require less personnel than a SIF or the LCR. In this manner, I believe the Marine Corps can still contribute to the deep precision strike without losing its offensive capability as an expeditionary force.
And this is what the Corps comes up with. Making something new that no one else uses.
I always wondered how they would reload this thing, if they were truly trying to keep their electronic signature low.
How many of these are in actual use in these MLR's? How many missiles does the Marine Corps have in stock pile? Why weren't the capabilities demonstrated during the recent sinkex in RIIMPAC?
The Army has developed world class short, mid, and long range anti-ship missile capabilities without divesting other needed capabilities. By comparison, Marine Corps anti-ship capabilities are inferior and insignificant - - not only to Army capabilities but also to Navy and Air Force capabilities. The Marine Corps needs to "smell the coffee," change course, and restore its offensive capabilities to respond quickly and effectively to global threats across the range of military operations.
“Writing 120 years ago, just after the U.S. Navy burst on the world stage in the Spanish-American War, Alfred Thayer Mahan said one of the most critical numbers naval planners needed to keep in mind was 3,500. The 3,500 nautical miles from Hawaii to Guam became the “standard distance” at the heart of naval planning for the United States”. Mahan’s “yardstick” is that 3500 (nm) measure.
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2019/july/go-get-mahans-yardstick
Pre-WW2 War Planner’s took Admiral Mahan’ warning to heart keeping Mahan’s yardstick as a critical planning factor in the Pacific War Planning. When looking at the history of both the war games and planning, you see maps with spider web lines labeled with distances between all Pacific key ports and harbors. Mahan’s concerned was the movement of the Pacific Fleet the 3500 miles between Hawaii to Guam. One of the planner’s concern at the time was the 3500 mile “yardstick” cuts through the Japanese Mandate Territory Islands of the Marshall, Caroline and Marianas.
This article also discusses the US Navy Carrier Aviation’s retreat from distance. ”In 2015, Jerry Hendrix issued an indictment of U.S. force development decisions in relation to carrier aviation entitled “The Retreat from Range,” tracing the rise and fall of range as a critical requirement at key decision points.4 The same bureaucracy that once developed long-range aircraft such as the A-6 and S-3—and the F-14 that combined aircraft range with sensor and weapon range—now has produced a carrier air wing with less reach than its 1960s counterpart.”
This article asks the question “what might be the “critical distance” for 21st-century naval strategy and operational planning? It also goes on to suggest that the new “yardstick” in now 1000 miles.
Now we learn the US Army has developed a Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) basically using existing technology. I should state that the MDTF development was announced at about the same time as the MLR. The MDTF not only has the capability to fire 1000 mile Tomahawks but also the SM-6 (Standard Missile) with a range of 250 miles, The SM-6 can also double as an anti-air missile. Both missiles can be fired from the HEMETT (Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck) mobile launcher.
If the US Army has the MDTF capability for the Combatant Commander, why does he need (or request) the “hide and seek” MLR? Is the reorganization of the Marine Corps worth the effort?
The bad news after fives of FD Happy Talk and divestiture of combined arms assets the Marine Corps has nothing to show for the effort. Now the good news, the Corps has nothing to show for it. Meaning, if the CMC can find some bottled oxygen, take a breath or two and clear his head, and the planning guidence reduced to “we will reequip and improve the Corps so that it regains full MAGTF capability and can better meet its Title X mandates” than we can get on with it.
Otherwise it is status quo and that is not working well at the moment.
The challenge as always is securing the funds needed to equip the Corps with the needed modern armor, wheeled artillery, new bridging, munitions (including new types such as loitering munitions and the right kind of missiles), and whatever advances there are in assault bridging. Types and numbers need to be based on a new operating concept; those developing such a concept would do well to take a very close look at Vision 2035.
Charles, I like your reasoning. After five years of FD happy talk, the Marine Corps has nothing to show for the effort. It will be that much easier to get back on track and once again be the world's premier combined arms naval expeditionary force.
The time is now for HQMC to stop doubling down on the misguided FD concept. After five years or so, there is nothing to show for it other than a weakened Marine Corps. The Littoral Combat Regiments are offensively weak, the Landing Ship Mediums are non-existent, and the missile program is weaker still. The Marine Corps cannot conduct offensive expeditionary missions, due to divestment of combined arms combat capabilities. Stop going down this rabbit hole. The Marine Corps cannot compete with the Army, Navy, and Air Force in the missile arena because this is their domain. In a few years, the Army will have five Multi-Domain Task Forces dedicated to long-range precision strike deployed to various theaters. However, there is one domain in which the other services cannot compete in: that being a combined arms naval expeditionary force. However as an offensive force in a pre-FD organized Marine Corps, the Marine Corps can still contribute to the precision strike mission by deploying HIRAINS (HIMARS raids). Imagine a traditional pre-FD artillery regiment with an added HIMARS battalion. As part of a MAGTF, HIMARS can be deployed by air or by LCAC to launch areas. Such raids would possibly require less personnel than a SIF or the LCR. In this manner, I believe the Marine Corps can still contribute to the deep precision strike without losing its offensive capability as an expeditionary force.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ch2Rqte6XOs
I remember seeing the video (above link) several years ago. I am sure it has gone beyond simulation now.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EJYqGAQ-kX8
And this is what the Corps comes up with. Making something new that no one else uses.
I always wondered how they would reload this thing, if they were truly trying to keep their electronic signature low.
How many of these are in actual use in these MLR's? How many missiles does the Marine Corps have in stock pile? Why weren't the capabilities demonstrated during the recent sinkex in RIIMPAC?