Compass Points - Only Drones?
Drones are just one tool.
Compass Points - Only Drones?
Drones are just one tool.
June 5, 2026
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Members of the House Armed Services Committee expressed a concern that the US Navy needs to spend less time and money on new battleships, and more time and money on new drones.
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House Democrats expressed frustration with the U.S. military for seeking funding for a $17 billion battleship instead of investing more in cheaper autonomous weapons systems as warfare continues to change rapidly.
During a House Armed Services Committee markup of the fiscal 2027 National Defense Authorization Act, lawmakers said that investing in Trump-class battleships would mean ignoring lessons learned from past Navy mistakes in which the service invested billions of dollars in ill-conceived procurement programs.
Instead, lawmakers wanted the military to invest in the future, incorporating lessons about the importance of uncrewed systems that other conflicts, such as the war in Ukraine, have laid bare.
“This is the most expensive sitting duck in world history,” said Rep. Seth Moulton, D-Mass. “This battleship is a boondoggle.”
Moulton referenced an op-ed by retired Navy Adm. James Stavridis in which he argued battleships are entirely obsolete in the face of hypersonic missiles, drone swarms and a litany of modern weapons systems.
-- Navy Times
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Many doubts have been raised about the new Trump Class battleships. A primary ship construction issue is that the Navy has only 18 dry docks and only one dry dock currently is big enough to handle the largest US aircraft carriers, dry dock 8 at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard. Although the Navy is planning to build a new carrier sized dry dock on the West coast, for now the construction of a new carrier and the construction of a new battleship would each require years of time in dry dock 8.
As large as battleships are, however, small aerial drones may grow into an even larger issue. It would be wonderful if small, inexpensive drones could solve all warfighting problems, but they cannot. If members of Congress believe that drones are the solution to all warfighting problems, they have been mislead. Drones are a useful tool. Aerial drones will likely grow more useful, but drones will never make obsolete all the tools, weapons, and platforms of war. Both now and into the future, there is more to war and warfighting than drones.
An article in International Security explains that as powerful as drones are, drones are not truly revolutionary; they are merely another evolutionary step.
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Rather than representing a rupture with the past, our framework suggests that drones are part of the evolution of air warfare, whose fundamental principle remains to avoid exposure to enemy fire. We maintain that drones do not by themselves produce the revolutionary effects that many have attributed to them. Specifically, drones are unlikely to shift the offense-defense balance toward the offense because they are vulnerable to electronic warfare and air defense systems. Drones are also unlikely to cancel existing military asymmetries because they require support from expensive and complex military assets as well as highly trained personnel. Finally, drones are unlikely to eliminate close combat and erase the importance of skills and proficiency in modern warfare because of opportunities to conceal ground capabilities.
-- International Security - “Why Drones Have Not Revolutionized War”
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Do the US military services need more drones? Absolutely. Can drones solve all military challenges? Absolutely not.
As the world’s greatest military power, the US needs a broad and deep range of combat capabilities.
One of the tools the US needs to maintain around the globe, now and into the future, are upgraded and enhanced Marine Corps combined arms, crisis response MAGTFs. More Marines, forward deployed on more ships, on more oceans, make the US stronger and the world safer.
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International Security - Vol 46 Issue 4
Why Drones Have Not Revolutionized War: The Enduring Hider-Finder Competition in Air Warfare
By Antonio Calcara, Andrea Gilli, Mauro Gilli, Raffaele Marchetti, Ivan Zaccagnini
https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/46/4/130/111172/Why-Drones-Have-Not-Revolutionized-War-The
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Navy Times - 06/04/2026
The US needs drones, not Trump-class battleships, Democrats argue
By Riley Ceder
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Late entry for CP – Artillery Alive.
The question that nagged me about the Artillery topic is: Should a US Marine discussion about artillery also include Naval Gun Fire support? Very early in my Marine career, the Marine leadership would frequently lament the loss of Naval Gunfire capabilities. I have not heard that lament in a long time.
During WW2 and Korea, Naval Gunfire proved to be essential for not only amphibious operations but also ground support. Naval Gunfire also contributed to Viet Nam ground operations. In Desert Storm the Naval Gunfire plan for the Marine Corps amphibious “faint” included the USS New Jersey. The USS New Jersey conducted fire missions in support of the Saudi Forces (with attached Naval Gunfire Liaison Teams) attacking up the Kuwait east coast.
The Mark 45 - 5 inch/54 caliber gun (and latest MOD 62 caliber) is the standard for the US Navy Arleigh Burke Destroyer. In fully automatic mode, the MOD IV can fire 20 rounds without any personnel inside the mount. In 2024–2025, U.S. Navy destroyers in the Red Sea increasingly employed the Mk 45 gun to defend themselves and merchants against one-way attack drones, launched by the Houthi rebels from Yemen during the Red Sea crisis.
Amphibious Doctrine use to call for a destroyer in direct support for each Colored/Numbered Beach (ie, Red 1 and Red 2) with a cruiser in general support of the Color Beach.
The Naval Gun Fire support missions include pre-landing bombardment, covering landing assault craft (with suppression and direct fire), and supporting ground advances.
Marines are familiar with the massive pre-landing bombardments in the WW2 Pacific Theater. In the European Theater, when the landing on Omaha Beach was in question, the British Admiral ordered destroyers to close on the beach in order to provide direct fire to help the assault troops get off the fortified beach. In both the Italian Sicily and Salerno invasions, the near successful German counter attacks on the landing beaches were stopped with the light cruisers 6 inch (152mm) guns.
Let’s not forget this quote from a German Officer captured during the Sicily counterattack on the USA 1st and 48th Infantry Divisions landing beaches.
“Dazed survivors, from the famed Herman Goering Division, taken prisoner, wondered what terrible new anti-tank weapon the Americans had. They had never experienced anything like the rapid fire of a 15-gun battery 6" cruiser, and they had no idea that what had hit them came from the sea. Naval support fire was most effectively controlled by cruiser observation planes and by shore fire control parties, landed with the troops, which had been previously trained for this role in the Amphibious Force schools.”
The accuracy of Naval Gun Fire also impressed the US Army at Normandy, especially when the Heavy Cruiser, USS Quincy (9 x 8 inch guns 203mm), fired 19 counter battery missions during the Cotentin Peninsula operations to capture the Port of Cherbourg.. General “Lighting Joe Collins” VII Corps artillery observers were greatly impressed with the accuracy and ”lethality” of the 8 inch Naval Gun and appreciated the help.
As Marines, we also need to remember Admiral Richard “Close In” Conolly, who fundamentally changed Naval Gun Support Doctrine after the WW2 Tarawa Amphibious Assault. He rewrote the U.S. Navy playbook that supported Marines and Soldiers going ashore.
Admiral Conolly changed doctrine by embedding naval gunfire liaison teams with Marines; creating real time communication loops between ships and shore; and timing fire missions to match infantry movement minute by minute. Making Naval gunfire a living part of the battle and not a pre landing ritual.
Before Admiral Conolly, Naval Gunfire ships fired (bombarded) from 10,000–12,000 yards offshore. Creating poor accuracy due to dispersion and flat trajectories with frequent over-shots and under-shots. Ship Captains were a;so fearful of accepting risk from reefs, mines, and costal guns.
After Admiral Conolly’s changes, destroyer and cruiser Captains were ordered to close to 3,000–4,000 yards and sometimes even less. This reduced shell dispersion dramatically increased accuracy. His philosophy: “You can’t hit anything if you can’t see it.” Naval gunfire became surgical instead of symbolic. The clincher for me was his quoted belief: “Better to risk a ship than a Marine.”
Amphibious Naval Fire Support Doctrine, weapons and coordinated fire support doctrine have come a long way since WW2. Today’s complexity of supporting arms not only requires complex training and planning but also PRACTICING. Consequently, can the Arleigh-Burke Destroyer, and/or Close Air Support, and/or Drones match the coordination and “lethality” of Admiral “Close-in” Conolly’s Naval Gun Fire Support Doctrine? S/F
I was privileged to have a 5 inch Destroyer and an 8 inch cruiser for an op in? RVN. THAT firepower was amazing. 5X54 is a hose of fire! Unfortunately the proximity to the beach is a vulnerability as even in a moonless night—-flash is easily seen